Thesis

Taking Three to Tango?
Triangular Cooperation and Policy Transfer in the ProSAVANA Program

Submitted by:
Stefano Berriel da Silva

The University of Tokyo
Graduate School of Public Policy

In partial fulfillment of the requirements
For the degree Master of Public Policy
The University of Tokyo
Tokyo, Japan
Summer 2016

Advisor: Prof. Dr. Jin Sato
Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like express my sincerest gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Jin Sato for all his support since April 2013, when I came to Japan as a graduate research student, and for accepting to remain as my supervisor for the purpose of this thesis despite his busy schedule. I am particularly grateful for the early suggestion to look into ProSAVANA as a research topic as well as for his insightful comments on my early drafts.

I would also like to express my appreciation to Professor Toshiro Nishizawa for his solicitude and assistance in contacting an interviewee who acted as a bridge to key stakeholders, thus greatly contributing to this study.

I am also incredibly grateful to all my interviewees, who kindly agreed to contribute to this research despite their busy schedules (and sometimes for much longer periods than the allotted interview time).

I would also like to thank the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) for the financial assistance that made my studies at the University of Tokyo possible.

Finally, I would like to thank Ksenia Spiridonova, my mother and my sister for their unrelenting emotional support.
Abstract

This study attempts to address a key gap in the Triangular Cooperation (TC) literature, namely, the need to bridge policy-oriented and politics-oriented analytical strands. As such, it proposes to use the Dolowitz and Marsh Model of policy transfer as a heuristic tool to integrate knowledge and project management elements (policy) with the strategic dimension of aid provision (politics). The guiding research question was: “How does triangular cooperation contribute to relevance and to the effectiveness of international development cooperation?” The meaning of “relevance” is twofold: alignment with recipient country priorities and appropriateness (to the recipient context). “Effectiveness,” is understood as a synonym of transaction cost analysis. In order to test the proposed analytical framework, ProSAVANA (a TC program involving Japan-Brazil-Mozambique) was selected as a (critical) case study. The selection criteria were threefold: participation of leading partners in TC, existence of a clear reference to a previous cooperation (PRODECER, between Japan and Brazil) and claims of similarity between recipient and one of the donors. The analysis was based on triangulation of data gathered from document reviews, loosely structured interviews with key stakeholders, academic articles and media reports. ProSAVANA was tentatively classified as an ongoing soft policy transfer (ideas, concepts, practices) that combines and adapts all key elements of PRODECER to local conditions. In terms of relevance, ProSAVANA was shown to be aligned with Mozambican agricultural policies. The related concept of appropriateness could not be explored in depth given the ongoing status of the program and a preliminary assessment was inconclusive. The analysis of transaction costs allowed for the identification of five intervening variables for triangular cooperation in ProSAVANA (effect in parenthesis): previous experience with bilateral and joint projects (+), linguistic and geophysical similarities between SSC provider and the recipient (+), need of coordination of different aid approaches (-), difference in socioeconomic context between SSC provider and recipient (-), and degree of feasibility of task allocation (-). While the positive elements seemed to predominate during project identification and negotiation phases, the negative signed variables seem to have outweighed the benefits during implementation. This exploratory study concludes by demonstrating the feasibility of the proposed policy transfer framework for the appraisal of triangular cooperation initiatives and for the identification of enabling/disrupting factors as the cooperation unfolds. It also highlighted, however, some inherent limitations for research, such as the need of a privileged access to key informants, which is further complicated in a trialateral context.
Table of Contents

Acknowledgements 1
Abstract 2
Table of Contents 3
List of Abbreviations 5
Figure Index 8
Table Index 8
Introduction 9

1. Triangular Cooperation: The state of the debate 12
   1.1. International development cooperation: overview of current trends 12
   1.2. Triangular Cooperation 14
   1.2.1 Definition and current trends 14
   1.2.2. Literature review 15
   1.3. Japanese and Brazilian development assistance and TC 20
   1.3.1 Japanese foreign aid 20
   1.3.2. Japan’s support to Triangular Cooperation 21
   1.3.3. Brazil and South–South Cooperation 22
   1.3.4. Brazilian experience with Triangular Cooperation 25
   1.3.5. Brazil-Japan experience with Triangular Cooperation and ProSAVANA 26
   1.4. Research question and conclusion 27

2. Theoretical framework: Policy transfer 28
   2.1. Chains of knowledge creation and emerging donors 28
   2.2. Policy transfer: key concepts 30
   2.3. Critique 33
   2.4. Policy transfer and foreign aid 34
   2.5. Sender’s motives: best practice, branding and standard models 37
   2.6. Completing the chains of knowledge creation framework 41

3. Methodology 44

4. Cerrado development and PRODECER 46
   4.1. Early Cerrado development 46
   4.2. PRODECER 47
   4.3. Perspectives on PRODECER and Cerrado development 50

5. ProSAVANA: a chronological analysis 53
   5.1. ProSAVANA background: the Mozambican context 53
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1.1</td>
<td>Overview of Mozambique</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.2</td>
<td>Overview of agriculture in Mozambique</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>From PRODECER to ProSAVANA</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>The three components of ProSAVANA</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Preliminary study</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>ProSAVANA-PI</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>ProSAVANA-PEM</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>ProSAVANA-PD</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>Responding to civil society mobilization</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Assessing policy transfer in ProSAVANA</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Identifying content and degree of transfer</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.1</td>
<td>Alignment</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.2</td>
<td>Appropriateness</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Effectiveness (i.e. transaction costs) in ProSAVANA</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex: Interview outline</td>
<td>126</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**List of Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Brazilian Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASBRAER</td>
<td>Brazilian Association of State Technical Assistance and Rural Extension Entities, oversees EMATERs (see below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Bahia (Brazilian state)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAGC</td>
<td>Beira Agricultural Growth Corridor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRL</td>
<td>Real (Brazilian currency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKC</td>
<td>Chains of Knowledge Creation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Center of Excellence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPAC</td>
<td>Embrapa’s (see below) Cerrado research division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO(s)</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee of the OECD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUAT</td>
<td>Land Use and Exploration Rights (Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMATER</td>
<td>Brazilian state-owned Technical Assistance and Rural Extension Corporations,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMATER-DF</td>
<td>EMATER of the Brazilian Federal District (DF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embrapa</td>
<td>Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FONAGNI</td>
<td>Forum of Non-Governmental Organizations of Niassa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FONGZA</td>
<td>Forum of Non-Governmental Organizations in Zambezia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frelimo</td>
<td>Mozambican Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GO</td>
<td>Goiás (Brazilian state)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIAM</td>
<td>Mozambican Institute of Agricultural Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JBIC</td>
<td>Japan Bank for International Cooperation,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JBPP</td>
<td>Japan-Brazil Partnership Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Portuguese, Empresa de Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Portuguese, Agência Brasileira de Cooperação</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Portuguese, Associação Brasileira das Entidades Estaduais de Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Portuguese, Centro de Pesquisa Agropecuária dos Cerrados</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Portuguese, Empresa de Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Brazilian, Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Portuguese, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Portuguese, Instituto de Investigação Agrária de Moçambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Japanese, 国際協力銀行</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Japanese, 日本・ブラジル・パートナーシップ・プログラム</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JICA</strong></td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JIRCAS</strong></td>
<td>Japan International Research Center for Agricultural Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MA</strong></td>
<td>Maranhão (Brazilian state)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MAPA</strong></td>
<td>Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply (MAPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MASA</strong></td>
<td>Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MCSC</strong></td>
<td>Civil Society Coordination Mechanism for the Nacala Corridor Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MINAG</strong></td>
<td>Mozambique Ministry of Agriculture (succeeded by MASA, see above)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MG</strong></td>
<td>Minas Gerais (Brazilian state)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MS</strong></td>
<td>Mato Grosso do Sul (Brazilian state)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MST</strong></td>
<td>Landless Workers’ Movement (Brazilian social movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MT</strong></td>
<td>Mato Grosso (Brazilian state)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NSC</strong></td>
<td>North-South Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ODA</strong></td>
<td>Official development assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OECF</strong></td>
<td>Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (Japan), succeeded by JBIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PADAP</strong></td>
<td>Program of Guided Settlement of Alto Paranaíba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PEDSA</strong></td>
<td>Mozambican Strategic Plan for Agricultural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PARPA</strong></td>
<td>Plan of Action for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PDIF</strong></td>
<td>ProSAVANA Development Initiative Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PFI</strong></td>
<td>Private-Finance-Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLOCENTRO</strong></td>
<td>Program for the Development of the Cerrado</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PPOSC-N Provincial Platform of Organizations of Civil Society of Nampula,
PPP Public-private partnership
PRAI Principles of Responsible Agricultural Investment
PRODECER Japan-Brazil Cooperation Program for the Development of the Cerrados
In Japanese, 日伯セラード農業開発事業
In Portuguese, Programa de Cooperação Nipo-Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento dos Cerrados
ProSAVANA Japan-Brazil-Mozambique Triangular Cooperation Program for the Development of the Tropical Savanna in Mozambique
In Japanese, 日本・ブラジル・モザンビーク三角協力による熱帯サバンナ農業開発プログラム
In Portuguese, Programa de Desenvolvimento da Agricultura nas Savanas Tropicais de Moçambique
ProSAVANA-PD Support of the Agriculture Development Master Plan for the Nacala Corridor (part of ProSAVANA)
ProSAVAN-PEM Project for Establishment of Development Model at Communities’ Level with Improvement of Rural Extension Service under Nacala Corridor Agricultural Development in Mozambique (part of ProSAVANA)
ProSAVANA-PI Project for Improving Research and Technology Transfer Capacity for Nacala Corridor Agriculture Development (Part of ProSAVANA)
QIPs Quick-Impact Projects (part of the ProSAVANA Master Plan)
Renamo Mozambican National Resistance
In Portuguese, Resistência Nacional Moçambicana
SENAR Brazilian National Service for Rural Vocational Education and Training
In Portuguese, Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Rural
SSC South-South Cooperation
TC Triangular Cooperation
TICAD Tokyo International Conference on African Development
TO Tocantins (Brazilian state)
UNAC Mozambican National Peasants’ Union
In Portuguese, União Nacional de Camponeses
USD United States Dollar
WHO World Health Organization
List of Figures

Figure 1: Analytical strands on Triangular Cooperation 16
Figure 2: Brazilian Triangular Cooperation: No. of projects in 2011 25
Figure 3: Chains of knowledge creation. 29
Figure 4: The missing link in the CKC model. 30
Figure 5: The policy transfer continuum 31
Figure 6: The updated Chains of Knowledge Creation model 42
Figure 7: Cerrado biome distribution 48
Figure 8: Mozambique GDP growth (annual %) 54
Figure 9: Embrapa material highlighting the geographical similarities between the Brazilian Mid-West and the Nacala Corridor 58
Figure 10: Current ProSAVANA target area. 62
Figure 11: Map of the clusters proposed in the ProSAVANA Master Plan of 2013 69
Figure 12: FGV Projetos material on the Nacala Fund 71
Figure 13: Alternative Nacala Fund structure 71
Figure 14: Proposed production cluster model under the Nacala Fund 79

List of Tables

Table 1: Definitions of Triangular Cooperation 14
Table 2: Summary of case studies using the Standardization Model 40
Table 3: List of interviewees 45
Table 4: Brief Description of PRODECER 48
Table 5: Mozambique: ODA and FDI inflow compared 54
Table 6: Comparison between Cerrado development context and that of Nacala Corridor 60
Table 7: Evolution of the ProSAVANA target area 61
Table 8: ProSAVANA-PI overview 63
Table 9: ProSAVANA-PEM overview 65
Table 10: Phases of the ProSAVANA Master Plan (2013 version) 67
Table 11: Proposed Clusters in the ProSAVANA Master Plan of 2013 68
Table 12: Digest of main Mozambican policies regarding agricultural Development 83
Taking Three to Tango?
Triangular Cooperation and Policy Transfer in the ProSAVANA Program

Stefano Berriel da Silva

As a modality, Triangular Cooperation is not necessarily new – Japan, for example, seems to be engaged in such initiatives since the mid-1970s (JICA, 2012) – but has grown in interest and scope during the last decade. According to somewhat outdated reports (Fordelone, 2009), over two-thirds of the OECD-DAC members had taken up this aid modality along with many of the so-called emerging donors as Brazil, South Africa, Mexico, Chile, Indonesia and Thailand; and with increasing engagement by international organizations and non-governmental actors (OECD, 2013). This somewhat novel aid modality is often portrayed in official documents as holding the potential to scale up development assistance initiatives while also providing knowledge and technologies that not only are more cost-effective but also more suited to the concrete institutional and geographical contexts of developing countries (Kumar, 2008; Fordelone, 2009; AECID, 2010: Ashoff, 2010).

Due to its relative novelty and to a lack of available data, the literature on Triangular Cooperation is very sparse, with the majority of the appraisals coming either from bilateral aid agencies or from selected international organizations (such as the OECD and the UNDP) (for example, Fordelone, 2009; AECID, 2010). These have mostly focused on how Triangular Cooperation can be framed in the aid effectiveness agenda and on general recommendations on how to overcome coordination challenges and increased transaction costs. In parallel a more critical strand of works has suggested the importance of inequalities of power and agency in Triangular Cooperation (McEwan and Mawdsley, 2012) and the need to evaluate the reasons behind increased donor interest in this aid modality (inter alia, Abdenur, 2007; Masters, 2014; Farias, 2015; Lengfelder, 2015).

Against this background, this study parts from the assertion that at least in a fundamental level, Triangular Cooperation, defined here as an arrangement by which a member of OECD-DAC and a provider of South-South Cooperation (SSC) jointly manage and deliver development assistance initiatives to a recipient country, rests on (a) the existence of “Southern best practices”, and (b) on a claim of similarity between a SSC provider and the recipient country. In order to bridge these policy- and politics-oriented
strands of analysis, this study proposes the adoption of a policy transfer analytical framework to answer the question: *how does Triangular Cooperation affects international development assistance in terms of relevance and effectiveness?* Relevance is understood here as alignment with recipient’s needs while effectiveness is understood in terms of ex-ante (negotiation) and ex-post (implementation) transaction costs of development assistance. These two concepts were selected as a means to assess impacts both in orders of content and process. The bridge with the politics-centered analysis is provided by the policy transfer literature, whose phenomena of study is “the process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000:5, my emphasis).

In order to test the proposed approach, the Japan-Brazil-Mozambique Triangular Cooperation Program for the Development of the Tropical Savanna in Mozambique (ProSAVANA) was selected as a case study. The selection criteria was based on (1) the relevance of the partners (both Brazil and Japan being leaders in Triangular Cooperation initiatives – Chatuverdi, 2012), (2) on the existence of a clear reference to a previous cooperation (PRODECER, the Japan-Brazil Cooperation Program for Development of the Cerrados) as a relevant experience for Mozambique, which is perceived to share soil and climate similarities with Brazil; and (3) on the availability of disclosed documents and high visibility. The data collected for this study stems from the triangulation of three main sources: an extensive document review regarding ProSAVANA and PRODECER, interviews with key stakeholders in Brazil and Japan as well as Mozambican CSOs, and academic and news reports covering the program.

Despite the limitations of the analysis of an ongoing program (ProSAVANA has a time horizon of 20 years and its Master Plan has been revised several times due to Mozambican civil society contestation), this study identified that ProSAVANA can be seen as a soft (ideas, concepts, practices) policy transfer (Evans and Davies, 1999) that combines and adapts all key elements of PRODECER (rural credit initiatives, promotion of rural cooperatives, model of agricultural development by leading farmers and cooperation coordination by a central public-private entity) to its local circumstances. In this sense, the ongoing policy transfer in ProSAVANA can be tentatively classified as “complete” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). With regards to the proposed concept of relevance, ProSAVANA was shown to be aligned with Mozambique’s main agricultural policies. An assessment on the appropriateness of the program though was inconclusive due to its ongoing nature.
The analysis of transaction costs was divided in ex-ante and ex-post perspectives and allowed for the identification of five intervening variables (enablers/disruptors) for Triangular Cooperation in ProSAVANA (effect in parenthesis): previous experience with bilateral and joint projects (+), linguistic and geophysical similarities between SSC provider and the recipient (+), need of coordination of different cooperation approaches (−), difference in socioeconomic context between SSC provider and recipient (−), and degree of feasibility of task allocation (−). While the positive elements seemed to predominate during project identification and negotiation phases, the negative signed variables seem to have outweighed the benefits during implementation.

This study concluded by demonstrating the feasibility of the proposed policy transfer framework for the appraisal of Triangular Cooperation initiatives but highlighted the limitations for research, such as the privileged access to key informants required in policy transfer studies (Evans, 2004), which is further complicated in a trilateral context.

This study is organized as follows. Chapter One presents a literature review on international development assistance and on aid in general and identifies two analytical strands: policy-oriented and politics-oriented. In Chapter Two, the frameworks of chains of knowledge creation by “emerging donors” and of policy transfer are introduced as the main theoretical and analytical frameworks of reference of this study. Chapter Three describes the methodology employed during research and the criteria for case selection. Chapter Four introduces a basic historical background of PRODECER and of Cerrado development in Brazil, from where the policy transfer in ProSAVANA would allegedly come from. This exposition is followed by a brief description of the Mozambican context along with a chronological presentation of ProSAVANA in Chapter Five. Chapter Six undertakes the key analytical task of this study by assessing ProSAVANA from a policy transfer perspective and evaluates the program against the proposed concepts of relevance and effectiveness. Finally, Chapter Seven concludes and underlines potential future research topics as well as some of the limitations of this study.
1. Triangular Cooperation: the state of the debate

1.1. International development cooperation: overview of current trends

The definition of international development assistance is far from consensual. Traditional donors, for one, came up with a set of self-restraint institutions for mutual monitoring centered in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD and its related agreements. For this grouping, development cooperation came to be defined as “Official Development Assistance” (ODA), which must conform to three criteria: (1) must be undertaken by the official sector, (2) must have socio-economic development and human welfare as its main goal, and (3) should be of concessional character (Manning, 2006:377). ODA would be thus composed of three main modalities: concessional loans, grants, and technical assistance. Flows not fitting these criteria such as export finance and non-concessional development finance were called “Other Official Flows” (OOF). DAC also progressively introduced criteria to account for the quality of aid: grant share (percentage of grants in total aid disbursement), grant element (sum of grants and concessional component of loans), and degree of untying of aid, that is, the extent by which procurement in aid schemes is not limited (tied) to companies in the donor country (Söderberg, 1996:37).

Regarding practices, traditional donors have been keeping up with the trends and buzzwords of international development research: during 1950’s and 1960’s the focus was on the role of government in poverty reduction, urban growth, and in the idea of infrastructure and labor-intensive growth as kick-starters of development; the 1970’s adopted a basic-needs approach and had as key priorities redistribution and rural development; the 1980’s were largely oriented by the idea of structural adjustments, stressed the importance of conditionalities for institutional reform and followed much of the so-called Washington Consensus; the 1990’s saw a return of poverty reduction concerns, highlighted the importance of good governance and of investments in education and health for sustainable livelihoods, having as key developments the introduction of the Human Development Index (HDI) and of the PSRPs (Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers); finally, the 2000’s deepened the engagement of the previous decade while also introducing direct budget support and concerns about aid effectiveness (de Haan, 2009).

The concept of Aid Effectiveness is currently at the heart of international development regime and had its principles defined in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) as ownership (demand-driven aid), alignment (follow priorities set
by the recipient), management for results, mutual accountability and harmonization (common arrangements and increased transparency between donors) (de Haan, 2009:145-148).

South-South Cooperation (hereinafter SSC), on the other hand, is heavily guided by the principles of solidarity between developing countries, non-interference and mutual benefit, having the Ten Bandung Principles as its guideline (Chandy & Kharas 2011:742; Walz & Ramachandran, 2011:17; Davies, 2010:2). Horizontality is highly emphasized as means to differentiate this form of cooperation from the hierarchical view embedded in the donor-recipient relationship. Another characteristic is that SSC is a fluid concept, encompassing anything from official financial flows (regardless of concessionality level), trade and investment promotion mechanisms, FDI or technical cooperation (Davies, 2010:3; Kharas & Rogerson, 2011:14). The perspective of mutual benefit and the framing of relationships as “partnerships” or “win-win” substantiate an acceptance of tied aid, which is prevalent, as well as the mingling political and economic goals with aid (Rowlands:2008:8-9; Chandy & Kharas, 2011:742; Park, 2011:55). The principles of sovereignty and non-interference as well as their experience as aid recipients finalizes by informing the rejection of conditionalities as a whole and at least in a rhetorical level a demand-driven approach (ECOSOC, 2008:21-22; Park, 2011:53; Walz & Ramachandran, 2011:17).

There are other aid models and definitions but both the practitioner and academic debate has overwhelmingly focused around the “DAC-Ability” of donors (Kim & Lightfoot, 2011). There has also been a growing understanding that such dichotomy obscures both the divergences within each group (DAC and “emerging”) as well as similarities between them (Sato et al, 2011).

Given these differences in approaches, it could be expected that the rift between traditional donors and SSC providers would be too far to bridge. Some authors, however, have actually compared the Aid Effectiveness Principles of the Paris Declaration with those guiding South-South Cooperation in the Bandung Declaration and China’s “Eight Principles of Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries” and emphasized a convergence of values, with differences being mostly explained by different interpretations (Chandy & Kharas, 2011; Park, 2011; Tortora, 2011). The West, for example, currently frames ownership and alignment as budget support while China does so by offering aid with no political conditions and by emphasizing self-reliance. Similarly, result-oriented management is seen by the West as a throughout socio-environmental impact analysis during project identification and extensive monitoring and evaluation during implementation. China, on the other hand, stresses low costs and swift
implementation, considering feasibility and impact assessment studies as a duty of the recipient (Li et al, 2014:29). Taken together, these findings suggest that there is a potential for cooperation and mutual learning yet to be explored. Chandy and Kharas (2011) recommend two possible options: improved transparency and Triangular Cooperation, the latter of which will be further explained in the next section.

