

IARU Global Summer Program

Japan in Today's World (2015)

Dates: July 14th (Tue) – July 21st (Tue), 2015

Venue: Room 26, Faculty of Law Building 1 (Hogakubu 1-go-kan), the Univ. of Tokyo

General Coordinator: Kiichi Fujiwara

7月14日(火曜) July 14th (Tue)

16:50-18:35 Class 1 Introduction

藤原 帰一 Kiichi Fujiwara

18:45-20:30 Class 2 Risk Governance

城山 英明 Hideaki Shiroyama

7月15日(水曜) July 15th (Wed)

16:50-18:35 Class 3 Politics

川人 貞史 Sadafumi Kawato

18:45-20:30 Class 4 Macro Policy

グレゴリー・ノーブル Gregory Noble

7月16日(木曜) July 16th (Thu)

16:50-18:35 Class 5 Election

谷口 将紀 Masaki Taniguchi

18:45-20:30 Class 6 Subculture

ニコラ・リスクティン Nicola Liscutin

7月17日(金曜) July 17th (Fri)

14:55-16:40 Class 7 Public Diplomacy

近藤 誠一 Seiichi Kondo

16:50-18:35 Class 8 Political Economy

飯田 敬輔 Keisuke Iida

18:45-20:30 Class 9 China and Japan

高原 明生 Akio Takahara

7月21日(火曜) July 21st (Tue)

14:55-16:40 Class 10 Class debate: Territorial Disputes テーマ討論 領土紛争

16:50-18:35 Class 11 Class debate: Nationalism and Public Opinion テーマ討論
ナショナリズムと世論

18:45-20:30 Class 12 試験 In-class examination

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July 14th (Tue)

16:50-18:35 Class 1 Introduction

Prof. Kiichi Fujiwara (Professor of International Politics,
Graduate Schools of Law and Politics, the University of
Tokyo)

Japan is the oldest democracy in Asia. The country was the first in the region to have a democratic constitution election based on universal franchise. However, Japan is also an illiberal democracy. Major government decrees are left out of formal legislation and there is a lack of political competition. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was actually a *de facto* coalition of small conservative parties that have retained political power. This type of illiberal democracy may have been created in Japan due to the lack of nationalism during the creation of the post-war political system. Democracy is observed as 'imposed' from the U.S., leading to nationalist reactions against democratic institutions in general.

In 1993, the LDP stepped down from power, but events did not follow the course in other democratic countries such as India, Mexico, or Italy where long-ruling parties were also forced from office. Weak opposition parties were not able to capitalize and LDP quickly reasserted its dominant position. The irony may be that the separation of formal institutions and actual political power has contributed to illiberal democracy in Japan.

In 2009, we observed a second instance of political change, when the LDP lost a general election to the Democratic Party of Japan, or DPJ, in a landslide. What followed, however, was far from an emergence of multi-party competition, where the DPJ kept betraying the hope of voters to the extent that its popularity dropped remarkably. In the 2012 election, the LDP came back with a vengeance, and it is highly likely that their victory streak will continue in the forthcoming upper house elections.

As the introductory session for a series of lectures on Japanese domestic politics, I wish to put the illiberal democracy of Japan into a comparative perspective, including both established democracies in the West and the emerging democracies in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America.

Kiichi Fujiwara, "The State of Asian Democracies", in Japan Foundation, ed., *The Community of Asia: Concept or Reality?*, (Anvil, 2006).

Kiichi Fujiwara, "Keizai-Kyoryoku: On the Life and Times of Japanese Economic Diplomacy," in William T. Tow,

David Walton, and Rikki Kersten, eds., *New Approaches to Human Security in the Asia-Pacific: China, Japan and Australia* (Ashgate, 2013), pp. 93-106.

18:45-20:30 Class 2 Risk Governance

Prof. Hideaki Shiroyama (Graduate School of Public Policy, the University of Tokyo)

The Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan reveals two failures in nuclear safety regulation, which typically shows the difficulties of managing multiple inter-related risks by multiple actors. First is the failure of interdisciplinary communication. The Fukushima accident has made it clear that there has been a severe delay in implementing countermeasures toward earthquake and tsunami which caused inter-related complex risks on nuclear reactors. As to the tsunami issues, Japan has responded in incremental ways. However, Japanese nuclear community couldn't catch up accurately with the rapid progress in understanding tsunami. Some tsunami experts estimated possible tsunami heights in Fukushima coastal area which can be higher than its earlier predictions. Such advances in tsunami research have made the uncertainty of tsunami predictions obvious in the tsunami experts' community. Nevertheless, their recognition of uncertainty was not transmitted to the nuclear safety community. Second is the failure of voluntary safety efforts of private nuclear utilities. The nuclear safety regulation in Japan has had a tendency toward relying heavily on operator's voluntary safety efforts. Behind other countries, Japan also introduced the severe accident management in 1992. However, under the regulatory scheme of voluntary safety efforts, accident management measures were been basically regarded as voluntary efforts by operators, not legal requirements. Moreover, in Japan, it was decided in keeping with the intention of operators that the PSA (Probability Safety Assessment), which provides the basis of accident management, limited the subject to internal events, and excluded external events including earthquakes in the meantime.

