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Chapter VII, Article 41

United Nations Security Council Economic Sanctions in Africa

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Inhaltsverzeichnis

I. Introduction

Rationale

Economic sanctions' usage in diplomatic relations between states is akin to that of a hammer in a toolkit. For centuries threatening economic consequences has been an indirect method of pressurizing foreign states. Economic sanctions have the advantage of being seen as non-violent in contrast to military action. They are also essentially a stealthy method of decimating a state, with the effects being universal, a notion that only entered warfare during the early decades of the 20th century, when total warfare became conventional.

Extending Carl von Clausewitz's statement that "War is the continuation of politics by other means", one could also say that "Economic sanctions are the continuation or preemption of war by other means". The extension of this famous line in political theory intends to elucidate the potential severity of economic sanctions and the degree of impact they can have for a state.

In our modern era, in which the United Nations is a legitimate global forum for decision-making with the United Nations Security Council as a nigh-universally acknowledged and accepted body for taking actions in an sovereignty-infringing manner, especially in the post-cold war period, where United Nations Security Council resolutions are simply blocked/vetoed on neither arbitrary- nor ideological animosity-based grounds. Such, one could argue, the world finds itself with a United Nations Security Council that is willing to take action when it is necessary under the criteria set out by treaties and international law and backed by Chapter 7, Article 41 of the UN Charter. Furthermore, one must realize that such resolutions are binding for all members of the United Nations itself: 193 states. This means that the gravitas such a resolution/decision holds is immense. Whereas a century ago, economic sanctions were implemented unilaterally or limitedly bilaterally with proportionately limited impact, the expected global implementation results in a proportionately strong impact. States and their citizens can be virtually cut-off from the outside world, given a sanction of such comprehensive nature is actually formulated and passed.

In such a scenario, though actual involvement in state affairs, underlined by the principle of sovereignty, is highly limited, but severe resolutions that permit infringement in sovereignty by physical means are even more scarce, it is highly important that the conceptualization and implementation of economic sanctions, which are the most popular tools in the absence of military involvement, are carefully and accurately managed and executed. Much like the previous run-on sentence, United Nation Security Council resolutions, particularly those dealing with international crises, are lengthily articulated and infused with complicated jargon, which hampers the clarity and implementation of them.

Nonetheless, it is of vital importance that United Nations Security Council resolutions mandating economic sanctions are carefully and accurately conceptualized and implemented. As we saw with the ridicule of the author's own sentence, diction and articulation, which fall under the umbrella term of the conceptualization of the economic sanctions, are vital. They, naturally, also are the foundation for the implementation strategy, and thus are the most crucial aspect of the United Nations Security Council resolutions that mandate economic sanctions.

Whilst United Nations Security Council mandated economic sanctions have been used throughout the world, from Haiti to Cambodia, the continent that has seen the highest incidence of United Nations Security Council mandated economic sanction usage is Africa. Africa, the world's 2nd largest continent, by both landmass and population is politically very young, with most states having just little over 50 years of statehood. With an abundance of natural resources, poverty and governance concerns, African states prove to be a popular target of United Nations Security Council mandated economic sanctions. Their political sway in the United Nations Security Council is limited as well with 3 representatives and no veto-power resting with the continent. Additionally, it should be noted, that most African states do not have clear alliances with any of the veto powers, with their recent economic drive being a result of their clever straddling of the great economic powers. The perception of Africa also plays a significant role. Note that Africa has been consistently piled together as a single entity in this paragraph, despite the continent encompassing, as per United Nations membership, 54 states. This has been done to symbolize the unitary perception of Africa in much of the populous of the remaining states of the world. Adjectives often associated with Africa include poor, corrupt, dictatorial, unequal, unstable and uneducated. These images, even if only present on a subliminal level, allows the United Nations Security Council to mandate sanction against African states without having to worry about significant public discontent from their domestic population.

It is thus not farfetched to presume that future sanctions would target African states and hence this analysis would be of relevance in the future as well. Furthermore, as the count of United Nations Security Council mandated economic sanctions are limited, to allow for a fairer analysis having Africa as a base would be the ideal. It should also be noted that this would not prevent the extrapolation of the findings upon non-African cases, but rather would just allow for a more coherent and consistent analysis. Nonetheless, one should remember that Africa is a vast and vibrant continent of a high degree of variety. Thus the utilization of this base is more an instance of convenience and consistence, and should not be mistaken for an instance of homogeneity.

It is not be crucially noted that this paper, despite its already fairly ambitious aim, will not exceed its mandate by engaging significantly in discourse on any of the following notions:

- The legitimacy of the United Nations Security Council in issuing sanctions,
- The politicized & ideological decision making processes of the United Nations Security Council,

- Sanctions that are neither mandated by the United Nations Security Council nor those of non-economic nature.

The above disclaimer wishes to clarify that the premise upon which this paper builds is that United Nations Security Council resolutions that mandate sanctions are entirely legitimate and their utilization will continue to be in the foreseeable future. Discussion on above topics has been conducted on various occasions by other authors, and thus referring to them would be recommended, should the reader have an interest.

