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1 *Historical Parameters of Japanese Foreign Policy*

The basic objective of the foreign policy of Japan, like that of any other country, is to ensure the nation's security and prosperity. It can be concluded that Japan has succeeded in the pursuit of that objective for more than half a century. Since the end of World War II, Japan somehow has managed to ensure that the wars, revolutions, and other crises witnessed in East Asia throughout the period have not fatally damaged its own security. And Japan has benefited immensely from the international economic order imposed by the Bretton Woods system, without which its economic recovery and ensuing economic success would not have been possible.

Today, however, a sense of drift or uncertainty about the future course of foreign policy seems to prevail in Japan. In part, it reflects uncertainty about the international situation. More than a decade has passed since the end of the cold war, during which international affairs were much more predictable. And yet a clear-cut concept for a new international order in the twenty-first century has yet to emerge. Many Japanese, although they may fully support the U.S. antiterrorism campaign, have begun to wonder

how President George W. Bush's preemptive strike doctrine will affect the U.S.-Japanese alliance in the future. The stunning admission by North Korea of its abduction of numbers of innocent Japanese in the 1970s and 1980s and the announcement of its decision to restart its nuclear facilities have reminded the Japanese people of the urgent need to rethink how best to deal with the dangerous quagmire in the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, as the Japanese watch the dynamic economic growth of China—in such contrast to the economic stagnation in Japan—many naturally wonder what East Asia will look like, say, twenty years from now.

Since today change is occurring everywhere at a truly exponential rate, some sense of uncertainty may be inevitable. Still, the main reasons for the sense of uncertainty evident in Japan today are indigenous. First, there is generational turnover. All the decisions that have defined the course of Japan's foreign policy were made long ago. With the passing of time, the heated debates and agonized decisionmaking of former political leaders are forgotten. Although today's younger generation is aware in an abstract sense of the importance of U.S.-Japanese relations, it seems to have difficulty grasping in any real sense the enormous stakes that Japan has in managing those relations. The domestic political tension that the leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had to deal with in opting to maintain security ties with the United States has become a dim memory of a bygone era. Today, the argument that the relationship between Japan and the United States is the cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy may sound like nothing but a cliché to many people. For that matter, in the 1970s and 1980s maintaining a friendly relationship with China was recognized as extremely important, and it evoked a certain sense of achievement among many Japanese who remembered the historical context and the difficulties that the two countries had to overcome to develop that relationship. But today, to a younger generation that does not share the memory, arguments of the importance of the friendship between Japan and China are hardly convincing. Moreover, today important policy statements, domestic and foreign, tend to be presented as "sound bites," and the complexity of the issues involved can easily be overlooked.

Second, in spite of the new culture of transparency and accountability in politics, the public seldom has access to the candid, in-depth analysis conducted by national decisionmakers of other countries' intentions, motives, and domestic power structure. Although such analysis is a prerequisite for successful decisionmaking, if countries began to disclose their assessments of each other publicly, the resolution of issues and

problems would become much more complicated, and mutually embarrassing outcomes inevitable. Candid and even unkind assessments of adversaries may be made public if officials do not care about further negative impact on relations that already are in bad shape. However, with the end of the cold war, such cases of openly adversarial relations between countries have become rare.

Much of the art of diplomacy lies in nations' ability to assess and analyze one another continually and accurately. If the analysis or assessment shatters the conventional wisdom, it may be welcome. The process, however, cannot be made transparent. That constraint may be very frustrating for the general public. In the course of discussions among members of the so-called Committee to Change the Foreign Ministry, it was argued that the ministry should make public all analyses and conclusions regarding policy alternatives before making any foreign policy decisions. The growing demand for such transparency is bound to make it an increasingly daunting task for the government to obtain better understanding and broader support among the population for its foreign policy.

Finally, we are witnessing a crisis of legitimacy. The prolonged economic difficulties in Japan have gradually taken a toll on Japan's national psyche. The domestic mood has become more resentful. The public harbors animosity toward various things—the bureaucracy, the banking sector, the traditional political process, foreign countries. In the face of protracted difficulty, people tend to react in one of two ways: one is to reflect on what they themselves did wrong; the other is to find someone or something else to blame. The latter reaction may be seen in the actions of Islamic fundamentalist-terrorists, but it is common throughout the world. Another example is the anti-immigration fervor in various European countries, where some nationals blame foreign workers for all sorts of problems. In Japan, one gets the impression that the public has become much more supportive of a tough, hawkish, assertive, and occasionally confrontational posture in the conduct of foreign policy. Since the mid-1990s, domestic criticism of the Foreign Ministry for being subservient to the United States, subservient to China, and soft on South Korea, North Korea, and many other countries has tended to be far more frequent.

Furthermore, a series of scandals involving fraud that have erupted in the Foreign Ministry since 2001 have badly damaged its credibility and legitimacy—so much so that there is a genuine risk that much of Japan's basic foreign policy may also lose its credibility and come to be viewed with skepticism or disdain.

Japanese Foreign Policy since World War II

This chapter revisits past decisions that have constituted the basis of Japanese foreign policy since the end of World War II. Some key decisionmaking processes of the postwar era are reviewed first, and then some reflections about future options on key issues are presented. However, before embarking on a review, it is important to have a clearer idea about the key domestic parameters—constraints, identity issues, obsessions, and other factors—related to foreign policy decisionmaking. For easier understanding, these parameters are discussed to the extent possible in a dialectical manner.

Catching Up with the West versus Maintaining an Asian Identity

Ever since Japan embarked upon modernization, many Japanese leaders have been acutely aware of a dichotomy in the national identity. A famous essay by Chomin Nakae vividly describes a hypothetical discussion between two characters in which one fervently argues that Japan should “get out of Asia” and join the club of Western powers while the other insists that Japan should remain an Asian nation. After all, the modernization effort since the Meiji Restoration can be simply defined as a nationwide attempt to catch up with the West. There were two phases of this catch-up process. The first was from the Meiji Restoration in 1868 to World War II, in which the fruit of the first phase was utterly destroyed. The second phase was from 1945 to sometime in the 1970s, when Japan became a major industrial power. When Japan was invited to the first summit of major industrial democracies (the gathering of the “G-6,” as Canada was not invited to the first meeting), there was a genuine sense of achievement in Japan, where many naturally thought that membership in that kind of forum signified the successful conclusion of the catch-up process. Since then, Japan’s identity as a responsible member of the major industrial democracies has become highly important, and it should be borne in mind in grappling with various foreign policy issues.

During the period from 1868 to 1945, there was not much conflict between the two approaches in terms of policy implications. To catch up with the West and perhaps to preempt any risk of colonization by Western powers, Japan vigorously participated in the game of imperialism in Asia. To “get out of Asia” was never an actual course of action. Instead, Japan’s Asian identity was stressed in terms of resentment toward the hegemony of the Western powers, notably the United Kingdom until

the early 1930s and the United States afterward. Fumimaro Konoe, who became prime minister in the late 1930s, published an essay in 1918 decrying the supremacy of the United Kingdom and the United States in international politics that had considerable resonance at the time among the elite class in Japan.

“Japan’s Asian identity” is almost a tautology. However, since World War II various arguments in favor of specific courses of action have been advanced on the basis of that identity. And often those arguments have tended to reflect Japanese psychological reservations about—or in some cases even revulsion toward—what the West embodies. A typical case in point is the issue of values, notably human rights.