After the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake in 11th March 2011, various processes for accident investigations and arguments for the reform of nuclear safety regulation were announced. In the process for institutional reform, "Basic Concept of Structural Reform of Nuclear Safety Regulations" was adopted at the Cabinet Meeting of August 15, 2011. It advocated the launch of a new safety regulatory body, on the basis of the principle of "separating regulation from utilization." After the negotiation with the opposition party at the time, LDP (Liberal Democratic Party), in the Diet House, it was finally agreed in June 2012 that Nuclear Regulatory Commission, an independent administrative committee based on Article 3 of the National Government Organization Act, would be set up. Issues of operation of Nuclear Regulatory commission, such as balance between science and management decision, will also be dealt with.

Sheila Jasanoff (1990), *The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policy Makers*, Harvard University Press, "Chap1: Rationalizing Politics".

Joseph V. Rees (1994), *Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety since Three Mile Island*, The University of Chicago Press, "Part One Discovering Institutions (Chap 4: Institute of Nuclear Power Operation)."

Hideaki Shiroyama (2015), "Nuclear Safety Regulation in Japan and Impacts of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident", Joonhong Ahn, Cathryn Carson, Mikael Jensen, Kohta Juraku, Shinya Nagasaki, Satoru Tanaka, eds., *Reflections on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident: Toward Social-Scientific Literacy and Engineering Resilience*, Springer.

July 15th (Wed)

16:50-18:35 Class 3 Politics

Prof. Sadafumi Kawato (Professor of Political Science and Japanese Politics, Graduate Schools of Law and Politics, the University of Tokyo)

This class picks up a few recent topics on Japanese politics. The new electoral system adopted in 1994 for the Lower House is a dual system of single-member districts and proportional representation districts. This system has promoted the development of the two-party competition between the Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Japan and led to a government turnover in 2009 and another in 2012. While the government is formed by a party or a coalition of parties who controls the majority in the Lower House, the election for the Upper House serves as an opportunity for the evaluation of the incumbent cabinet. In the Upper House elections of 2007 and 2010 the governing parties lost a majority in the Upper House and the incumbent cabinets had to face the "the divided Diet" in which it was very difficult to pass important government bills without the opposition parties' consent. Since 2006 we have seven Prime Ministers, each of whom served about one year. Each PM had unique reasons for the resignation, but the divided Diet affected their decision. In this class I will review foreign scholars' work on Japanese electoral politics and present my own analysis on the lawmaking in the Divided Diet. Participants are advised to read the following papers and comment on them at the class.

Steven R. Reed, Ethan Scheiner, and Michael F. Thies. 2012. "The End of LDP Dominance and the Rise of Party-Oriented Politics in Japan." *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, Volume 38, Number 2, Summer 2012, pp. 353-376.

Nyblade, Benjamin. 2011. "The 21st Century Japanese Prime Minister: An Unusually Precarious Perch." *Shakai Kagaku Kenkyu* 62(1), 195-209.

Kawato, Sadafumi, and Mikitaka Masuyama. 2014. "Does the Divided Diet Make a Difference?" Draft.

18:45-20:30 Class 4 Fiscal Policy

Prof. Gregory W. Noble
(Professor of Noble Politics and administration in the
Institute of Social Science at the the University of Tokyo)

Can Abenomics cure Japan's ills?

Prime Minister Abe just won his third smashing electoral victory in a row and claimed a mandate to pursue the “three arrows of Abenomics”: quantitative easing of monetary policy, “agile” fiscal policy, and structural reform to encourage private-sector investments. How has Abe implemented this “growth strategy” and how successful will it be in confronting Japan’s long term challenges, including demographic aging, skyrocketing deficits, and declining international competitiveness? This seminar will argue that Japan’s problems stem at least as much from the corporate sector as from the government; that Abenomics has relied to an unnerving extent on just one arrow, loose monetary policy; and that Abenomics has but a narrow, two-year window of opportunity to succeed. Given the structural limitations of Japan’s political system and the support structure of the ruling party, completing significant reform in time could prove difficult.