1.2. Triangular Cooperation

As mentioned above, Triangular Cooperation is vented as an aid modality with the potential for bridging differences in Northern and Southern aid as well as playing up their complementarities. This subsection further explores this modality of cooperation, first by clarifying contentions around its definition, then introducing the main strands in the literature and finally providing a bird’s eye view of how Brazil, Japan and ProSAVANA fit into this debate.

1.2.1 Definition and current trends

The concept of Triangular Cooperation (TC), much like that of SSC, is not yet well established (see table 1 below). In this study, Triangular Cooperation is understood as an arrangement by which three partners, namely a DAC donor, a pivotal country and a recipient, jointly engage in development assistance. In a nutshell, the employed definition is tantamount to North-South-South cooperation (NSSC). For the purposes of analysis, “pivotal country” and “SSC provider” are treated as synonymous.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Definitions of Triangular Cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JICA</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AECID</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Triangular Cooperation has been marked by a great deal of fragmentation, with most initiatives configuring capacity building and technical cooperation initiatives with small budgets (ranging from USD 2 to USD 10 million) (ECOSOC, 2008:15; Ashoff, 2010; Schulz, 2010; Chatuverdi, 2012). Still, according to Fordelone (2009), the modality has been attracting interest and 16 of the DAC members are now engaged in triangular arrangements.

Four pathways to initiate Triangular Cooperation have been described by the literature: (1) bilateral cooperation between a DAC donor and a pivotal country as a starting point, (2) South-South Cooperation as a starting point, (3) the pivotal country joins an existing development cooperation initiative between a DAC donor and a recipient, and (4) bottom-up triangular interaction, with all three parties taking part in project identification, formulation and implementation (OECD, 2013:14-15; Piefer, 2014).

### 1.2.2. Literature Review

As the lack of a well-established and consensual definition indicates, studies in Triangular Cooperation are still somewhat sparse. Two strands of literature are identifiable at this point: policy-oriented appraisals, most of which coming either from bilateral aid agencies or from selected international organizations (such as the OECD...
and the UNDP) (see for example, AECID, 2009, 2010; Fordelone, 2009; OECD, 2013; Honda and Sakai, 2014) with a focus on management and on prospects for aid effectiveness and critical studies on the political aspects of this modality of cooperation stemming from International Relations (IR) and foreign policy analysis.

Figure 1: Analytical strands on Triangular Cooperation (Source: made by the author)

For the policy-oriented strand, the rationale for Triangular Cooperation lies in the opportunity to explore the complementarities between NSC and SSC as a means to improve aid effectiveness and achieve more appropriate and sustainable solutions (Lengfelder, 2010; McEwan and Mawdsley, 2012:1194). Most of the studies in this strand are written by practitioners and thusly emphasize both enabling factors and challenges for this modality of cooperation. This branch of literature can be subdivided in two: (1) focused on transaction costs and coordination due to increased complexity, and (2) focused on the importance of the South as a source of knowledge valuable to developing countries and that can be scaled-up through TC. These studies are briefly reviewed below.

As previously mentioned, Triangular Cooperation is deemed to give rise to transaction and operational costs that are higher than that would normally be the case in a bilateral cooperation. The added complexity of involving three partners and their corresponding political and technical counterparts, each with their own methods and procedures, is seen as placing heavy personnel, time and administrative costs for related bureaucracies – costs which, if high enough, may even keep beneficial small-scale
projects from happening (Fordelone, 2009:8; Rhee, 2011:269-70; BMZ, 2013:11). Another identified risk is that the added complexity would require intense negotiations between donors to ensure harmonization, thus creating the risk of keeping project identification and negotiations between themselves and consequently undermining recipient ownership (Fordelone, 2009:9-10; Ashoff, 2010:23). Finally, the aforementioned difficulties are also said to possibly result in a poorly defined division of labor, which by itself may also lead to worse quality of project delivery and increased fragmentation (Fordelone, 2009).

Alternatively, the case is also made for a reduction of transaction costs in Triangular Cooperation. Such studies argue that TC should rely on the comparative advantages of each actor as a means to achieve aid effectiveness (Pantoja and Elsner, 2009:10-11; UNDP, 2009:187-8; Ashoff, 2010:24). On the one hand, pivotal countries’ shared cultural, geographic and linguistic backgrounds with recipients are said to facilitate cooperation while their own experiences of development provide them with more context-appropriate technology and expertise, thus paving the way for increased efficiency and effectiveness in implementation (Mehta and Nanda, 2005:5-6; ECOSOC, 2008; Kumar, 2008; Pantoja and Elsner, 2009). An additional advantage is also seen in cost-effectiveness as expertise and training provided by developing countries are generally cheaper than those provided by nationals of traditional donor countries (e.g. ECOSOC, 2008:15). Traditional donors, on the other hand, could contribute in terms of their accumulated experience in areas such as project management and monitoring and evaluation (Fordelone, 2009), which are still widely regarded as weaknesses in SSC (ECOSOC, 2008; Hosono, 2013:241). Additionally, the interaction with pivotal countries in Triangular Cooperation is seen as an important venue of contact with good donor standards and with state-of-the-art development assistance approaches, which could further contribute to the capacity building in SSC aid systems and to aid harmonization (Attenburg and Weikert, 2007; Ashoff, 2010). Attenburg and Weikert (2007) suggest that such goals should also be included in efficiency assessments of Triangular Cooperation projects along with those related to the main beneficiary country (recipient). The same authors also argue that because Triangular Cooperation is generally based on previously provided cooperation to pivotal countries, it can replicate such efforts at a lower cost (inter alia; Attenburg and Weikert, 2007; Kumar, 2008; Fordelone, 2009; Pantoja, 2009; UNDP, 2009:187-8). Furthermore, it is emphasized that (1) following a demand-driven approach and (2) sharing cooperation costs by all three partners are important tools to improve efficiency by ensuring joint responsibility and ownership (Langendorf & Müller, 2011:8; TT·SSC, 2011:). From a recipient country perspective, ownership is allegedly
facilitated by the presence of another Southern country, which would blur the distinction between donor and recipient (AECID, 2010; Ashoff, 2010; Schulz, 2010). Lengfelder (2010:15) summarizes these assertions by saying that those who argue that TC has higher transaction costs probably refer to ex-ante costs (“negotiation and contracts”) and those who argue for lower transaction costs for TC refer to ex-post costs (implementation). It seems likely though that studies on ex-post costs of TC underestimate complexity in harmonizing procedures of at least three different bureaucracies during implementation (Farias, 2015:5).

It is also argued that TC should be evaluated in a medium- to long-term horizon as transaction costs may be compensated in the future by increased trust between the partners and by improved aid harmonization (Piefer, 2009:26; TT-SSC, 2011), which leads some practitioners to recommend starting TC with small projects as a means to build trust and enable deeper and more complex cooperation in the future (Kato, 2012:78). Finally, there is also an argument by leading TC partners Japan and Spain that transaction costs can be reduced through standardization of procedures, increased delegation of authority to country offices for implementation and alignment with recipient country procedures (AECID, 2009; UNDP, 2009; Hosono, 2013a; Honda, 2013a, 2013b).

As previously outlined, the second line of inquiry in the policy-oriented strand places a key focus on the potential of Triangular Cooperation to scale up SSC, which is seen as a horizontal sharing of experience and knowledge co-creation between developing countries (Rhee, 2011). The premise adopted by most of these works is that the similarity in levels of development and in challenges faced by both SSC providers and recipients allow SSC to transfer knowledge and expertise that is not only more relevant to a developing country context (Ekoko and Benn, 2002; ECOSOC, 2008), but that is also is not available in the North (e.g. tropical agriculture, tropical diseases etc.) (Kato, 2012; Hosono, 2012, 2013a, 2013b). The transition from traditional forms of technical assistance (based on unilateral transfer of technology) to capacity building, which focuses on co-creation of knowledge, is seen as informing the role of Northern donors as facilitators or catalysts of SSC (Kato, 2012; Hosono, 2012). In this sense, the DAC donor engagement goes beyond supplementary financial and managerial support to also include support for (1) capacity building in pivotal countries so that they can engage more effectively in SSC and TC as well as (2) platforms for knowledge-sharing, networking and supply-demand match-making between SSC providers and recipients. (UNDP, 2009; Rhee, 2011; Hosono, 2012; Kato 2012).

The policy-oriented strand, as introduced above, places a heavy focus on aid
effectiveness and on the underlying assumption that Triangular Cooperation, or aid in
general, is essentially a tool for the development of beneficiary countries (or for mutually
beneficial horizontal relationship in the case of SSC), which in general either ignores
motives behind donor involvement or makes only minor references to issues as increased
prestige and visibility among the goals of pivotal donors and traditional donors’ interests
in improving relations with key emerging countries (Ashoff, 2010: Chatuverdi, 2012:20–
21). In a nutshell, it maps out only stated motivations (Sohn, 2014). Recognizing that the
provision of development assistance depends on scarce resources (limitations in donor aid budget vs. potential number of recipients), the politics-oriented strand emphasizes the inherently political nature of aid allocation and attempts to develop frameworks for the analysis of the strategic elements of Triangular Cooperation.

A central question posed by politics-oriented analysis has been the identification of elements capable of explaining the increased interest in TC. At a more fundamental level, Abdenur (2007) suggests that a potential reasoning for engagement in triangular settings is the wider range of interaction strategies possible between three actors as opposed to a bilateral one. Some works also suggest with a constructivist undertone that pivotal country participation in TC schemes may be related to self-identity as an intermediary or bridge actor (Piefer, 2014:4). In a more critical pole, some talk of TC as a “a vehicle to co-opt (re)emerging donors into existing hegemonies of development ideology, policy and practice” (McEwan and Mawdsley, 2012:1198, see also Kragelund, 2015), a suggestion that likely reflects the tensions within DAC itself in enforcing “shared values” as seen the cases of Japan and Korea (Kim and Lightfoot, 2011:713). Accordingly, both panoramic (Ayllon Pino, 2013:22) and case studies on leading pivotal countries as Brazil and South Africa (Masters, 2014; Leite et al, 2014) highlight concerns of “instrumentalization” of SSC by Northern donors.

Aside from the possible technical advantages discussed in the policy-focused stream, the literature has identified the following drivers for TC by DAC members: ways to (1) smooth the phasing out of aid to emerging powers, (2) engage SSC providers in the concrete application of aid effectiveness agenda, and (3) improve legitimacy of the intervention by association with a provider without a colonial past, (4) opportunity to maintain dialogue with key countries even in contentious periods, and (5) bandwagon effects (McEwan and Mawdsley, 2012; Abdenur and Marques da Fonseca, 2013; Lengfelder, 2015; Farias, 2015). On the other hand, strategic reasons for the attractiveness of Triangular Cooperation for SSC providers has been vented to lie among other factors on: (1) potential in balancing the solidarity (experience as recipient) narrative with strategic interactions with developed countries, (2) improved
international standing (i.e. fitting rhetoric of bridge actors or self-perception of regional leadership), (3) less costly promotion of regional agendas, (4) potential enabler of legitimization by association as recipient countries may be unease about emerging regional powers. Country-specific studies also mentioned the role of commercial interests, the increase of financial resources for engagement with other developing countries, and prestige goals (fitting the rhetoric of pivot country in the developing world) (Abdenur, 2007; McEwan and Mawdsley, 2012:1200; Abdenur and Marques da Fonseca, 2013; Piefer, 2014).

A dearth of studies on the recipient country perspective has been identified some time ago (McEwan and Mawdsley, 2012), but the gap in the literature persists. Some authors have argued though that the recipient may face difficulties in dealing with large countries (risk of being left out during the priority setting stage) while also challenging the SSC component’s presumed horizontality by arguing that resource asymmetry between some SSC providers and recipients is too large to ignore (Ayllon Pino, 2013:22; Piefer, 2014; Masters, 2014; Lengfelder, 2015:18-9).

In a nutshell, the literature on TC has evolved into two strands and there has not been yet an approach that combines the aspects of knowledge management and political interests. This study proposes a framework based on policy transfer literature along with knowledge creation theory in an attempt to fill this gap and devise an analytical framework that accounts for both process and content.

1.3. Japanese and Brazilian development assistance and Triangular Cooperation

1.3.1 Japanese foreign aid

Despite Japan being one of the founding members of DAC, many aspects of its development assistance paradigm differ from those of the other members of the committee. On the one hand, DAC located most of its efforts into poverty reduction and in favoring grants as the preferred modality of aid, placing an emphasis on promoting sustainability and good governance practices. On the other hand, Japanese aid has remained historically guided by the principle self-help, which informs a focus in the promotion of economic growth through the aid-investment-trade tripod, a tendency to privilege loans and a reluctance to the intrusive character of conditionality (Kawai & Takagi, 2004; Jerve, 2007; OECD-DAC, 2010; Denney et al., 2011).

Early Japanese aid was thus extensively used as a tool for securing access to resources, promoting Japanese exports and opening markets to Japanese products
As such, pretty much like current Chinese aid, it also suffered from international criticism against its alleged self-serving character, overtly commercial goals and low quality (Yasutomo, 1990; Arase, 1995; Söderberg, 1996; Raposo & Potter, 2014). Foreign pressure would then guide the progressive untying of Japanese aid and the consolidation of “aid” over the broader concept of economic cooperation as a means to more clearly differentiate between commercial and developmental goals (Yasutomo, 1990; Arase, 1995). Many observers of Japanese foreign policy have highlighted the competing pressures in Japanese development assistance efforts, such as Katada’s (2002) characterization of two competing aid approaches: the self-interested commercialist view supported by MOF/METI/Japanese business at one side, and the “diplomatic/humanitarian track” under the auspices of MOFA and JICA, which counted on eventual foreign pressure (外圧 gaiatsu) as a means to pressure for compliance with international standards for development assistance. The background of declining aid budgets since the 1990’s as a result of economic stagnation and international accusations against Japan’s aid policies as being selfish, commercially-driven and “without a principle,” combined to weaken the commercialist triad, thus having the 1990’s and the 2000’s as a more internationally focused (Menocal et. al, 2011). The creation of the “New JICA” in 2008 consolidating all three aid modalities (grants, loans and technical cooperation) in a single implementing agency, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) being responsible for planning and policy guidance can be seen as reinforcing this trend (Raposo and Potter, 2010:182; Denney et al., 2011).

1.3.2. Japan’s support to Triangular Cooperation

Japan can be considered a pioneer and a steady supporter of South-South and Triangular Cooperation: its first triangular project (along with Thailand) dates back to 1974 (Kumar, 2008; Denney et al., 2011; Honda and Sakai, 2014:18) and the country is currently the leading DAC donor in this modality (Chatuverdi, 2012). Japan’s support to TC has also been emphasized in the 2015 Development Cooperation Charter as a “good practice” that builds upon expertise, human resources and networks from the South (Government of Japan, 2015)

According to Honda (2013, 2014:9-13), there are four patterns of Triangular Cooperation performed by JICA: (1) dissemination of excellent practices, which is dissemination of previous knowledge created through bilateral technical cooperation to other Southern countries (training and dispatch of experts), (2) collaborative support,
which precludes joint support to a southern country as equal partners (the rationale is that the rise of relevant knowledge in emerging countries makes for synergistic and complementary cooperation for recipients), (3) “bilateral Triangular Cooperation integrating southern knowledge” which is mobilization of southern knowledge in areas where they have comparative advantage (mostly for training programs and third country expert dispatch), and (4) network/platform in which no single southern country spreads knowledge but rather interested parties interact among themselves and Japan supports all parties (or a secretariat). Finally, for considering TC as an indirect way by which Japan can provide SSC, JICA is also engaged in the support for Southern technical cooperation activities and support for SSC organizational capacity development (focus on planning and management of cooperation, for examples see Kumar, 2008; Hosono, 2016).

Hosono (2012) describes three approaches emphasized by Japan’s Triangular Cooperation. First, supporting and teaming-up with Southern Centers of Excellence (COE) is seen as a way to make use of knowledge accumulated in the South for more effective solutions to developing countries’ problems and as a way to enable future cooperation by the recipient herself or in a triangular setting (ibid:34). Kato (2012:75) also argues that the support to COEs can also bring advantages in transaction costs if the COE becomes a natural choice for certain type of cooperation (such as, for example, the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation – Embrapa – for matters on tropical agriculture). Second, Japan has also signed Partnership Programs with 12 countries as of 2012¹, which are high level platforms for joint planning of development assistance (Honda, 2014:20) and have the advantage of providing regular contact while enabling use of a variety of cooperation instruments in a single framework (Hosono, 2012:34). The third and final approach is a regional framework such as the JICA-ASEAN Regional Cooperation Meeting, which is seen as facilitating needs-matching and discussions on common regional challenges (Hosono, 2012:34; Honda, 2014:21-22). Kato (2012:78) describes JICA’s overall approach as following a gradual scaling up: initiatives start small, aiming at knowledge exchange and capacity building of a partnering institution.

1.3.3. Brazil and South-South Cooperation

Brazil’s engagement in international development assistance started in 1960’s connected with idea of universalism in foreign policy (Inoue & Vaz, 2007) and in the

¹ - Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Tunisia. (Honda, 2014:20).
1970’s was intensified as part of an effort towards a more pragmatic foreign policy thus linked with goals of advancing national development through export promotion, attempting to secure provision of key commodities and seeking international prestige (Puente, 2010). The alignment with SSC principles was evident as Brazilian cooperation emphasized a horizontal cooperation (devoid of conditionality) and priming for the respect of the non-interference principle (ibid). It would, however, be only during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) and most notably Lula da Silva (2003-2012) administrations that SSC would see an expressive expansion of resources, recipients and projects.

Official statistics do not portray the actual volume of Brazilian international development cooperation as they do not account for financial assistance (grants and loans) and debt relief2. As such, most analysis of Brazilian cooperation, this study included, focuses on Brazilian technical cooperation – not only due to its institutionalization (albeit frail as seen below) through the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, hereinafter ABC) but also due to its rising role as a foreign policy tool (inter alia Batista Barbosa, 2012; Marroni de Abreu, 2013).

Brazil’s experience as a recipient plays an important role in its view of aid as it saw conditionalities as an interference in internal affairs (Leite et al., 2014:16). The Brazilian official discourse on development cooperation is marked by the following values: solidarity, horizontality, demand-driven approach, no imposition of conditions or connection with commercial interests, non-interference in internal affairs of the recipient country and sharing of Brazilian successful public policy experiences (Farani, 2011a; IPEA & World Bank, 2011:36-38; Marroni de Abreu, 2013). According to the Government of Brazil (2011:36), Brazilian technical cooperation “makes use of good practices in economic and social development – tested and nationally successful – adapting them to other developing countries with similar realities and with which Brazil shares historical and cultural aspects. Hence, the geographic distribution of TS&TC [technical, scientific and technological cooperation] in Brazil illustrates the priority given to South American neighbors and Portuguese-speaking countries.”

Brazil claims not to be against North-South Cooperation, but that SSC requires a different set of rules (Farani, 2011b) and that it only signed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness as a recipient (de Souza, 2010). Brazilian foreign policy is also guided

---

2 - The officially recognized modalities of Brazilian development cooperation are: technical, scientific and technological cooperation, scholarships to foreigners, humanitarian assistance, support and protection of refugees, contributions to international organizations and peacekeeping operations (Government of Brazil, 2011:13, 2013:5).
by a commitment to multilateralism and the country portrays itself as a potential bridge actor between developed and developing countries (Schläger, 2007; Souza, 2010; Burges, 2013, 2014). Despite the rhetoric of non-commercial and non-conditional transfer, Brazilian aid is seen as a tool to support the country’s prestige (e.g. reform of the UN Security Council, election of Brazilian nationals as heads of international organizations) and the internationalization of Brazilian businesses (Burges, 2014; Leite et al., 2014), the latter of which being acknowledged by Brazilian diplomats as “unintended positive results” of technical cooperation (Batista Barbosa, 2012; Marroni de Abreu, 2013).

The institutional setup of Brazilian technical cooperation is marked by (1) a de facto decentralization of its aid programs and the low coordination between Brazilian ministries involved in provision of aid and (2) the fragility of the institutional background in which the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, hereinafter ABC) operates, being a mere division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Inoue and Vaz, 2007; Cabral and Weinstock, 2010). ABC’s frail institutional environment is marked by high staff turnover (career diplomats that rotate posts regularly and the remaining of the staff being composed of short-term UNDP consultants), dependence on the UNDP for hiring and procurement for the benefit of third countries (due to limitations set by the Brazilian Constitution), insufficient documentation, monitoring and evaluation (affecting institutional memory) and lack of own budget (due to its subordinate position within the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (Cabral & Weinstock, 2010; Marroni de Abreu, 2013; Leite et al., 2014).

An often emphasized trait of Brazilian technical cooperation is the commitment to capacity building in recipient countries’ institutions (Farani, 2011b). This matter is related to project implementation, which is conducted by public servants from leading Brazilian institutions such as Embrapa (agriculture) and Fiocruz (public health). This approach is said to reduce risk of corruption and strengthen knowledge exchange as, instead of relying on consultants, public servants are familiar with the programs and implementation difficulties through practice (Puente 2010). It also is said to allow for cheaper cooperation as these public servants are paid by their respective organization and not by ABC, thus allowing the agency to take part in larger projects than otherwise (ABC, n.d.). Because of this structure, ABC estimates that for each BRL 1 (1 Brazilian Real) spent by ABC, BRL 15 are spent by implementing institutions (Inoue and Vaz, 2007:12; The Economist, 2010a). A cursory study with recipients of Brazilian aid has shown that implementation delays due to ABC’s budget and institutional constraints, especially from Dilma Rousseff’s administration (2013~), did not yield negative views of Brazilian cooperation, with local institutions emphasizing style (capacity building focus,
horizontal partnerships) over project completion (Bry, 2015).