Understanding should also be granted as to why above 3 concepts will be left untouched. The discussion of the legitimacy of the United Nations Security Council in mandating sanctions, whether of economic nature or otherwise, is extensive and an amalgam of moral, political and legal discussion. Based upon the simple fact that all members of the United Nations, upon their accession to this international organization, agreed to the principles and formalities of the United Nations charter, the legitimacy of the sanctions, as mandated by the United Nations Security Council, will be understood as given. Regarding the processes which are undergone and the nature of them, this discussion would require an incredible degree of insight into the finer dealings of the United Nations Security Council; most of which is not known to the public. The political and ideological nature of the processes should be discounted from the discussion as it generally results in a circular argument that would merely hinder the emergence of results in this research. Finally sanctions outside the United Nations Security Council's purview and those of non-economic nature, will generally be left undiscussed, as they are not the focal point of this paper. By diverging into tangents, this paper will lose any significance it desired to have. Naturally slight occasional inclusions of the above topics is possible, but extensive discussions are highly improbable.

Literature Review

Regardless of that which will not be discussed, it is more crucial to establish that which will, for which a detailed insight into the existing literature is critical, so as to understand the foundation upon which this paper hopes to build. Despite the existence of economic sanctions in the international arena for decades, if not centuries, literature on their conceptualization and formula has been relatively sparse, as transparency has often been lacking. The promotion and mandating of them through the United Nations Security Council has changed this aspect. Public access to the resolutions upon which these sanctions are articulated has changed this matter considerably, especially in the age of the internet. A set of select academics have also realized the potential and importance of these sanctions and has set out to discuss them. A significant proportion of literature and discussion on the United Nations Security Council focuses on the legitimacy and composition of the body, with a focus on their unique ability to mandate the use of force in conflicts and thus the essential loss of the monopoly of the use of force by a state itself.

Excluding most of the aforementioned literature types, one finds a limited pool of literature on economic sanctions, with at least partial if not entire focus on those mandated by the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. Within this scholarly body, focus is divided between the political discussion of economic sanctions and analysis of the effectiveness of economic sanctions. The former, though undoubtedly interesting, is unessential for this study, hence it will predominately not be touched upon. The focus will thus fall upon the latter set of literature.

Margaret P. Doxey, from Trent University, is perhaps the founding mother and an academic authority in the field of international economic sanctions. Her seminal piece *Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement* (1980) is an astounding piece of literature with an extensive review of economic sanctions history and cases, with not being limited to the modern era. She also identifies a set of problems, of which the majority have been reiterated by most other authors who write on this field. She also analyzes the reactions of target states to sanctions. Her piece will be form the foundation of the paper, as it is an excellent starting point towards understanding the development and nature of sanctions throughout history. Her second book, *International Sanctions in a Contemporary Perspective* published in 1996 takes a step further by not only updating and expanding the content from the previous book, but also by delving deeper into identifying problematiques, goals and implementation issues pertaining to economic sanctions. This book identifies the UN’s role as the Prof. Doxey imagined it as her highlighting of collateral damage control and burden sharing as crucial aspects to consider when resolutions mandating economic sanctions are passed, highlights a key issue pertaining to how careful the conceptualization of economic sanctions need be. Her listing of the components of the implementation process: coordination, monitoring and policing also sheds an interesting light on how economic sanctions do not end with the action they mandate, but that the resolutions should clearly highlight how implementation is to be assured. This relates to the feasibility of economic sanctions and how certain forms may be more easily implemented.

In the year 2000, David Cortright and Geroge A. Lopez published *The Sanctions Decade*, which characterizes the rise of economic sanctions usage by the United Nations Security Council in the post-cold war era. It also includes an interesting model that aids in the analysis of aforementioned sanctions and introduces the concept of smart sanctions and depicts issues such as the humanitarian dilemma, unintended political impacts and sanctions hijacking that are all pitfalls of economic sanctions. The very recently published *A Strategic Understanding of UN Economic Sanctions* (2014) by Golnoosh Hakimdavar takes a much more critical approach to economic sanctions, but also recommends concepts such as smart sanctions. It also includes a set of idealistic concepts such as positive sanctions, global trade regulation, preemptive sanctions and UNSC expansion. The juxtaposition of the two books demonstrates how, in the little over a dozen years that passed when smart sanctions were endorsed, progress has been limited and sparse.

The aforementioned 3 pieces are normatively driven literature, but empirical research has also been conducted. None more significant than Peterson Institute of International Economics Fellows' Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jefferey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliot & Barbara Oegg's *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* (2007), being now in its 3rd edition, with the first print having surfaced in 1985. This book embarks upon the most extensive econometric analysis of sanction cases known in the sanctions literature, encompassing 174 cases in total. Of these, the majority are non-United Nations Security Council mandated economic sanctions, and hence generally irrelevant to this research, but the variables of relevance and the sanctions examined make this an invaluable foundation for any sanctions research. They compute a multitude of variables and eventually bring forth a success score (out of 16). This success score is derived from the product of the score they attributed to the result (out of 4) and to the contribution the sanction had upon aforementioned result (out of 4). Critically 4 variables stood out in relation to United Nations Security Council mandated economic sanctions: foreign policy goal, target country cost, duration of sanctions and health & stability within the state. These were deemed to be, in differing degrees, significant in their contribution to the result and to the contribution of the sanctions to the result, and hence are of critical importance in understanding the topic at hand.