TAKENAKA Harukata, “Japan in Pursuit of Westminster Democracy.” Nippon.com, September 25, 2013

OKAZAKI Tetsuji, “The Barriers to Budget Balance in Japan.” Nippon.com, April 21, 2014.

July 16th (Thu)

16:50-18:35 Class 5 Elections

Prof. Masaki Taniguchi (Professor of Modern
Japanese Politics, Graduate Schools of Law and
Politics, the University of Tokyo)

In the House of Representatives general election held on August 30, 2009, the opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), significantly increased their power by gaining 308 seats, while the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) led by Prime Minister Taro Aso was roundly defeated, winning only 119 seats. As a result, with DPJ President as Yukio Hatoyama as Prime Minister, the DPJ, Social Democratic Party (SDP) and People’s New Party (PNP) formed a ruling coalition and established a new administration on September 16.

This was not the first time that a change of government happened after an election (in the sense that the ruling party changed). But both the 1947 Tetsu Katayama Cabinet (which replaced an LDP Cabinet with a coalition Cabinet of the Socialist Party and others) and the 1993

Morihiro Hosokawa Cabinet (which replaced an LDP Cabinet with an 8-party coalition Cabinet) were both Cabinets that were finally formed after coalition negotiations between each party, when the leading party in the immediately preceding election didn't get a majority of seats and the regime was undecided. In contrast, although the Hatoyama Cabinet formed a coalition government to secure a majority in the House of Councillors, the 2009 election results gave the DPJ an overwhelming majority of the seats in the House of Representatives. Thus, this can be said to be the first instance in which the popular will led to a clear-cut regime change.

As opposed to one-party rule, a "one-party dominant system" is when elections are carried out freely and fairly but result in the same party consistently winning. The LDP is a typical example of one-party dominance where, since its foundation in 1955, it was the relative majority party—except for when it went into opposition in 1993-1994 due to a split in the party. Today, after the DPJ's victories in the 2009 House of Representatives election, the DPJ has realized regime change, but in the 2012 general election and the 2013 House of Councillors election—the LDP won, leading once again to a coalition government between the LDP and the Komei-to—in other words, the second Shinzo Abe Cabinet which continues today. Thus, a bipolar competition centering on these two party blocs has been established instead of one party dominance.

This class will start by reviewing the basic principles of elections. Further, there are many ways to do go about electing representatives of the people. Therefore, next I will explain the various types of electoral systems in Japan. Last, I will take a close look at the recent elections.

Hirofumi Kawaguchi, "Japanese Politics: 'Season Three'," *Asia Pacific Bulletin* 198, 2013.

Masaki Taniguchi, Shiro Sakaiya, Chihiro Okawa, and Hideaki Uenohara, "Upper House Election 2010: What Does It Mean for the DPJ?" *Japan Echo Web* 3, 2010.

Masaki Taniguchi, Hideaki Uenohara, and Shiro Sakaiya, "The 2009 General Election: Who Ended the LDP's Reign?" *Japan Echo* 37(1): 19-25, 2010.

18:45-20:30 Class 6 Subculture

Prof Dr Nicola Liscutin (Professor of Japanese Studies, Center for the Development of Global Leadership Education, the University of Tokyo)

What is a 'subculture'? Most studies in the field define subcultural practices in terms of social networks with shared distinctive meanings, identities and styles; deviance from mainstream society and culture; resistance to hegemonic ideologies; and a sense of marginalization (Ross Haenfler, 2014). Whereas earlier studies foregrounded class as a determining factor in the

formation of youth subcultures, recent research emphasizes aspects of race, gender, sexualities as well as the role of digital media in shaping subcultural experience. By contrast, critics (in particular of the ‘moral panic’ persuasion) cite escapism, social withdrawal, delinquency, consumerism or even, ‘parasitic’ lifestyles as characteristics of youth subculture, while seemingly overlooking the shift towards ‘immaterial labour’ and an ever increasing precariousness of working conditions and livelihood, especially for young people. So what does ‘subculture’ mean, today, in Japan?

Not so long ago, Japanese popular culture was commonly equated with ‘subculture.’ Yet, given the global spread of manga, anime, video games, or cosplay, the transnational networks of ‘otaku fandom,’ the multi-billion USD volume of J-pop’s cultural industries, and the intense marketing of ‘Cool Japan’ through governmental cultural policies, ‘subculture’ no longer seems to be the fitting term. So, what kind of subcultures can one find in present-day Japan? What are their characteristics and practices? These are some questions this lecture seeks to address, while zooming in on a number of intriguing examples of subcultural practices you might come across while in Tokyo.