The Japanese people today are thoroughly committed to universal values such as freedom and democracy. However, whenever it appears that Westerners are eager to press their human rights agenda on Asian countries, the Japanese often claim that Asian values are different. Japan, as an Asian country, should point out those differences, the argument goes—for example, by refusing to join Western efforts to impose sanctions on certain Asian countries because of human rights violations. Moreover, the theory used to be expounded that enlightened dictatorial regimes in various East Asian countries were the key to their successful economic development. And it has been frequently argued throughout East Asia that Asians attach more importance to and emphasis on group-oriented values, such as the importance of the family, and that those values have been the key to social cohesion and success in nation building. For example, in the early 1990s Singapore’s leaders often expressed the view that there was little doubt that a society with communitarian values, where the interest of society takes precedence over that of the individual, suits them better than the individualism of America. The very success of some East Asian countries in achieving dynamic economic development gave a certain degree of legitimacy to these arguments in defense of Asian values. However, treating what can be argued to be a universal value as a parochial value of the West to be contrasted with Asian values is of debatable validity. Nevertheless, when issues are discussed in the context of the differences between Western culture, values, or standards and those of Asia, the argument that, because of its Asian identity, Japan should act differently from the West can have considerable impact on popular opinion.

Another interesting case in point was the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) issue in the early 1990s. Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad

of Malaysia proposed forming the EAEC, whose membership was supposed to include all members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan, China, and the Republic of Korea (ROK). If this group had been a formal economic entity, something like a trade bloc, perhaps arguments about its pros and cons would have been clearer, because its economic advantages and disadvantages would have been easily identifiable. However, since Mahathir's proposal was to establish an informal forum with a very loosely defined agenda, the debate inside Japan centered solely on the identity question. The Asian identity school held that there was nothing wrong with the idea of East Asians getting together to talk about economic problems pertaining to East Asia and that Japan, as an Asian nation, should wholeheartedly support the scheme. The industrial democracy identity school held that the notion of excluding countries like the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand could be counterproductive at a time when APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum) was starting to do well; besides, the United States was adamantly opposed to such a group, claiming that it would undermine APEC. In any event, the EAEC became a nonissue in the late 1990s, when a new forum for dialogue between Asia and Europe was created at the joint initiative of Singapore and France. The participants from Asia were limited to ASEAN members, Japan, China, and the ROK, and European participants were limited to European Union (EU) members. Thus a precedent was established for forming a group, the membership of which was de facto EAEC, without much agonizing about the possible impact on Pacific unity.

Pacifists versus Realists on the Security Issue

The clash between pacifists and realists regarding the peace and security of Japan has persisted since the end of World War II. In view of the catastrophic casualties that Japan had suffered during the war, it is natural that the Japanese people came to have an extremely strong aversion to war and anything related to the military. And in the immediate aftermath of the war, the foremost concern of the United States was to eliminate any possibility of the reemergence of the military in Japan. Therefore, at the initiative of the United States, a new constitution was promulgated that included a provision, Article 9, that if read literally seemed to preclude any possibility of Japan's regaining its defense capability. As described in chapter 2 of this volume, many Japanese government officials in those days assumed that in the event of an attack on Japan, the United Nations

would take care of Japan's defense with its own forces, as envisioned in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. However, the advent of the cold war at the end of the 1940s totally altered Japan's circumstances. Instead of ensuring the security of the United States against Japan, ensuring the security of Japan against the newly emerging threat from the communist bloc became the more urgent priority for the United States. In response to U.S. pressure to proceed with the rearmament of Japan, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida eventually opted for forming what was described as a "lightly armed mercantile state." The gist of Japan's defense policy was the establishment of security ties with the United States and the eventual creation of the relatively small Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF).

In the past, the domestic debate between pacifists and realists over the peace and security of Japan quite often led to fierce political turmoil. Three notable features of the debate should be pointed out. First, it often takes the form not so much of a policy argument as of legalistic scrutiny focusing primarily on the constitutional constraint on military action. Second, the crux of the debate is whether the notion of deterrence is accepted or not. Third, at issue is whether and to what extent even the democratically elected government can be trusted never to return to the path toward militarism, which had led Japan into war, with tragic consequences.

LEGALISM. In the course of parliamentary debate, the opposition parties try to attack the government by taking up the legalistic aspects of the defense issue. From the pacifist viewpoint, "rearming" Japan by creating the JSDF—as well as maintaining security ties with the United States—is an unforgivable breach of the constitution. Also, the opposition has always been a minority in the Diet, so if the debate is about the policy options related to security, the opposition is bound to be numerically overwhelmed. However, as long as the debate is about the legality of the government's action, the opposition can proclaim what the government is doing to be unconstitutional and illegal.

Moreover, the assumption is that government agencies carry out their functions exactly as they are stipulated in the authorizing laws and regulations. Therefore, for example, the law related to the role and functions of the JSDF had to be amended so that JSDF aircraft could be used to evacuate Japanese nationals in foreign countries. In any other country, it would be inconceivable that aircraft of the national defense force could not be used for such purpose unless a specific clause was included in the law.

As to the constitutional constraint on military action, the debate often is related to the definition of "use of force." The constitution permits the use of force—that is, military action by the JSDF—only for individual self-defense (to fight foreign forces that are engaged in armed attack on Japan) and not for collective self-defense (defense of allies, for example). However, things are not that simple. The legal question is always raised of whether the apparently noncombat logistical support activities of the JSDF, such as supplying materiel to U.S. forces (USF), facilitating refueling of U.S. combat aircraft and ships, and providing medical support to the USF can be considered to constitute the use of force. The government's interpretation of the constitution is that they can, as long as they are part of combat operations. An often-quoted example is that to engage the JSDF in transporting materiel to the front line, where actual combat is going on, constitutes an integral part of the use of force and therefore is unconstitutional.

This is a serious question that requires a clear-cut response. Following the enactment in 1999 of a law paving the way for logistical support activities by the JSDF for the USF in the vicinity of Japan—and in 2001 of a law defining measures to deal with terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11—the government was authorized to engage the JSDF in various non-combat support activities for the USF. However, as Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi suggested, the opposition's legal arguments against those laws sometimes were as relevant as medieval theological debates. Thus far the issue has not been clearly sorted out. It has often been pointed out that if the standing interpretation of the constitution were revised to accept the constitutionality of the exercise of collective self-defense, then the need for elaborating on the definition of "use of force" in the context of logistical support by the JSDF for the USF would practically disappear.

Another unique aspect of the legal battle is that the government is expected to maintain the legal consistency of all the answers it has given in past parliamentary debates. If there are frequent changes of the governing parties, the new governing party can claim that it is not bound by the legal positions of the previous government. However, in Japan, because the LDP has stayed in power continuously for decades, the LDP government is required to maintain the continuity of its legal arguments. For example, in parliamentary debate about the interpretation of the security treaty between Japan and the United States, responses of government officials some forty years ago have to be quoted and adhered to.

THE NOTION OF DETERRENCE. In essence, the pacifist view is characterized by the rejection of the notion of deterrence. Maintaining deterrence by establishing security ties with the United States and forming the JSDF is viewed as a dangerous ploy that can entangle Japan in another war. This fear of entanglement had considerable resonance among the Japanese people throughout the postwar era. During the cold war era in particular, the Japanese had a strong psychological impulse to distance themselves from the prospect of the horrific devastation that could ensue if the hostility between the two sides erupted in a nuclear exchange.