Economic Sanctions: International Policy and Political Economy at Work (2007) by Robert Eyler takes a very practical and empirical approach to the analysis of economic sanctions and thus represents a divergent extension of the previously mentioned piece of literature by Hufbauer et al (2007). The approach taken by this book is extremely mathematic and on a very high level of economics, utilizing the newest techniques and their versions such as New Open Economy Macroeconomics. Unfortunately the book is limited in its application, particularly in comparison to Hufbauer et al (2007) and in addition the complexity of it makes it less accessible to policy-makers who are generally of a variety of backgrounds, particularly from the field of political or legal science.

Daniel Drezner, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado, Boulder and former research consultant for the RAND Corporation, published *The Sanctions Paradox* in 1999, which examines economic coercion and expectations in an economic context to analyze sanctions. Though the theory is of interest and potentially influential in nature, its limit on bilateral sanctions issued by either the United States of America or the Soviet Union mitigates the applicability of it on United Nations Security Council mandated economic sanctions. Akin to the literature published by Robert Eyler (2007) its depth in economic theory is extensive and contextually very interesting, but therefore also limits its accessibility as well.

The 1987 published *The Utility of International Economic Sanctions* edited by David Leyton-Brown is an interesting analysis of economic sanctions, which includes those mandated by the United Nations Security Council. However the aged nature of the book limits its applicability beyond the theoretical lessons acquired from it that include the realization that economic sanctions alone are never solely responsible for the desired outcomes and the resultant effects of them on third parties that are not directly connected to the state sanctioned.

The final piece of literature of note that need be introduced is Makio Miyagawa's *Do Economic Sanctions Work?* published in 1992. The book is a very interesting normative take on the utility of economic sanctions and includes detailed analyses of the Iranian hostage crisis as a case study to examine the proposed question. The lessons learnt are reflected in the works by Margaret P. Doxey (1980/1996) and generally form just a detailed understanding of the Iranian hostage crisis as case, rather than bringing about new findings and conclusions. The significant aspect of this book is the intuitive and understandable nature of it. This is due to the fact that the author of this literature was at the time the Deputy Director of the Russia Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, and hence his approach is less academic and more policy-oriented, increasing the utility of his piece for policy-makers.

The above literature review was selectively compiled for the reason of providing the foundation upon which this paper wishes to build. Generally we realize that 2 types of literature exist in the field at the present moment. The first is a normative analysis of economic sanctions, with a significant focus on United Nations Security Council mandated economic sanctions as well. These generally lay out an extensive array of factors that contribute to the success of sanctions and what a success actually means. They also highlight aspects that pertain to how sanctions are eventually mandated by the United Nations Security Council. The second type pertains to the empirical driven pieces, which include a high level of economic and mathematic theory to grant an attempted objective perspective to sanctions. Due to the limited number of United Nations Security Council mandated economic sanctions, these generally include not only economic sanctions from the United Nations Security Council, but also sanctions that are bilateral or multilateral, which are thence not endorsed by the United Nations Security Council.

Setup & Methodology

The research topic of this paper is to:

<u>Examine the factors that led to the success/failure of United Nations Security Council mandated economic sanctions on African States</u>

To accomplish above research topic a mixture of the above literature types will be utilized. The empirical data from Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jefferey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliot & Barbara Oegg's *Economic*

Sanctions Reconsidered (2007) will be utilized as this piece is generally acknowledged to be the most comprehensive and robust econometric analysis of economic sanctions in the existent literature. Utilizing primarily the success score, thus as the dependent variable, with success being adjudged to be any score of 8 and above, the analysis will then attempt to decipher which of the carefully selected independent variables were most relevant to the success of sanctions. This book also provides the data for 4 of the 5 independent variables chosen for this analysis: foreign policy goals, target country costs, duration of sanctions and health & stability score. In addition to above 4 independent variables, the fifth will be the target industry of the sanctions, as this was deemed in the literature to be of particular significance (Hakimdavar 2014). These variables are further validated by their mentioning in other pieces of literature as well (Doxey 1996/Cortright & Lopez 2000).

The approach taken will be similar to the policy-based intuitive one utilized by Makio Miyagawa in his *Do Economic Sanctions Work?* with a case-by-case normative analysis of 5 instances whereby the United Nations Security Council mandated economic sanctions upon African states (1992). These 5 cases will be:

- Angola
- Rhodesia
- Rwanda
- Sierra Leone
- Somalia

These were chosen as they were the ones that had complete data on them in Hufbauer et al (2007). Other cases will be extrapolated upon using the findings from these cases to test the significance and relevance of the understandings acquired from this research.