Readings:

Carl CASSEGÅRD (2014). ‘The Recovery of Activism.’ In Cassegård, *Youth Movements, Trauma and Alternative Space in Contemporary Japan*. Leiden, Boston: Global Oriental, pp. 233-251

MŌRI Yoshitaka (2005). ‘Culture = Politics: the emergence of new cultural forms of protest in the age of the *freeter*.’ In: *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, Vol. 6, No.1, pp.17-28

Anne ALLISON (2009). ‘The Cool Brand, Affective Activism and Japanese Youth.’ In: *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 26 (2-3), pp. 89-111.

July 17th (Fri)

Class 7 14:55-16:40 Public Diplomacy

Prof. Seiichi Kondo (Professor, Faculty of Law, the Graduate School of Public Policy, the University of Tokyo)

Whereas traditional diplomacy was conducted exclusively by sovereign states, the “new” diplomacy today is characterized by the involvement of general public, often called “public diplomacy.” This class examines, first, the nature of this new form of diplomacy, and looks into the background against which this change has taken place. One could get some hints from the significant changes in international relations in recent years due to accelerating globalization, spread

of democracies in the world, emergence of the middle class, the development of social media, and the rise of civil society worldwide. Then the class goes on to analyze the specific characteristics of public diplomacy in order to find out what kinds of opportunities and challenges states face when dealing with public diplomacy.

These works will be followed by a case study that is drawn from the Japan-U.S. Auto Talks of 1995, because this provides typical examples of success and failure of public diplomacy, leading us to better understanding of the specific nature of public diplomacy.

The class then will turn to the constructivist theory of international relations, and try to find the possibility of using major countries' public diplomacy as a tool to examine what kind of dynamics (realism, liberalism, etc.,) will govern the international relations of the years to come. In this regard, the class will pick up China's public diplomacy because what kind of international community it thinks will rise in the coming years will define, to a great extent, the new world order.

Seiichi Kondo, "Wielding Soft Power: The key Stages of transmission and Reception," *Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States*, Watanabe Yasushi and David L. McConnell, with a foreward by Joseph S. Nye, Jr.2008.

Seiichi Kondo, "The Japan-U.S. Auto Talks: A Case Study of Public Relations," *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Volume 12, Number 2 (Summer 1998)

Ingrid d'Hooghe, "Public Diplomacy in the People's Republic of China," *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, Edited by Jan Melissen, 88-105, 2005.

Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press,1999 (not distributed)

16:50-18:35 Class 8 Political Economy

Prof. Keisuke Iida (Professor of International Political Economy, Graduate Schools of Law and Politics, the University of Tokyo)

This lecture will give an overview of Japan's economic diplomacy in the postwar period. After reviewing the economic environment in which Japan finds itself, it divides the post-war era into four periods. In each period, Japan undertook significant changes in its economic diplomacy. Then, we shall try to understand the sources of these changes.

In the first period from the end of the Second World War to the end of the 1950s, the major theme in Japan's economic diplomacy was the return to the international community-- the postwar economic order created by the United States. In this context, Japan was very successful in gaining membership in the IMF and World Bank in 1952, the GATT in 1955, the UN in 1956, and finally becoming a member of the OECD in 1964.

The second period from the early 1960 to the early 1970s was marked by an economic miracle, and Japan's economic diplomacy was very low-key, because Japan concentrated on achieving high economic growth.

In the third period, Japan had to go through turmoil because of frequent and very intense trade and other economic conflicts with the United States and Europe. Japan was considered a serious challenger to the international economic order. The culmination of this was Japan's rebuff of Clinton's results-oriented approach.

From the 1990s and onwards, Japan underwent dramatic transformations due to various factors. Japan began to emphasize environmental diplomacy; Japan also began to search for regionalism in Asia. However, this burst of effort toward noble goals came to an impasse.

Now, the newly rediscovered goal for Japan is again economic growth. And under the Abe administration, Japan began to undertake a concerted effort to regain growth momentum and self-confidence through various means, not the least of which is participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement.

Chalmers Johnson, "The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept," in Meredith Woo-Cumings, ed., *The Developmental State*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999, pp. 32-60.

Kent Calder, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State," *World Politics*, Vol. 40, No. 4 July, 1988, pp.617-641.