It also should be noted that the implicit assumption was that as long as Japan refrained from engaging in military provocation, the risk of entanglement in warfare would be minimized, because the invasion of a harmless Japan by foreign powers was deemed unlikely. Many Japanese share the belief that the Mongolians' attempt to invade Japan in the twelfth century was the only instance of invasion by foreigners and that, with the exception of World War I, all the wars that Japan fought in the modern era were initiated by Japan. Of course, one may be tempted to call this view typical of an insular mentality. Still, the perception that unless Japan starts war, the country can avoid war and enjoy perpetual peace constitutes the basis of Japanese pacifism, inasmuch as it logically rejects the notion of deterrence. This perception is in marked contrast to the lessons of history learned by the Europeans, who harbor vivid memories of centuries of mutual invasion.

Ever since Prime Minister Yoshida opted to create a lightly armed mercantile state—a decision eventually designated the Yoshida Doctrine—the conservative Japanese polity, which can be described as "realist," has adhered to the maintenance of effective deterrence for the security of Japan in spite of persistent opposition by pacifists. Whenever it has been necessary to take legislative action related to the maintenance of effective deterrence or to the role of the JSDF—such as the revision of the security treaty between Japan and the United States, the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control, or more recently, peacekeeping operations (PKO) and measures related to the fight against terrorism—highly emotionally charged debate often has erupted between the LDP government and the opposition parties and some newspapers that are staunchly committed to the pacifist philosophy. However, over time public understanding and support of deterrence has become stronger. There has been a marked shift in the opinion polls in the degree of acceptance of the JSDF and the security ties between Japan and the United States. For example, according to

polls conducted since the end of the 1960s, the percentage of those who favored maintenance of security ties and the JSDF was 40.9 percent in 1969, 64.6 percent in 1981, and 71.2 percent in 2000. Meanwhile the percentage of those favoring the abrogation of the security ties and the abolition of the JSDF was 9.6 percent in 1969, 7.6 percent in 1981, and 5.8 percent in 2000.

Especially since the end of the cold war, a series of new legislative actions have been taken authorizing the government to engage the JSDF in various noncombat missions abroad, such as peacekeeping missions and logistical support activities for U.S. forces. Sending the JSDF abroad was a hardcore taboo during the cold war era, and the pacifists did their utmost to block proposed legislation to expand the JSDF's role. The very fact that the government could overcome the opposition and manage to enact the laws signifies that perhaps Japan is entering a new phase in terms of the age-old clash between pacifists and realists. The changes that have affected the role and mission of the JSDF are discussed in chapter 2. Meanwhile, it seems safe to assume that a majority of the Japanese people have come to understand that—within the basic constraint that the use of force is prohibited except for individual self-defense—the role and mission of the JSDF should be redefined in order to address newly emerging security challenges in the aftermath of the cold war.

Finally, one unique feature of the pacifist-realist clash should be pointed out. In the realm of international politics, the concepts of peace and security often are used in tandem and treated as virtually synonymous. However, in the clash between pacifist and realist in Japan, that is not quite the case. The notion of peace has become the exclusive property of the pacifists. The pacifists tend to view “security” as the opposite of “peace” and therefore pejorative, in that the notion of security is likely to be used as justification for the policy of deterrence, which the pacifists detest. In essence, the “peace-loving” opposition fiercely attacks the realists, who preach the importance of the “security” of Japan.

CONFIDENCE IN JAPAN'S DEMOCRACY. After World War II, the Japanese people felt strongly that they had been badly betrayed by the imperial government, which had led Japan into war and inflicted so much damage and suffering on ordinary citizens. They became very distrustful of the government's role in anything related to peace and security, and that distrust helped the pacifists greatly in their efforts to oppose the government's security policies. For the generation whose memory of the

prewar era was still fresh, claims that Japan was back on the slippery slope to war or that once again citizens would be haunted by the intrusions of the military police were entirely credible, and cries such as “We will never again allow our sons to be slaughtered in war” had considerable resonance. Because they had suffered so much as a consequence of the militarism of the prewar era, many of them tended to assume that there was an inverse relation between the strength of the military and the degree of democracy—the stronger the military, the weaker the nation's democratic values. That attitude is in marked contrast with that in many other democratic countries, such as the United States, where the country's military generally is perceived to be the guarantor of the democratic values that its citizens cherish. The clash between pacifist and realist could be boiled down to one question: If a democratically elected government is responsible for all decisions pertaining to national security, is the democracy so fragile that it will be jeopardized if the nation is able to defend itself? That is precisely the question that *Yomiuri*, the newspaper with the largest circulation in Japan, raised in the mid-1980s in support of the assertive posture that Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone had taken on various defense issues. *Yomiuri* argued that almost four decades after the end of World War II, democracy in Japan was strong enough to dispel any possibility of the resurgence of militarism.

Clearly the clash between pacifists and realists and the difference in their perceptions regarding the relationship between defense and democracy is the product of their different historical memories. Things therefore cannot be settled simply by logical argument. Again, over time the significance that new generations attach to these issues will gradually change; still, these themes are bound to recur whenever Japan faces a new security agenda.

Realpolitik versus the Idealistic Approach

The classic conflict between fundamental human values and the national interest—or idealism and realism—in the conduct of diplomacy has been amply discussed in many books on foreign policy. It certainly has affected Japan's foreign policy as well. One often wonders whether the argument that a policy serves Japan's national interest or the argument that it is Japan's moral obligation has more appeal and therefore a better chance of gaining the support of the general public. In many cases, the principle of respecting human values and the principle of serving the national interest

are not starkly different in their application. In late 1980s, the Japanese government presented the concept of contributing to the maintenance of international order as the cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy. The idea was that in this way Japan would help to ensure the peace and prosperity of all mankind. Obviously such a policy orientation can be justified by either argument.

Still, there have been many instances in which Japan has had to agonize over the issue. But before proceeding to the discussion of those cases, some clarification is needed of the concepts of "national interest" and "human values" in Japan's foreign policy. When people talk about the pursuit of the national interest in the context of *realpolitik*, they commonly think of the maneuvers to maintain the balance of power in nineteenth-century Europe. Various arguments have been presented for applying the European model to Asia, bringing about an Asian balance of power by weaving a network of alliances, ententes, or so-called strategic relationships among major players, including the United States. Particularly notable is the emergence of a new school of thought in Japan that stresses the importance to Japan of having better relations with India or Russia as a counterforce to China. That strategy certainly is a product of the end of the cold war, and it reflects the sense of uncertainty and anxiety among the Japanese about China's future course, given the country's sheer size and robust economic growth, as well as the fact that a considerable portion of the fruit of that growth is allocated for defense.

During the cold war era, the rapprochement between the United States and China brought about by Henry Kissinger in 1971 was certainly a classical success of the *realpolitik* approach. However, from the standpoint of the realist school in Japan in those days, Asia was not yet prepared for the balance of power game, simply because the cold war persisted and the crucial issue was the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The major concern of the realists in Japan was the maintenance of a credible alliance with the United States, as well as of the effective defense capability of the JSDF. As far as the domestic debate was concerned, it was not for the most part between realists and idealists, but between realists and pacifists. But because the pacifists monopolized the ideal of peace, the debate gave the impression of being a clash between realists and idealists.

Human values were not treated as the key parameter of Japan's foreign policy in the cold war era for a number of reasons. Today, there is virtual consensus in Japan that the communist regimes were undemocratic,

dictatorial, and therefore, in terms of the basic principles of democracy and freedom, failed systems. However, during the early phase of the cold war, the predominant tendency among Japanese intellectuals was to accept and endorse the legitimacy of the communist regimes in the Eastern bloc, although they were quite vociferous in denouncing dictatorial regimes that were part of what was called the free world. Not wanting to provoke the East unnecessarily, the government did not raise issues such as the undemocratic and tyrannical nature of the regimes in the communist bloc. Besides, as far as the values agenda was concerned, the leftists were in an advantageous position, monopolizing the idea of peace as the supreme value in Japan.

