

7. Regimes and International Agreements

outline

7.1 International Negotiations

7.2 Participation in International Institutions

- *Is there a democratic advantage in international negotiations and institutions?*
- *How do International organization promote economic interdependence, democratization, and peace?*

7. Regimes and International Agreements

7.1 International Negotiations

- *The logic of two-level games*
 - *The setup and the implications*
 - *Distributional conflicts and coordination problems*
- *Two-level games and political regime*
 - *Democratic advantages? – Sources?*
 - *Policymaking transparency*
 - *Government competence* (→ economic voting/spatial competition theory)
 - *Diverse representation* (→ veto player theory)
 - *Democracies and the type of agreements*
 - *Reciprocal but complicated/high level*

7. Regimes and International Agreements

7.1 International Negotiations

- Democracies and the type of agreements
 - Reciprocal and high level

H1: Jointly democratic dyads will engage in comparatively high levels of cooperation.

H2: Jointly autocratic dyads will engage in higher levels of cooperation than dyads composed of one democracy and one autocracy.

H3: Dyads composed of one democracy and one autocracy will find the impediments to cooperation strongest; they will engage in lower levels of cooperation than states with similar internal structures.

Table 1. Regime Type and International Cooperation, 1953–1978
Unit of Analysis: Dyad-Year

Independent Variable	Model 1 Average Level of Cooperation	Model 2 Cooperation (1 = Yes; 0 = No)	Model 3 Average Level of Cooperation if Cooperation > 0
Jointly Democratic Dyad	3.108** (0.408)	0.606** (0.101)	2.847** (0.237)
Jointly Autocratic Dyad	3.062** (0.275)	0.410** (0.077)	1.335** (0.166)
Mixed Regime Type Dyad	2.180** (0.255)	0.311** (0.059)	0.563** (0.174)
Jointly Wealthy Dyad	0.890* (0.394)	0.225* (0.098)	0.616** (0.192)
Jointly Stable Dyad	0.728** (0.167)	0.187** (0.034)	0.271* (0.130)
Shared Alliance	4.553** (0.361)	0.542** (0.082)	1.541** (0.159)
Constant	3.523	-0.455	10.847
N	22,320	22,320	11,815

Note: Each cell contains the estimated coefficient with its associated standard error listed in parentheses below. **indicates statistical significance at the .001 level. *indicates statistical significance at the .05 level.

7. Regimes and International Agreements

7.1 International Negotiations

- Democracies and the type of agreements
 - Reciprocal and high level




FIGURE 1. Average alliance density per decade, 1816–1965




FIGURE 2. Alliance survival functions (Kaplan–Meier estimates) for alliances by treaty (reduced model 1)

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7.2 Participation in International Institutions

- *The logic of liberal institutionalism*
 - *The setup and logic*
 - *Information and coordination problems*
- *Who participates?*
 - *The Issue: The effectiveness of agreements*
 - ➔ *Selection bias and coordination depth*
 - *Enforcement or screening devise?*
 - *Enforcement and agreement (← compliance issue)*
 - *Examples*
 - *Who joins human rights conventions?*
 - *Is there a democratic advantage?*

7. Regimes and International Agreements

7.2 Participation in International Institutions

- Who participates?
 - Who joins human rights conventions?
 - How effective are human rights conventions?

- The first part of my argument is that torture is more likely to be practiced where dictatorships share power. Hence dictatorships with multiple political parties are more likely to practice torture.
- The second step of my argument is that dictatorships facing multiple political parties have been found to grant concessions to interest groups within society. Hence I argue that the effect of the multiparty institution is to make a dictatorship more likely to enter into the CAT.

