講義日程 |
序論 - 理論的分析の要件と国際政治経済の射程
１．KennethWaltz, Theory of International Politics
(McGrew Hill, 1979), Chap
I.理論的前提：システムレベル分析の射程と限界
第1週 国際対立の理論 - 構造的現実主義（structural realism）と覇権安定論
２．StephenD.Kranser, “State Power and the Structure of International
Trade,” World Politics, 28-3 (1976), 317-347.
３．JoanneGowa, “Bipolarity, Mutipolarity, and Free Trade,” American
Political Science Review, 83-4 (1989), 135-146.
第2週 国際協調の理論 - 相互依存論・自由主義制度論（liberal institutionalism）と利得論争
４．RobertO.Keohane & JosephS.Nye, Power and Interdependence,
3rd. Edition(London: Longman, 2000), Part 1.
５．StephenD.Krasner, Global Communications and National Power,”World
Politics, 43-3 (1991), 336-366.
第3週 国際・国内政治経済の連携 - 戦後政治経済と民主協力論
６．JohnRuggie, “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization,
31-4 (1982), 379-415.
７．RobertPutnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” International
Organization, 42-3 (1988), 427-460.
８．BrettAshleyLeeds, “Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments,
and International Cooperation,” American Journal of Political
Science, Vol.43, No.4 (Oct., 1999), 979-1002.
II. 国際貿易・投資の政治経済
第4週 貿易・投資政策の国内的要因（1） 市場適応
９．James E. Alt, Jeffry Frieden, Michael Gilligan, Dani Rodrik
& Ronald Rogowski,“The Political Economy of International Trade,”
Comparative Political Studies, 29-6 (1996), 689-717.
１０．Vinod K. Aggarwal, Robert O. Keohane & David B. Yoffie, The
Dynamics of NegotiatedProtectionism,”American Political Science
Review, Vol. 81-2 (1987), 252-273.
１１．OonaA.Hathaway, “Positive Feedback: The Impact of Trade Liberalization
on Industry Demands for Protection,” International Organization,
52-3 (1998), 575-612.
第5週 貿易・投資の国内的要因（2） 政治過程
１２．JudithGoldstein, “The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions
of Protection,” American Political Science Review 80 (1986),
161-184.
１３．WendyL.Hansen, “The International Trade Commission and the Politics
of Protectionism,” America Political Science Review, 84-1
(1990), 21-46.
１４．HelenV.Milner&BenjaminJudkins,“Partisanship,TradePolicy,and
Globalization: Is There a Left-Right Divide on Trade Policy,” International
Studies Quarterly 48-1 (2004), 95-119.
第6週 貿易・投資の国内的要因（3） 政治制度
１５．QuanLi & Adam Resnick, “Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic
Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries,”
International Organization, 57-1 (2003), 175-211.
１６．NathanM.Jensen, “Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations:
Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment,” International
Organization, 57-3 (2003), 587-616.
１７．RobertoRigohorn and DaniRodrik, “Rule of Law, Democracy, Openness,
and Income: Estimating the International Relationship,” NBER Working
Paper no. 10750, (2004).
III. 国際金融・通貨の政治経済
第7週 資本規制・自由化の政治経済
１８．JeffryA.Frieden, “Invested Interests: The Politics of
National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance,” International
Organization, 45-4 (1991), 425-454.
１９．Alberto Alesina, Vittorio Grilli & Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti,
“The Political Economy of Capital Controls,” in Leonardo Leideran
& Assaf Razin eds., Capital Mobility: The Impact on Consumption,
Investment and Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994), 289-328.
２０．DennisP.Quinn & CarlaInclan, “The Origins of Financial Openness:
A Study of Current and Capital Account Liberalization,” American
Journal of Political Science, 41-3 (1997), 771-813.
２１．DennisQuinn, “The Correlates of Change in International Financial
Regulation,” American Political Science Review, 91-3 (1997),
531-551.
第８週 通貨制度選択の政治経済
２２．WilliamBernhard & DavidLeblang, “Democratic Institutions and
Exchange-rate Commitments,” International Organization, 53-1
(1999), 71-97.