The hypothesis of this author is that the success of economic sanctions are high, when the cost of sanctions are damaging to a state and the duration of the sanctions are approximately restricted to the medium term (5-10 years). The importance of targeted smart sanctions should also not be underestimated, but hypothetically the effectiveness should be higher when above two conditions are met.

II. Case-by-Case Analysis

This section will analyze individually each of the 5 cases. The first four cases will be cases that are judged to be successes and the variables will be examined to establish which factors contributed significantly to the success of the economic sanctions. This section will proceed in chronological order, beginning with Rhodesia and being followed by Angola and Sierra Leone. The remaining two cases of Somalia and

Rwanda will follow as the cases of failures and a similar analysis will be conducted. The cross-analysis of the determined factors will then be conducted in the chapter following this one.

Rhodesia

Rhodesia was founded as a state in 1965 with the unilateral declaration of independence. It was a state that was ruled by the Caucasian minority and generally failed to be recognized formally as a state overall. (Losman 1979) Economic relations existed and particularly the export of chromium enabled the state maintain a budget and utilize it in its ruling. (Losman 1979) The crux of the international rejection emanated from the fact that 50 of the 66 parliamentary seats were unequivocally reserved for the white minority which constituted less than 5% of the total population of the country. (Losman 1979) This can be summarized by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 216 (1965) which condemned (Southern) Rhodesia as an "illegal racist minority regime", thus rejecting the unilateral declaration of independence and calling upon all other United Nations member states to refuse recognizing it as well. (UNSC) This resolution was succeeded by further resolutions, also issued by the United Nations Security Council, which continued condemning the regime. Ultimately, on May 29th 1968, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 253 which included a variety of measures within the economic sanctions imposed. (UNSC) These included universal import restrictions of (Southern) Rhodesian products, temporarily prohibition of Rhodesian nationals in territories of United Nations members from promoting the export of goods from Rhodesia, the disallowing Rhodeisan goods, packages and shipments on vessels and aircraft from entering United Nations members' territories, with exceptions for the general set of goods the United Nations considers extraordinary (humanitarian, medical etc.), as well as the prevention of the shipment of goods from United Nations members to be exported, by whichever means they travelled, whether by vessels, aircraft or by land transport, to Rhodesia. (UNSC 1968) The economic sanctions also included comprehensive prohibition of support offered to Rhodesia, whether this be of touristic, commercial, industrial or public utility nature. (UNSC 1968) Funds, investments and any other financial or economic ventures were prohibited as a whole, whether from state side or from nationals of the United Nations member territories. (UNSC 1968) Nationals from Rhodesia, whether officially by passport or concealed by use of a different passport, were to be disallowed from entering United Nations member countries. (UNSC 1968) This also included nationals of other countries that engaged in unlawful activities with the Rhodesian regime. (UNSC 1968) A comprehensive ban on all airlines and aircraft that were in some form of the other registered within a United Nations member state to interact with Rhodesian airlines or aircraft. (UNSC 1968) Emigration to Rhodesia was also to be prevented. In addition to these comprehensive measures against Rhodesia, measures to aid Zambia, whose economy was deemed to undoubtedly suffer as a result, to be afforded by member states and agencies. (UNSC 1968)

The comprehensive nature of the sanctions is positively surprising, as is the consideration of the negative externalities of such sanctions on neighboring states. It should be noted that as per Hufbauer et al (2007) the sanctions imposed on Rhodesia resulted in a $28.89 per capita drop on GDP with a duration of 14 years in sanctions. Furthermore the goal of these sanctions is essentially to evoke majority rule in the state and the success score is 12, thus indicating the high level of success these sanctions enjoyed. The nature of the sanctions are general, without a focus on any particular industry and the health and stability level was medium as the time of sanction issuance.

Contemplating the data and the historical information the conclusion that one comes to is that the economic costs upon Rhodesia were indeed very high and that the sanctions were rather total and comprehensive in their nature, as they encompassed, with very few exceptions, a wide range of fields. (Doxey 1980) The duration of the sanctions exceeds the medium term, but this could be potentially explained by the fact that Rhodesia was afforded considerable help initially from its natural ally South Africa, as well as from certain wealthy nationals from other states. (Doxey 1980) This is of particular importance as in the 1960s and 1970s, financial transactions were more difficult to track and these sanctions were the first of their kind to be this comprehensively imposed by the United Nations Security Council. (Hakimdavar 2014) Hence the inexperience of the staff and the lack of comprehensive monitoring allowed the sanctions to remain less effective initially. (Doxey 1980) It should also be noted that states such as Rhodesia that benefitting significantly from their natural resources are able to rely on surplus funds until they dry out, hence why lengthier sanctions may be required.