1.3.4. Brazilian experience with Triangular Cooperation

Brazil is singled out as one of the leading pivotal countries in Triangular Cooperation initiatives (Chatuverdi, 2012:10; OECD, 2013:18), which arguably shows that a critical stance towards Northern aid and the Aid Effectiveness Agenda does not mean its complete rejection (Abdenur, 2015:330).

![Figure 2: Brazilian Triangular Cooperation: No. of projects in execution or concluded in 2011](image)

Source (ABC, n.d.2)

A key principle in Brazilian Triangular Cooperation is that it should have a comparative advantage over analogous bilateral means (Government of Brazil, 2011:34) while also meeting the same standards as Brazilian cooperation in general, namely, absence of conditionality and commercial interests, demand-driven approach and sharing Brazilian good practices (Farani, 2011a; Government of Brazil, 2013:27).

In an interview with the author, Minister Marco Farani, who oversaw the ABC’s portfolio and budget expansion during the Lula administration, argues that during his term as director “the criteria [to identify Northern partners for Triangular Cooperation] was to work with aid agencies that had worked and were still working in Brazil – as is the case of USAID, JICA and GIZ – that is, agencies that were already familiar with our institutions and that had country offices in Brazil, which allowed us to negotiate and
elaborate projects at the ABC in Brasília (...) At the same time, we also considered the technical criteria, that is, to work with aid agencies with established methodologies and strong institutional standing as we were still not very solid in this field (...) And, of course, there was the political criteria: we evaluated with whom to work carefully so as to not be ‘instrumentalized’ by anyone” (interview with the author on April 18, 2016).

1.3.5 Brazil-Japan experience with Triangular Cooperation and ProSAVANA

Triangular Cooperation initiatives involving Japan and Brazil as parties started in 1985 with the start of a Third-Country Training Program sponsored by JICA in Brazil. Under this arrangement, cost sharing was divided as follows: 70% of the expenditures were taken by Japan, leaving Brazil with the remaining 30%. In 2000, however, Brazil and Japan upgraded their relationship into a Partnership Program (the Japan-Brazil Partnership Program – JBPP) with equal participation, thus paving the way for joint provision of projects (Sakaguchi, 2000). In 2007, the JBPP was complemented with the launching of the “Japan-Brazil Global Partnership for the Solution of Global Issues” as a means to facilitate the joint undertaking of large scale projects (ibid:227-8).

ProSAVANA (Triangular Cooperation Program for Agricultural Development in African Tropical Savanna) is a Triangular Cooperation program signed by the governments of Brazil, Japan and Mozambique in September 2009 and is the second project under the new Japan-Brazil Global Partnership³. It was envisioned with the goal of promoting rural development in the Nacala Corridor region in Mozambique while applying the knowledge accumulated with the development of the Brazilian Cerrado and from the successful implementation of PRODECER (Japan-Brazil Cooperation Program for the Development of the Cerrados) (Memorandum de Entendimento, 2009:1), which had a span of 20 years and is evaluated as one of JICA’s most successful programs (Hosono & Hongo, 2016). The rationale was that there were significant geophysical and climatic similarities between the tropical savannas in Mozambique and the Brazilian Cerrado. Additionally, the selection of Brazil as a partner for development of tropical agriculture in Mozambique is said to stem from its comparative advantages, namely the experience accumulated by Embrapa (Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation) as a center of excellence in tropical agriculture and linguistic advantages (both Brazil and Mozambique speak Portuguese) (Hosono, 2012). The program was also defined by senior JICA officials as aiming to support not only Mozambique, but also to assist human

³ - The first project was a 2-year long capacity building initiative for the Josina Machel Hospital in Angola (Sakaguchi, 2012).
capacity building in Brazil as a way to further enable its transformation into an established donor country (Oshima, 2012).

1.4. Research Question and Conclusion

The present chapter has introduced a brief history of current trends in the aid regime a well and the background debate on Triangular Cooperation. The definition of Triangular Cooperation is still not very well established and this is reflected in a fragmented body of literature. By and large two analytical strands can be identified: a policy-oriented one written by practitioners and focusing on the potential contribution of Triangular Cooperation to aid effectiveness and management of knowledge from the South, and a politics-oriented one, which analyzes the strategic potential of this form of cooperation and is based mostly on case studies and isolated International Relations works. Taking into consideration that these two strands in their current state cannot provide a comprehensive view of Triangular Cooperation, this study proposes a framework based on policy transfer literature along with knowledge creation theory in an attempt to fill this gap and to provide an answer, albeit tentative, to the following question: how does Triangular Cooperation contribute to relevance and to the effectiveness of international development cooperation? These two concepts address respectively content and process. The meaning of “relevance” here is twofold: alignment with recipient country established goals and appropriateness (to the recipient context). “Effectiveness,” on the other hand, is related to the matter of transaction costs, both ex-ante and ex-post and is not to be confounded with the broader concept of “aid effectiveness”. As a guide for this research, four hypothesis were formulated based on the literature: (H1) the lack of conditionality in TC caused by the participation of a SSC provider leads to alignment with recipient priorities, (H2) Knowledge and experiences from the SSC provider scaled up in TC provides solutions that are more appropriate to a developing country context, (H3) the reproduction of past cooperation reduces overall transaction costs (i.e. burning steps), (H4) the supporting role of the DAC donor and the similarities between the SSC provider and the recipient make way for smoother implementation (i.e. lower ex-post transaction costs). The following section provides a theoretical background for the existence of Southern “best practices” and introduces the policy transfer framework as a means to combine a focus on both process and content without losing sight of the political nature of aid.
2. Theoretical framework: Policy transfer

The present chapter is organized as follows. The first section introduces the model of chains of knowledge creation by emerging donors as a relevant background for the understanding of SSC and TC as well as some of its shortcomings. The second section provides the main concepts of the policy transfer literature by making reference to the most widely used framework of analysis: The Dolowitz and Marsh model. Section Three briefly discusses some of the criticisms against the policy transfer concept and suggests that despite some degree of validity, most of the critics seem to target the “policy transfer” label itself, rather than the substance of the studies developed under it. The fourth section discusses the understudied area of policy transfer in developing countries and defines foreign aid as an instance of policy transfer. Despite widespread assumption of foreign aid as coercive transfers, the literature seems to emphasize bargaining tactics by the recipient as well as the transformation of policy content from the interaction of local and foreign actors throughout implementation. The fifth section criticizes the focus of most of the literature on the receiving end of policy transfer, paying only limited attention to the interests by policy transfer actors located outside the recipient’s jurisdiction. A review of some of the frameworks dealing with this shortcoming, such as critics against “best practice” models, policy branding and standard models, is then conducted. The sixth and final section builds the connection between chains of knowledge creation and the policy transfer concepts introduced in this chapter and presents the finalized version of the framework of analysis to be utilized throughout this study.

2.1. Chains of knowledge creation (CKC) and emerging donors

In an effort to demonstrate the contributions of emerging donors and the role of their experience as aid recipients, Shimomura and Wang (2015) introduce three hypotheses, which are explained in detail below. This study finds however shortcomings in this early approach and suggests the integration of policy transfer concepts as a way to strengthen the analysis.

The primary hypothesis in the CKC framework is that new knowledge can emerge through the interaction of local and foreign (donor) knowledge. The former is assumed to be embedded in the recipient’s traditional socio-cultural inheritance, consisting mostly of tacit knowledge. Foreign knowledge, on the other hand, is to a large extent assumed to be of explicit nature, codified in plans and manuals. As such, their
second hypothesis states that the interaction of tacit and explicit knowledge paves the way for the creation of new knowledge by the recipient. Their third and final hypothesis is that knowledge created in the abovementioned interactions “often plays a vital role in aid giving activities of emerging donors” (Shimomura and Wang, 2015: 4), which would enable a chain of knowledge creation between aid recipients.

![Figure 3: Chains of knowledge creation. Made by the author, Based on Shimomura and Wang (2015)](image)

The relief that Shimomura and Wang put in the socio-economic inheritance as a key background to local knowledge serves to highlight that new donors’ aid reflects not only the experience as a recipient but also their idiosyncratic characteristics. As such, a complementary assumption of the model is that both knowledge creation and transfer (through aid) by the recipient country is determined by local contexts and by the different articulations between local actors (Shimomura and Wang, 2015: 6).

The CKC model provides an innovative approach to integrate knowledge creation into the analysis of international development cooperation. Its strengths lie in the recognition of the diversity between emerging donors (through the idiosyncratic character of local knowledge) and in the two-way transfer implied in the model, which recognizes recipient agency. The authors also argue that their model also aims to bridge the analytical gap between aid inputs and aid outputs/outcomes by focusing on the intermediate process of knowledge creation (Shimomura and Wang, 2015: 7-8).

A problem, however, is that while the first step of the CKC is indeed accounted for in the model, no actual explanation is provided as to how the created knowledge is
translated into the new donor’s aid policy aside from the vague assertions that “the basic characteristics of the creation and transfer of new knowledge by recipient countries are determined by the specific local actors” (ibid., 7) and that “the aid recipients nurtured the acquired knowledge and applied it to other countries through financial and/or technical cooperation” (ibid., 32).

Figure 4: The missing link in the CKC model. Source: the author, based on Shimomura and Wang (2015)

The CKC framework in its current state provides only a partial account of the knowledge creation process as it does not explain the link between created knowledge and knowledge promoted in the aid policy of emerging donors. As mentioned in the previous chapter, since aid policy depends on scarce resources, both its allocation and contents are inherently political. To bridge the gap in the CKC model, this study deems it necessary to go beyond a process-focused inquiry by integrating an analysis of content, or more specifically, of the sub-process by which content is selected among the repertoire of knowledge available to emerging donors. As the next section will further elaborate, this undertaking can be achieved through reference to the policy transfer literature, especially of concepts related to policy export and coercive policy transfer.

2.2. Policy transfer: key concepts

The most widely cited definition of policy transfer stems from Dolowitz and Marsh’s (1996:344) seminal article that defined it as the process in which “knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or place is
used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place.” Their main contribution, aside from a widely cited, albeit still contested (see Dussauge-Laguna, 2012) definition, was to provide a heuristics for the analysis of policy transfer through the “Dolowitz and Marsh model,” which is guided by seven questions related to (1) the motivations to engage in policy transfer, (2) the key actors in such process, (3) the content of the transfer, (4) from where lessons are drawn, (5) the degree of transfer, (6) enabling and obstructing factors to transfer, and (7) the connections between policy transfer and policy success (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996,2000).

The rationale for policy transfer was introduced through the distinction between voluntary and coercive transfer. While the former is presented as related to lesson-drawing and dissatisfaction with the status quo, the latter entails an external actor (government, international organization, or else) compelling a national government to adopt a certain policy (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). Further studies highlighted that most transfers actually take place somewhere in between these two extremes, thus prompting the notions of “semi-coercive”/negotiated transfer (Evans, 2004) and of a policy transfer continuum (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000).

![The policy transfer continuum](image-url)  
*Figure 5: The policy transfer continuum (reproduced from Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000:13)*

A wide range of actors has been identified in policy transfer processes, including elected officials, political parties, bureaucracies, pressure groups, policy entrepreneurs, international organizations (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996), epistemic communities (Haas, 1992), consultants (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000), think tanks (Stone, 2000), transnational advocacy networks, global public policy networks (Stone, 2004), among others. The analysis of policy transfer is essentially agent-centered and assumes that actors can exert a certain degree of mediation over structural factors (Stone, 2012:485), thus denying the structural determinism criticized by Rise Kappen (1994) and emphasizing
the interplay of knowledge and agency. In this sense, “when and where an agent becomes involved in the policy-making process can tell us a great deal about his or her motivations for offering transferred information” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2012:341).

The plurality of actors potentially involved in policy transfer also meant the stretching of the concept of “policy” to take into account both soft (ideas, ideologies, negative lessons) and hard (instruments, programs, institutions) forms of transfer (Davies and Evans, 1999:382). Even though this distinction is important because “knowledge [soft] transfer may be more extensive than policy [hard] transfer” (Stone, 2012:495), it has brought about concerns of “conceptual overstretched’’ as some suggest that “there is a sense in which almost any form of knowledge transfer, be it negative or positive, could now be considered a form of policy transfer” (Benson and Jordan 2011:371). To make up for this criticism, this study subscribes to Evans and Davies (1999:366) description of policy transfer as a process resulting from intentional activity from those who seek to borrow policies from abroad and/or from those seeking to impose policies on others. This distinction is particularly important not only for drawing a scope of analysis (which kind of knowledge about policy matters) but also to differentiate policy transfer from unintentional policy convergence (i.e. common processes and globalization pressures).

As for the degrees of transfer, Evans (2010:9) suggests four different processes: copying (adoption of a policy from elsewhere without modification), emulation (acceptance of a policy from abroad as a best standard for policy change), hybridization (combination of policy elements from several settings as a means to develop a context-sensitive policy), and inspiration (an idea from a different setting is used to bring about policy change).

The Dolowitz and Marsh framework also suggests the following moderating variables as potential enablers/disruptors of policy transfer: policy complexity, past policies (path dependency), degree of institutional, financial and technological feasibility, and degrees of similarity (geographic, cultural, historic, stage of economic development etc.) between countries (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996:353-4:2000).

Finally, regarding policy outcomes, most studies refer to the Peter Hall’s (1993) concept of orders of policy change. According to such framework, (a) first order change refers to a change of specific policy instrument settings; (b) second order change entails an alteration of both instruments and institutions; and (c) third order change encompasses both first and second degree changes as well as the reorganization of the hierarchy of policy goals in a particular field. The occurrence of policy transfer and subsequent policy change has not been associated with any normative element – that is,
policy transfer is not assumed to improve policies (be it in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, equity or else) in a particular field. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), however, suggested that certain types of policy transfer, namely uninformed, incomplete and inappropriate transfers, are more likely to lead to policy failure. In this sense, uninformed transfer takes place when the borrowing country lacks information about the transferred policy and how it is implemented in its original context. Incomplete transfer, on the other hand, entails failure to include key elements that contributed to the success in the originating country. And lastly, inappropriate transfer refers to a lack of fitness of the transferred policy to the local economic/social/political/ideological context.

2.3. Critique

Yet, policy transfer is not without critics. This section briefly presents some of the main arguments forwarded against the policy transfer literature and discusses the ways such issues have been addressed.

A variety of studies argued against the concept of “policy transfer” for an alleged “apolitical nature” (de Morais, 2005:8-11) or for the mechanistic assumption of simple transposition of policy templates (Massey, 2010:144-5), for assuming a “straightforward a·to·b movement” (Ward and McCann, 2012:328) and an “automatic or unproblematic, taken·for·granted process” (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2007:15). These studies argue then for the need of a more in-depth analysis by proposing new concepts such as “policy translation” (for example, Lendvai and Stubbs, 2007; Kim, 2013), “policy assemblages” (Ward and McCann, 2012), “policy mobilities” (Peck, 2011), and “policy mimesis” (Massey, 2010). The main argument for these approaches has been that policy transfer studies have failed to take into account the contested political nature of transfer, how its contents are constantly altered and constructed by social interactions and how social and political cultures as well as time affect the policy process. While this criticism does point to some valid weaknesses in the literature, such as a bias towards perceived “success stories” (Stone, 2012:488), this study does not subscribe to them fully for understanding that their framing of policy transfer is rather simplistic, reflecting more a dissatisfaction with the label itself than with the actual studies.

As shown in the previous section, in no moment transfer was assumed to be “automatic,” as it is clearly expressed by the need to take into account moderating variables as well as to consider both degrees of transfer and the potential implications of uninformed, incomplete and inappropriate transfer. The need to take into account the political nature of transfer is also fully acknowledged and incorporated into the policy
transfer approach as explicitly stated by Dolowitz and Marsh: “both supporters and opponents of various policies use lessons selectively to gain advantage in the struggle to get their ideas accepted” (1996:346) and “the use of transferred information will change depending on where an agent who is interested in using it interacts with the policy-making system and the role he or she is playing in the policy’s development” (2012:341).

Lastly, while policy is indeed not defined as a social construction in orthodox policy transfer analysis, the adoption of such socio-constructivist posture is not unproblematic either, as it fails to provide a framework for assessing policy outcomes (Park et al, 2014:399) and makes it difficult to analyze policies and institutions independent of the way in which they are discursively constructed (Marsh and Evans, 2012a:480-1). It seems then that these different labels actually refer to rather similar concepts (Marsh and Evans, 2012b:587) and express less a disagreement in principles and more a difference in focus: with policy transfer emphasizing the relation between agency and process (“who,” “how” and “why”) and policy translation/mobilities/assemblages putting more relief on the interaction between content, context and agency (“what,” “where,” “when” and “for who”).

2.4. Policy transfer and foreign aid

One of the widely recognized shortcomings of the current body of literature on policy transfer is its focus on advanced liberal democracies, especially in North America and Europe, and its inherent bias towards horizontal and voluntary transfers (Evans, 2010:7; Marsh and Sharman, 2010:43-4; Stone, 2012:485). While studies on transfer to developing countries are gradually growing, analyses of policy transfer from and between developing countries are still uncommon (but for some exceptions, see Lana and Evans, 2004; de Morais, 2005; Weyland, 2005). This section presents a brief review of this emerging body of literature and pays special attention to the analysis of international development assistance as a form of policy transfer.

Policy transfer to the developing world is widely assumed to bear coercive elements, with major states, international organizations and multinational companies being described as seeking to impose their preferred policies on other actors, especially developing countries, where the resource gap is supposed to be bigger (Evans, 2010:8; Marsh and Sharman, 2010). Against this background, it is not surprising that most scholarly accounts on foreign aid identify it as a type of coercive transfer: Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 356) argue that “a political leader in a Third World country has little alternative but to accept the policies imposed by the World Bank or the IMF” and suggest
that “[w]hen aid agencies are making loans it is likely to lead to coercive policy transfer” (2000:16). Similarly, Evans (2010:8) argues about the pervasiveness of negotiated forms of transfer to developing countries and Singh (2002:300) describes foreign aid from the 1980’s onwards as accompanied by “far-reaching and intrusive conditionality.”

From the abovementioned terms, both negotiated transfers and conditionality appear to be cognates of sorts. Evans (2010:8) defines negotiated transfer as somewhere between voluntary and coercive transfer spectrum, as it is described a process by which a government is compelled to adopt certain policies in order to secure access to financial resources (grants, loans, investments etc.), with the coercive element being evident in the recipient’s alleged “denied freedom of choice.” On the same vein, conditionality relates to actions and promises of actions made only at the insistence of a donor country, being intimately linked to an unequal bargaining power and to the use of financial strength to promote donor country/policy exporter objectives (Killick, 1998:9-12). Collier et al (1997:1400-2) further demonstrated the connection between aid, conditionality and coerciveness by highlighting its five intrinsic features: inducement (of policies that governments would not otherwise implement), selectivity (aid is given only to “good performers”), paternalism (as it directs resources to a favored policy or sector), restraint (as a warning against policy reversal), and signaling (of good policy behavior).

When tested against empirical case studies, the assumption of widespread conditionality and straight coercive transfer in foreign aid does not hold well, with both studies on policy resistance and policy translation referring to bargaining processes and negotiated transfers, while also emphasizing recipient agency and the length of strategic options explored by local actors. Ivanova and Evans (2004) and Randma-Liiv and Kruusenberg’s (2012) analyses of “immature policy environments” in the cases of transition in Ukraine, and Latvia and Estonia respectively are most expressive for they demonstrated that conditionality is not omnipresent: in these cases, aid resources were seen as a tool to facilitate intended policy introduction and not the other way around. Interestingly though, Street (2004) suggests that in the case of health sector reform in Kyrgyzstan, an initial voluntary request for assistance by a transition country as highlighted in the abovementioned studies, faced indirect coercive pressures by donors (USAID) for the adoption of specific policy proposals (fundholding mechanisms).

Bache and Taylor’s (2003) study of high education policy transfer to Kosovo highlighted that despite the asymmetry of resources, an aid relationship is better depicted as a bargaining process between interdependent actors as the recipient controls domestic implementation. They even suggest a two-stage game where (1) a policy is adopted under coercive pressures and (2) policymakers decide to actually implement,
revert or resist the new policy (ibid:238). In a similar vein, Silova (2005) demonstrated how the “traveling policies” of educational reform supported by major donors and international organizations have been “hijacked” in Central Asia, where local elites made use of “flags of convenience” as a means to balance their desires to revive pre-Soviet traditions, retain “best” Soviet practices and establish closer relations with the West through aid.

Policy translation studies also seem to share these findings in their emphasis that the indigenization of a transferred policy is only a matter of time and starts from implementation (Stone, 2012:489). Valghan and Rafanell’s (2012), for example, analyzed a World Bank-led public sector capacity building program in Ethiopia in the early 2000's and have showed that one of the strategies of the Ethiopian elite was to retain decision-making authority by reducing points of contact with donors. True to the translation approach, they further suggest that the intended goals of participation, accountability and cohesion were not only reinterpreted but transformed during implementation through ad-hoc interactions between the donor community, mid-level officials, political elites and the public. Similarly, Kim’s (2013) analysis of aid to South Korea showed how local decision makers made use of legislative and policy design capacities to curb foreign aid agencies’ intervention in implementation and to compensate for its lack of negotiating power. The result of this interaction was the transformation of “coercively imposed conditions into cooperative forms of partnership with donors” (Kim, 2013:432).

