

# UNSC ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN AFRICA



BY SANDEEP RAJGOPAL

# AGENDA

- ❖ I. Introduction
- ❖ II. Case-by-Case Analysis
- ❖ III. Cross-Analysis
- ❖ IV. Conclusion & Policy Recommendations

# I. INTRODUCTION: RATIONALE & LIT REVIEW

- ❖ Long history of sanctions
- ❖ Chapter VII, Article 41
- ❖ Africa: target
- ❖ 3 most important literature pieces:
  - ❖ Doxey, M.P. (1980) *Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement*
  - ❖ Hufbauer, Schott, Elliot & Oegg (2007): *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*
  - ❖ Miyagawa, M. (1992): *Do Economic Sanctions Work?*

# I. INTRODUCTION: LIT REVIEW & METHODOLOGY

- ❖ Research Topic: Examine the factors that led to the success/failure of UNSC mandated economic sanctions on African states
- ❖ Dependent Variable: Success (score) of sanctions
- ❖ Independent Variables:
  1. Foreign policy goals
  2. Target Country Costs
  3. Target Industry of Sanctions
  4. Duration of Sanctions
  5. Health & Stability
- ❖ Hypothesis: Success of economic sanctions are high, when the cost of sanctions are damaging to a state and the duration of sanctions are restricted to the medium term (5-10 years)


## II. CASE-BY-CASE ANALYSIS: RHODESIA

- ❖ History: Racist Minority Rule
- ❖ Resolution 253: Comprehensive
- ❖ Success Score: 12
- ❖ Goal: Majority Rule
- ❖ Costs: \$28.89 per capita
- ❖ Industry: General
- ❖ Duration: 14 years
- ❖ H&S: Medium



## II. CASE-BY-CASE ANALYSIS: ANGOLA

- ❖ History: Rejected elections & conflict
- ❖ Resolution 864 (1993), 1127 (1997), 1173 (1998), 1237(1999) >>> 1295(2000)
- ❖ Success Score: 12
- ❖ Goal: Accept democracy & ceasefire
- ❖ Costs: \$32.81 per capita
- ❖ Industry: Oil & Diamonds
- ❖ Duration: 9 years
- ❖ H&S: Low




## II. CASE-BY-CASE ANALYSIS: SIERRA LEONE

- ❖ History: Rejected elections & conflict
- ❖ Resolution 1132 (1997)
- ❖ Success Score: 8
- ❖ Goal: Accept democracy & end conflict
- ❖ Costs: \$12.22 per capita
- ❖ Industry: Diamonds
- ❖ Duration: 6 years
- ❖ H&S: Low



## II. CASE-BY-CASE ANALYSIS: SOMALIA

- ❖ History: Decades long strife
- ❖ Resolution 733 (1992), +62
- ❖ Success Score: 2
- ❖ Goal: End civil war & establish rule of law
- ❖ Costs: \$7.30 per capita
- ❖ Industry: -
- ❖ Duration: 23+ years
- ❖ H&S: Low



## II. CASE-BY-CASE ANALYSIS: RWANDA

- ❖ History: Ethnic conflict
- ❖ Resolution 918 (1994)
- ❖ Success Score: 2
- ❖ Goal: End civil war & genocide
- ❖ Costs: \$(5.38) per capita
- ❖ Industry: -
- ❖ Duration: 1 year
- ❖ H&S: Low



# III. CROSS-ANALYSIS (TABLE)

	Rhodesia	Angola	Sierra Leone	Somalia	
Score	12	12	8	2	2
Goal	Majority	Democracy	Democracy	Civil War	Civil War
Costs	28.89	32.81	12.22	7.30	(5.38)
Industry	General	Oil & Diamonds	Diamonds	-	-
Duration	14	9	6	23+	1
H&S	Medium	Low	Low	Low	Low

# III. CROSS-ANALYSIS: FINDINGS

1. Foreign policy goals
2. Target Country Costs
3. Target Industry of Sanctions
4. Duration of Sanctions
5. Health & Stability

### III. CROSS-ANALYSIS: EXTRAPOLATION

#### ◆ Liberia:

◆ History: Charles Taylor & fueling Sierra Leone conflict

◆ Resolution: 1343 (2001) & 1521 (2003)

◆ Successful: resolution 1689 (2006)

#### ◆ DRC:

◆ History: permanent conflict since independence in 1960s

◆ Resolution: 1493 (2003) & 1952 (2010)

◆ Limited success, external players

# IV. CONCLUSION & POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

## ❖ Policy Recommendations:

1. Information collection
2. Conflict identification
3. Key industry identification
4. Ensuring global cooperation
5. Humanitarian struggle consideration

## ❖ Conclusion:

- ❖ Learn lessons
- ❖ Understand limitations

FIN

*"We need to keep hope alive and strive to do better" -  
Kofi Annan*

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