Despite the seemingly comprehensive success of the United Nations Security Council mandated economic sanctions, the effort of the local populace should not be neglected and should be considered noteworthy. With 95% of the population essentially against the regime, the task of effecting the foreign policy goal became substantially more probable. (Losman 1979) Despite human rights infringing actions by the Rhodesian regime, the presence of peace and stability mitigated the fallout. The medium-level health & stability score should also be considered as a factor of importance, as this allowed the state to hang on to its power for a lengthier period of time, as higher degrees of human suffering increases the desperation and sanctions could potentially hit harder from the onset, thus increasing the likelihood of popular revolt. Ultimately, one must state that in the case of Rhodesia the United Nations mandated economic sanctions worked due to the fact that their comprehensive nature handicapped the state severely and thus forced the state's hand, which was evident when the first set of reforms in the electoral system, though still insufficient and largely unfair, were initiated as swiftly just under 2 years after the sanctions were imposed by the United Nations Security Council (Doxey 1980).

Angola

The case of Angola is an interesting one as the case could be deemed one of dissolution of a conflict or a civil war, but is crucially deemed one of democratic principles. The background of these sanctions involve numerous efforts and resolutions by the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to resolve the conflict in the state peacefully. The national government and the rebel fraction União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) had a large conflict for numerous years culminating eventually in the 1990s. (Guimaraes 2001) Though the Acordos de Paz peace agreements were signed and agreed to, the provisions within them were not implemented and the ceasefire was not adhered to, resulting in a deteriorating humanitarian, political and military situation. (Guimaraes 2001)

After no less than 9 resolutions by the United Nations Security Council from 1991 till 1993, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 864 (1993), which finally placed economic sanctions (UNSC). These economic sanctions prohibited the selling of arms, petroleum and related products to UNITA as well as the purchase of goods from them (UNSC 1993). The problem essentially arose from the fact that UNITA did not accept the 1992 elections, and as such the aim of this resolution was the acceptance of these elections by UNITA, such that peace could be regained in Angola. (Guimaraes 2001) The Angolan oil economy suffered two-fold, first by the fact that UNITA made the export and investment infrastructure inaccessible and secondly by the fact that the resolution prevented the purchase of the oil from UNITA by United Nations member states and all nationals and corporations within them. (Guimaraes 2001) Thus UNITA was essentially squeezed slowly and their economic impact on them ensured they were unable to continue financing their conflict and had to accept the democratically conducted elections of 1992. (Guimaraes 2001)

Resolution 864 was subsequently followed by several other resolutions that tightened the economic sanctions on UNITA further. Resolution 1127 in 1997 tightened the oil related restrictions as well as those relating to aircrafts, whether it be the flying of them or the provision of spare parts towards them (UNSC). Then resolution 1173 in 1998 specifically targeted the biggest source of UNITA’s financing: diamonds, by prohibiting the purchase of diamonds not controlled by a certificate of origin scheme and prohibiting the sale of mining equipment and vehicles to non-state authorities (UNSC). Furthermore contact with UNITA was to be suspended, hence limiting the occurrence of trade with them (UNSC 1998). Resolution 1237 of 1999 then provided the framework for resolution 1295 on the 18th of April 2000 which dealt the hardest blow on UNITA, by first requesting a report (Fowler Report) pertaining to UNITA’s financing to be written and then reacting upon it in the latter resolution by essentially cutting off the diamond and oil based network that UNITA used to finance itself.

The case of Angola is interesting, as Hufbauer et al (2007) give this case a success score of 12 points as well, with the cost per capita to the GDP being $32.81, in a state with low health & stability standards. The duration of these sanctions was thus 9 years in total and hence within the medium range hypothesized. It is interesting to note that unlike the Rhodesian case, the Angolan case saw a significant and progressive improvement in the design of sanctions in the chronological sense.

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone represents an interesting case, as it happened parallel to the latter phase of the Angolan case, when progressive and smart United Nations Security Council mandated resolutions were put in to place, but seemingly Sierra Leone did not benefit from that. Once more, like in the case of Angola and UNITA, Sierra Leone’s case includes a civil war but revolves around the rejection of a democratic election that resulted in the civil war (Jackson 2004). In 1996, after a series of military governments, that are generally deemed to have enriched themselves and ruled with ruthlessness, pressure from the international society as well as the domestic populace, democratic elections were held and the Abidjan Peace Accord signed in the neighboring Ivory Coast (Jackson 2004). However this government was toppled by a military junta and conflict erupted violently as a result (Jackson 2004).

Resolution 1132, mandated by the United Nations Security Council in 1997 included provisions to prevent the sale of arms & oil and also limited trade (UNSC). The comprehensiveness of this resolution was lacking, and knowing retrospectively that diamonds played a significant part in the fueling of this conflict, it is particularly concerning that the United Nations Security Council had not explicitly acted upon it. Though a series of resolutions followed, none directly attacked the problem at hand and focused more on the general provisions of travel bans and arms embargoes (UNSC 1997). However, the lawlessness of the land and the existence of the black market enabled Sierra Leone to finance its civil war and democratic dissent vis-à-vis diamonds and purchase weapons as well (Jackson 2004).