In the zero sum game of the cold war, in which the top priority of the West was to maintain the precarious balance between the two blocs so that the catastrophe of nuclear war could be averted, the West initially did not have much interest in pressing its values agenda on the East. The policy cliché in those days called for peaceful coexistence between East and West; obviously, differences in their values—"Your system is awful," for example—were considered a nonissue.

It was the human rights diplomacy of President Jimmy Carter in the late 1970s that introduced the values agenda squarely in the foreign policy arena. When President Carter started to attach high priority to the human rights agenda in conducting his foreign policy, the Japanese government initially was perplexed. It was evident that if Japan rigorously pursued the human rights agenda in its dealings with neighboring countries, then its relations with them were destined to be disrupted, because at the time most of the countries in East Asia were ruled by totalitarian or dictatorial regimes. However, toward the end of the century, dynamic economic development in many countries in the region ushered in the emergence of a new middle class, which became the driving force for democratization. As a result, the sensitivity of the human rights agenda in relation to Japan's neighbors was considerably attenuated.

It was argued toward the end of Carter's presidency that his human rights policy had destabilized the regimes of many friendly countries whose support was vital to the West. In contrast to Carter, President Ronald Reagan took up the values agenda primarily in the context of the cold war. His epithet "evil empire" set the tone of the endgame of the cold war in the 1980s.

Today, the conflict in Japan between values and the national interest often is related to the use of economic sanctions against countries that

perpetrate human rights abuses. Typically, "the idealist" advocates imposing sanctions, such as the suspension of economic assistance, while "the realist" argues that penalizing the country in question would substantially disrupt existing relations and would not serve the strategic interests of Japan. Whenever Europeans or Americans are at the forefront in accusing an Asian country of human rights abuses, the Asian school of Japanese identity often expresses the dissenting view. A classical case involved Japan's development assistance to China in the aftermath of the Tiananmen massacre in 1989. Japan agonized over whether to continue to suspend assistance to protest this terrible human rights abuse by Chinese authorities (the values-oriented approach) or to resume aid, defying the democratic countries of the West, because it was not in the interest of Japan to reverse its policy of economic engagement with China, which had led to a marked improvement in relations in the 1980s (the interest-oriented approach). A single standard cannot be applied to resolve this dilemma; it demands a case-by-case approach.

Apologists versus Nonapologists

In 1995, on the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II, the Japanese government issued a statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, clarifying the basic position of the Japanese government regarding the war: "During a certain period in the not-too-distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here again my feeling of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology."

Seven years later, one gets the impression that polarization is occurring on the history issue. For the sake of simplicity, it can be described as a clash between apologists and nonapologists, although the debate is not so much about apology per se as about a way of looking at history.

The nonapologist school of thought is not monolithic. Moderates among the nonapologists take the position that although Japan admittedly inflicted terrible pain on its Asian neighbors, it already has apologized amply and therefore should not have to repeat the apology whenever its Asian neighbors or others demand it. Besides, there is a growing

sense of frustration among the younger generation, which does not see the rationale for apologizing for actions taken long before their birth. Those who take a more hardline stance contend that there was nothing morally wrong with what Japan did in the prewar era and that therefore there is no need for apology. The division between the two is defined by the question of whether and to what extent one should glorify the past. Apparently, there are more moderates than hardliners, although the latter have gotten more vociferous in recent years.

Apologists, who share the view that Japan committed terrible atrocities in the prewar era, naturally refuse to glorify the past. However, their views vary regarding the extent to which Japan should have to continue to express official apologies or offer monetary compensation to the victims of its actions.

The issue with Japan's neighbors is not about apology per se. They often stress that what they are most concerned about is whether the Japanese people have genuinely learned the lessons of history; they believe that only if the Japanese people do so can the resurgence of Japanese militarism be prevented. Whenever Japan's neighbors begin to suspect that Japan's prewar history is going to be officially glorified, for example, in the process of certifying a history textbook or when a prime minister makes an official visit to Yasukuni Shrine, a memorial to Japan's war dead, they express their strong resentment.

That the historical memory of victims of war does not easily fade was amply manifested throughout the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia, where atrocities committed by the Turks against Serbs in the fourteenth century became the driving force behind Serbian persecution of the Albanians in Kosovo. It would appear safe to assume that the much more recent memory of the atrocities committed by Japan against its neighbors in the prewar period is even less likely to fade anytime soon. Moreover, the very memory of humiliation often can become the basis of a fiercely emotional nationalism. Therefore the history issue is likely to be a truly difficult and sensitive parameter of Japan's foreign policy.

Nationalism versus Internationalism

If one is looking for a concept that can be dialectically contrasted with nationalism, perhaps "internationalism" is a candidate. In the 1980s the government of Japan adopted the notion of "internationalization" as the guiding principle of its foreign policy. The idea was to introduce systemic

changes in the structure of the Japanese economy in order to facilitate the entry of foreign players into Japanese markets. At the time, foreigners were increasingly exasperated by the difficulties that they encountered in their attempts to become active participants in different sectors of the Japanese economy—including trade in goods and services, which had been handled exclusively by Japanese nationals—and direct investment in those sectors that had been closed to foreigners. Because Japan was amassing a huge trade surplus with the rest of the world, it was imperative to initiate a systemic opening up of its economy to other countries. Internationalism was conceived primarily as an approach to managing Japan's economic relations with the rest of the world.

In contrast, nationalism is difficult to define. Practically all Japanese were seized with a strong sense of nationalism while they watched the Japanese national soccer team play in the World Cup in the summer of 2002. However, such nationalism is unlikely to be relevant in the domestic debate on foreign policy. Perhaps it might make more sense to distinguish between “healthy” and “unhealthy” nationalism. But again, things can be complicated further. It is worthwhile to list some typical issues that can contribute to manifestations of nationalism.

One issue is the resentment or frustration among the Japanese people toward foreign countries and specific aspects of Japanese foreign policy that are perceived to be soft on or subservient to foreign countries. Traditionally there were two sources of frustration. One was the pressure from foreign countries, in particular the United States, to open the Japanese market. In retrospect, the process of gradual opening did not damage the dynamism of Japan's economy. However, the opening of specific sectors was pushed through under pressure from foreign countries, often the United States, rather than through efforts to convince the people that it was in the overall interest of the Japanese economy. As a result, a victim mentality persists among the Japanese, who believe that Japan is always forced to succumb to foreign pressure.

The other source of frustration is the U.S.-Japanese security arrangement, which, as discussed, the pacifists have been at the forefront in denouncing since its inception. However, some people who have a right-of-center ideological orientation, unlike the pacifists, also oppose it because they believe that the arrangement—which was based on the protector-protégé relation between the United States and Japan in the immediate aftermath of Japan's defeat—obliges Japan to remain subservient to the United States. An extreme form of this type of frustration might

logically lead to a political posture similar to Gaullism, although no such trend has gathered strength thus far. Moreover, given U.S. global activism in the aftermath of 9/11, U.S. military predominance, and the U.S. proclivity to pursue a unilateralist foreign policy, the perception that Japan is subservient to the United States is likely to be exacerbated in Japan.

Serious crimes or mishaps involving American personnel stationed at U.S. military bases in Japan also contribute to the Japanese people's anger and resentment. The base issue often becomes a rallying point not only for pacifists but also for nationalists.