The author further argued that policy transfer through aid is often accompanied by uninformed, incomplete and inappropriate elements and that policy success is predicated in institutional capacities for localization. In this sense, “if [policy] takers have good institutions for localization, they lead to policy change that contains local translations whether countervailing or heterogeneous to sender’s intentions” (ibid:413).

The importance of local institutions and expertise is further highlighted by suggestions that both in developing countries and in transitional settings, policy transfer (whether through aid or not) may actually mean the emergence of new policy areas as opposed to changes in existing policy, as it tends to be the case for transfers among industrialized countries (Bache and Taylor, 2003; Randma-Liiv and Kruusenberg, 2012). In this sense, Randma-Liiv and Kruusenberg (2012:163) underlined the potential vicious circle related to the lack of expertise in these new policy areas, which makes unclear how the validity of role models or “best practices” is asserted. Implications of such circle for foreign-aid induced transfers is further illustrated by Street’s (2004) analysis of health reform in Kyrgyzstan, where the lack of a knowledge base and of local epistemic communities reduced Kyrgyz grounding for contesting or rejecting donors’ suggestions.
This finding underscores the need to not only question best practices and how they are formed, but also to identify the roles and motivations of actors seeking to inform the content of policy transfers: a task that is undertaken in the following section. Given that the present study will conduct an analysis of the case of transfer in Mozambique, a country marked by high aid dependency and also in transition, this inquiry is made all the more important.

2.5. Sender's motives: best practice, branding, and standard models

From the previous exposition, it can be apprehended that most policy transfer studies have focused on the receiving end of the policy transfer, largely ignoring the analysis of interests and motivations in the “exporting jurisdiction” (Holden, 2010; Marsh and Fawcett, 2011a/b; Ancelovici and Jenson, 2012). This is particularly troublesome in cases where there is a possibility of coercive transfer, as is often the case with foreign aid. This section reviews some of the approaches used to explore this problematic within the policy transfer network, namely challenges to the concept of “best practice”, policy branding, policy exports and the creation of standard models.

The creation of a best practice involves the selection of perceived success stories by authorities with the goal of promoting innovation, learning, and exchange of experiences on common problems (Brannan et al, 2008). This selection is, however, political as some cases are picked over others and definitions of policy success are far from consensual (Fawcett and Marsh, 2012). Stead (2012:103) highlighted gains in power, reputation and financial resources as reasons for promotion of best practice. Bechberger et al (2008:4) also mentioned how best practices may be produced to meet bureaucratic objectives (such as signaling organizational interest or meeting expectations of advice input) despite sometimes thin evidence of policy success or generalization potential.

Analyzing the relation between best practice, policy transfer and development assistance in the context of global health policies, Walt et al (2004) argued that the making of best practice and its dissemination should be seen as the final result of a process of three iterative policy loops. In the first loop, which is prior to agenda-setting and to policy transfer, policy communities are engaged in knowledge generation in a context-specific and bottom-up interaction. The second loop, which might be triggered by a focal event, is marked by the involvement of global public policy networks and by the effort to make the highly-context specific knowledge generated in the first loop into standardized policy guidelines (global best practice). Lastly, the third loop entails top-down process of communication and dissemination of the policy generated in the second
The effects of branding on policy transfer is an understudied topic (Marsh and Fawcett, 2011a). A pioneering study in this field was conducted by Ogden et al. (2003) on their analysis of the impact of branding of the DOTS regimen for tuberculosis control. According to them, a window of opportunity (tuberculosis outbreaks in New York) was seized by policy entrepreneurs to advocate the by then unconventional short-course treatment regimens for treating the disease in developing countries. This method, which had only been tested in a handful of small African countries by a tight network of specialists, was adopted by the World Health Organization (WHO) and adapted it into a simple policy package under the DOTS brand. Their study underlines that “[t]he Global TB Programme explicitly intended to develop a policy package that was simple and marketable to policy makers and programme implementers” (Ogden et al, 2003:184) and that branding was key to this process because it was, as expressed by one of their informants, “an important mechanism of policy transfer (...) [providing] a message that is simple enough to rally people around so that even if they don’t understand it they can say that they want it” (ibid). The conclusions of their case study are threefold: (1) branding may not be successful in the absence of agenda-setting (in this case, an external focusing event), (2) branding may help in mobilizing resources and amplifying advocacy potential but does not guarantee successful implementation (the majority of adopters in Africa, for example, did not achieve nationwide coverage of the population), and (3) branding ensues massive simplification and as such carries risks of not providing enough room for adaptation to local contexts (“one-size-fits-all”), which in turn can bring about resistance during implementation both by different policy communities and by recipient government and the general public.

Marsh and Fawcett (2011b) also analyzed branding in the case of voluntary transfers of the United Kingdom’s Gateway reviews for public procurement. According to them, this policy was branded since its formulation to simultaneously protect the methodology of reviews and to facilitate adoption across the UK and possibly abroad. As transfers became international, branding and franchising were emphasized as a means to minimize the risk of transfer failures adversely affecting the process in the UK and to provide a common framework for exchanges. The authors then carefully suggest that branding may have contributed to the seemingly successful transfer to Australia as it allowed for the process to be transferred mostly intact, while still recognizing that it was unclear whether said perception of success derived from actual results or from a brand qua brand effect (Marsh and Fawcett, 2011b:255).

With regards to policy exports, Holden (2010) shows how attempted coercive
transfers resulted from the inclusion of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) services export promotion in British industrial healthcare policy. He demonstrates through extensive documental evidence how the Department of Health used linkages with DFID, the World Bank and consultancy firms as a means to support the transfer of the British Private-Finance-Initiative model (PFI) to developing countries with the goal of creating business opportunities to British consultancy services (Holden, 2010:90). He underscores that in such strategy material interests overruled the controversial nature of PFIs in the UK and a realistic assessment of their appropriateness in a developing country context, where PFIs pose major challenges given their long-term inflexibility and high administrative capacity demands (ibid:83-4). The aforementioned study of Kyrgyz health sector reform by Street (2004) also provides a fitting example as the support of fundholding and market-based health insurance programs by USAID did not make reference to conflicting evidence of the effectiveness and fairness of such arrangements, while the author suggests that such support was likely linked to USAID ideological preference for market-based solutions, American interests in heralding Kyrgyzstan as an example to neighboring countries and also part of an effort to facilitate access of US health care services in overseas markets (ibid:123-125).

Self-interested transfer by policy exporters was also highlighted by Chien, Zhu and Chen (2015), who suggested a framework of “self-learn through teaching” to account for policy transfer to large developing countries like China. According to them, the potential gains for increased economic engagement with such countries leads policy exporter governments to engage in sequential policy transfers as means to further their knowledge of the local context. As such, the policy lender (“teacher”) not only shares its codified knowledge on policy with the developing country, but through this interaction also acquires experience and tacit knowledge about local dynamics, which, in turn, help formulate better strategies for future projects and transfers (Chien et al, 2015:1652). This finding suggests a more flexible accommodation of policy export efforts to local circumstances and also seem to be supported by Holden (2010:86-7), who demonstrated that the attempt to export British PFI-related services to India was met with an offsetting request for aid funds that led to the unconventional involvement of DFID in the scheme despite its commitment of providing untied aid. It also seems to fit the behavior of some international organizations, as Ancelovici and Jenson (2012:52) argue regarding the World Bank's interest in contributing to the policy design of conditional cash transfers in Brazil as a means to claim a degree of ownership over the program as well as to facilitate dissemination of related initiatives in future interventions.

The most comprehensive analytical effort towards the study of the initial phases
of policy transfer was developed by Ancelovici and Jenson (2012), who, through an analysis of policy transfer in the cases of truth commissions and conditional cash transfers, have proposed a model of standardization as the initial step for policy transfer or policy exports. According to them, each transfer should be preceded by a political process by which a practice in a particular sector is reconfigured by political actors to allow for transfer to other contexts. The standardization process is further defined by three mechanisms: certification, decontextualization and framing. “Certification” entails the recognition of a practice that displays some degree of putative success as a standard model by an external actor with some sort of authority on that field (ibid:41). “Decontextualization” implies disembedding the practice from its original setting and from all elements that may hinder transferability (ibid:41). Finally, “framing” involves the discursive work with strategic purposes to define problems, connect distinct situations, propose solutions and folding new key issues under the policy scope as a means to widen potential support (ibid:42). With regards to their occurrence, the authors caution that these mechanisms may well overlap and do not necessarily occur linearly. The table below summarizes their findings and integrates those of Milhorance de Castro (2014) as well, who applied the model to agricultural policy transfers between Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Summary of case studies using the Standardization Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Certification</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Truth Commissions (South Africa as a role model)____a</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conditional Cash Transfers CCT (Brazil as a role model)____a</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.6. Completing the chains of knowledge creation framework

The aforementioned policy transfer concepts can be integrated in the chains of knowledge creation framework to fill in the gap between knowledge created through the experience of receiving aid and new donor knowledge. In this sense, this section discusses the compatibility between these two theoretical backgrounds and adds a new guiding hypothesis.

As previously mentioned, policy transfer refers to the process by which knowledge about policy lato sensu is used in designing policies in another setting. As with the chains of knowledge creation framework, this knowledge is not transferred unaltered, but rather is determined by the interaction between policy transfer actors in different jurisdictions. The overlap is particularly substantive in policy translation studies as they emphasize the role of the recipient and of local context-related intervening variables in the process of policy transfer/knowledge creation.

In the case of foreign aid, aid agencies can be seen as primarily involved in the export of policy knowledge that is externalized into take-away lessons and best practices (Stone, 2004:550-5). This study proposes that connecting incipient analyses on policy exports, branding, best practice and standardization holds the key to filling the gap in the chains of knowledge creation model, namely the transformation of knowledge created as an aid recipient and new donor knowledge.

All the above-mentioned approaches underline the importance of taking knowledge grounded in local experience into a generalizable, simplified form. Bulkeley (2006), for example, argues that the promotion of “examples of action” through best practices entails the transformation of contextual (tacit) knowledge about a policy and its implementation into explicit knowledge through codification. As being generalizable is one of the criteria for best practices (Bechberger et al, 2008:3), this decontextualization
often results in a sanitized and de-politicized technical solution to (1) promote performance and (2) to contest other framings of a perceived policy problem (Bulkeley, 2006). Policy branding acts in a similar way by promoting simplification as a means to facilitate diffusion and transfer (Ogden et al, 2003).

The most comprehensive framework for analysis is provided by Ancelovici and Jenson (2012) in their standardization model, which can be integrated into the chains of knowledge creation framework as illustrated below.

![Figure 6: The updated Chains of Knowledge Creation model](image)

The main advantage of Ancelovici and Jenson’s standardization model lies in its potential for widespread application. It covers, for example, all three iterative policy loops proposed by Walt et al (2004) for the creation of global best practices. Similarly, all three mechanisms can also be identified in policy branding, which can be considered a sub-set within the wider group of standardization processes. Another valuable contribution is the incorporation of intentionality in all mechanisms, a feature whose analysis is essential to the study of potentially coercive forms of policy transfer, of which foreign aid is a prime example. Finally, it also addresses the previously mentioned critic
regarding seemingly apolitical assessments of knowledge/policy transfers.

The updated chains of knowledge creation model developed complement Dolowitz and Marsh’ model of policy transfer and provide the basis for a new supporting hypothesis: (H5) the presence of “best practices” from the South increases the risk of uninformed, inappropriate and incomplete transfer.

The updated and final framework of analysis can then be defined as follows. The guiding research question is: how does Triangular Cooperation contribute to relevance and to the effectiveness of international development cooperation? Relevance is, once again, further specified in two elements: alignment to recipient’s priorities (content-related) and appropriateness to recipient’ context (content and process-related). Effectiveness, on the other hand, is understood as synonymous of transaction costs (process-related). The Dolowitz and Marsh model also include an important restriction to the assessment of appropriateness as dependent on policy outcomes (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000:17). Additionally, the undertaking of an approach that covers both content and process can be seen as making up for the shortcomings identified in the section 3 on policy transfer and its critics. Finally, the updated guiding hypothesis for this research are listed as follows: (H1) the lack of conditionality in TC caused by the participation of a SSC provider leads to alignment with recipient priorities, (H2) Knowledge and experiences from the SSC provider scaled up in TC provides solutions that are more appropriate to a developing country context, (H3) the reproduction of past cooperation in TC reduces overall transaction costs (i.e. burning steps), (H4) the supporting role of the DAC donor and the similarities between the SSC provider and the recipient make way for smoother implementation (i.e. lower ex-post transaction costs), and (H5) the presence of “best practices” from the South increases the risk of uninformed, inappropriate and incomplete transfer.
3. Methodology

This study opted for a case study approach upon recognizing the scarcity of such type of work in the Triangular Cooperation literature. The case was selected due to the relevance of the partners involved (both Brazil and Japan being leading proponents of Triangular Cooperation) but also for its particularity: while Triangular Cooperation projects in general entail technical cooperation and have short duration and small budgets (Ashoff, 2010; Schulz, 2010), ProSAVANA is a long-term development program encompassing two phases and three preliminary technical cooperation projects with very distinct characteristics. This analysis selected a high visibility ongoing project to deal with the problem of lack of documentation (that is, publicly available data) that is endemic in Triangular Cooperation projects. It was believed that media coverage along with interviews and sizable previous academic work on the case would contribute to the feasibility of this study.

A triangulation exercise was undertaken by combining relevant academic and journalistic works on the case with extensive document analysis and 13 loosely structured interviews with 18 individuals either face-to-face or via Skype (see annex for the interview outline). Upon explicit consent of the interviewee, interviews were recorded and verbatim transcribed, with a copy being sent to the interviewee for approval in no more than 24 hours after the interview took place. In two cases recordings were not conducted by request of the interviewees. In these occasions, notes were taken in a notebook and then transcribed to Microsoft Word at the earliest possible convenience as means to ensure the highest possible level of content accuracy under the circumstances. Interviewees were assured of full confidentiality due to the sensitive nature of the topic. One interviewee though, Mr. Marco Farani, former director of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency, explicitly authorized disclosure of the interview content and of his identity for the purposes of this study. Interview length was in average 35 minutes.

The original base of prospective interviewees contained over 50 individuals in Japan, Brazil and Mozambique who were or still are involved in ProSAVANA at strategic and operational levels either as government officials, private consultants or CSO members. Prospective interviewees were selected through document research and media reports. One of the identified constraints of the policy transfer framework lies in the need of “an excellent access to key informants” (Evans, 2004:40) and proved to be a serious limitation to this study. The highly contested nature of ProSAVANA among Brazilian, Japanese and Mozambican civil societies (see for example UNAC et al, 2013, 2014) led
to an overall climate of suspicion regarding any request of information about the program. A sizable amount of interview requests was rejected on the grounds of previous negative experiences with “academic activists” and is representative of some of the challenges faced during research. The most glaring limitation of the analysis that follows lies in the absence of informants from the Mozambican government, who, for the most part, did not respond to interview requests. A list of those who agreed to cooperate with this research along with their affiliation at the time of their involvement with the program is provided below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification</th>
<th>Interview date</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Embrapa Interviewee 1</td>
<td>April 1, 2016</td>
<td>Via Skype</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Embrapa Interviewees 2, 3 and 4 | April 7, 2016 | Via Skype  
Group interview |
| Embrapa Interviewee 5| April 8, 2016  | Via Skype                                  |
| Embrapa Interviewee 6| April 18, 2016 | Via Skype                                  |
| Embrapa Interviewee 7| June 2, 2016   | Via Skype                                  |
| JICA-RI Interviewee 1| April 13, 2016 | In Person                                  |
| JICA Interviewee 1, 2 and 3 | April 4, 2016 | Via Skype  
Group interview |
| JICA Interviewee 4   | May 3, 2016    | In Person                                  |
|                      |                | No recording                               |
| JICA Interviewees 5 and 6 | May 10, 2016 | In Person, Group interview  
No recording |
| Mr. Marco Farani (former ABC director) | April 18, 2016 | In Person                                  |
|                      |                | Authorized disclosure                       |
| Mozambican CSO Interviewee 1 | May 25, 2016 | Via Skype  
Affiliation: Solidariedade Moçambique |
| Mozambican CSO Interviewee 2 | May 27, 2016 | Via Skype  
Affiliation: Provincial Platform of Organizations of Civil Society of Nampula |
| Mozambican CSO Interviewee 3 | June 1, 2016 | Via Skype  
Affiliation: ORAM (Rural Association for Mutual Aid) |

Source: the author.
4. Cerrado development and PRODECER

Many of the ProSavana documents make the point that the experience of the Brazilian Cerrado and that of the Brazil-Japan cooperation for the development of tropical agriculture (PRODECER) provide key lessons and reference points to the triangular initiative (see for example Memorandum de Entendimento, 2009, JICA & Oriental Consultants, 2010; JICA, 2010). This chapter will introduce the agricultural development in the Brazilian Cerrado in brief and will draw special emphasis on the policies that were adopted as part of the Japan-Brazil cooperation framework. A panoramic overview of the competing views regarding this development model is also presented and is followed by some final concluding remarks.

4.1. Early Cerrado development

The Cerrado is a tropical savanna biome located in Mid-Western region in Brazil and characterized by two distinguished seasons: rainy and dry. It is the second largest biome in Brazil (the first being the Amazon rainforest), covering a total area of 2 million km² (23% of the Brazilian territory) (Campolina, 2009).

The Cerrado region was traditionally deemed to be unsuitable to agriculture due to its ancient (thus poor in nutrients) and acidic soils, which are rich in toxic aluminum (Pereira et al, 2012; Hosono & Hongo, 2016). As such, much of the activities developed in the area during the earlier second half of the 20th century were extensive cattle farming and subsistence agriculture in small farms. The region was very scarcely inhabited and was frequently described along with the Amazon rainforest as a “demographic emptiness” (“vazio demográfico” in Portuguese). Some initiatives to colonize the area started in the 1930’s as the “March to the West” programs, but without much success. The relocation of the country’s capital from Rio de Janeiro to newly-built Brasília during the Juscelino Kubitschek presidency in the early 1950’s can also partially be seen as an episode of this saga. In the 1970’s, the Brazilian military government envisioned the agricultural development of the region as a way to increase exports, which would then bring the foreign currency needed to finance the import-substitution strategy (ISI) (Pereira et al, 2012).

The first structured program for the development of Cerrado agriculture was PADAP – Program of Guided Settlement of Alto Paranaíba (Programa de Assentamento Dirigido do Alto do Paranaíba) – in 1972, an initiative of the Minas Gerais State
government along with the Cotia agricultural cooperative, at the time one of the largest in Brazil (Hosono & Hongo, 2016:36-40). PADAP conducted a guided settlement of 89 families, most of which of Japanese descent originally living in Brazil’s southern region, in over 60,000 ha in southern Minas Gerais. According to Hosono & Hongo (2016), the success of the program can be related to the high level education of the settlers (most of which having university degrees in agronomy), technical and managerial support from Cotia cooperative, and technological development through the state agricultural research institute. PADAP is seen as an important sign for confirming the feasibility of family farms in the Cerrado region (ibid:40). The Brazilian federal government followed with POLOCENTRO - Program for the Development of the Cerrado – in 1974 and directed funds to research, infrastructure (transportation, energy and warehousing) and subsidized credit to medium and large farmers in Brazil’s Mid-West (Santana & Nascimento, 2012:81). According to Diniz (apud Barros et al., 2007:27-8), over two million hectares were incorporated in the period, most of which for pastures and soybean cultivation.

4.2. PRODECER

Following the U.S. decision to impose an embargo on soybean exports in 1973, Japan who was at the time highly reliant on American soybeans, faced the threat of food insecurity and sought alternative suppliers. Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited Brazil in 1974, thus paving the way for future cooperation. According to Rodrigues (2016:225), Japan originally pressed for Brazil to guarantee the supply of soybeans as a condition for the cooperation, but later came to accept the Brazilian government’s stance that an increase in production, even for domestic consumption, would put a downward pressure in world prices, thus indirectly benefitting Japan. After five years of negotiation two projects were signed: a project for technical and scientific support for Embrapa’s Cerrado research division (CPAC) in 1977 and to the launch of PRODECER (Japan-Brazil Cooperation Program for the Development of the Cerrados) with four pilot projects in Minas Gerais in 1979. Good performance in this initial project led to its expansion under PRODECER II, with pilot projects (1985-1990) located in the states of Bahia (BA) and Mato Grosso (MT) and full-fledged projects (1985-1993) in the states of Minas Gerais (MG), Goiás (GO) and Mato Grosso do Sul (MS). The third and final phase (PRODECER III) was launched in 1995 and consisted in two pilot projects in the northern states of Tocantins (TO) and Maranhão (MA) (MAPA & JICA:2002).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: Brief description of PRODECER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRODECER I</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project location</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Full-scale</strong>: Goiás (GO), Mato Grosso do Sul (MS) and Minas Gerais (MG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project area</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-scale: 140,000 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of settled families</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-scale: 380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average property size</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-scale: 350 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project cost</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Made by the author based on (MAPA & JICA, 2002)

---

Figure 7: Cerrado biome distribution. Source: Adapted from (Campolina, 2009:4)
PRODECER took inspiration from PADAP and adopted an agricultural cooperative-supported guided settlement approach for the development of Cerrado frontier agriculture. Its main characteristics are summarized below:

- **PRODECER settlement areas** were selected according to their suitability to mechanized farming (plateaus) and were mainly unused land bought from absentee landowners (Pereira Botelho, 2016:245);

- **Settlers** were selected by leading agricultural cooperatives, which provided support for land acquisition, input purchase, storage and marketing. The criteria for selection required Brazilian nationality, not being a landowner, previous experience with agriculture, a certain availability of own financial resources and willingness to live either in a farm or in the settlement’s closest city (MAPA and JICA, 2002: 3-9). Most of the selected farmers came from Southern Brazil (gaúchos) and were already highly skilled in agriculture (some of which with university degrees in agronomy). While cooperatives selected 80% of the settlers, the remaining 20% was selected by the implementing entity (CAMPO) from interested locals (ibid 3-9).