Hufbauer et al (2007) grant this case a success score of 8, hence being just on par. With a $12.22 GDP per capita decrease and 6 years of sanctions (medium-term), and a low health & stability situation, this case is ambiguous in its nature as the eventual resolution of the conflict can clearly not be attributed entirely to the sanctions. The peace efforts by the United Nations Security Council as well as the usage of uncharacteristically aggressively armed peacekeepers enabled the defusing of the situation and the establishment of democracy in the year 2003, but the sanctions themselves were only limitedly successful (Jackson 2004).

Somalia

Following two successful and one limitedly successful case, the focus shifts on the failed cases. Somalia, more than any other state, is a symbol of the failure of the international community (Rutherford 2008). This notion persists till today, and with the emergence of the Somali pirates of the Gulf of Aden and extensive terrorist networks in the past decade, the belief that Somalia is one of the greatest failures of the United Nations as a whole is only strengthened (Hesse 2011). The conflict in Somalia is a prolonged one that would require a thesis of its own to explain, as it emanates primarily from the division of the territory between Britain and Italy during colonial times and extended throughout its history (Hesse 2011). It includes tribal, religious and political groups that have consistently fought over this region, as well as new entrants (Hesse 2011). It also includes significant failures by particularly Western states to interfere in an insensitive manner, which only served to exacerbate the situation further (Rutherford 2008).

The first United Nations Security Council to mandate economic sanctions on Somalia was issued on the 23rd of January 1992 with the number 733 (UNSC). It imposed a complete arms embargo, hence limited the trade on that front only (UNSC). A host of United Nations Security Council resolutions have been mandated since, with one count placing the total list of United Nations Security Council resolutions pertaining to Somalia at 63, with only the 1960 resolution 141 having a positive consequence: the admission of Somalia into the United Nations (Rutherford 2008).

Hufbauer et al (2007) grant this case a success score of 2. The decrease in GDP per capita was $7.30 and the duration now exceeds 23 years. The health & stability standard has always been low and the foreign policy goal is said to have been the dissolution of the civil war. As one cannot miss, these figures are quite sobering and clearly depict how an arms based sanction is insufficient. Somalia has no clear industry to speak of, hence the United Nations Security Council also found it to be rather difficult to have targeted sanctions (Rutherford 2008).

Rwanda

The Rwandan case is equally dispiriting as the Somali case, as Hufbaer et al (2007) grant this case a success score of 2 as well. They also note a perverse increase of the GDP per capita by $5.35 during the time of the economic sanctions and note that the dissolution of the civil war was the goal. The health and stability standard was low and the duration of these sanctions was merely a single year.

The Rwandan conflict emanated from the sparring relations between the Hutu and Tutsi tribe of the state and culminated in a bloody civil war, which is universally accepted to have included a genocide as well (Verwimp 2013). The United Nations Security Council condemned the situation thrice using United Nations Security Council resolutions 872 (1993), 909 (1994) and 912 (1994) (all UNSC). Finally they opted to use economic sanctions with United Nations Security Council resolution 918 (1994) to prevent all forms of trade related weapons, ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, police equipment and other spare parts (UNSC). This proved ultimately futile as the conflict had already escalated to a very high level and the weapons were already on the ground (Verwimp 2013). Furthermore consideration for the neighboring countries had been crucially not included. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, a state which itself has been in a conflict for decades had sufficient weaponry and the black market to fuel the conflict in Rwanda as well as the nature resources (Stearns 2012). Rwanda, despite having no diamond mine of note, has been exporting diamonds to this day (Verwimp 2013). It is commonly accepted that these are blood diamonds smuggled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo into Rwanda to be smuggled out (Stearns 2012). Essentially the point that must be made is that, the banning of such an export could have been crucial as well as more firm action in this case, as the degree to which the civil war had escalated meant that economic sanctions were irrelevant, as the warring occurred not between fractions but literally could include any common individual of the opposing tribe.

To conclude, much like the Somali case, Rwanda is a dark mark on the track record of the United Nations Security Council. It represents a comprehensive failure by the United Nations Security Council to understand the situation and react accordingly (Verwimp 2013). The cost of human life was immense and the cluelessness of the United Nations Security Council is particularly concerning. It must however be noted, that unlike the Somali case, this case does not necessarily represent a failure of the economic sanctions mandated by the United Nations Security Council, but rather the lack of more firm and necessary measures as civil wars are unpredictable in their nature and structural adjustments would do little to disarm them.

III. Findings, Cross-Analysis & Application on Recent Cases

Findings & Cross-Analysis

With these 5 cases a diverse set of scenarios has been examined that show the strengths as well as the weaknesses of both the United Nations Security Council as well as the mandated economic sanctions by it. The 5 independent variables have been examined individually in each case, thus now it would be of utility to examine their overarching relevance. Furthermore their conjunctive relevance should also be considered, as in the complex sphere of international relations and international political economy, such factors seldom have an isolated effect. Furthermore the application and extrapolation of the derived findings on recent cases would be of interest to examine the relevance of them.