In a relatively new development, China also has become a focal point of frustrated or resentful nationalism, for various possible reasons: the emergence of China as a dynamic economic competitor of Japan; its sheer size, which suggests that China will become the dominant economic and military power in Asia; growing nationalism in China, which often manifests itself in anti-Japanese sentiment; the impression that China adamantly refuses to let the history issue rest; and the perception shared by many Japanese that China is eager to undermine Japan's interests. Japan's relations with China are discussed in some detail in chapter 5. Suffice it here to point out that avoiding the clash of nationalistic sentiments will remain difficult for both countries.

In any country, historical memory is a key feature of nationalism and the tendency to glorify national history is inevitable. The resentment of the nonapologists, therefore, can be described as a manifestation of nationalistic sentiment. To what extent frustrated or resentful nationalism may become a key parameter in foreign policy decisionmaking will have to be assessed carefully. Obviously, in the age of globalization any policy orientation that is averse to deepening and widening interaction with the rest of the world is bound to be a nonstarter. Therefore, dealing with the unhealthy type of nationalism, which sometimes borders on xenophobia, may become a serious priority on the national agenda. One hypothesis was that as long as unwavering confidence in the Japanese way of doing things predominated in Japan, there would not be much room for widespread nationalism of that type. But as Japan enters a historic transitional phase in which it appears that the familiar rules of the game will have to be discarded and seemingly more Darwinian “survival of the fittest” strategies accepted, it is understandable that anxiety or perhaps pessimism about the future may provide fertile ground for the growth of frustration and resentment. Of course, it is unlikely that the mood in Japan will easily swing back to the proud nationalism, bordering occasionally on hubris,

of the 1980s, when the Japanese economy looked so invincible. Still, it is extremely important that the Japanese people recover some degree of confidence in the future, more specifically about their collective capacity for making the dynamic adjustments that they have made in past crises.

Obsessions about Economic Vulnerability

Ever since Japan embarked on its quest to catch up with the West following the Meiji Restoration, an obsession about the scarcity of key natural resources in Japan seems to have been deeply embedded in the national psyche. The export of manufactured products from Japan was considered to be essential in order to secure key resources and materials from abroad. The corollary of this mercantilist orientation was imperialist expansion to secure areas in the vicinity of Japan that could serve not only as markets for Japan's products but also as suppliers of various resources. In the 1930s, while Shigeru Yoshida was Japanese ambassador in London, he emphasized to key British leaders that maintaining an economic sphere of influence in northeast Asia was essential to Japan's national survival. Obviously Yoshida reasoned that since the United Kingdom had been one of the great imperial powers, its understanding or at least acquiescence in regard to Japan's actions in Manchuria and China would be highly helpful. However, one commodity that northeast Asia could not supply was oil. Japan depended on the United States for its supply of oil, which was essential to the conduct of war. Today, to prepare for war against the United States when Japan was totally dependent on the United States for oil looks like an act of lunacy. Both Japan and the United States were aware that Japan's only alternative source of oil was the Dutch East Indies—now Indonesia—and Japan's readiness to launch a military advance into the Dutch colony made it obvious that war was inevitable.

In the postwar era, Japan has suffered from two types of obsession about economic vulnerability. One, as mentioned, relates to Japan's vulnerability with regard to its supply of natural resources, in particular, oil. The other relates to its access to the export market. In particular, Japan has been haunted by the possibility of other countries forming economic blocs from which Japan might be excluded and as a result restricted in international trade.

After the end of World War II, Japan's first priority was to get back into the world market so that exports could be resumed. The U.S. government,

having been convinced in the early 1950s of the strategic desirability of supporting Japanese economic reconstruction, opened the U.S. market to cheap manufactured commodities from Japan. The United States also helped Japan to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), although it took many years to overcome the reluctance of other major trading countries to give Japan full-fledged member status. The loss of the Chinese market, which used to account for roughly one-third of Japanese external trade in the prewar era, meant tremendous damage to Japanese trade. Although Prime Minister Yoshida opted for joining the "free world," one of his first actions was to attempt to resume trade with the People's Republic of China (PRC), defying arguments by some Americans officials that expanding trade between Japan and PRC would not serve the strategic interests of the free world. Yoshida's attitude toward China is discussed in chapter 5.

Joining GATT was important because its members accorded most-favored nation (MFN) status to one another across the board. As long as that principle was upheld, Japan did not have to worry about differential treatment by other countries that might be eager to restrict Japan's market access. In those days, the memory of the bloc economies of the 1930s, which had accelerated the decline of Japanese world trade, was still vivid among the Japanese; Japan therefore found the formation of the European Common Market a worrisome development. If it had been possible, Japan would have been happy to block the endeavor. It should be pointed out that Japan did not have the option of forming a similar regional association in East Asia, simply because there was no country in the region with which Japan could undertake a viable attempt at economic integration.

In the case of Europe, there was a basis for the horizontal division of labor among the countries in the region. Even though they had to make huge efforts in the 1950s and 1960s to recover from the damage that they suffered during World War II, their national economies had reached the stage of advanced industrialization. The formation of a single market that makes it possible for European countries to benefit from economies of scale by trading manufactured commodities with each other has become the key factor in their economic growth since the 1960s. In contrast, Japan's trade relations with its East Asian neighbors was characterized by the vertical division of labor: Japan exported manufactured goods to and imported primary commodities from its neighbors, because of the differences in their respective stages of economic development. No economies

of scale could be achieved by forming a single market among the countries in the region.

Eventually, perhaps inspired by the success of the European endeavor, the formation of free trade areas became the vogue in various parts of the world. Japan always watched this process with the uncomfortable feeling that the ideal trade order of GATT, which was based on the global application of MFN status, was being eroded by the regional free trade schemes, to the detriment of Japan. Of course it can be argued in hindsight that Japan's trade with Europe has expanded markedly as a result of the dynamic European economic growth that followed regional integration. Still, the fear that Japan might be left behind in the international trend toward regional integration remains a key parameter of its foreign policy.

Japan's other sense of vulnerability relates to the supply of oil. In the post-World War II era, Japan's dependence on oil from the Middle East remained extremely high, and Japanese companies attempted to exploit oil deposits in the Gulf area. However, Japan's tacit and optimistic assumption was that since the major U.S. oil companies were its main suppliers of oil, any possible disruption of supply would be effectively prevented by the United States and perhaps the United Kingdom. It was not until the embargo by oil-producing countries in the Gulf area in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 that Japan suddenly awakened to its vulnerability in regard to its supply of oil. The oil embargo shattered the Japanese people's confidence and expectation that Japan would continue along the path toward unprecedented prosperity. Although the embargo was not effectively enforced, the huge hikes in the price of oil that ensued further intensified the Japanese sense of vulnerability. At the time, the sense of crisis was shared by all the democratic industrial countries, so much so that the first G-6 summit meeting, officially called the Summit of the Industrial Democracies, was convened at the initiative of France in the fall of 1975.

Following another round of oil shortages toward the end of the 1970s after the turmoil in Iran, issues related to the oil supply, such as the stability of the Persian Gulf region, came to top the national agenda not only in Japan but in practically all the major countries. However, as time passed it became evident, to the relief of many, that even in the case of oil the market mechanism worked and the likelihood of oil embargoes diminished markedly. Japan made a nationwide effort to reduce its dependence on oil from the Gulf throughout the latter half of the 1970s. (In

1970, oil accounted for 71.9 percent of total energy consumption in Japan, and 84.6 percent of that oil came from the Gulf. By 1985, those numbers had dropped to 56.3 percent and 68.8 percent, respectively.)