- An intricate financing scheme was developed: resources were transferred from JICA (pilot projects) and from Japan’s Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (full-scale projects) to the Brazilian Central Bank, which then would finance Brazilian banks for the provision of subsidized loans to the final beneficiaries (individual farmers and cooperatives). Lower interest rates were made possible by the Brazilian government’s interest and principal repayment guarantee as well as by its responsibility to cover all currency exchange risks (MAPA & JICA, 2002:3-7~3-12).

- A bilateral public-private joint venture called CAMPO (Agricultural Promotion Company, initially referred to as CPA) was created as the coordinating and executing agency. Among its functions were the final word on settler selection and land acquisition, agricultural technology dissemination and support for farmers in loan applications (Pereira Botelho, 2016: 236). For its founding, two public-private holding companies were created: BRASAGRO (with a 51% share, with majority control by the Brazilian government and minority participation by Brazilian private sector) and JADECO (owning the remaining 49% share, constituting a consortium between JICA and Japanese private investors) (MAPA &JICA, 2002).

- Coordination between technical and financial cooperation was deemed key as the project with Embrapa Cerrados division (CPAC) continued to develop new soil correction techniques and new cultivars adopted to local conditions (Wagner et al, 2016). Public rural extension services such as the EMATER network (Technical Assistance and Rural Extension Corporations) and CAMPO played a key role in
disseminating state-of-the-art technologies to farmers in the region.

PRODECER can be said to have followed a scale-up approach. PRODECER I was implemented as pilot projects in Minas Gerais as a way to test and showcase viability of medium-scale family farms in Cerrado agriculture by taking advantage of the previous success of PADAP and of the already installed infrastructure in MG. The second phase, which started in 1985 was divided in two: pilot projects in Bahia and Mato Grosso states, which are transition regions of Cerrado into other biomes (the semi-arid vegetation of Caatinga in the case of Bahia and the Amazon rainforest in the case of Mato Grosso) and full-fledged projects in MS, GO and MG. The former, deemed to be experimental and high risk projects, were financed by JICA, while the latter were financed through aid loans disbursed by Japan’s OECF (Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund – later JBIC). The third phase in Tocantins and Maranhão was driven by experimentation in areas with only minor variation of day length throughout the year.

4.3. Perspectives on PRODECER and Cerrado development

A final joint-evaluation report by the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply (MAPA) and JICA in 2002 ranked the achievements of PRODECER as highly satisfactory. Brazil consolidated itself as an agricultural powerhouse and became the only major soybean exporter outside the temperate zone, Japan enjoyed diversification of its soybean imports and lower global market prices (MAPA and JICA, 2002). The development of the Mid-West was also seen as alleviating both urban pressure in Southern Brazil and the expansion of the rural frontier towards the Amazon forest, while at the same time creating employment and improving quality of life in the region (MAPA & JICA, 2002; Barros et al, 2007:133; Pereira et al, 2012).

A set of virtuous policies is seen as allowing the breakthrough development of Cerrado agriculture: the scientific development conducted by Embrapa, state-backed infrastructure development and provision of subsidized rural credit, and extensive know-how of migrant farmers who were then able to make use of technological breakthroughs quickly (World Bank, 2009: The Economist, 2010b). It is said that Norman Borlaug, the father of the Green Revolution, referred to the Cerrado development as “one of the great achievements of agricultural science in the 20th century,” with the World Food Prize of 2006 being awarded to three scientists, two of them from Embrapa, in recognition to their contribution to “unlock Brazil’s tremendous potential for food production” (WFP, 2006).

Pereira et al. (2012) argue that majority of gains in productivity between 1970-
80 were given by increase in agricultural land but that afterwards the registered increase is mostly explained by consistent incorporation of technology, which had an important land-saving effect and reduced pressure on natural resources. Some also mention the mandatory conservation areas in farms (which range from 20% to 50% of farm size) and the current use of green corridors and of a soy moratorium to the Amazon rural frontier as proofs of sustainability (Hosono & Hongo, 2016: 114-136).

Eliseu Alves (2016), who was president of Embrapa from a significant period (1973 -1985), highlighted that Embrapa had benefitted from external support from various aid agencies, including the World Bank, France, U.S. but emphasizes cooperation with JICA and JIRCAS as differential due to their focus on institution building and joint research (while other donors had a more specialized and project-oriented approach).

There are however critics to this development model. Santana & Nascimento, (2012: 16) point out that concentration of financing to large scale farms created a “loan-land purchase-loan” cycle which not only increased land concentration and land prices in the region but also drove a substantial amount of smallholders out of agriculture. Mueller & Mueller (2006) argue that Cerrado development was a conservative modernization project implemented by the Brazilian military government and that land concentration had barely changed in the period (gini coefficient for land concentration for the region as 0.836 in 1967 and 0.802 in 2000).

Others argue that the Cerrado is one of the global biodiversity hot spots and home to an estimated 160,000 indigenous species (Ratter et al., 1997; Klink and Machado, 2005) and that the pace of conversion of Cerrado-covered land to crop fields and pastures has been too fast, with less than 50% of original vegetation remaining as of 2010 (MMA, 2014:35), and with studies warning that under the current development model the whole Cerrado biome may disappear by 2030 (Machado et al, 2004).

Pessôa & Inocêncio (2014:17) also question the effects on local inhabitants arguing that despite reservation of settler slots to local farmers in PRODECER, these could not meet criteria for selection such as initial capital, affiliation to cooperatives or experience with modern agricultural technology and were simply excluded from the process.

It can thus be seen that despite international recognition as an agricultural success, the development of Cerrado agriculture and its policies, including PRODECER, are still a matter of contention in social and environmental spheres. According to Milhorance de Castro (2014), Brazilian international cooperation in the rural sector conceals these contestations through an effort of standardization in the terms of Ancelovici and Jenson (2012): (1) Brazilian agricultural exports and the prestige of
Embrapa as the leading agricultural research institute in the tropical area confer it certification for rural policy transfer; (2) decontextualization of negative effects and of conflict between the models of agribusiness and family farming, each represented by a different ministry in Brazil (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply, MAPA, for the former, and Ministry of Agrarian Development, MDA, for the latter); and (3) framing the Brazilian experience as a pacific coexistence between different models of agriculture.
5. **ProSAVANA: a chronological analysis**

This chapter introduces the ProSAVANA, the case under study, in the following manner. The chapter is divided in three sections. The first section offers a background of the Mozambican context with special attention being paid to the recent evolution of its agricultural policies. The second section begins with a reconstruction of the origins of the program and proceeds with a chronological analysis of each of ProSAVANA components. The third and final section describes the context of civil society contestation and the reformulation of the ProSAVANA Master Plan in 2015.

5.1. **ProSAVANA background: The Mozambican context**

5.1.1 **Overview of Mozambique**

Mozambique, with a population of over 27 million, is located in Southeast Africa and is considered to be one of the Least Developed Countries (World Bank data, 2015). It became independent from Portugal in 1975 and was engulfed in a prolonged civil war from 1977 to 1992 between two rival groups: Frelimo (Mozambique Liberation Front) and Renamo (Mozambican National Resistance). As the Mozambican government under Frelimo control post-independence opted for a socialist economy, this conflict can be seen as one of the proxy wars that marked the Cold War period (Hanlon, 2010). It is estimated that over 1 million people lost their lives in the war and that more than 5 million left the country as refugees (ibid:78). In 1992 a peace treaty was signed and in 1994 the country held its first democratic elections, which were won by Frelimo. Ever since the country has been a relatively stable presidential democracy, but recently there has been apprehension regarding lack of transparency, election fraud, a growing hold of the state apparatus by Frelimo (which has won every single election since 1994) and tensions over increased military hostilities between Frelimo and Renamo (Freedom House, 2014, 2015).

Mozambique’s transition to a market economy started even before the peace treaty in 1987 and the process, which continued throughout the 1990’s is regarded as a success case of structural adjustments by the IMF (Lipton, 2013) despite persistence of high unemployment levels and high incidence of absolute poverty (Hanlon, 2004). Ever since the Peace Treaty the economy has registered sustained growth rates (see below).
Mozambique is also a high aid dependency country, but mineral discoveries in
the late 2000’s have driven FDI to surpass ODA as a percentage of GDP (see the table
below). Vollmer (2013) argues that the Mozambican government is actively trying to take
advantage of this scenario to reduce aid dependency, a goal that has gained increased
attention after a temporary budget support suspension by major donors (December 2009
to March 2010) who demanded increased efforts towards electoral reform, corruption
control and conflicts of interests in the government. Vollner notes, however, that the
country’s positive economic outlook creates incentives for donors to stay despite the
rhetoric of aid harmonization, thus doing little to reduce the current scenario of aid
fragmentation (36 donors as of 2011) (ibid:2).

| Table 5: Mozambique: ODA and FDI inflow compared |
|-------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| FDI (net inflows as % of GDP) | 1.58      | 3.02      | 4.45      | 5.58      | 8.52      | 12.39     | 27.90     | 38.77     | 41.81     | 31.36     |

Source: Made by the author based on World Bank data (2015)

5.1.2. Overview of agriculture in Mozambique

The agricultural sector is of great importance to the Mozambican economy: it
constitutes 23% of the country’s GDP in 2010 and is responsible for employment of 80%
of the Mozambican workforce (Government of Mozambique, 2011). Mozambique is also a net food importer and as of 2007 suffered from a 35% incidence of undernourishment (Government of Mozambique, 2007a; World Bank data, 2015). Unsurprisingly, rural and agricultural development have been constantly emphasized as national priorities in the country's Five-Year Plans (Government of Mozambique, 2005, 2010).

The vast majority of farmers in Mozambique are subsistence smallholders living in farms of less than 2 ha and are along with medium farmers (up to 25 ha) responsible for 95% of the country’s agricultural production (Government of Mozambique, 2010; ProSAVANA-PD, 2015). The predominating cultivation method is shifting agriculture: an extensive system of cultivation in which cultivation plots are rotated periodically so as to allow the soil to recover fertility (which means that these farmers’ actual land is much larger than land currently under cultivation) (ProSAVANA-PD, 2015).

According to Alfieri et al. (2009:134), Mozambican agricultural policies can be divided chronologically in three periods:

- **Socialist Central Planning (1975-87):** This period was marked by an attempt to reorganize rural areas into communal villages so as to facilitate the delivery of public services and reorganization of the rural economy through direct state control of marketing, processing and production through a combination of large scale state-owned mechanized plantations, collective farms and agricultural cooperatives (Pitcher, 2002:89-90). The lack of state capacity and widespread corruption and mismanagement for economic interventions led to a shortage of consumer goods, delay in payments as well as in the delivery of inputs and tools for those working in collective farms, which led many farmers to abandon collective plots and communal villages to return to their old land tiles (ibid:96).

- **Privatization of state-owned enterprises and market liberalization (1987-1998):** part of the structural reform package, for the rural sector it meant the privatization of state-run farms and abolition of schemes such as price controls and minimal price systems (Ikegami, 2000:44).

- **1999-onwards:** reduction of government intervention in the agricultural sector with exception of selected cash crops, which face export taxes, restricted geographical concessions and minimum price legislation. (Alfieri et al., 2009:134).

A peculiar trait of the Mozambican context is related to the legal regime for land, which is based in the Land Law of 1997. According to the Land Law of 1997, all land belongs to the state and as such cannot be sold, purchased or leased. Land use rights are
conferred temporarily in a concession regime through a land use and exploration rights title called DUAT (Land Use and Exploration Rights – from the Portuguese, Direito de Uso e Aproveitamento de Terras). DUAT can be acquired by recognition of customary laws for community occupation, good faith occupation or through application for a 50-year concession by the state (renewable once). DUAT applications, especially for rural land, involve a series of complex procedures that require the submission of a land usage plan, mandatory consultation with local communities and negotiation of compensations if necessary, (according to OECD, 2013b:60 these first steps can take 90 days). Another matter is that the DUAT can be terminated by the government at any moment should it be found that the undertaken activities are not in accordance with the land usage plan. OECD (2013b:59–65) and UNCTAD (2012:74) claim that this poses a challenge for agricultural development as it has a negative impact in investor confidence while also not allowing smallholders to use their land as a collateral for access to credit, which by itself is also a major challenge in Mozambique, with less than 0.6 bank branches per 100,000 people in rural areas (World Bank, 2013:17) and high interest rates for agricultural loans (Government of Mozambique, 2011:19).

5.2. From Prodecer to ProSAVANA: origins

According to the Memorandum of Understanding of September 2009, the first document about ProSAVANA, the program originated from an agreement between then Brazilian president Luis Inácio Lula da Silva and Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso in the G8 Summit of July 2009 in L'Aquila to promote agricultural development in Mozambique by making use of knowledge accumulated in PRODECER (Memorandum de Entendimento, 2009:1). This point has been regularly raised by critical literature as evidence against the Brazilian rhetoric of demand-driven cooperation (Nogueira & Olinaho, 2013) and that ProSAVANA was at first a Japanese initiative (Funada-Classen, 2013a, 2013b), with Mozambique only being included in negotiations at a later stage. Interviews conducted by the author support this perspective, as illustrated by the following point raised by Mr. Marco Farani, director of ABC at the time: “The idea came from a JICA official named XXXX, who, at the time, worked directly under the JICA

---

4 Decisions on DUAT allocation in this case depend on the dimension of the land submitted in the application: up to 1,000 ha are under the decision of the Provincial government, while the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for issuing DUATs of land plots between 1,000 and 10,000 ha. Finally, DUAT applications for over 10,000 ha must be approved by the Council of Ministers. (OECD, 2013b:60)

5 Omitted to preserve confidentiality.
vice presidency and came to Brasilia to talk with me. [...] The Japanese proposal to ABC and to the Brazilian government regarded the possibility of conducting some joint intervention in Africa in relation to soybean agriculture. So, XXXX came to consult us about this completely open proposal. We had our first meeting, where we discussed the idea a lot and settled on Mozambique, to which we followed by contacting the Mozambican government to gauge their interest. Then we began discussing the project.” (Interview, April 18, 2016). An Embrapa news report dated April 2009 stated though that the prospective cooperation was being discussed during a visit of JICA vice-president Kenzo Oshima to Brazil and that both the Mozambican embassy and the Mozambican Institute of Agricultural Research (IIAM) had already manifested interest in the initiative at that time (Embrapa Cerrados, 2009). This matter is also confirmed by JICA news reports (JICA, 2009), which refer to this April meeting as setting a mutual understanding between Japan and Brazil for a joint project for the development of agriculture in the African savanna, with Mozambique being defined as a target.

While recognizing the socioeconomic differences between the Brazilian and Mozambican contexts, ProSAVANA aims to extract lessons from the Cerrado experience and develop a market-oriented “new model of sustainable agricultural development” (Memorandum de Entendimento, 2009:3). The program has been described as a “win-win-win” Triangular Cooperation:

- Japan: improved its own as well as global food security, boosts its international status, and introduces a basis for the entry of Japanese companies;
- Brazil: boosts in international status, acquisition of knowledge of African genetic resources by Embrapa, basis for entry of Brazilian agribusiness in Mozambique;
- Mozambique: poverty reduction, job creation, acquisition of foreign currency and improved tax revenues due to (agro)industrial promotion (Hongo, 2010; Yoshida, 2012; JICA アフリカ部/農村開発部, 2013:16).

ProSAVANA drew widespread attention as a showcase for innovative Triangular Cooperation. Then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton singled out the program as an example to be followed in her speech at the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011 (Clinton, 2011). In the same year, Bill Gates singled out ProSAVANA in his report for the G20 summit in France as a case of Triangular Cooperation that leverages the comparative advantages of each partner, with Brazil sharing relevant technology for tropical agriculture and Japan providing financial support for knowledge exchange and infrastructure development. The program is seen as building from previous cooperation in the Cerrado to help Mozambique achieve food security and ultimately increase its exports. (Gates, 2011).
5.3. The Three Components of ProSAVANA

ProSAVANA (originally named ProSAVANA-JBM) is a Triangular Cooperation program signed by the governments of Brazil, Japan and Mozambique in September 2009. It was envisioned with the goal of promoting rural development in the Nacala Corridor region in Mozambique while applying the knowledge accumulated with the development of the Brazilian Cerrado and from the successful implementation of PRODECER (Memorandum de Entendimento, 2009:1). The rationale was that there were significant geophysical and climatic similarities between the tropical savannas in Mozambique and the Brazilian Cerrado. The experience accumulated by Embrapa in terms of soil correction techniques and development of cultivars adapted to tropical climates were deemed to be a great contribution if adapted to the new region (ibid:2). ProSAVANA was meant as a long duration program (target of 20 years) that would combine technical and financial cooperation. The program was defined in two phases: (1) Preparation Phase, which encompasses research and planning and was to be conducted through technical cooperation, and (2) Program Implementation Phase, to be informed by the results of (1) and to include financial cooperation instruments as well as mobilization of private capital as a way to finance the development of commercial agriculture models and capacity building among local population (Memorandum de Entendimento, 2009).

Figure 9: Embrapa material highlighting the geographical similarities between the Brazilian Mid-West and the Nacala Corridor (location between Southern parallels 13 and 17).

Source: (Batistella & Bolfe, 2010:18)
As ProSAVANA is still in its early stages, the present study can only analyze the aforementioned Preparation Phase, which is still ongoing in Mozambique. The first phase was composed of three projects: (a) strengthening Mozambican agricultural research and development capabilities (ProSAVANA-PI), (b) development of a sustainable agricultural development strategy for the program area (i.e. Master Plan, ProSAVANA-PD), and (c) support for the diffusion of technologies validated in ProSAVANA-PI as well as capacity building for the local rural extension services (ProSAVANA-PEM). Preliminary studies were conducted in 2010 by both Brazilian and Japanese teams to simultaneously conduct a socioeconomic and environmental assessment of the target area and consider how to apply lessons from Cerrado development to the program area (JICA & Oriental Consultants, 2010:S-1). Each component project as well as key findings from the preliminary study are briefly introduced in the sub-sections below.

5.4. Preliminary Study

The preliminary study was conducted from September 2009 to March 2010 by Oriental Consultants on behalf of JICA. The area covered by this undertaking was a set of 12 districts in Niassa and Nampula Provinces along roadway N13:

- Nampula Province: Malema, Ribáuè, Murrupula, Nampula, Meconta, Mogovolas, Muecate and Monapo;
- Niassa Province: Mandimba and Cuamba;
- Zambézia Province: Gurue and Alto Molocue;

Its goals were (1) make a preliminary assessment on how to apply lessons from the agricultural development in Brazil’s Cerrado to Mozambique, and (2) to make recommendations for the three abovementioned technical cooperation projects (PI, PD and PEM) (JICA & Oriental Consultants, 2010:1-1).

Aside from a socioeconomic and environmental assessment of the target region, the research team also conducted a field trip to Brazil to study the current state of Brazilian agriculture, including environmental measures and family farming (JICA & Oriental Consultants, 2010:4-1~4:29). A concise comparison of their findings can be found below.
Aside from these findings, the team also noted that the soils in the target area were actually basic (Cerrado soils are acidic) for the most part (exception was Gurue district), and that almost half of the districts had hilly topographies (the bulk of Cerrado development took place in Brazil’s Central Plateau). The most relevant lessons highlighted by the study team are (1) how increased agricultural production in Cerrado led to the development of processing and input industries (agribusiness), (2) the importance of the support provided by agricultural cooperatives to smallholders, and (3) the key role that CAMPO played in the execution of PRODECER (JICA & Oriental Consultants, 2010:5-2~5-6). The final recommendations are the following: development model based in agricultural clusters and value chains, promotion of farmers’ organizations, development of local infrastructure and capacity building for IIAM (the Mozambican Agrarian Investigation Institute, which is a public entity under the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture) (ibid: 6-11~6-26).
A report for the Brazilian team led by Embrapa was not made public. The aforementioned JICA report though brings a summary of Embrapa’s recommendations as follows:

- The area studied by the Japanese team was inappropriate for the development of large scale agriculture, which would reduce the Embrapa’s potential contribution in terms of genetic resource technologies for commercial agriculture;
- Embrapa recommended for the time being to put efforts into improving the productivity of existing crops along with small and medium scale farmers;
- Embrapa found an area of 6,400,000 ha to the northwest of the study area that had soils similar to Cerrado’s and recommended its inclusion in the project areas as to allow for agricultural investments in commercial scale (JICA & Oriental Consultants, 2010: S-23-24).

The proposed expansion of ProSAVANA target area was supported by the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture and was officially approved in March 2010. (ibid:S-25). ProSAVANA official documents of November 2012 also incorporated the districts of Ngauma and Lichinga in Niassa Province (ProSAVANA-PD, 2012:1-2). The Minutes of the Meeting of ProSAVANA Joint Coordinating Committee dated December 3, 2012 recognized 16 districts as the target area (addition of Majune and Sanga districts in Niassa Province) and recommended a further expansion to also include Mecuburi and Lalaua in Nampula Province and Mecanhelas in Niassa Province (Minutes of the Meeting, 2012:5). The final ProSAVANA area would then cover a total 19 districts in the Nacala Corridor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7: Evolution of the ProSAVANA target area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Niassa Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nampula Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambézia Province</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\): added before November 2012  
\(^b\): added between November 2012 and December 2012  
\(^c\): added in December 2012.