２３．J.LawrenceBroz, “Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment
Regimes,” International Organization, 56-4 (2002), 169-195.
２４．MichaelW.Klein & JayC.Shambaugh, “Fixed Exchange Rates and
Trade,” NBER Working Paper no. 10690 (2004).
第９週 通貨・金融危機の政治経済
２５．GracielaL.Kaminski & CarmenM.Reinhart, “The Twin Crises:
The Causing of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems,” American
Economic Review, 89-3 (1999), 473-500.
２６．DavidLeblang & WilliamBernhard, “The Politics of Speculative
Attacks in Industrialized Democracies,” International Organization,
54-2 (2000), 291-324.
２７．Ilker Domac & MariaSoledadMartinez Peria, “Banking Crises and
Exchange Rate Regimes: Is There a Link?” Working Paper No. 2489 (The
World Bank, 2000).
２８．AaronTornell, FrankWestermann & Lorenza Martinez, “The Positive
Link Between Financial Liberalization, Growth and Crises,” Working
Paper 10293 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004).
第10週 国際資本移動とマクロ経済政策
２９．MichaelC.Webb, “International Economic Structures, Government
Interests, and International Coordination of Macroeconomic Adjustment
Policies,” International Organization, 45-3 (1991), 309-342.
３０．DavidM.Andrews, “Capital Mobility and State Autonomy,” International
Studies Quarterly, 38-2 (1994), 193-218.
３１．CarlesBoix, “Partisan Governments, the International Economy, and
Macroeconomic Polices in Advanced Nations, 1960-93,” World Politics,
53-1 (2000), 38-73.
IV. 国際経済関係と国際制度
第11週 二国・地域貿易協定
J３２．udithGoldstein, “International Law and Domestic Institutions:
Reconciling North American ‘Unfair’ Trade Laws,” International
Organization, 50-4 (1996), 541-564.
３３．EdwardD.Mansfield & HelenV.Milner, “The New Wave of Regionalism,”
International Organization, 53-3 (1999), 589-627.
３４．JamesMcCallSmith, “The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining
Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts,” International Organization,
54-1 (2000), 137-180.
３５．KerryA.Chase, “Economic Interests and Regional Trading Arrangements:
The Case of NAFTA,” International Organization, 57 (2003),
137-174.
３６．TimButhe & HelenMilner, “The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment
into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through Policy Commitment
via Trade Agreements and Investment Treaties,” Paper delivered to
the American Political Science Association Meeting (2004).
第12週 地域通貨協力
３７．C. RandallHenning, “Systemic Conflict and Regional Monetary
Integration: The Case of Europe,” International Organization,
52-3 (1998), 537-573.
３８．RicardoHausmann, UgoPanizza, ErnestoStein, “Why Do Countries Float
the Way they Float?” Working Paper #481 (Inter-American Development
Bank, 2000).
３．BerhnardFritz-Krockow & EmiliaMagdalena Jurzyk, “Will You Buy
My Peg?: The Credibility of a Fixed Rate Regime as a Determinant of
Bilateral Trade,” IMF Working Paper no. 04-065 (2004).
第13週 国際通貨・貿易体制
４０．JudithGoldstein, “International Institutions and Domestic
Politics: GATT, WTO, and the Liberalization of International Trade,”
in AnneO.Krueger, The WTO as an International Organization
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998), 133-152.
４１．EdwardD.Mansfield, HelenV.Milner & B.PeterRosendorff, “Why
Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade
Agreements,” International Organization, 56-3 (2002), 411-513.
４２．EthanB.Kapstein, “Resolving the Regulator’s Dilemma: International
Coordination of Banking Regulations,” International Organization,
43-2 (1989), 454-478.
４３．ThomasOatley & RobertNabors, “Redistributive Cooperation: Market
Failure, Welfare Transfers, and the Basle Accord,” International Organization,
52-1 (1998), 55-86.
４４．BethA.Simmons, “International Law and State Behavior: Commitment
and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs,” American Political
Science Review, 94-4 (2000), 819-835.
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