Still, the oil crisis—later called the “oil shock”—was the first instance since the end of World War II in which the Japanese acutely felt their vulnerability to dependence on foreign resources. Its imprint on the national psyche will not fade easily and may quickly reappear if another crisis affecting the oil supply should erupt.

2

*Security Ties between Japan
and the United States*

In a memorable success for both victors and vanquished, following the end of World War II Japan and Germany began to adopt the values and ideals of their former adversaries and eventually formed security arrangements with the United States that have been pillars of peace and security for more than half a century—in marked contrast to events in the aftermath of World War I. The decisive factor was the advent of the cold war, in which adversarial relations developed among the victors, with the United States and the West Europeans on one side and the Soviet Union and its satellites on the other. In the newly emerging zero-sum game of the cold war, the United States began to regard the economic potential of Japan and Germany as a huge asset to the free world and the alignment of either nation with the communist bloc as a devastating loss. But even before the cold war began, the United States was fully aware of the lesson of Versailles—that the revanchism of the victor may be the best way of ensuring another war in the future. The first priority of the United States, therefore, was not so much to impose punitive measures on its former enemies as to give them an opportunity to work for the reconstruction of their country, as long as the systemic

causes of their militarism could be eradicated completely. And both Japan and West Germany accepted that opportunity. Had Japan fiercely objected to U.S. policies during the occupation and tried to maintain the remnants of militarism in the immediate aftermath of defeat, the course of history would have been different. That Japan decided instead to accept the vast reform agenda that the United States was eager to carry out allowed the United States to focus on ensuring Japan's security instead of ensuring its own security against Japan, and to treat Japan as a strategic asset in the emerging cold war.

One wonders how the Allied Powers would have reacted if Japan had procrastinated in implementing the terms of surrender and secretly engaged in developing nuclear weapons, as Saddam Hussein did after the end of the Persian Gulf war in 1991. It is interesting to note that, following the defeat of Hussein's regime by the United States and its allies in May 2003, the postwar reconstruction of Japan reportedly is being considered as a model for the current reconstruction effort in Iraq. Although the situation in Japan in 1945 was vastly different from that of Iraq in 2003, one can say at least that far-sighted planning by the United States made the ensuing stability and economic recovery of its former adversaries possible.

The fascinating historical process that culminated in the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan in 1951 is covered in many books. This chapter does not attempt to elaborate further on the actual course of history; rather, it reflects on the hypothetical as well as the realistic options available to decisionmakers at that time—and perhaps more important, on the extent to which new options may present themselves half a century later. Certainly it does not make much sense to imagine alternative courses of history, speculating, for example, on what U.S. policy regarding the security of Japan would have been if the Soviets had continued to behave nicely. Without the advent of the cold war, the UN Security Council would likely have functioned as envisioned in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Japan would have assumed that the UN would ensure its national security, and there would have been no U.S. push for Japanese rearmament and no security agreement between Japan and the United States. And indeed, that was the assumption of the Japanese government toward the end of the 1940s. However, the advent of the cold war, and in particular the eruption of the Korean War in 1950, utterly shattered Japanese expectations that the UN would be able to guarantee international security. Still, during negotiations with the United States to end the

occupation, the Japanese sought to define the security arrangement with the United States as a provisional measure justified as the exercise of the right of self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, pending eventual action by the Security Council to restore peace and security.

It should be noted that the expectation that the UN would someday have the authority and capability to ensure the peace and security of the whole world survived in Japan through the cold war. Interestingly, this expectation was shared not only by the pacifists, who disliked the alliance with the United States, but also by the realists, who believed that Japan could and should offer its own personnel to serve in a UN force in the event that one was organized, since such an action would be perfectly permissible under the constitution.

Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida often is quoted as describing the Korean War as “kamikaze” (the wind of God). Certainly it gave a huge boost to the Japanese economy, as Japan supplied the United States with a massive amount of the goods and services that were essential to the conduct of the war. But apart from the economic benefits, the war improved the prime minister’s position in his effort to negotiate the end of the occupation by concluding the peace treaty with the Allied Powers.

Theoretically speaking, what options did Yoshida have before concluding the peace treaty and the security treaty, simultaneously, in San Francisco in 1951? Obviously, the negotiations were not between equal sovereign countries, but between victor and vanquished; the options, therefore, were limited. Certainly the cold war had enhanced the strategic value of Japan as an important member of the free world. That fact strengthened the effectiveness of Yoshida’s gambit in resisting U.S. demands—for example, for Japan’s prompt rearmament—by stressing the imminent danger of the takeover of Japan by the communists and other leftists if economic deprivation worsened. However, the argument that “Japan might drift toward the communist bloc unless you help” was not a viable alternative; as far as Yoshida, a staunch anticommunist, was concerned, opting for the communist bloc was totally out of question. His stance was based not only on his ideological disdain of communism but also on his conviction that Japan’s economic recovery and national security could be secured only by joining the free world. Even though the Bretton Woods system was still in its infancy, it is evident that there was no practical alternative other than to try to gain maximum economic benefit from that system.

The leftists insisted that Japan should not conclude a peace treaty with the Allied Powers until all the powers, including the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, were represented in the talks. This stance called for what was described as an “all-embracing peace” rather than a “separate peace”—a treaty with the United States. The leftists fiercely opposed a separate treaty on the grounds that it would mean that Japan was taking the U.S. side in the cold war and thereby becoming an enemy of the communist bloc, which in their view was wrong and dangerous for Japan. This was a typical manifestation of the pacifists’ fear of entanglement in war. As far as Yoshida was concerned, joining the U.S. side was precisely what he intended to do. He asserted that to insist on the pursuit of an all-embracing peace when the cold war was intensifying was totally unrealistic and derided the idea as “an attempt to pick a flower in a mirror.”

In the autumn of 1950, during preparations for the treaty talks, a team of advisers submitted to Prime Minister Yoshida what might be termed the idealists’ proposal, the gist of which called for the complete disarmament of Japan and the Korean Peninsula and for arms reduction by four powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, and the United Kingdom—in the Far East. The idea was to ensure Japan’s security without rearming Japan. However, Yoshida refrained from tabling the proposal, which, when the same four powers were engaged in a deadly war on the Korean Peninsula, was bound to be a nonstarter.

That episode calls to mind the option of the “unarmed neutrality” of Japan. Before the advent of the cold war, General Douglas MacArthur once suggested that Japan should aim at becoming the “Switzerland of the Orient.” It is doubtful that he envisioned Japan equipped with the Swiss Army’s legendary defense capability; instead, what he had in mind was a totally demilitarized, neutral Japan. Many Japanese loved the idea of being Switzerland in the Orient—that may be one reason why Switzerland has been one of the most popular countries in Japanese opinion polls since the end of the war.

The pacifists advocated Japan’s unarmed neutrality. However, the neutrality or total demilitarization of a country is infeasible unless it is guaranteed by all surrounding powers. Without a guarantee, the peace and security of a country can be seriously compromised, and the end result may well be intervention or invasion by powers eager to take over the country or preempt its takeover by rival powers. In the regional power

game of the early 1950s, if Japan had opted for neutrality without U.S. acquiescence the move would have been seen by the United States as a hostile action. And in that case, Japan would have been compelled to think seriously about its security vis-à-vis the United States.

Today, many Japanese tend to overlook the fact that in the postwar era, unlike in the first phase of Japan's modernization, from 1868 to 1945, Japan no longer had to worry about the possibility of the United States becoming an adversary. It sounds so obvious that it can easily be taken for granted. Still, that fact was a result of the difficult decision-making involved in picking one option instead of others that were advocated by the pacifists and idealists and had considerable resonance among the Japanese people.