Source: the author, based on the aforementioned documents.
Interviews conducted by the author suggest that a variety of interests was involved in this area expansion. According to Embrapa interviewee 2, the preliminary study conducted by the Japanese team was problematic because "The consultants hired by the Japanese government only conducted soil analysis for the area around the road and railway of Nacala Corridor and logically a railway is only built on soils that can support cargo transport. Consequently, they did not take into account the agronomic aspects as districts under study were identified by their proximity to the railway." This claim was confirmed by an African Development Bank project report for the rehabilitation of the Nacala-Cuamba road (N13 highway, which is contiguous to a railway) that classified the soils around the road as “having very low to low fertility and prone to erosion, and low water retention capacity” (AfDB, 2009:7).

Embrapa interviewee 4 argued however that “Embrapa has definitely made technical recommendations on this matter but there were also political negotiations from the government level, for example [requests] from the Mozambican government, in which we [Embrapa] played no role at all.” In this sense, Embrapa interviewee 1 denied that
requests to expand the target area originated from the Brazilian study team: “The inclusion of new districts was not a proposal by Embrapa, it was a demand by the Mozambican side that we have accepted. Actually they kept making requests of this kind, but we had reached a point in which we would no longer be able to meet their demands...So we made it clear to them that in the current conditions we would not be able to meet further requests, while still giving our best to meet the ones that we had accepted.” JICA interviewees 4, 5 and 6 also argued that the requests originated from the Mozambican side and that they were welcomed in negotiations as a sign of local interest in ProSAVANA. Finally, former ABC director Marco Farani argued during an interview with the author that “The reasoning for that expansion was related to soil quality. The Nacala Corridor area holds a vast extension of fertile lands, which could be occupied by producers in the future. The Mozambican minister of agriculture then – as you know, land in Mozambique cannot be bought, they work with a concession method – he agreed in expanding the project area to eventually enable concessions for Brazilian and Japanese farmers.” While this study could not secure interviews with Mozambican government officials, it seems reasonable to conclude that the area expansion was fruit of negotiations in which political and technical factors were intertwined.

5.5. ProSAVANA-PI (Project for Improving Research and Technology Transfer Capacity for Nacala Corridor Agriculture Development)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8: ProSAVANA-PI overview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Budget and expected</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIAM (MOZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embrapa (BR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIRCAS (JP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTC International Co. Ltd. (JP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the author, based on (ProSAVANA-TEC, 2011), (Minuta de Reunião, 2010)

ProSAVANA-PI\(^{10}\) (originally called ProSAVANA-TEC) is a technical cooperation project oriented towards agricultural research and development as well as capacity development of the Institute of Agrarian Investigation of Mozambique (hereinafter IIAM, following the Portuguese abbreviation). The rationale is to identify ready-to-use technologies in two pilot farms as well as validating the technical and political feasibility of the Master Plan (ProSAVANA-TEC, 2011:4). A dual goal for agrarian investigation was identified: (1) promotion of transition technologies towards more modern production methods for small and medium farmers and (2) promotion of state-of-the-art technologies for private projects oriented to commercial agriculture, of which the Brazilian experience was deemed to be the most appropriate (ProSAVANA-TEC, 2011:9). The intervention strategy prioritized the former in Nampula province and the latter in Niassa province (ibid:9). The PI project also includes the creation of at least two demonstration units for engagement with communities in family farming, activities which were supposed to be conducted in cooperation with the Mozambique National Peasants Union (UNAC) and with IKURU, a farmer’s trading company supported by Oxfam (ProSAVANA-TEC, 2011:18). Project sites were expected to incorporate areas with potential for both intensive agriculture and family farming and were selected by the Provincial governments of Nampula and Niassa (Pro-SAVANA-TEC, 2011:27). Finally, two research

---

\(^6\) - Inputs expected from the Japanese side are dispatch of experts, training courses, equipment as well as the construction of an experimental laboratory in Nampula, but no expected budget is provided (Record of Discussions, 2011).

\(^7\) - According to a group interview conducted by the author in April 2016 with three Embrapa officers the project duration was likely to be extended by 18 more months.

\(^8\) - JIRCAS stands for Japan International Research Center for Agricultural Sciences and is an incorporated Administrative Agency under the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) (JIRCAS, n.d.).

\(^9\) - NTC International Co., Ltd. is a Tokyo-based private consulting company.

\(^10\) - “PI” stands for “research and (rural) investigation” (“pesquisa e investigação” in Portuguese).
laboratories were to be built in IIAM’s Zonal Centers in Lichinga (by Brazil) and in Nampula (by Japan). According to several news reports, construction of the Japanese-backed laboratory in Nampula started in November 2013 and was concluded in June 2015 (ProSAVANA, 2013, 2015; MASA, 2015) but the construction of the Brazilian laboratory was reported as halted as of March 2015 due to lack of resources by ABC (Campos Mello, 2015). According to interviews and personal communication with Embrapa officials, the project duration was likely to be expanded by 18 months, even though Embrapa no longer had any staff stationed in Mozambique since December 2015.

5.6. ProSAVANA-PEM (Project for Establishment of Development Model at Communities’ Level with Improvement of Rural Extension Service under Nacala Corridor Agricultural Development in Mozambique)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9: ProSAVANA-PEM overview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase of agricultural production at each farm size through adoption of new development models; improve accessibility and quality of agricultural extension services in the project area.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Define development models and establish “reference projects” in cooperation with target groups; conduct courses and trainings for public/private/NGO agricultural extension service providers; support and promotion of rural extension services of the abovementioned groups.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013/03-2019/05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementing agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Directorates of Agriculture of Nampula, Niassa and Zambézia (MOZ)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordinating agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and (MOZ)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the author, based on (Record of Discussions, 2013)

\(^{11}\) According to author’s interview with two JICA officers in May 2016, JICA had also hired an unidentified consultancy firm to assist in implementation.
ProSAVANA-PEM’s\textsuperscript{12} goal is to improve access and quality of rural extension services and cooperate with small, medium and large producers as well as cooperatives for the definition of models to increase agricultural production (Record of Discussions, 2013). Aside from minor references in official documents such as records of discussions, no project document for ProSAVANA-PEM is readily available. A field study conducted by Ekman and Macamo (2014:9-10) reported that the PEM project was on hold as it would be based on findings from PI and PD components. Articles on ASBRAER (Brazilian Association of State Technical Assistance and Rural Extension Entities) and SENAR (Brazilian National Service for Rural Vocational Education and Training) and EMATER-DF (Federal District Technical Assistance and Rural Extension Corporation) websites have shown that project negotiations were still ongoing as of 2013 and 2014 (Asbraer, 2013, 2014; Emater-DF, 2013; SENAR, 2013) while a recent bulletin from SENAR dated November 2015 stated that ProSAVANA-PEM was to begin that month with a 10-day course on rural extension methodologies to be provided to local agronomists (SENAR, 2015), which suggests that PEM is currently in execution.

5.7. ProSAVANA-PD (Support of the Agriculture Development Master Plan for the Nacala Corridor)

The formulation of the Master Plan was envisioned to provide a sustainable agricultural development plan for the 19 districts in the target area. It was initiated in March 2012 and was expected to be concluded in August 2013. The Japanese study team was led by a consortium of three consulting companies (NTC International, Oriental Consultants and Task Co.) while the Brazilian study team was led by FGV Projetos, the consulting branch of a Brazilian private higher education institution Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV). The Mozambican parties were the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture itself and the Provincial Directorates of Agriculture.

The overall goal of the Master Plan is described as “to formulate an Agricultural Development Master Plan that contributes to social and economic development by engaging private investment to promote a sustainable production system and poverty reduction in the Nacala Corridor” (ProSAVANA-PD, 2013:1-1). Additionally, this goal is further specified in three stages for the three main targets of intervention: individual farmers (small- and medium-scale), farmers’ organizations, and agribusiness (see below).

\textsuperscript{12} “PEM” stands for “Project of (rural) extension and models” (“Projeto de Extensão e Modelos” in Portuguese).
### Table 10: Phases of the ProSAVANA Master Plan (2013 version)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual farmers (Small to Medium-Scale)</td>
<td>The unit yield further increases through accelerated improvement in farming technology of small to medium farmers. The farmers also start to diversify their producing crops.</td>
<td>Small to medium scale farmers are well-empowered to improve their farming by their self-reliant efforts. Diversification of agriculture has expanded, and some of the farmers specialize in specific crop production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement of small and medium scale farmers in agribusiness starts</td>
<td>Participation of small and medium scale farmers in agribusiness is strengthened by fostering a sound farmers’ organization.</td>
<td>The development of agribusiness makes a considerable progress, and many agricultural clusters are established and in operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agribusiness</td>
<td>Private investment in agribusiness (production, processing and marketing) starts in consistency with PRAI.</td>
<td>Private investment in agribusiness starts the expansion, and the development of agricultural cluster starts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Extracted from (ProSAVANA-PD, 2013: 2-12)

ProSAVANA identifies the current predominant production techniques (shifting agriculture) as not sustainable given the prospects of population growth, which may trigger shorter fallow periods and lead to reduced soil fertility, thus increasing the potential for land conflicts (ProSAVANA-PD, 2012:2-14). As such, the transition to settled farming is meant to be undertaken through several channels, most important of which are the promotion of DUAT acquisition among small and medium farmers, support
for contract farming and outgrower schemes to improve access to inputs and marketing channels, and backing of leading farmers as demonstrators of intensive farming technologies to communities and as catalyzers for market-oriented farmers’ associations and cooperatives (ibid: 3·36–3·37). Cooperatives in specific are to be promoted also based on the PRODECER experience due to their potential of improving small and medium farmers’ bargaining power and access to information, rural extension services and credit (ibid: 3·57–3·64). In order to enable a demonstration effect for the feasibility of intensive cultivation in local communities and to enable the formation of cooperatives, ProSAVANA aims to support “leading farmers,” who would receive 2 years of intensive training in Mozambique and then be awarded one of the following two choices: (a) receipt of DUAT for a 5 ha farm and soft loan to cover initial costs or (b) employment as public extension agent (ProSAVANA-PD, 2013:3·23–3·25).

The Master Plan also envisioned a strategy of agricultural clusters for the target area as a way to develop a high value-added agriculture. The rationale was that agribusiness value chains appropriate to each area held the potential to promote the integration of both upstream and downstream industries, including marketing channels and consumers, complimentary industries and services (ProSAVANA-PD, 2012: 2013). As such, seven production clusters were proposed for the target area as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>№</th>
<th>Name of Cluster</th>
<th>Main Production category</th>
<th>Suggested Initial Location (see map below)</th>
<th>Possible Components</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Integrated Grain Cluster</td>
<td>Corporate farming with outgrower schemes</td>
<td>Majune (brown in the map), expansible to N’Gauma</td>
<td>Soybean, Maize, Sunflower, Elephant grass and Poultry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Family Food Production Cluster</td>
<td>Family Farming</td>
<td>Malema (in blue)</td>
<td>Maize, Cassava, Cotton, Vegetables and Groundnuts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Grain and Cotton Production Cluster</td>
<td>Entrepreneurial and Corporate Farming</td>
<td>Lioma plain, Gurué (in green)</td>
<td>Soybean, Maize, Cotton and Poultry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cashew</td>
<td>Entrepreneurial</td>
<td>Monapo,</td>
<td>Cashew nuts, Maize, Beans,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production Cluster and Family Farming</td>
<td>Mogovolas, Meconta, Muecate (in purple)</td>
<td>Cassava, Groundnuts, Sesame, Vegetables and Eucalyptus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Food and Grain Production Cluster</td>
<td>All categories</td>
<td>Ribàuè (in orange)</td>
<td>Soybean, Maize, Cotton, Seed Farm, Vegetable and Poultry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea Production Cluster</td>
<td>Entrepreneurial and Family Farming</td>
<td>Gurué (in red)</td>
<td>Tea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuamba Agricultural Infrastructure Cluster</td>
<td>(non-agricultural activities)</td>
<td>Cuamba (in yellow)</td>
<td>Infrastructure, logistics, inputs &amp; services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from (ProSAVANA-PD, 2013:2-16).

Figure 11: Map of the clusters proposed in the ProSAVANA Master Plan of 2013
Source: adapted from (ProSAVANA-JBM, 2013:13)
In order to advance these cluster development plans, ProSAVANA-PD underlined a series of 32 priority projects that would contribute to the main goals of Phase I (transition from shifting to fixed/intensive cultivation, increasing private sector investment in agricultural sector and showcasing the potential of the Corridor to attract more investors) (ProSAVANA-PD, 2013:3-6). Among these priority projects those that were deemed to hold the potential to generate sizable impacts in the short-term (3 to 6 years) were designated as Quick-Impact Projects (QIPs). Among those selected as public projects were land registration for small- and medium-scale farmers (DUAT), improvements of roads for marketing, planning of land reserves for medium- and large-scale agricultural investment and the model project for cluster development centered in family food production (ibid:4-1~4-4).

ProSAVANA-PD also foresaw two financing venues for projects: The ProSAVANA Development Initiative Fund (PDIF) and the Nacala Fund. The former was structured as a soft loan scheme for cooperatives as well as medium and small agribusiness companies for the implementation of pilot projects. PDIF was reportedly set by the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture, JICA and the Mozambican Office to Support Small-Scale Industries (GAPI) in September 2012 with the intention to test different approaches of contract farming in the target area (ProSAVANA-PD, 2013: 3-9:3-10). The resources came from MINAG’s Counterpart Fund for Food Aid provided by the Japanese government (ProSAVANA-PD, 2013: 3-8). A total of five pilot projects (also considered QIPs) were selected to test different the viability of different types of contract farming/outgrower schemes and were already under implementation in partnership with 5 local private companies as of March 2013 (ibid:3-9).

The Nacala Fund, on the other hand, is mentioned in early ProSAVANA-PD reports (ProSAVANA-PD, 2013: 3-2, 3-7,3-35,5-4, 5-7) as a priority project for financing medium/large agribusiness investment. The fund was meant to be set in Luxembourg and be jointly managed by FGV Projetos and 4LGreen (FGV Projetos, 2013; n.d.). Several presentations of the prospective fund structure are available online, some of which outline ABC, JICA, the Government of Mozambique and the African Development Bank as members of an advisory board with no-voting right, while others only mention a variety of Brazilian government agencies (ABC, Embrapa) as well as international institutions (FAO, AfDB, UNEP among others) as “partners”. The Nacala Fund was expected to attract investment of USD 2 billion and referred to ProSAVANA as an institutional package that would reduce the risk for private investors (FGV Projetos, 2013; n.d).
Figure 12: FGV Projetos material on the Nacala Fund, Source (FGV Projetos, 2013:9)

Figure 13: Alternative Nacala Fund structure, Source: (FGV Projetos, n.d.: 59)
To minimize the risks caused to farmers by the promotion of agribusiness investments, ProSAVANA incorporates the following measures to protect smallholders: promotion of DUAT acquisition among small- and medium-scale farmers, intensive promotion of agricultural cooperatives and farmers’ associations and incorporation of the Principles of Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI) – a set of voluntary investment guidelines jointly formulated by FAO, the World Bank, IFAD and UNCTAD – followed by a mechanism of law enforcement. Some mechanisms in PRAI were already identified to be part of Mozambican domestic law, such as recognition of customary rights over use of land and mandatory community consultations (ProSAVANA-PD, 2013:5-4~5-6).

The ProSavana-PD Report 2 (Quick Impact Projects, dated March 2013) was leaked in April 2013 and drew extensive criticism from Mozambican civil society organizations and concerned academics, who assumed that its support for agribusiness and investment promotion outlined a plan of large scale land-grabbing that would be the doom of Mozambican smallholders. FGV Projetos’ simultaneous involvement in the Nacala Fund and in the formulation of the Master Plan met harsh criticism from CSOs and the academia, which allegedly led both Brazilian and Japanese governments to remove their support to the initiative (Fingermann, 2013: 129-9, 142).

5.8. Civil society mobilization and a new draft

The presence of investment promotion components in ProSAVANA-PD accompanied by the concepts of contract farming and of agribusiness clusters in the covered area sparked land grabbing claims by both Mozambican civil society and the academia (Justiça Ambiental et al., 2013). It is important to note though that some sectors of Mozambican civil society had already expressed their disapproval of the program before the leak. Brazilian news reports of August 2011 regarding the announcement by then Minister of Agriculture José Pacheco of an offer of 6 million ha13 for Brazilian producers in Northern Mozambique at the price of BRL 21/ha (Campos Mello, 2011) fueled civil society suspicion and resulted in a prompt denial by the Mozambican government, claiming that the Brazilian media had misunderstood Mr. Pacheco (O Pais, 2011; Verdade, 2011). UNAC (the Mozambican National Peasant Union) launched a position statement in October 2012 denouncing ProSAVANA as a “top-down policy” lacking in transparency and unwilling to engage civil society organizations, and associated the program with several business prospecting missions by Brazilian producers in Northern Mozambique at the price of BRL 21/ha (Campos Mello, 2011) fueled civil society suspicion and resulted in a prompt denial by the Mozambican government, claiming that the Brazilian media had misunderstood Mr. Pacheco (O Pais, 2011; Verdade, 2011). UNAC (the Mozambican National Peasant Union) launched a position statement in October 2012 denouncing ProSAVANA as a “top-down policy” lacking in transparency and unwilling to engage civil society organizations, and associated the program with several business prospecting missions by Brazilian

---

13 - Note that the recommended expansion of the target area in 2010 was to cover additional 6.4 million ha (JICA & Oriental Consultants, 2010).
entrepreneurs and business groups to the region (UNAC, 2012).

In May 2013 23 civil society organizations in Brazil, Japan and Mozambique launched an Open Letter to their countries’ leaders decrying the lack of transparency, irregularities in implementation of the Quick Impact Projects, and accused the master plan of intending to implement a model of export-oriented large scale agriculture in Mozambique that would benefit multinationals at the expense of farmer’s self-determination and food security while also importing “built-in contradictions of the development model of Brazilian agriculture” (UNAC et al., 2013). The letter called for an immediate halt of the program and demanded the creation of an open and democratic mechanism for consultation. The letter also demanded policies for the agricultural sector that would be centered in family farming in areas such as rural credit, extension services, and rural infrastructure (ibid). The document also drew support from international and civil movements as CSOs, mostly from Brazil, and individuals, the majority of which being academics from Japan, and was presented to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe by a delegation of Mozambican farmers during the Fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD V) in June 2013 (Richard, 2013). Civil society mobilization in this period identified ProSAVANA as an attempt to replicate development of the Brazilian Cerrado, which was identified by CSOs in Mozambique as promoting agribusiness at the expense of smallholders and family farming, and production methods that created health (due to the heavy use of agrochemicals) and environmental (biodiversity loss) risks to local communities and to the region (for example, UNAC & ORAM, 2013). This connection was further emphasized through contact with Brazilian NGOs and social movements opposing the Cerrado agribusiness model such as FASE and MST (the Brazilian Landless Workers’ Movement) (La Via Campesina, 2013).

ProSAVANA and the Mozambican government later conducted a series of consultations in the area covered by ProSAVANA-PD in 2013 and introduced a “ProSAVANA Concept Note” in September 2013 that was made available through the program website (also launched in 2013) and in all public consultations (Macauhub, 2013). The document retains the main elements of previous reports but emphasizes that ProSAVANA target beneficiaries are all the farmers in the Nacala Corridor regardless of scale and that program is aligned with the Mozambican Strategic Plan for Agricultural Development (PEDSA) (ProSAVANA-PD, 2013b). Records of discussions that took place during public consultations are available in the ProSAVANA website and show that the communities felt that there was an information deficit around the program while also demonstrating interest in elements such as improvement of smallholders’ access to quality seeds, inputs and credit, technology transfer and improvement of rural extension
services (ProSAVANA, n.d.).

As the Open Letter was left unanswered by the three governments, nine Mozambican civil society organizations (including UNAC) launched the “No to ProSAVANA” campaign in June 2014 and reiterated their call for a complete halt of the program while also denouncing episodes of civil society intimidation by the Mozambican government (UNAC et al, 2014).

ProSAVANA proposed a new version of the Master Plan called “Draft version 0” in March 2015 and initiated public consultations with local communities and CSOs in the Nacala Corridor. This new draft further emphasizes the alignment with PEDSA and prioritization of family farming and retains previous elements as the transition from shifting farming as essential to achieve productivity gains, the development of clusters based on value chain concerns, promotion of farmers’ cooperatives and leading farmers (now referred to as “emerging producers”), formulation of a model of Responsible Agrarian Investment (RAI) for the Nacala Corridor, development of agribusiness to promote marketing and processing industries, and integration of smallholders into commercial agriculture through contract farming and outgrower schemes (ProSAVANA - PD, 2015). Specific elements such as the previously suggested seven clusters, land reserves for medium and large agricultural investments and references to the development of Brazilian Cerrado are no longer found.

Mosca and Bruna (2015:23-26) argued that the ensuing consultations were flawed in terms of territorial coverage, participation (alleged poor representation of small farmers and CSOs) and procedures (short term notices and authoritarian approaches by Mozambican authorities). The authors also claim that the new Master Plan draft is technocratic in nature and lacking in concrete details for financing and execution along with an incomplete assessment of social and environmental impacts (Mosca & Bruna, 2015).