Findings & Cross-Analysis: Foreign Policy Goal

In terms of the foreign policy goal, there have been two types of goals that have surfaced in the 5 cases examined: establishment of democratic rule & diffusing of a civil war. In the cases where democratic rule was to be established: Rhodesia, Angola & Sierra Leone, the cases were deemed successes. In the cases where civil war was to be diffused: Somalia & Rwanda, the cases were deemed failures. However the matter is more complex than this simple division. Both Angola & Sierra Leone had an element of internal conflict as well. Angola did not have the prevailing of the same degree of lawlessness and Sierra Leone's situation was better than that of Somalia & Rwanda. However it must also be noted that the former two success cases had had an election that was democratically conducted that then rejected by a fraction, whereas the latter two had not had that instance. Furthermore it could be argued that the diffusing of a civil war of the type that Somalia & Rwanda experience is very different to that which Angola & Sierra Leone experienced. In Somalia & Rwanda the civil wars were generally total in their nature, whereby even general civilians drew arms, whereas the Angolan & Sierra Leone case was usually conducted by an organized element against the democratically elected government authority. Therefore one can conclude that the establishment of democratic principles is a process that can be coerced by economic sanctions, whereas the diffusing of a civil war is more complex and highly dependent on the scenario faced.

Findings & Cross-Analysis: Target Country Costs

The target country costs in the success cases were higher than that of the failure cases. But once again, such a simplification is naïve. The duration of the sanctions in Rwanda and the lack of targeting doomed the economic sanctions in this case from the beginning, whereas the Somali case revolves around a state that is highly agriculture based and thus includes more self-sufficient groups (Hesse 2011). It is also considerable that both these states did not have an economy to speak of before, hence damage to their economy could be considered negligible overall. The other cases all had economically better situations, though Sierra Leone's case is more arguable. The conclusion on this aspect will be delivered comprehensively after the next section, as they are both inadvertently intertwined.

Findings & Cross-Analysis: Target Industry of Sanctions

We find that in the case of Rhodesia (Chromium), Angola (Diamonds & Oil) and Sierra Leone (Diamonds), states that are highly reliant on a natural resource are more likely to suffer the consequences of targeted economic sanctions, whereas both Rwanda & Somalia did not have targeted economic sanctions beyond arms. This was due to the fact that neither have nature resource based industries officially. Rwanda's smuggled diamond industry should be noted as a case where the United Nations Security Council should have thought out of the box, whereas in Somalia they were generally helpless. In Sierra Leone they failed to properly target diamonds, but the industry managed to be subdued eventually due to the Kimberly Process. In Rhodesia's case the comprehensive trade ban ensured that the chromium industry that the state was reliant on suffered as well, whilst in Angola's case targeted economic sanctions truly showed effect.

In conclusion, economic sanctions that target industry's and harm the economic capabilities of the state are only effective in instances whereby the conflict is fueled by this (natural) resource. Furthermore such sanctions must be permitted time to take effect, as states generally have reserves they can rely on during difficult times.

Findings & Cross-Analysis: Duration of Sanctions

This transitions perfectly into the duration of sanctions concept, as we have noted that in the Rwandan case the sanctions were too short-lived to have an effect and in the Somalia case they have been continuing for too long. Once a state is economically incapable and still continuing with the conflict significantly, then there is a problem with the implementation of the sanctions or they are just irrelevant in this case. We see generally a tendency towards the medium-term with 5-10 years seeming to be the effective period in which economic sanctions can take effect and make the targeted country and their conflict-driving regimes suffer as a result. The durational type of sanctions are thus more recommended in situations where the state has a degree of health & stability or it is not in a situation of civil war, as the opposing situations would result in significant humanitarian situation for which the United Nations Security Council would then be considered liable.

Findings & Cross-Analysis: Health & Stability

The health & stability aspect generally seems irrelevant on its own, but in conjunction with other aspects has limited relevance. However, ultimately one must conclude that health & stability seem to have little bearing on the effectiveness of economic sanctions, barring providing some ground conditions for some of the independent variables.

Extrapolation: Liberia

Liberia was sanctioned in resolution 1343 (2001) and 1521 (2003) regarding its support of rebels in Sierra Leone and how diamonds thence exited through Liberia and thus fueled the conflict in Sierra Leone (both UNSC)/(Harris 2012). The conflict in Liberia regarding democratic issues pertaining to their president Charles Taylor were also part of the concerns voiced by the United Nations Security Council (Harris 2012). This case could be deemed a success story, as the targeting of both the diamond and timber industry in Liberia strongly affected their economy, and thus resulted in their relenting over time (Harris 2012). They handed over Charles Taylor to the special tribunal, which was positively recognized by the United Nations Security Council in resolution 1689 (2006), which removed the suspended export of timber, but maintained the diamond ban till the country agreed to follow the Kimberly process and thus eliminate all doubt of blood diamond presence (UNSC).

Thus we note here that the cost of the sanctions, the industry that they targeted, the duration (5 years) as well as the more controlled and modest goal allowed the United Nations Security Council to achieve a success through its sanctions.