TABLE 1. The effect of multiple parties on torture in dictatorships—using the Hathaway torture measure

	Ordinal logit	Fixed effects logit	Duration dependence logit
PARTIES	0.58*** (0.15)	0.71** (0.34)	0.80*** (0.22)
GDP/CAPITA	0.02 (0.03)	-0.33 (0.35)	-0.01 (0.03)
GROWTH	0.01** (0.003)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
POPULATION	0.002*** (0.001)	0.12** (0.04)	0.001* (0.001)
TRADE/GDP	-0.01*** (0.002)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01*** (0.003)
CIVIL WAR	0.79*** (0.17)	0.57 (0.47)	0.41* (0.24)
COMMUNIST	-1.10** (0.36)		-0.69 (0.68)
COUNT			-1.29*** (0.20)
<i>Spline 1</i>			-0.01 (0.01)
<i>Spline 2</i>			-0.13*** (0.04)
<i>Spline 3</i>			0.09** (0.04)
<i>Constant</i>			-0.06 (0.28)
<i>Cut 1</i>	-3.07** (0.24)		
<i>Cut 2</i>	-1.05** (0.16)		
<i>Cut 3</i>	1.14** (0.17)		
<i>Cut 4</i>	2.70** (0.22)		
<i>Number of observations</i>	694	428	694
<i>Log likelihood</i>	-893.58	-162.03	-310.99

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10.

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7.2 Participation in International Institutions

- *Why participate?*
 - *The Issue: The benefits of participation*
 - *Moral hazard, defection, and credible commitment*
 - *Why tougher conditions increase accruing benefits through credibility?*
 - *Empirical examples*
 - *Benefits of IEO membership and credibility*
 - *Economic benefit for individual members*
 - *Benefits of democratic IOs and democratic consolidation*
 - *Is there a democratic advantage?*
 - *Why democracies insist on deeper cooperation*

7. Regimes and International Agreements

7.2 Participation in International Institutions

- *Why participate?*
 - *The benefits of participation*
 - *market credibility*




Fig. 1. IO membership over time, unweighted indicator, 1985-2004.

Table 2
International organizations and country risk, 1985-2004.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Membership in selected IOs, unweighted ($t - 1$)	3.965* (1.76)	5.762*** (2.90)	2.574* (1.83)	3.965** (2.05)	1.512** (2.04)	5.250* (1.84)	28.708** (2.11)	39.008** (2.42)
Law and order, index ($t - 1$)	0.308*** (2.72)			0.308*** (2.72)	0.300*** (5.27)	0.595*** (3.38)	0.170 (1.24)	
(log) GDP per capita	2.159 (0.89)	4.068* (1.68)		2.159 (1.23)	1.771*** (8.86)	16.011*** (5.79)	3.900** (2.31)	5.215*** (3.40)
Trade (% of GDP)	-0.014 (0.76)	-0.004 (0.23)		-0.014 (0.91)	-0.004 (1.35)	-0.028 (1.47)	-0.018 (1.33)	-0.009 (0.68)
GDP growth (annual %)	0.199*** (3.05)	0.175*** (3.15)		0.199*** (3.44)	0.218*** (7.33)	0.054 (1.54)	0.202*** (5.38)	0.176*** (4.63)
Inflation	-8.776*** (4.45)	-9.853*** (4.73)		-8.776*** (4.32)	-3.681*** (3.23)	-7.348*** (2.94)	-9.873*** (4.52)	-10.183*** (4.65)
Real interest rate	-0.019 (1.33)	-0.019 (1.19)		-0.019 (1.29)	-0.019* (1.88)	-0.037** (2.21)	-0.038** (2.00)	-0.042** (2.08)
Dependent variable ($t - 1$)	0.511*** (17.38)	0.493*** (14.12)	0.571*** (14.68)	0.511*** (16.65)	0.698*** (30.73)		0.489*** (17.30)	0.459*** (15.34)
Dependent variable ($t - 2$)	0.059* (1.93)	0.065** (2.21)	0.081*** (3.23)	0.059** (2.12)	0.163*** (7.58)		0.037 (1.33)	0.029 (0.96)
Method	OLS, fe	OLS, fe	OLS, fe	Newey West	GLS	AR(1)	2SLS	2SLS
Number of observations	1571	1823	2420	1571	1569	1486	1569	1821
Number of countries	111	126	137	111	111	110	109	124
R-squared	0.56	0.54	0.54			0.25	0.49	0.39

Notes: The dependent variable is Euromoney's risk rating, ranging between zero and 100, with higher values representing higher credibility. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. A dummy for each year is included. Absolute t -statistics in parentheses; * (**, ***) indicates significance at 10 (5, 1) percent level.