The crucial element in the U.S.-Japanese security treaty of 1951 was Japan's agreement that the United States could continue to maintain military bases in Japan, where, at the time the treaty went into effect in 1952, 110,000 U.S. forces were stationed. The opposition charged that the new treaty was nothing but a U.S. ploy to continue the occupation of Japan. Today the consensus of historians is that Prime Minister Yoshida considered the continued use of bases a crucial card to play in resisting American pressure for Japan's substantial rearmament. It was equally evident that the U.S. forces stationed in Japan would fight to defend Japan in case of armed attack by other countries, notably the Soviet Union. Article I of the treaty specifies:

With the entry into force of the Treaty, Japan permits the right to deploy the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force of the United States within and in the vicinity of Japan and the United States accepts this right. . . . This Force may be used to contribute to the international peace and security in the Far East, and . . . to contribute to the security of Japan against armed attack from outside.

A decade later, under the leadership of Prime Minister Shinsuke Kishi, the Treaty of Security and Mutual Cooperation between Japan and the United States of America was concluded, replacing the security treaty of 1951. In the new treaty of 1960, the legal obligation of the United States to protect Japan was clearly stipulated and the requirement of prior consultation regarding the use of bases was defined so that the notion of unrestrained use could be dispelled.

Throughout the history of the U.S.-Japanese security arrangement, which has been in effect for more than half a century, the base issue has always been the key pillar. In essence, the United States assumes the legal obligation to defend Japan, and Japan permits the United States to maintain bases in Japan. This structure often is described as asymmetrical in that the defense commitment is not mutual, given Japan's constitutional constraint against the exercise of collective self-defense. The U.S. defense commitment is considered to be balanced by the U.S. right to maintain bases in Japan not only for the defense of Japan but also for U.S. operations to ensure peace and security in the Far East—the latter a considerable strategic asset to the United States during both the cold war era and its aftermath. Naturally, the pacifists opposed the very idea of offering the use of bases to the United States, and the precise location of the geographical boundaries of “the Far East” often has been a contentious issue in the parliament. If, for example, U.S. forces stationed in Japan are sent somewhere else, such as the Persian Gulf region, the pacifists will question the legality of the deployment under the treaty because the region is outside the Far East. Also, according to the treaty of 1960, certain aspects of the use of bases—namely, any important changes in the deployment of U.S. forces, any important changes in the equipment used (for example, use of nuclear weapons, which is categorically refused by Japan), and military operations conducted from Japan—are subject to prior consultation with Japan, and debate has frequently erupted over the extent of prior consultation.

What sorts of alternatives were available to Japan in the formative phase of the security arrangement? As mentioned, Prime Minister Yoshida played the base use card to resist U.S. pressure for rearmament. Yoshida also was probably well aware of the deterrent effect of letting the United States continue to use bases in Japan, thereby assuring automatic U.S. involvement in the defense of Japan in the event of armed attack. If Japan had decided to rearm, the base use card might not have been needed. However, in view of the domestic climate in Japan, including the economic feasibility of sustaining a military buildup as well as the possibility of strong popular opposition, it seems in hindsight that substantial rearmament never constituted a realistic option. In any event, in 1950 Yoshida launched a modest rearmament initiative by creating what was initially called the Police Reserve Force, which included 5,000 officers; this became the Japanese Self-Defense Force in 1954.

Another option was to try to obtain a defense commitment from the United States without offering the use of bases—or at least to hold any offer until the final stage of negotiations. If Japan had not been constrained by the constitution and had been ready to accept a mutual defense commitment—that is, if it had been ready to fight with the United States if hostilities broke out in East Asia—it might not have been necessary to offer the use of bases. Security ties based on mutual defense could have been possible, assuming that the huge disparity between the two countries in terms of their actual defense capability was not taken into account. But because that was simply impossible, it would not have been a plausible opening gambit for Japan to declare to the United States, “After the termination of the occupation, you are to withdraw your troops from Japan but nevertheless assume the legal obligation to protect us. Meanwhile, we will not carry out the rearmament that you expect of us, and, as you know, constitutionally we are not allowed to fight with you, except for our own defense.” One may be tempted to argue that since the strategic value of Japan to the United States was so high in the zero-sum game of the cold war, regardless of what Japan was or was not prepared to offer, the United States had no option but to defend Japan. However, that type of bluff, so to speak, by Japan would have fatally frayed the basic fabric of goodwill and trust between the two countries. In any negotiations, an element of bluffing and the use of assorted red herrings are common. Still, in the course of negotiating a defense commitment, for which mutual trust is essential, countries should not take the risk of destroying that trust lightly.

A Rough Sketch of Events after the Security Treaty of 1960

Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda took power after the resignation of Prime Minister Kishi, who managed to conclude the treaty of 1960 in the midst of political upheaval (the high point of which came when a huge crowd of demonstrators broke onto the Diet campus to protest the new treaty). Ikeda succeeded in restoring relative calm in Japanese politics by putting the pursuit of economic growth at the top of the national agenda. His political platform, which was based on doubling the national income, and his posture—“As far as the economy goes, trust me”—worked effectively.

After the treaty of 1960 established the framework of Japan’s security arrangement with the United States, the basic task for successive leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party was to maintain the arrangement’s effec-

tiveness in the face of pacifist opposition. The clash between the pacifists (the opposition) and the realists (the government) persisted with varying intensity. A rough description of Japanese political culture at that time suggests that the majority of the population supported the LDP for its success in fostering dynamic economic growth, while finding considerable appeal in the pacifist posture as well.

Various developments affected Japan’s security environment between the late 1960s and the end of the 1980s. In the 1960s, the United States was bogged down in the Vietnam War. Nobody was quite sure to what extent the domino theory was going to be relevant in Southeast Asia; still, the situation looked extremely precarious. The base issue, in the context of the U.S. action in Vietnam, was hotly debated in parliament.

It was in this setting that Japan had to negotiate the reversion of Okinawa from U.S. to Japanese control. Throughout the occupation, the United States had taken for granted its indefinite retention of Okinawa, which was a crucial base for the forward deployment of U.S. forces. During the early occupation, even those in the United States who envisioned a thoroughly demilitarized Japan assumed that the handling of Okinawa would be different. In the 1960s, with the intensification of the war in Vietnam and the worrisome uncertainties in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, Okinawa remained of crucial strategic importance to the United States.

The historic negotiation of the reversion of Okinawa is well documented. The disposition of the U.S. bases in Okinawa was the crux of the issue. As set forth in the Joint Statement of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and President Richard Nixon in 1969, the reversion should be accomplished “without impairing the security of the Far East including Japan.” The leaders agreed that the existing security arrangement between the countries “should be applied to Okinawa without modification thereof” and that “the reversion should not hinder the effective execution of the international obligations assumed by the United States for the defense of countries in the Far East including Japan.” It was a truly commendable achievement of the two countries that the reversion of Okinawa was accomplished without calling for a different treatment of the bases in Okinawa.

Henry Kissinger’s spectacular gambit in initiating rapprochement with China in 1971 changed the contours of power politics in Asia. And in that context, Japan normalized its relations with China in 1972. As the Soviet Union had become a serious threat to Chinese security by the end

of the 1960s, China no longer raised much opposition to the security arrangement between the United States and Japan. In fact, in the early 1980s China even adopted a posture of acquiescence toward it, since it could effectively serve as a deterrent to Soviet aggression.