The most recent developments regarding the ProSAVANA Master Plan include the creation of the Civil Society Coordination Mechanism for the Nacala Corridor Development (MCSC) in January 2016 as the official platform of engagement with CSOs, which are envisaged as partners in planning, implementation and monitoring of ProSAVANA. MCSC’s first task is the joint analysis and revision of the Master Plan (ProSAVANA et al., 2016). The newly established mechanism integrates the Provincial Platform of Organizations of Civil Society of Nampula (PPOSC·N), the Forum of Non-Governmental Organizations of Niassa (FONAGNI), the Forum of Non-Governmental Organizations in Zambezia (FONGZA) and the Alliance of Platforms of Civil Society Working for Natural Resources Management. According to Mozambican CSO
interviewee 1 from Solidariedade Moçambique, UNAC retains its position against the program but takes part as an observer as well as a member of the aforementioned CSO forums and platforms. All CSO interviewees indicated that Observatório do Meio Rural, a Mozambican independent research institute led by João Mosca, was selected by MCSC to act as advisor in conducting the review of ProSAVANA-PD.
6. Assessing policy transfer in ProSAVANA

Having presented both PRODECER and ProSAVANA, this chapter introduces the main analytical undertaking of this study, namely: the assessment of policy transfer in ProSAVANA and its connection with the proposed concepts of relevance and effectiveness. The chapter is divided in four sections. In the first section the content of transfer is investigated and its very occurrence is challenged, which allows for an assessment of the degree of transfer. The second section brings a two-step evaluation of ProSAVANA in terms of relevance: first, it compares the program's constituting elements with Mozambican agricultural policies, and second, it attempts to conduct a preliminary assessment of appropriateness. The third section focuses on the process of transfer itself and provides an appraisal of transaction cost claims on Triangular Cooperation (both ex-ante and ex-post) in a concrete setting, thus allowing for the identification of intervening variables (i.e. enabling or disrupting factors) in TC. The fourth and final section connects the abovementioned findings to this study's research question and tests the validity of the five proposed supporting hypothesis.

6.1. Identifying content and degree of transfer

Chapter Four demonstrated that the agricultural development in the Brazilian Cerrado was marked by a combination of governmental commitment to research and development of tropical agriculture along with a public policy support scheme that targeted medium and large-scale producers for the promotion of agricultural commodities for export markets. The experience of the Cerrado and that of PRODECER can be seen as yielding the following policy takeaways (i.e. factors that contributed to the perceived success of the program): (a) the importance of an appropriate access to financing and related public policies such as infrastructure development, (b) the key role of farmer's cooperatives (facilitating access to credit and enabling more marketing opportunities), (c) the protagonist role of private sector (either as a partner in the case of CAMPO) or as individual entrepreneur (each farmer) in leading agricultural development and (d) the coordination role performed by CAMPO.

With regards to financing, PRODECER and the Brazilian government employed a system of subsidized rural credit to enable the development and expansion of commercial agriculture. This was particularly important as Cerrado soils require input-heavy cultivation techniques, which according to Barros et. al. (2007:53-56) can reach up
to 40% of the build-up of a farmer’s financial costs in the case of soybean production. Rural credit was thus essential to catalyze agricultural investment and to improve access to production inputs. ProSAVANA explicitly recognizes the importance of access to rural credit, but the Mozambican context posed important challenges, namely the poor coverage of Mozambican banks and the country’s land laws, which do not recognize land ownership, thus disabling an important pathway to credit (the use of land as a collateral). This matter was addressed by proposing the creation of finance schemes (PDIF for small and medium farmers and cooperatives, and the defunct Nacala Fund for medium and large scale agribusiness investments) (ProSAVANA-PD, 2013:3-33-3-35). The most recent formulation of the ProSAVANA Master Plan proposes upgrading PDIF and making use of commercial banks as intermediates for subsided credit to rural areas without providing much policy details (ProSAVANA-PD, 2015:4-21-4-24).

Financing was also seen as essential in facilitating access to production inputs in the Brazilian experience. Given the rural credit constraints, ProSAVANA documents have suggested that one of the advantages of contract farming is to fill this role as in most outgrower schemes the contractor provides both seeds, inputs and technical assistance (ProSAVANA-PD, 2013, 2015). This solution, however, is explicitly referred to as a lesson drawn from the neighboring Beira Agriculture Growth Corridor14 (BAGC) as well as from Mozambique’s largest outgrower schemes in tobacco and cotton production (ProSAVANA-PD, 2012:2-39-2-41; 3-92-3-95) and is reaffirmed in the latest version of the Master Plan (ProSAVANA-PD, 2015: 2-35, 5-2). It can be said then that, at least with regards to financing, the Cerrado experience gave at best a background idea or concept from which ProSAVANA incorporated its own solution (actually based on existing outgrower schemes in Mozambique as well as the experience of the neighboring Beira Agricultural Growth Corridor).

PRODECER as well its antecessor PADAP were based in an agricultural frontier development model guided by settlements that were organized around rural cooperatives. In PRODECER the rural cooperatives’ role was to select prospective settlers, acquire and distribute land as well as provision of agricultural production materials (machines, tools, fertilizers, seeds), technical assistance and sales and marketing information to settlers (JICA & Embrapa, 1989: 13-18). This cooperative-guided settlement model was also deemed to facilitate the provision of public services by local governments as the

---

14 - The BAGC is a public-private initiative launched in the World Economic Forum in 2009 with the support of the Mozambican Government and of a multi-donor consortium (JICA is a member, but Brazil is not) for the development of commercial agriculture in the Beira Corridor provinces (Tete, Manica and Sofala, located immediately beneath ProSAVANA’s Zambézia Province). (BAGC, n.d.).
settlements were concentrated in a well-defined area (JICA, 2010). Reflecting the widely different context in Mozambique (with relatively high population density and predominance of smallholders), ProSAVANA also consistently proposes the promotion and support to rural cooperatives and farmer’s organizations but emphasizes it as a pathway to alleviate poverty of small-scale farmers (see for example ProSAVANA-PD, 2013:3-47; ProSAVANA-PD, 2015:5-9). In the Cerrado experience, cooperatives were selected as key players due to their own strength (knowledge resources and well established marketing networks); in Mozambique, however, farmers’ organizations and cooperatives are very much incipient and are recognized as instruments to guide the transition from shifting to intensive farming, to increase the bargaining power of smallholders and to improve both access to inputs and marketing opportunities (ProSAVANA-PD, 2015:2-19).

Another element that is common to PRODECER and ProSAVANA is the idea of leading farmers and demonstration fields. PRODECER in specific can be said to be guided by this very logic as the selection criteria for prospective settlers included previous experience in agriculture. According to Eliseu Alves, “[t]he Cerrado is thus a typical case of agricultural development promoted by farmers from more advanced agronomic culture, rather than the local population, and this is a point that cannot be overlooked when dealing with Africa. In this process, the local population benefitted from technology and experience of those newly settled farmers” (Alves, 2016:146-7). This matter was referred by several interviewees as the entrepreneurial element of Cerrado development. The ProSAVANA Master Plan of March 2013 considers that “leading farmers should be cultivated in local community and they shall lead to diffusion of new settled farming and cooperative activities among the farmers aiming at the increase of crop production and their income with intensive agricultural technology” (ProSAVANA-PD, 2013:3-24). The author’s interviews suggest though that this concept has been present from the very beginning of project formulation albeit in different forms. Embrapa interviewee 7, for example, argued that “The great challenge in the design for ProSAVANA was that you do not have this entrepreneurial farmer. What you have there are small producers who are 100 years backwards in terms of [rural] property management. So there is a whole experience that you just cannot transfer. Regarding the design of ProSAVANA, the great discussions were about how to fit this element that just does not exist there [in Mozambique]. We could transplant seeds and planting methods but how to transform the Mozambican farmer into an entrepreneur is a different matter. And we had it here: [during Cerrado development] we had this entrepreneur who did not have land.” When asked about the lessons from Cerrado
development to ProSAVANA interviewee 6 from Embrapa argued that: “[…] there was a series of programs and policies being implemented at the time [of Cerrado development] and that were complemented by migration of the first producers and entrepreneurs, mostly from Southern Brazil, who were experienced farmers already […] For Cerrado that was the perfect combo: you had technology, public policy and human capital assets all in the same place, so it was a perfect match. That was our idea: to transfer this experience with all these assets to that region, which is very similar to ours [the Cerrado]. We even talked that some Brazilian farmers could be pioneers in the capacity development of Mozambican farmers as a way to derive from our experience” (interview, April 18, 2016)

Documents from FGV Projetos also discuss the abovementioned model as an implementation strategy for investments through the now defunct Nacala Fund (see below).

![Figure 14: Proposed production cluster model under the Nacala Fund](image)

Source: Reproduced from (FGV Projetos, 2013:13)

JICA interviewee 4 acknowledged that a proposal to bring young Brazilian farmers to lead the demonstration process was one of many approaches considered during negotiation and argued that another vented idea was to accentuate Mozambican leadership by instead providing technical training to groups of young smallholders in small-scale farms in the Green Belt of Brasília (specialized in horticulture production)
who would, upon return, engage in modern agriculture in demonstration camps as a way
to showcase the viability of new techniques and the region’s full agricultural potential
(interview, May 3, 2016). The final adopted strategy abandoned the concept of new
settlements (ProSAVANA-PD, 2013:3-2) and focused instead on the provision of 2 years
of intensive training in farming practice in Mozambique with two options upon
completion: (a) receipt of DUAT for a 5 ha farm and soft loan to cover initial costs or (b)
employment as public extension agent (ProSAVANA-PD, 2013:3-23~3-25; 2015: 4-13~4-16).

Also differing from the Brazilian experience, in ProSAVANA leading farmers are
also seen as a key component for guiding the formation of farmers’ associations and rural
cooperatives as well as to promote a shift away from current slash-and-burn cultivation
methods and into contract farming. The latest Master Plan draft calls these leading
farmers as “emerging producers” (producers engaged in cash crop production and who
have farms no larger than 10 ha) and “expects emerging farmers to play a prominent
role in the process of organizing local producers and expand their scale of activities
through active adoption of mechanized agriculture [...] emerging producers will also
act as facilitators of contract farming for family farmers and should become the driving
force for the development of the area through provision of market information and
promotion of improved agricultural techniques, quality seeds agrochemical products and
fertilizers” (ProSAVANA-PD, 2015: 3-13~3-14).

Another difference in the role of the private sector is related to the development
of clusters, which were identified by the ProSAVANA preliminary study of 2010 as one
of the key lessons from the Cerrado experience (JICA & Oriental Consultants, 2010:5-4).
While in Brazil the development of clusters was gradual, as value chains were only built
after farmers became competitive in the production of low value added products (World
Bank, 2009:49; Hosono & Hongo, 2016:94-98), ProSAVANA, on the other hand,
introduces this development model from the very beginning through the support of
strategic linkages and of the processing industry (ProSAVANA-PD, 2013: 2-14, 3-43~3-60; 2015: 5-9~5-19), which Ekman and Macamo (2014:16-17) define as similar to an
“agricultural big push” aimed at sector wide transformation.

Lastly, in terms of institutional background, the coordinating role played by
CAMPO was highlighted both in PRODECER reports (JICA & Embrapa, 1989: MAPA &
JICA, 2002) and in the earliest ProSAVANA study (JICA & Oriental Consultants, 2010:5-4)
as an essential part for the program’s success. Several recommendations were made
to create a coordinating and implementing institution following the CAMPO example
(ibid: 6-31, 8-4) in 2010, but the 2012 draft of the ProSAVANA Master Plan actually
recommended two models for institutional setup based on the organization structure of the neighboring Beira Agriculture Growth Corridor (BAGC) (ProSAVANA-PD, 2012: 4-44~4-48). The 2015 draft of ProSAVANA-PD, however, suggests an institutional framework based in the Master Plan implementation by the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MASA, formerly Ministry of Agriculture, MINAG) along with a yet to be defined coordination structure with an inter-institutional advisory body comprising all relevant actors (including donors and provincial authorities) (ProSAVANA-PD, 2015:8-16~8-18).

Given the exposition above, to what extent then can one talk of policy transfer from PRODECER to ProSAVANA? While a complete account cannot be made at this point due to the program’s ongoing status, it can be said that ProSAVANA can be seen as a soft transfer of ideas, concepts, attitudes (Evans and Davies, 1999:382), norms and knowledge (Stone, 2004). Content-wise, the transfer can be said to be complete, which Dolowitz and Marsh (2000:549) defined not as a direct copy, but as a transfer in which all elements deemed to key to the success in the original context are present: as demonstrated above, all four key elements of PRODECER (credit access, promotion of agricultural cooperatives, support of leading farmers, and the importance of a coordinating agency) were included in all publicly available versions of ProSAVANA policy documents up to March 2015. The degree of transfer can be said to be a case of hybridization (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996:351) through the combination of Brazilian and local experiences (such as that of the BAGC in contract farming and organizational structure). Finally, assessing where ProSAVANA stands in Dolowitz and Marsh’s (2000) policy transfer continuum is sketchy at best given this study’s lack of access to Mozambican government officials. The circumstances that gave origin to the program, in which it seems that Mozambique was involved only after an initial agreement between Japan and Brazil, suggest that this may not be a case of voluntary transfer. However, the alignment of ProSAVANA elements with Mozambican agricultural policies (see the following section) hints that a pure coercive transfer also seems unlikely. In this context, this study can suggest signs that ProSAVANA would be better categorized as a negotiated transfer as illustrated by the episodes of the expansion of the target area and of the content modifications in response to Mozambican civil society mobilization.

6.2. Relevance

Having identified the content of transfer, this sub-section analyzes ProSAVANA with regards to its relevance, a concept proposed by this study as a combination of two
elements: alignment to recipient-set priorities and appropriateness to the context in the receiving end.

6.2.1. Alignment

The first element of the proposed concept of relevance is alignment, which is understood for the purposes of this study as the extent by which the transfer through Triangular Cooperation reflects recipient-defined policy priorities. In this case, ProSAVANA claims to be aligned with the PEDSA 2011-2020 (the Mozambican Strategic Plan for Agrarian Development), which is based on four main policy goals: (1) increase production, productivity, and competitiveness of the agrarian sector, (2) improving infrastructure and services for market access, (3) sustainable use of natural resources, and (4) strengthening institutions and organizations for agricultural development (Government of Mozambique, 2011: vii). Ekman and Macamo (2014) conducted a detailed comparison of the priorities identified by PEDSA and the goals of priority projects in the 2013 version of the ProSAVANA Master Plan and concluded that there was a marked alignment between the two. The most recent version of the ProSAVANA Master Plan is organized around the aforementioned four pillars and brings a whole section to link all of its proposed components to those of PEDSA (ProSAVANA-PD, 2015: 8-3~8-5).

The alignment with PEDSA though is contested by academics and by Mozambican civil society alike. Nogueira and Olinaho (2013:10), for example, point that the alignment with PEDSA is dubious because in an aid dependent country like Mozambique it is not clear whether or not the plan was developed in response to the agenda of the donor community. In the same vein, some interviewees from Mozambican civil society remarked that they were skeptical of ProSAVANA alignment with PEDSA because of a “temporal incongruence,” as ProSAVANA was initiated while PEDSA was still under formulation. As CSO interviewee 2 argues, “When ProSAVANA negotiations started PEDSA was not yet conceptualized, but then the ProSAVANA design claims to have been based on PEDSA. So, even though PEDSA was being formulated at the time, it was not yet a public policy approved by the Republic of Mozambique because the Council of Ministers had not yet created that instrument. So there is no way in which one could claim that there is a direct relation between PEDSA and ProSAVANA.” Recognizing this point of contention, this study then proceeds to compare ProSAVANA with Mozambican policies for agricultural development approved before the beginning of the program (see the table below).

---

15 - PEDSA was approved by the Council of Ministers in May, 2011.
### Table 12: Digest of main Mozambican policies regarding agricultural development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Mozambican Five Year Plan (2005-2009)</strong></th>
<th>“Guarantee enough domestic food production to satisfy the population’s basic needs (...) This goal will be complemented by the promotion of agroindustry that adds value to nationally produced crops and enables their sale in both domestic and export markets” (Government of Mozambique, 2005:188).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Supply Technical and Scientific knowledge to both family farmers and agricultural cooperatives” (ibid:189-90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Speed up the process of authorization of DUAT” (ibid:189)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Encourage the introduction and development of agroindustry including input markets, surplus crops marketing and related services” (ibid:189)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Improve performance of public services for family agriculture, specially rural investigation and extension” (ibid:189)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Support formation of financial institutions targeting rural areas” (ibid)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mozambican Five Year Plan 2010-2014</strong></td>
<td>The main goal remains the achievement of a structural transformation that would allow for progressing from subsistence agriculture to an agrarian sector that is integrated, prosperous, competitive, sustainable and that contributes to GDP growth through adoption of Green Revolution techniques. (Government of Mozambique, 2010:50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facilitate access and use of DUAT (ibid:53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Widen the coverage area of rural extension services (ibid:51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foment the cultivation of strategic cash crops (cotton, cashew, oleaginous plants) (ibid:51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promote productivity [sic] competitiveness and capital accumulation in rural areas (ibid:109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop infrastructure with potential to attract investment to rural areas (ibid:110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PARPA II 2006-2009 (Plan of Action for the)</strong></td>
<td>Main challenges to rural development include: the promotion of financial services to meet the needs of local initiatives, strengthening of farmers’ groups (“associationism”), development of rural markets, and increased community participation (Government of Mozambique, 2006:70).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reduction of Absolute Poverty

The objectives for rural development include: (1) changing the capital accumulation pattern in the national economy, (2) breaking the vicious circle of rural poverty through improvements in productivity, competitiveness, efficiency, and human capital development; (3) massive support to small and medium enterprises capable to bringing about transformations in rural areas (ibid:71)


The government’s goals should be: (i) guarantee of an improvement of food access conditions through production (especially so for traditional and family farming), processing, industrialization, marketing (…) (ii) creation of a favorable environment for national and foreign investment that would contribute to achievement food and nutrition security (…), (iv) promote the production of strategic food products such as cereals, roots and tubers, grain legumes, fruits, horticulture, cashew nuts, cotton, tea, bovine cattle, small ruminants, and dairy, poultry and fish products” (Government of Mozambique, 2007a:16)

Strategy for the Green Revolution in Mozambique (2007)

“Widen the coverage and improve the quality of rural extension services (…) improve access and availability of agricultural inputs (such as seeds and fertilizers)” (Government of Mozambique, 2007b:26)

“Promotion and support for extended coverage of both formal and informal rural credit systems” (ibid:27)

Measures should be taken to (…) improve family earnings through cultivation of soybean and peanuts (ibid: 45)

Source: the abovementioned Government Plans, free translation by the author from Portuguese originals.

The policy goals and policy challenges identified above seem to be congruent with some of the main elements outlined in ProSAVANA, such as: a transition from shifting to intensive/settled farming, promotion of agribusiness following a value chain development approach, support for the development of agricultural cooperatives and farmer’s associations, improved market and input access (through contract farming and outgrower schemes), improvement of Mozambican agricultural research and rural extension services, provision of DUAT to small and medium holders, and support for leading farmers. Additionally, the majority of the strategic foods products identified in the Mozambican Strategy of Food and Nutrition Security are identified as key crops to be promoted under ProSAVANA in all versions of the Master Plan (ProSAVANA-PD, 2012: 3·33~3·36; 2013: 2·9~2·11; 2015:4·1~4·3). This demonstrates that, overall,
ProSAVANA has been aligned with Mozambican agricultural policy priorities set both before (as shown above) and after (PEDSA) its launch.

6.2.2. Appropriateness

Dolowitz and Marsh (2000:17) define appropriateness as the “fit” between the policy and the economic/social/political/ideological context to which it was transferred. In the policy transfer framework, however, “appropriateness” is a factor to be assessed in relation to policy success/failure (ibid). In the case of ProSAVANA such task suffers from a major limitation, namely the fact that its main element, the Master Plan, is still being formulated. It is beyond the scope of this study to conduct a comprehensive prospective appraisal of each ProSAVANA Master Plan component through time. As such, this study limits itself to briefly indicate some evaluations conducted by the literature as well as those shared by some of the interviewees on this matter.

Worlford and Nehring (2015) argue, for example, that ProSAVANA is an attempt to replicate the Brazilian agribusiness model that fails to take into consideration differences in factors of production: land (private in Brazil, state-owned and customary rights in Mozambique), labor (highly educated in Brazil and win-win contract farming proposal for Mozambique) and capital. While this study’s analysis contradicts the idea of any direct copy of the Cerrado experience in ProSAVANA, some Embrapa interviewees shared similar opinions regarding Mozambique’s socialist heritage. Embrapa interviewee 4, for example, states that “In the development of the Brazilian Cerrado there was, of course, public policy support in terms of strategy, but the key actor, who really brought about agricultural development, was the private sector. The rationale for the program in Mozambique was the same […] We believed then and still believe now that the Cerrado reference for development guided by the private sector initiative is ideal, but in the Mozambican case there are matters related to the country’s socioeconomic structure – and especially to land ownership structure – that inhibited the success of this kind of initiative. [...]. And aside from all of this there are still institutional and legal challenges that should be addressed to enable this kind of initiative to thrive. [...] But it is not international cooperation that will bring this to Mozambique: Brazil had to deal with all of those [challenges] to bring about the success of domestic policies for development of the Cerrado and also to not only be able to receive this kind of cooperation but to make use of it in an effective way. So for Mozambique to receive this kind of cooperation while these local challenges persist... I could perhaps say that this is why the on-the-site efficiency of these interventions is limited. These local challenges must
be dealt with, sure, but this is a process that only Mozambican society itself can conduct.” This argument echoes some of the previously referred policy transfer studies that underlined the importance of local institutions for localization of imported policies (Street, 2004; Randma-Liv and Kruusenberg, 2012; Kim, 2013).

For Embrapa interviewee 5, in ProSAVANA “We were proposing a capitalist production system, that is, from a capitalist point of view with large production types and establishments (like soy, corn, cotton) inside a socialist production system where [...] there is no private property and the level of organization of communities, which we refer to as family farming, was absolutely different from the one we find in Brazil. Under no hypothesis you can even compare it to Brazil both in terms of economic development and in terms of stage of community organization. These brought then a conflict that had to be solved internally in Mozambique, and that led to a complete reorientation of the project from a development program to a closer interaction with local family farmers.”