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
7.2 Participation in International Institutions

- *Why participate?*
 - *Benefits of IEO membership and credibility*
↔ *newly democratic countries*

H_1 (*Selection*): The same countries that are likely to start the EU membership process are also the same countries that are likely to have low sovereign yields.

H_2 (*Policy reform*): Markets react to changes in economic policy undertaken outside EU negotiations.

H_3 (*Seal of approval*): Markets react to signals from Brussels that accession countries have conformed to EU standards.



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7.2 Participation in International Institutions

- *Why participate?*
 - *EU membership and market credibility*

TABLE 1 EU Effect Across Stages of Expansion*

Variable	A.	B.	C.	D.
Constant	1.18*** (.22)	1.60*** (.13)	2.07*** (.09)	2.55*** (.11)
Inflation	.001*** (.0003)	.001*** (.0003)	.003*** (.0007)	.003*** (.0006)
Current account	.0004 (.002)	.0008 (.002)	.0002*** (.00006)	.00003 (.00004)
Reserves	-.0002*** (.00007)	-.00002*** (.00007)	-.00009*** (.00001)	-.0004*** (.00009)
Portfolio liabilities	. - .0004 (.001)	-.0008 (.002)	.00001 (.00009)	-.00001 (.00006)
EU apply	-	-.14 (.12)	-	-.05 (.17)
EU negotiation	-	-.49*** (.08)	-	-1.45*** (.12)
EU accession	-	-.31*** (.08)	-	-.81*** (.17)
EU membership	-	-.75*** (.13)	-	-.31 (.21)
Wald χ^2	26.7	159.33	-	-
Prob > χ^2	0.00	0.00	-	-
σ_{μ}	-	-	.94	.91
σ_{ϵ}	-	-	1.21	1.00
N	496	496	496	496

*Dependent variable is the natural log of spreads on government bonds, quarterly from 1991 to 2006. Models A and B are Prais-Winsten regressions with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; models C and D are fixed-effects regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10.

TABLE 2 Effects of One SD Change of Independent Variables on Bond Spreads

Inflation	-5.56
Current Account	1.08
Reserves	-1.26
Portfolio liabilities	-1.01
EU apply	-1.06
EU negotiation	-3.44
EU accession	-5.67
EU membership	-3.57

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7.2 Participation in International Institutions

- *EU membership and market credibility*
 - ➔ *independent effect beyond good economic management and policy reform*

TABLE 4 Test of Policy Reform*

Variable	A.	B.	C.	D.
Constant	5.29*** (1.49)	4.15*** (1.52)	9.09*** (2.05)	9.63*** (2.19)
Inflation	0.002*** (0.0007)	0.003*** (0.0008)	0.004*** (0.0006)	0.003 (0.0006)
Current account	0.0002** (0.00009)	0.0002** (0.00009)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.00008)
Reserves	-0.00004** (0.00002)	-0.00005** (0.00002)	-0.00004* (0.00002)	-0.00004* (0.00002)
Portfolio liabilities	0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0002 (0.0002)	0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0002 (0.0002)
Privatization	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.02)
Price liberalization	0.001** (0.0005)	0.001** (0.0005)	0.08 (0.07)	0.06 (0.065)
Institutional reform	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
EU apply	-	0.34 (0.31)	-	1.27*** (0.35)
EU negotiation	-	-0.66** (0.32)	-	-0.45* (0.25)
EU accession	-	-1.73*** (0.64)	-	-1.21** (0.42)
EU membership	-	0.56 (0.75)	-	1.21* (0.50)
σ_u	1.79	1.53	-	-
σ_e	1.05	.99	-	-
Wald χ^2	-	-	33.9	67.21
Prob > χ^2	-	-	0	0
N	113	113	113	113

*Dependent variable is the natural log of spreads on government bonds, quarterly from 1991 to 2006. Models A and B are Prais-Winsten regressions with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; models C and D are fixed-effects regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10.