Perhaps the détente during the 1970s—which made direct military invasion by the Soviets look less likely—had the effect of reducing the Japanese fear of entanglement in war that drove the pacifist opposition in earlier periods. Still, the debate in both the Diet and much of the media was dominated by the clash between pacifists and realists. Against that background, Japan's defense was planned to deal only with limited invasion; any full-scale invasion, presumably by the Soviet Union, would be dealt with by the United States, which was expected to rush to Japan's defense. During this period, defense expenditures remained about 1 percent of the gross national product (GNP). In later years, the 1 percent ceiling became the gauge of Japan's defense effort.

The fall of Saigon and the victory of the communist forces in Indochina—and the ensuing image of a defeated United States, whose national psyche seemed to be badly bruised—certainly had an impact on domestic politics in Japan. However, the event that awakened the Japanese sense of vulnerability in those years was related not to the cold war, but to the oil crisis in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, in 1973. By the beginning of the 1970s, the Japanese people's memory of the painful economic deprivation that the country had suffered immediately after the end of World War II had faded. They had begun to assume that regardless of external developments, such as the deteriorating war in Vietnam, Japan's future prosperity was ensured. They were all the more shocked, therefore, to realize the vulnerability of Japan's economy to the unexpected disruption of the supply of crude oil from the Middle East following the Arab oil embargo.

The concept of comprehensive security, which came into vogue at that time, was a result of this acute sense of economic vulnerability. There was thought to be no point in concentrating on national security in its narrow sense, such as the adequacy of Japan's defense capability or the effectiveness of its security arrangement with the United States, since the disruption of the supply of a key commodity such as oil could, in effect, put an end to the very existence of Japan. "Comprehensive," therefore, became a key word. Besides, the Japanese still seemed to have some allergy to handling the security issue *per se*. The need to take stock of all aspects of the nation's vulnerability—not only its military capability but also its

access to natural resources—was far more convincing and palatable to the majority of the Japanese.

The end of the 1970s brought with it what was described at the time as a renewal of the cold war. The acquisition of naval bases in Vietnam by the Soviets in 1979 was thought to signal the emergence of a new strategic parameter in East Asia, and the subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan toward the end of 1979 totally destroyed the remnants of détente. Affirmation of solidarity with the West became an important item on the national agenda, and the boycott of the Olympic Games in Moscow in 1980 became a litmus test of that solidarity. In late 1979, even before the invasion of Afghanistan, Japan had encountered difficulty over Iran, which used to be an important source of oil even after the Islamic revolution under Ayatollah Khomeini. In the middle of U.S. anguish over the hostage crisis in Tehran, it was disclosed that Japan continued to purchase Iranian oil. This news immediately kindled anti-Japanese fury in the United States. Although a crisis was swiftly sidestepped when both the United States and Japan took various measures to reaffirm their solidarity, it was an important lesson for Japan. In early 1980, Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira declared that "Japan was ready to share the pain and burden with the United States."

In hindsight, the Reagan administration ushered in the end game of the cold war, although nobody had the slightest premonition that the end was near. The administration feared at the outset that the military capability of the Soviets might eventually surpass that of the United States, and its first priority was to strengthen the military capability of the United States and its allies. The strengthening of the JSDF's ability to share the defense burden with the United States, in particular the defense of a sea lane roughly 1,000 miles in length that extended from Japan to an area north of the Philippines, topped the U.S.-Japanese agenda. The United States attached tremendous importance to the protection of this sea lane because, in the event of an attack on Japan, it would have to be used to transport troops and materiel.

In one interesting episode, on the occasion of an official visit to the United States, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki's use of the term "the alliance" in describing the U.S.-Japanese security arrangement triggered an uproar in Japan. Before that, the Japanese government had refrained from using the term because it could be interpreted to indicate a more aggressive arrangement and was likely to be fiercely attacked by the pacifists. It was Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone who forcefully voiced a

policy of support for President Reagan by stating on the occasion of his first official visit to the United States in early 1983 that Japan and the United States were bound by a shared destiny, and later by taking the lead in affirming at the G-7 Summit at Williamsburg that "the security of the West was indivisible."

In the history of the U.S.-Japanese security arrangement, the truly defining moment was the signing of the 1951 security treaty, which was essential for terminating the occupation. Thereafter, much of the effort of successive Japanese governments has gone toward maintaining deterrence, which has been based on the security ties and the defense capability of the JSDF. It is true that other options, such as unarmed neutrality, were advocated by the pacifists, and their ideas had considerable resonance among the people of Japan. However, no truly meaningful alternative for ensuring Japan's security could have arisen during the cold war, unless, of course, Japan was prepared to consider the option of joining the communist bloc and having the United States as an adversary. Later, Prime Minister Kishi reportedly defined the salient feature of conservative orthodoxy (*hoshu-honryuu*) in Japanese politics as the maintenance of good relations with the United States.

However, because the security arrangement was not negotiated between two equal, sovereign countries but between victor and vanquished to terminate the occupation of the latter by the former, some sense of frustration and humiliation persisted among the Japanese. Those sentiments resembled somewhat the sentiments of the Japanese in the early Meiji era toward the "unequal treaties" with the Western powers and often manifested themselves in the criticism that the government doggedly followed U.S. policy. Nor were such feelings the monopoly of the pacifists; they were shared by the Asian identity school described in chapter 1. Occasionally, one gets the impression that in Japan any policy that openly opposes U.S. policy is the surest way to get applause. Obviously, Japan should forcefully assert its national interest in its dealings with the United States, including the management of the security arrangement; it can be argued, however, that often U.S. policy was more or less in line with Japan's national interest. Moreover, the bottom line in maintaining the security ties should be to refrain from doing things that harm the United States, inasmuch as mutual support is what the alliance is all about.

Apart from unarmed neutrality, the notion of "independently oriented defense," a close approximation of Gaullism in France, occasionally

surfaced in Japan, although it never predominated. In the early period of the security agreement, Ichiro Hatoyama, the political rival of Yoshida, advocated what was called the "independent defense policy." The gist of the policy was to revise the constitution so that the rearmament of Japan could be formally undertaken, and it was intended to play up the contrast with the incremental approach taken by Prime Minister Yoshida in creating the JSDF without revising the constitution. Hatoyama's proposal embodied the views of the conservatives, who had considerable reservations regarding the posture of Yoshida, which in their opinion was too pro-American. However, as the buildup of the JSDF began to get under way and after Hatoyama became prime minister in 1954, the enthusiasm for constitutional revision subsided, and with it the call for an independent defense policy.

In later years some argued for a Gaullist defense doctrine. However, since the basic tenet of Gaullism was the refusal to rely on the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States and since Japan had no realistic nuclear options, it was never a persuasive alternative. It is interesting to note that in Japan the credibility of the U.S. defense commitment did not become a key issue in parliamentary debate, in marked contrast with Western Europe, where U.S. credibility had always been the dominant concern among members of NATO. In particular, the question of "coupling and decoupling"—that is, whether the United States was prepared to risk a Soviet nuclear attack on its own soil to defend its European allies—surfaced again and again. Perhaps because the focus of the debate between the pacifists and realists had always been the fear of entanglement in war, the credibility issue did not claim center stage in Japan.

The Changing Role of the JSDF: The Gulf War and Thereafter

Japan's post-cold war security agenda has been characterized by a series of legislative measures authorizing the government to engage the JSDF in various noncombat activities outside Japan, reflecting the desirability of playing an active role in maintaining international peace and security in the new era. Throughout the process of redefining the role and mission of the JSDF, debate between the pacifists and realists has been continual, as it was during the cold war; however, the international situation has been markedly different.