Extrapolation: Democratic Republic of the Congo

In the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has been experiencing conflicts since its independence from Belgium in previous century, the economic sanctions imposed upon the country with United Nations Security Council resolution 1493 (2003) and 1952 (2010) have shown limited success thus far (Stearns 2012)/(both UNSC). Resolution 1493 focused solely on an arms embargo and subsequent resolutions until 2010 just aimed at strengthening this embargo and restricting travel rights of conflict related individuals (UNSC). This country is suffering a brutal civil war with massacres and sexual violence abound, yet the United Nations Security Council has only had limited success thus far (Stearns 2012). With resolution 1952 the United Nations Security Council finally implemented targeted sanctions, which immediately showed effect with lessening violence (UNSC)/(Stearns 2012). The concern with this case is that numerous states violate this sanctions knowingly as the Democratic Republic of the Congo has a vast pool of natural resources including diamonds, metals and rare earth metals (Stearns 2012). Neighboring states that do not have reserves of these resources have been mysteriously exporting them in the past decade and states with significant political power on the international stage have been attempting to divert focus away from their economic priorities (Stearns 2012). This case shows that the limit of economic sanctions is dependent on the cooperation of the United Nations member states.

Cross-Analysis

Overall must one concede that the complexity of the sphere in which United Nations Security Council mandated economic sanctions are supposed to take effect is rather daunting. With a vast array of factors to consider and political & economic interests notwithstanding, these sanctions rightfully struggle to have an impact at times. Should however the United Nations member states be unified in their desire to improve the situation, then the United Nations Security Council can, by virtue of the juxtaposition of aforementioned independent variables mandate economic sanctions that would duly serve their purpose.

IV. Policy Recommendations & Conclusion

As a result of above analysis we can conclude initially that with a modest policy goal, a focused yet strong economic sanction on targeted industries and with the resilience to continue the mandate for at least 5 years, the United Nations Security Council can effectively use economic sanctions. However it is their limitations that must not be neglected and be always considered. Generally one can state that economic sanctions are and can be effective, but they are highly dependent on conditions, their structure and the implementation of them. Should these factors be maligned, then the economic sanctions are surely doomed to fail.

Policy Recommendations

Resultantly, the recommendation to policy-makers would be multidimensional. The first recommendation is that policy-makers comprehensively collect information on the given case. They must understand the political, economic, military and humanitarian aspects of the country before they impose sanctions, as blind sanctioning is ineffective and at best a public relations stunt.

The second recommendation for policy makers is to utilize this information to identify the nature of the conflict they are facing. Given a situation that is highly volatile, more extreme measures should be considered, but if the situation is dire but yet structured to an extent, then policy makers should be confident to proceed with considering how they wish to implement sanctions and of what type.

The third recommendation for policy makers is to call upon aforementioned collected information to identify the key industries in the state where the conflict is occurring. Ideally the core source of the funding for the conflicting parties should be found, but given the difficulty of doing that, a comprehensive ban on all the key industries would be most effective, as that would allow for gradual loosening of the sanctions whilst they are able to identify those industries that fuel the conflict the most. It is also important to note that natural resource based industries should be most certainly targeted, as these have proven to be consistent source of funding for conflicts in a multitude of cases.

The fourth recommendation for policy-makers is to ensure cooperation from all UN member states as without this aspect, all sanctions could be as easily navigated as Swiss cheese. Particularly in times of highly influential transnational corporations and highly capitalistic states, it is crucial that their support is either pledged or coerced, as these loopholes could easily prolong conflicts by a significant period of time and potentially also mask the effect that the United Nations Security Council mandated economic sanctions could have, would cooperation be present.

The fifth and final recommendation for policy-makers is to focus on the humanitarian struggle, as a state is nothing without its people. Even if the sanctions could potentially mitigate the conflict eventually, the humanitarian cost must not be neglected and should always be considered when sanctions are drafted, and that is why targeted & smart sanctions are highly recommended, as they generally manage to mitigate the negative effect they have upon the common populous.

Conclusion

Finally, it must be stated that though these recommendations may seem simple and may have been offered before in either the highly theoretical or empirical pieces mentioned in the literature review, it is worth noting with concern that cases emerge repeatedly that depict the forgetfulness of diplomats with regards to the success they had previously with certain methodologies. As the great mind Confucius once said "Study the past, if you would divine the future".

Focus was placed on Africa for this analysis as Africa seems to be hotbed for the conflicts where the United Nations Security Council seems most willing and able to act. Furthermore, since one naturally hopes for a more diplomatic solution, the use of economic sanctions, relative to those of outright intervention seems preferable and desirable as a whole. The past, as was mentioned should be learnt from, but the true test for the United Nations Security Council is whether it can be strict and stringent with itself when it applies the economic sanctions it mandates and the manner in which it does. For, the crises that the United Nations Security Council is called upon to deal with do not allow a margin of error, thus preparing, analyzing and implementing economic sanctions appropriately should be of the highest priority for every policy-maker involved in these sensitive processes. It is highly challenging, but hope should not be cast away for as former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan said "We need to keep hope alive and strive to do better"

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