TABLE 3 Treatment Effects—Test for Selection Bias*

Variable	Full
Constant	2.54*** (.17)
Inflation	.004*** (.0008)
Reserves	-.00006** (.00002)
Debt liabilities	.0001 (.0002)
Current account	.0001 (.00009)
EU negotiation	-1.02*** (.36)
Selection	Equation
Constant	3.73 (1.14)
Movies	.02* (.01)
UNESCO sites	.11* (.06)
Civil liberties	-1.41*** (.49)
GDP per capita (PPP-weighted)	.0004 (.0001)
Km from Bonn	.002* (.0006)
ρ	.16 (.26)
σ	1.10*** (.07)
λ	.18 (.28)
N	124

*Dependent variable is the natural log of spreads on government bonds, quarterly from 1991 to 2006. Treatment-effects regression, with country and year dummies suppressed. N = 128. Likelihood ratio test of independent equations ($\rho = 0$): $\chi^2(1) = 0.39$ Prob > $\chi^2 = 0.53$. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10.

7. Regimes and International Agreements

7.2 Participation in International Institutions

- Why participate?
 - IO membership and liberal market commitment/democratic consolidation
 - Democratization ⇔ unable to make credible commitments
 - Reputational problems/time inconsistency / political conflict/ economic credibility
 - ⇔ cost of backsliding / democratic lock-in
 - Democratization
 - Join more democratic regimes to strengthen credibility

TABLE 2. The effects of democratization on changes in IO membership, 1965–2000

	Model (1.1)	Model (1.2)
DEMOCRATIZATION	0.225*** (0.105)	0.222*** (0.105)
AUTOCRATIZATION	-0.175* (0.097)	-0.182* (0.097)
REGIME TYPE	0.012** (0.005)	0.011** (0.005)
MAJOR POWER	0.521*** (0.133)	0.530*** (0.133)
INDEPENDENCE	0.0007 (0.0008)	0.0007 (0.0008)
FORMER COMMUNIST	1.029*** (0.236)	0.991*** (0.228)
DISPUTE	-0.052** (0.023)	-0.050** (0.023)
HEGEMONY	-22.450*** (8.188)	-22.554*** (8.179)
DEVELOPMENT	-0.000001 (0.000001)	-0.000001 (0.000001)
GDP	-8.73 × 10 ⁻¹¹ (5.90 × 10 ⁻¹¹)	-9.34 × 10 ⁻¹¹ (5.89 × 10 ⁻¹¹)
OPENNESS	-0.0003 (0.0006)	-0.0002 (0.0006)
YEAR	-0.053*** (0.020)	-0.046** (0.020)
#IO	0.009*** (0.003)	—
SATURATION	—	1.256*** (0.399)
NORTH AMERICA	-0.274* (0.163)	-0.288* (0.163)
SOUTH AMERICA	-0.338*** (0.130)	-0.349*** (0.130)
MIDDLE EAST	-0.219 (0.145)	-0.376** (0.152)
ASIA	-0.234 (0.154)	-0.318** (0.159)
OCEANIA	-0.529*** (0.154)	-0.629*** (0.155)
EUROPE	-0.265* (0.142)	-0.265* (0.140)
Constant	112.580*** (41.535)	97.225** (41.535)
R ²	0.07	0.07
N	3687	3687

(continued)

7. Regimes and International Agreements

7.2 Participation in International Institutions

- Why participate?
 - Democratization and IOs
 - ➔ Join more democratic regimes to strengthen credibility
 - What kind of IO memberships are more credibility enhancing?
 - ➔ standards IOs/economic IOs, or political IOs