William H. Cooper and Mark E. Manyin, "Japan Joins the Trans-Pacific Partnership: What Are the Implications?" Congressional Research Service, August 13, 2012

Class 9 18:45-20:30 China and Japan

Prof. Akio Takahara (Professor of Modern Chinese Politics,
Graduate Schools of Law and Politics, the University of
Tokyo)

Since a few years ago and especially after the row over the Senkaku Islands, there is widespread belief in China that Japan is trying to contain its development. This is incorrect. Japan has supported China's economic rise ever since the beginning of reform and opening. Along with others, Japan will continue to benefit from China's stable growth and from its soft-landing. China in its turn has gained greatly from the economic exchange with Japan, particularly during the early period of reform and opening. At the same time, Japan has been a source of concern for China in terms of security and a target of criticism over issues regarding history and Taiwan.

China's rise in itself is not a problem for its neighbours including Japan, but the question is how it will use its increased power. What is causing grave concern at the moment is the immediate crisis over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. China regularly sends its vessels to the Senkaku area, which is very dangerous since the

situation would escalate badly if there was an accident. If Japan conceded, it would mean rewarding an attempt to change the status quo by physical force; in China where there have been serious debates over the future course of the country, hardliners would sing in triumph and moderates would be marginalized even further. This would be bad for China, too.

Both countries will benefit by reinforcing the resilient aspect of the bilateral relationship, such as economic and cultural exchange, and reducing the fragile aspect that exists mainly in the realm of history and security. Since basic knowledge and common sense about the issues in the bilateral relationship is not shared by the two nations, each side must find ways to reach out to the ordinary people in the other country and feed them with accurate information about itself. Japan and China must also find a way to coexist strategically, and to do so it is indispensable to conduct a dialogue between Japan, China, and the United States.

Akio Takahara, “Resilience and Fragility in Japan-China Relations”, in Niklas Swanström and Ryosei Kokubun (eds), *Sino-Japanese Relations: The Need for Conflict Prevention and Management*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2008, pp.35-46.

Akio Takahara, “A Japanese Perspective on China’s Rise and the East Asian Order”, in Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng (eds), *China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics*, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 2008, pp.218-37.

Amy King, “Where Does Japan Fit in China’s “New Type of Great Power Relations?” Special Forum, Asan Forum, March 20, 2014

<http://www.theasanforum.org/where-does-japan-fit-in-chinas-new-type-of-great-power-relations/>

July 21th (Tue)

14:55-16:40 Class 10 Class debate: Territorial Disputes

Since 2010, Sino-Japanese relations have turned extremely tense, especially over territorial control over the Senkaku – Diaoyu islands. No one lives in the islands, but nationalist emotions erupted in both societies that have made compromise extremely difficult. We must also not forget that Senkaku – Diaoyu islands are not the only territorial dispute in the region, for we can also observe similar conflicts between the Philippines, Vietnam and China over the control of Spratly islands, and also between South Korea and Japan concerning Takeshima – Dokto.

In this class, I will ask participants to take roles in the workshop. Japanese students must take the role of the Chinese government in the Senkaku – Diaoyu dispute, and argue why the Chinese claims are legitimate and the Japanese not so. Non-Japanese students must take the role of the Japanese government, and establish their own case. The distribution of the two groups may differ, so I will intervene to make the two groups more or less the same number.

There are no reading assignments for this class. Each participant must find their own way in accumulating related information, documents, reading materials, etc. The Japanese students (as defined by their legal nationality, not mother tongues or lineage) students should prepare a power point presentation that establishes the claims made by the Chinese government; the non-Japanese students (again, as defined by his or her legal

nationality) should prepare a power point presentation that established the claims made by the Japanese government. After a power point presentation of more or less 15 minutes, we will have debate in class. The coordinator will also serve the role of umpire.

16:50-18:35 Class11 Class debate: Nationalism and Public Opinion

Following our previous exercise on territorial disputes, this class will focus on the role of nationalism in the politics of the East Asian region. All students will be requested to give his / her view on why and how political discourse in East Asian nations have centered on the articulation of nationalism. What do we mean by nationalism? Is nationalism one coherent set of ideas, or an extremely diverse group of thoughts that have been called ‘nationalism’ by outside observers? Is it possible to ‘overcome’ nationalist political discourse; in fact, should we overcome nationalism and not preserve or promote it? The purpose of this class is to reach an understanding of nationalism and political discourse that is not particularly limited to a certain nation or a geographical region, and try to understand the nationalist discourse in Japan from a comparative perspective.

18:45-20:30 Class 12 In-class examination