Figure 1
The Number of Economic, Standards-Based, and Political International Organizations (IOs), 1965–2000




Table 2
The Effects of Regime Type and Regime Change on Changes in International Organization (IO) Membership, 1965–2000

Variable	Economic IOs	Political IOs	Standards IOs	Economic IOs ^a	Political IOs ^a	Standards IOs ^a
Democratization	0.153** (0.080)	0.048* (0.028)	0.150*** (0.058)	0.124* (0.084)	0.096** (0.043)	0.197*** (0.059)
Autocratization	-0.156** (0.067)	0.025 (0.028)	-0.001 (0.043)	-0.134* (0.072)	0.079* (0.046)	-0.008 (0.048)
Stable Democracy	0.069 (0.059)	0.074*** (0.023)	0.091*** (0.034)	0.096* (0.058)	0.128*** (0.033)	0.128*** (0.045)
#Economic IOs	-0.018** (0.007)	0.005** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.004)	-0.022** (0.009)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.014** (0.006)
#Political IOs	0.048*** (0.015)	-0.030*** (0.009)	0.012 (0.009)	0.050*** (0.012)	-0.029*** (0.010)	0.019** (0.008)
#Standards IOs	0.025** (0.012)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.039*** (0.010)	0.011 (0.012)	0.016** (0.006)	-0.041*** (0.011)
Major Power	0.180* (0.106)	0.015 (0.045)	0.145** (0.062)	0.207* (0.117)	0.100 (0.071)	0.176** (0.078)
Independence	0.00001 (0.0006)	0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0003 (0.0004)	-0.0001 (0.001)	0.0004 (0.0003)	0.0004 (0.0004)
Dispute	-0.027* (0.017)	-0.012** (0.006)	-0.036*** (0.010)	-0.032* (0.017)	-0.032*** (0.009)	-0.044*** (0.012)
Hegemony	-14.393*** (5.466)	-2.167 (1.858)	-6.127 (4.589)	-15.913*** (5.824)	-2.838 (3.059)	-11.402** (5.068)
Year	-0.048*** (0.013)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.049*** (0.014)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.023* (0.013)
Former Communist	0.496*** (0.167)	0.150** (0.065)	0.342*** (0.050)	0.498*** (0.186)	0.328*** (0.117)	0.414*** (0.114)
Constant	99.667*** (27.836)	10.330 (9.597)	14.665 (24.02)	100.777*** (29.932)	-0.596 (15.986)	48.321* (26.349)
R ²	0.05	0.03	0.06	0.05	0.03	0.06
N	4,665	4,665	4,665	4,665	4,665	4,665

Note: Entries are ordinary least squares estimates, with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. We do not report coefficient estimates for region fixed effects.

^a Counts of IO membership not based on mutually exclusive categories.

* $p \leq .10$. ** $p \leq .05$. *** $p \leq .01$. One-tailed tests of statistical significance are conducted for the coefficient estimates of *Democratization* because its sign is specified by the model. Two-tailed tests are conducted for the remaining estimates.

7. Regimes and International Agreements

7.2 Participation in International Institutions

- The Issue: The benefits of participation
 - Why democracies impose tougher conditions?
 - Why tougher conditions increase credibility?

H1: State commitment to HRAs does not systematically produce improvement in human rights behaviors after commitment.⁴⁷

H2: State commitment to PTAs supplying soft human rights standards does not systematically produce improvement in human rights behaviors after commitment.

H3: State commitment to PTAs supplying hard human rights standards does systematically produce improvement in human rights behaviors after commitment.




FIGURE 1. Human rights behaviors: Percentage of states that repress and that ratify human rights agreements




FIGURE 2. Preferential trade agreements with human rights standards

7. Regimes and International Agreements

7.2 Participation in International Institutions

- The Issue: The benefits of participation
 - Why democracies impose tougher conditions?
 - Why tougher conditions increase credibility?

TABLE 2. Estimates of the effects of international human rights agreements and preferential trade agreements on repression, 1972–2002

Variables	(1) REPRESSION _{it}	(2) IMPUTE _{it}	(3) CIVILLIBERTY _{it}
INVESTMENT _{it-1}	-0.633 (0.36)	-0.616 (0.35)	0.262 (0.27)
TRADE _{it-1}	-0.483*** (0.13)	-0.450*** (0.12)	0.078 (0.10)
pCGDP _{it-1}	-0.162** (0.05)	-0.160** (0.05)	-0.264*** (0.05)
DEMOCRACY _{it-1}	-0.031** (0.01)	-0.028** (0.01)	-0.080*** (0.01)
DURABILITY _{it-1}	-0.006* (0.00)	-0.007* (0.00)	-0.005 (0.00)
DENSITY _{it-1}	0.091 (0.05)*	0.090* (0.04)	0.017 (0.03)
HRAS _{it-1}	0.082 (0.07)	0.078 (0.07)	0.029 (0.07)
PTAsoft _{it-1}	-0.265 (0.16)	-0.210 (0.15)	-0.197 (0.14)
PTAhard _{it-1}	-0.255* (0.12)	-0.273** (0.11)	-0.303** (0.11)
X ²	1033.23***	1054.57***	1273.75***
Log likelihood	-2026.06	-2135.31	-1594.92
N	2244	2359	2423

Note: All estimates are ordered logit, unless otherwise specified. The numbers in parentheses are panel-corrected standard errors. All models include binary variables for each level of the dependent variable (excluding the most repressive category), lagged. The estimates are not reported to save space: they are all negative and significant at $\leq .001$.

*** $p \leq .001$; ** $p \leq .01$; * $p \leq .05$.

7. Regimes and International Agreements

7.2 Participation in International Institutions

- The Issue: The benefits of participation
- Do democracies impose tougher conditions and sanctions?

TABLE 1. Determinants of regional IGO enforcement following flawed elections

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
GEOPOLITICAL IMPORTANCE: GDP (<i>log</i>)	-0.40** (0.05)			-1.17*** (0.00)		
GEOPOLITICAL IMPORTANCE: MILITARY EXPENDITURES (<i>log</i>)		-0.17 (0.17)			-0.97*** (0.00)	
GEOPOLITICAL IMPORTANCE: FUEL EXPORTS (<i>log</i>)			-0.21** (0.03)			-0.78** (0.03)
INTERNATIONAL ELECTION observers	1.28* (0.06)	1.25* (0.08)	1.75* (0.06)	-17.00** (0.02)	-14.47*** (0.01)	-2.72 (0.27)
INTERACTION: GEOPOLITICAL importance x observers				0.83** (0.02)	0.86*** (0.00)	0.56* (0.08)
POLITY	-0.14 (0.10)	-0.13 (0.14)	-0.21** (0.03)	-0.14 (0.10)	-0.13 (0.15)	-0.21** (0.03)
POLITY ²	-0.04** (0.03)	-0.04** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.19)	-0.04** (0.03)	-0.04** (0.04)	-0.02 (0.18)
CHANGE IN POLITY SCORE	-0.23 (0.12)	-0.20 (0.16)	-0.04 (0.77)	-0.23 (0.12)	-0.21 (0.16)	-0.04 (0.77)
FOREIGN AID (<i>log</i>)	-0.06 (0.75)	-0.08 (0.60)	-0.05 (0.81)	-0.08 (0.71)	-0.14 (0.53)	-0.01 (0.98)
DEMOCRATIC DENSITY	0.41 (0.13)	0.26 (0.42)	0.31 (0.42)	0.41 (0.15)	0.26 (0.46)	0.31 (0.42)
YEAR	0.37*** (0.00)	0.35*** (0.00)	0.38*** (0.00)	0.38*** (0.00)	0.37*** (0.00)	0.39*** (0.00)
Constant	2.96 (0.49)	-1.2 (0.71)	-5.46 (0.26)	20.37** (0.02)	14.40* (0.05)	-1.91 (0.66)
Observations	144	131	117	144	131	117
Number of countries	34	33	35	34	33	35
Log pseudo-likelihood	-58.92	-57.72	-50.56	-58.13	-56.59	-50.22
Pseudo-R2	0.35	0.30	0.32	0.36	0.31	0.33

Notes: Parameters estimated using logistic regression. Standard errors clustered on country. Robust *p* values in parentheses. Two-tailed significance tests: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

7. Regimes and International Agreements

7.2 Participation in International Institutions

- *Why participate?*

- *Benefits of democratic IOs and democratic consolidation (hazard ratio)*

→ *more democratic IOs
more commitment*

TABLE 1 Estimates of the Determinants of the Duration of Democracy, 1950-1992.

	Cox Models ^a		Weibull Models	
	Polity98	Gasiorowski	Polity98	Gasiorowski
IOScore _{it-1}	-0.04 (-0.98)	-0.06 (-1.14)	-0.04 (-0.79)	-0.08 (-1.50)
DIOScore _{it-1}	-0.62* (-2.35)	-0.37** (-2.61)	-0.56** (-2.74)	-0.32* (-2.44)
pcGDP _{it}	-0.69** (-3.15)	-0.50* (-2.51)	-0.71** (-3.26)	-0.59** (-2.74)
DpcGDP _{it}	-0.47** (-4.30)	-0.09 (-0.77)	-0.14** (-3.87)	-0.06 (-0.83)
Contagion _{it}	-1.02 (-1.02)	-0.04 (-0.05)	-0.41 (-0.45)	-0.14 (-0.17)
PBDown _{it}	0.08 (0.28)	0.26 (0.73)	0.38 (1.35)	0.50 (1.44)
RegConflict _{it}	-0.54 (-1.87)	-0.07 (-0.40)	-0.47 (-1.53)	-0.05 (-0.32)
IntViolence _{it-1}	0.54 (1.11)	-0.05 (-0.11)	0.35 (0.72)	-0.07 (-0.15)
Prez _{it}	-1.01 (-1.93)	0.24 (0.65)	-0.83 (-1.49)	0.21 (0.56)
StableD _{it}	-0.44 (-0.75)	0.13 (0.35)	-0.72 (-1.29)	0.23 (0.63)
Indep _{it}	0.01** (2.49)	0.004 (0.92)	0.01 (1.68)	0.01 (0.94)
Constant	—	—	-1.28 (-1.64)	-2.25** (-4.13)
α	—	—	1.14 (0.92)	1.34* (1.96)
N =	1552	805	1552	805
(Countries)	76	52	76	52
Log Likelihood	-77.99	-174.97	-52.09	-80.65
Chi-square	45.47**	25.68**	46.95**	27.43**

Figures in parentheses are asymptotic z-statistics computed using clustered standard errors.

** = p < .01; * = p < .05; two-tailed tests.

^a Note that Cox Models do not include a constant. It is absorbed into the baseline hazard.

7. Regimes and International Agreements

7.2 Participation in International Institutions

- *Why participate?*
 - *The Issue: The benefits of participation*
 - *Moral hazard, defection, and credible commitment*
 - *Why stronger conditions increase accruing benefits through credibility?*
 - *Empirical examples*
 - *Benefits of IEO membership and credibility*
 - *Economic benefit for individual members*
 - *Benefits of democratic IOs and democratic consolidation*
 - *Is there a democratic advantage?*
 - *Why democracies agree on deeper cooperation*

7. Regimes and International Agreements

Summary

- *7.1 International Negotiations*
 - *The logic of two-level games*
 - *Two-level games and political regimes*
- *7.2 Participation in International Institutions*
 - *Who participates?*
 - *Compliance and depth of agreement*
 - *Why participate?*
 - *Cost of credible commitment and membership benefits*
 - *Is there a democratic advantage in international negotiations and institutions?*
 - *How do International organization promote economic interdependence, democratization, and peace?*