This point is also shared by Mozambican CSOs, as illustrated by CSO interviewee 1 from Solidariedade Moçambique: “The current document [the Master Plan draft of 2015] does not reflect this grand experience, I mean, this experience in terms of production. The problem is that we have two contexts. The first thing is the Nacala Corridor region, which is more densely inhabited and ecologically viable for agriculture. Second, there is our Land Law, which is very favorable to the citizen in comparison to that of Brazil. The history of Cerrado cannot be applied to such a situation [...] So, the experience that took place in the Cerrado at first scared CSOs and the communities in the Nacala Corridor, because at the time we were seeing a ProSAVANA that was a copy of the Brazilian Cerrado, so we said ‘If that is the model, then no. We must devise a model that is better suited to our reality from the perspective of our legislation.’”

The abovementioned matter is intrinsically related to Mozambican CSO’s accusations of ProSAVANA as a facilitator of “land grabs” (e.g. UNAC, 2012). Another key concern expressed by civil society as well as by academic critics of ProSAVANA regards the risks of contract farming such as imbalanced negotiating power between smallholders and contractors, farmer indebtedness in case of bad crops or unrealistic/abusive contracts, and potential decrease in food security (due to monocrop and export-oriented production) (inter alia, Nogueira & Olinaho, 2013: 14; Mosca & Bruna, 2015:5-6). Additional difficulties identified by JICA officials as well as academics are farmers’ unfamiliarity with this instrument, with reported cases of farmers not feeling obliged to the contractor if offered a higher price in other market channels (Oshima, 2012; Hanlon & Smart, 2013). ProSAVANA documents and JICA officials recognize these risks and highlight that the potential role of foreign investors and the
conduct of contractors in the agribusiness sector was to be mediated by the PRAI, Mozambican laws and that smallholders would be further protected by acquisition of DUAT (Oshima, 2012; ProSAVANA-PD, 2013:5-1–5-8; Tawa et al, 2014; ProSAVANA-PD, 2015:6-5–6-11). Critics point however that the proposed transition to intensive farming along with acquisition of DUAT aimed not at helping farmers, but at making land accessible for investors (Funada-Classen, 2013b:55). Furthermore, the effectiveness of the PRAI, which is a voluntary guideline, and of the pro-peasant Mozambican Land Law is also called into question given widespread corruption and the recognized limited capacity of the Mozambican land administration system (Nogueira & Olinaho, 2013; Funada-Classen, 2013a/b; Mosca & Bruna, 2015)

Lastly, it is worth noting that similar initiatives for the promotion of commercial agriculture and foreign agribusiness investment have not drawn as much attention or contestation in Mozambique (Milhorance & Gabbas, 2015:12). Hanlon and Smart (2012:1) demonstrated that contract farming schemes for soybean production in the Gurué district (part of the ProSAVANA target area) have been supported by NGOs and donors as diverse as Norway, the United States, Switzerland, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation since 2004. Similarly, the previously mentioned BAGC, created in 2009 as a public-private initiative supported by the Government of Mozambique, NGOs and several aid agencies claims to “provide a focus for increased commercial investment in agribusiness along the entire value chain in agriculture supporting infrastructure, farming and processing, input supply chains (fertiliser, seeds etc) and access to markets (storage, wholesale markets etc)” (BAGC, n.d.:7), and is described in promotion materials as holding the potential to become “the next Cerrado” (ibid:8). UNAC’s reaction to the latter, for example, focused on more technical matters of seed certification systems and fertilizer use (ACB & UNAC, 2015). While not disqualifying UNAC or any of the ProSAVANA critics, these episodes demonstrate the complexity of prospective appropriateness assessments and indicate that a comparison between these other initiatives and ProSAVANA may well hold potential as a future research venue.

### 6.3. Effectiveness (i.e. transaction costs) in ProSAVANA

While the previous sections demonstrated the content of transfer and its connection with the proposed concept of relevance, the current section will introduce a more process-oriented analysis by focusing on the concepts of ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs.

Interviews conducted with key involved officials from both Brazilian government
(ABC and Embrapa) and JICA suggest that the early negotiation phase went smoothly. Marco Farani, former ABC director, assesses that “We converged very rapidly and very well – the Japanese were very clear and practical – so we managed to proceed very quickly in the direction of a project, or should I say, of a grand idea that had its first step in a specific technical project for capacity building of ILAM and of its technicians by Embrapa.”

From all Japanese interviewees, two elements stand out in relation to the selection of Brazil as a cooperation partner: (1) the trust built upon previous experiences of bilateral (most important of which being PRODECER) and Triangular Cooperation projects such as the third-country training programs and the Japan-Brazil Partnership Program, (2) the recognition of Embrapa as a leading authority in tropical agriculture research. JICA Interviewee 1 also emphasized that Brazil’s unique status as the leading emerging economy among Portuguese-speaking countries make it a key strategic partner for Japan and for JICA. The operational aspect of language was also mentioned by JICA interviewees 4, 5 and 6, who highlighted the added fluidity in communication and improved effectiveness in capacity building initiatives since all research materials and textbooks would be available in the local language, thus saving up the translation costs. Finally, JICA interviewee 5 also underlined that Brazil’s long history of friendly relations with Mozambique (since the independence) was a precious asset to JICA, which had only opened an office in the country in 2003.

From the Brazilian perspective, the general view expressed by the interviewees regarding the partnership with Japan in ProSAVANA was that Japan’s familiarity with Brazilian institutions and the experience of PRODECER were key enabling factors. From Embrapa’s point of view, the expertise accumulated from the development of the Cerrado along with the involvement of Japanese personnel who worked in Brazil during PRODECER also were frequently mentioned as important factors for project identification. Embrapa interviewee 6, for example, stated that “All this experience of people who had worked here in Brazil at the time of Cerrado development, including many Japanese, along with the proximity enjoyed between Embrapa and JICA were what created this logic in the sense of making use of this past experience. […] And we also had a colleague working in an Embrapa advanced office in Mozambique, so all of these factors contributed to set it [the program] in motion”. Similarly, Embrapa interviewee 1 expressed that “the Japanese who were working in the project [ProSAVANA] were technicians who already had knowledge about the Brazilian context […] These Japanese technicians had also worked at Embrapa, so there was a history of joint work with Brazil. It was all very fluid because they already knew of our work at
Embrapa and of what took place in Brazil, after all they had worked in the Cerrado.” This point was also supported by an early study conducted by Ferreira (2012), who demonstrated the substantial role of interpersonal relations during program identification and negotiation.

The Japanese side also expressed appreciation for the commitment demonstrated by the Brazilian side by the assignment of the first ever ABC permanent staff assigned abroad to act as a coordinator for the program (JICA interviewees 4, 5 and 6). Embrapa interviewee 7 also shared this perspective: “The ABC director was remarkable in his acceptance to allocate a [permanent] ABC staff to Mozambique to work on the matter. So I think that it was a spectacular experience for the Brazilian government and for everyone in the Mozambican government as well.” The expansion of ProSAVANA target area due to Mozambican government requests was also interpreted by some JICA interviewees (4, 5 and 6) as a clear demonstration of interest by local governments.

While these accounts suggest low ex-ante transaction costs as well as a successful case of the Japanese strategy of supporting southern Centers of Excellence to enable future cooperation projects, the same cannot be said to have taken place with regards to the program’s overall coordination and implementation (ex-post transaction costs). On the one hand, all interviewees shared the same view in relation to the macro division of labor between the three partners: Brazil was to provide technical knowledge in agriculture while Japan provided minor technical assistance along with financial resources and overall coordination support, and finally, Mozambique was in charge of promoting public support. All Mozambican CSO interviewees also shared this perspective but argued that along with many aspects of ProSAVANA, the division of labor, and especially the role of the Mozambican government was not very clear from the start and, as emphasized by CSO interviewee 3, “only after a long time and after a lot of insistence on our part [CSOs] that we got to know that each party had a specific role and what we know comes from information provided during some debates organized by the three parties.” Despite this agreement on the government level on task divisions in a macro perspective, the division of labor in ProSAVANA-PI and to a certain extent in ProSAVANA-PD have shown signs of shortcomings.

A particular characteristic of Triangular Cooperation lies in the presence of a legal framework marked by one overarching document for all three parties which is then complemented by two bilaterally negotiated technical agreements (Cabral & Weinstock, 2010:32,33). In this sense, Embrapa interviewee 4 described ProSAVANA-PI in the following manner: “There were two bilateral projects [...] The Brazilian project was signed between Brazil and Mozambique, and was executed by Embrapa, so there was no
Japanese participation in project execution. And in the project signed between Japan and Mozambique, Embrapa had no participation in project execution. You had links through the JTCs [Joint Technical Committees], which periodically made the linkages between these projects, but the situation in the field is that there are two bilateral projects under a trilateral umbrella.”

The particularity of such legal arrangement would then require substantial joint planning to achieve effective coordination and to avoid duplication of efforts. A key challenge in this way, at least from the perspective of some Embrapa interviewees, was the harmonization of two models for the provision of technical cooperation: The Brazilian model, based on the direct involvement of Brazilian public servants and the Japanese model, which had a consulting company (NTCI) as part of its research team. Embrapa interviewee 1, for example, argued that: “This [the division of labor] was the Achilles’ Heel [of the project] and brought heavy negotiation costs. The way by which the teams were organized generated some difficulties because for the Japanese side there was a sort of joint venture between JIRCAS and NTCI, the latter of which being a private consulting company. So these private consultants had to meet certain targets in order to be paid for their services. As such, they were very much concerned about completing any tasks that would meet Japanese payment requirements. Meanwhile, on the Brazilian side, Embrapa was not there to meet specific targets. Neither our technicians nor Embrapa as a company received a single penny for our work there as we had been demanded by the Brazilian government. This scenario brought some management problems – and I can say this because I was personally involved in the coordination aspect – because their work dynamic was not fit to the area of biological research. […] It [the project] could have been much better conducted if we had a single plan of action for Japanese, Brazilians and Mozambicans. But this did not actually take place: we were working under two bilateral plans.”

A JIRCAS newsletter also mentioned complications regarding coordination in ProSAVANA-PI: Mr. Satoshi Tobita, one of the leaders of the Japanese team, reported that “As Brazil is relatively inexperienced as a donor country, Embrapa, in contradiction of its intention, sometimes could not act in concert with the Japanese Team. There was also a scene, during the project planning, where the recipient (IIAM) got confused as two work plans separately prepared by Japan and Brazil were proposed in parallel.” (Tobita, 2013:6). These difficulties in coordination are also supported by Fingermann (2014), who conducted a field study in 2013 and identified problems in ProSAVANA-PI such as deficient communication between Brazilian and Japanese teams and potential cases of duplicated experiments (ibid:137-8).
Additional obstacles for the execution of ProSAVANA-PI stemmed from the bureaucratic requirements and financial constraints of ABC, which, as exposed in the previous chapter, was unable to proceed with the construction of the research laboratory in Lichinga (Campos Mello, 2015). Fingermann (2014:140-1) also reported that the different dispatch dates of Japanese (March 2012) and Brazilian (July, 2012) teams for the preliminary research for the Master Plan can be attributed to lengthy bureaucratic procedures at ABC. The financial constraints are also likely to have affected overall ProSAVANA coordination: Ligia Maria Scherer, former Brazilian ambassador to Mozambique (2012-2015), reported to the Brazilian Senate in June 2015 that ABC budget constraints had left it without a permanent representative in Maputo and that it would be in the country’s interests to reactivate the ABC representation to the coordination of ProSAVANA along the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture and JICA as soon as possible (Scherer, 2015).

The division of labor also seems to have impacted the relationship with civil society. ProSAVANA documents assigned to the Government of Mozambique and to the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture the task of promoting the program and securing public support (Record of Discussions, 2011:5; Minutes of the Meeting, 2011:9). Embrapa interviewee 6, however, argued that: “There were some problems with the MST [the Brazilian Landless Workers’ Movement] who went there and caused a ruckus […] So you had a reaction against the project that argued that it would bring local culture to an end etc. For these reasons perhaps it can be said that it [ProSAVANA] was not very efficient in communicating with civil society. There was a great deal of support from the [Mozambican] government though – and at the time I thought that it was very difficult for Embrapa and for the Japanese collaborators as well to… What I mean is that the one who should have dealt with this matter in a much stronger way was the Mozambican government itself. I think that this [communication with civil society] was not done in the appropriate intensity, so you had these problems that I mentioned.”

In a similar fashion, JICA interviewees 4, 5 and 6 recognized that Mozambique lacked human resources to perform a more adequate contact with local communities to explain ProSAVANA and its goals. Interviewee 4 remarked that JICA has also engaged in community consultations but that these were conducted through translators, which was far from ideal. JICA Interviewees 5 and 6 emphasized that the Mozambican counterpart, despite human resource limitations, was committed to promoting public understanding about the program and cited numerous public consultations as well as the availability of ProSAVANA documents in the program website as proof.

CSO interviewee 2 also shared this view, arguing that “In terms of specific task
allocation, the Mozambican government should have a concrete focus, because in my view the direct implementer [of ProSAVANA] is the Mozambican government - as such it should mobilize actors in the public and private sectors as well as civil society organizations in all levels. It is their duty to mobilize and engage these actors. Unfortunately, the Mozambican government does not dispose of resources to do that, which would be a long-term, concrete and cohesive engagement. Not having these resources, the government has been skipping steps in this process and in doing so it is putting the communities that would benefit from the project at risk, because then it becomes a process of development without appropriation.” Likewise, CSO Interviewee 3 stated that “We [CSOs] only got to know about ProSAVANA by the end of 2012. Only then CSOs started to react as a way to try to understand what the program was about. So the tension increased from late 2012, specially in 2013, and well into 2015. But it was justified [...] [before 2012] nobody knew about it, the government of Mozambique did not publicize ProSAVANA.”

6.4. Discussion

The lengthy preceding analysis underscores tentative answers to the research question proposed at the beginning of this study, namely: how does Triangular Cooperation (TC) contribute to relevance (alignment and appropriateness) and to the effectiveness (transaction costs) of international development cooperation? The supporting hypotheses based on insights from the literature were: (H1) the lack of conditionality in TC caused by the participation of a SSC provider leads to alignment with recipient priorities, (H2) Knowledge and experiences from the SSC provider scaled up in TC provides solutions that are more appropriate to a developing country context, (H3) the reproduction of past cooperation reduces overall transaction costs (i.e. burning steps), (H4) the supporting role of the DAC donor and the similarities between the SSC provider and the recipient make way for smoother implementation (i.e. lower ex-post transaction costs), and (H5) the presence of “best practices” from the South increases the risk of uninformed, inappropriate and incomplete transfer. By utilizing a policy transfer framework in the analysis of ProSAVANA, a preliminary effort at identifying relevant intervening variables in Triangular Cooperation initiatives could be thus be conducted.

As indicated by the policy-oriented strand of the literature on TC, past experience both in donor-recipient (PRODECER) and co-donor contexts (JBP) appeared as an enabling factor for project and partner identification in the perspectives of interviewed Brazilian and Japanese actors involved in ProSAVANA. Another interesting
and still unexplored factor in most analyses of international cooperation initiatives was the importance attributed to interpersonal relationships and to trust at the personal level as a sub-element of the previous experience, which may be a topic that is worth further study (for an early effort on this matter, see Ferreira, 2012). The claimed similarities between SSC provider and the recipient also appeared in ProSAVANA in terms of language and physical geography were widely used in early stages of the program as a promotion tool, while also being seen as positively related to prospective partner identification. Curiously, the association with the Cerrado experience also appears to have played a role in enabling connections between Brazilian, Japanese and Mozambican CSOs, which is yet another topic worth of further study.

The factors above had an overall positive influence in partner and project identification. On the negative side though the analysis on transaction costs suggests that the existence of different cooperation approaches, as illustrated by the case of ProSAVANA-PI, posed a constraint to coordination and led to duplication of efforts and potential increase in the administrative burden for Mozambique. Another negative relationship was related to the rhetoric of similarities, which did not hold true in terms of socio-economic context: as demonstrated in the cursory overview on appropriateness, the feasibility of some of the policy elements in ProSAVANA was contested in relation to particularities of the Mozambican context (socialist heritage reflected in the Land Law and incipient level of family farmers’ organizations).

From the Brazilian and Mozambican perspectives, the degree of institutional feasibility of assigned tasks might well be the most important element among the identified intervening variables. From the Brazilian side, ABC’s institutional frailty and increased financial constraints can be seen as causing delays and complicating overall coordination. While the current economic downturn in Brazil and the more domestic-oriented stance of the Rousseff administration could not have been foreseen during the formulation of ProSAVANA, the very complexity of the program sticks out from the technical cooperation portfolio at ABC, marked by short- to medium-term projects and specialized scope. ProSAVANA, on the other hand, goes beyond technical agricultural cooperation and involves elements of a long term development plan (with a time horizon of 20 years). Senior JICA officials have previously argued that ProSAVANA was also intended to support human resource development in Brazil to further enable its transformation into an established donor country (Oshima, 2012). From the JICA perspective of gradual scale-up of SSC support and Triangular Cooperation (Kato, 2012:78), ProSAVANA might be seen as too big of a step, specially so if one compares it with the preceding project under the “Japan-Brazil Global Partnership for the solution
of global issues,” which was a 2-year long capacity building project for the Josina Machel Hospital in Angola (Sakaguchi, 2012). Finally, regarding Mozambique, the lack of human resources was also suggested to have played a role into the deficient ProSAVANA divulgation, which was shown to be one of the factors to bring about civil society contestation.

In a nutshell, this study demonstrated that ProSAVANA can be said to be aligned with Mozambican agricultural policy priorities, but was unable to connect this finding with the matter of conditionality, thus only partially confirming hypothesis 1. The matter of appropriateness could not be determined given the program’s ongoing status (stuck in the formulation phase in the case of the Master Plan), but was able to indicate what can be seen as a mixed record: despite concerns by interviewees and CSOs, similar initiatives by other donors have not met the same degree of resistance and contestation in Mozambique. As such, this study was unable to assess the validity of Hypothesis 2. Meanwhile, hypothesis 3 could only be partially confirmed: the experience of previous related cooperation (PRODECER) reduced ex-ante transaction costs but was not shown to have been enough to overcome coordination problems during implementation. Hypothesis 4 was rejected as the division of labor was shown to have caused difficulties during implementation and overall coordination. Finally, the data collected as well as the ongoing status of ProSAVANA only allowed for partial assessment of Hypothesis 5. Kim (2013) argued that policy transfer through aid is likely to be uninformed, inappropriate and incomplete. While endorsements by prominent individuals (such as Hillary Clinton and Bill Gates) in the earlier phases could be seen as playing the role of the certification mechanism in transfers as introduced by Ancelovici and Jenson (2012), this study’s lack of access to Mozambican government officials render it unable to determine whether the transfer was uninformed or not. As previously mentioned, appropriateness could not be satisfactorily assessed as ProSAVANA is still in its early phases. Lastly, the content assessment has shown that ProSAVANA can be seen as a complete transfer: it contains all the elements deemed to have contributed to the success of PRODECER but with considerable adaptations to the local context (again, it is unclear at this stage if these are appropriate or not).
7. Conclusion

This study attempted to integrate the policy transfer theoretical framework to the analysis of Triangular Cooperation in the case of ProSAVANA, an agricultural development program involving Japan, Brazil and Mozambique. A literature review on Triangular Cooperation was undertaken and identified two main analytical strands. The first, a policy-oriented one, underlines practical challenges to this cooperation modality (with a focus on the matter of transaction costs) and on the potential contribution of knowledge from the South for international development efforts. The second strand, though, is essentially politics-oriented, emphasizing the inherent political nature of international development assistance and questioning the motivations behind increased donor interest in this aid modality. While equally relevant, each branch of studies was found to have little to no contact with the other. The framework developed by Dolowitz and Marsh in 1996, which defined policy transfer as the process by which knowledge about policy lato sensu is used in designing policies in another setting, was identified as holding the potential to bridge the gap between the aforementioned analytical strands.

The guiding research question was: how does Triangular Cooperation (TC) contribute to relevance (alignment and appropriateness) and to the effectiveness (transaction costs) of international development cooperation? The proposed concepts of relevance and effectiveness were shown to take full advantage of the potential of the policy transfer concept by organizing the argument in terms of content (What was transferred? What was the degree of transfer? Was the transfer aligned to recipient priorities? Was it appropriate to the recipient context?) and process (ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs). The data collected for this study through the triangulation of documental sources, stakeholder interviews, news reports and academic researches allowed for a tentative classification of ProSAVANA as an ongoing soft transfer. The main elements of PRODECER were shown to be consistently present in ProSAVANA formulations, but far from being a mere copy, were adapted to local circumstances and combined with elements of other policies in Mozambique, such as the BAGC. In terms of relevance, ProSAVANA was shown to be aligned with Mozambican agricultural policies. The related concept of appropriateness could not be explored in details given the ongoing status of the program. Unsurprisingly, the preliminary analysis proved inconclusive: while alignment with Mozambican policies and the existence of initiatives with similar elements being carried out in Mozambique by other donors suggest a certain degree of appropriateness, opinions shared by key informants as well as manifestations from
CSOs and academics would suggest otherwise. Lastly, an assessment of effectiveness was undertaken and suggested the presence of low ex-ante transaction costs (facilitated by the mutual trust between Brazil and Japan built during PRODECER and by a clear macro division of labor) and high ex-post transaction costs (suggesting difficulties in coordination and implementation).

The advantage of this method of study is that it allowed for the identification of different intervening variables to the policy transfer process as it unfolds. In this sense, intervening variables that were positively related to relevance and effectiveness were the existence of a previous cooperation experience between Brazil and Japan (both as donor-recipient and as co-donors) and the geographic and linguistic similarities between Brazil and Mozambique. On the other hand, variables with negative influence were identified as the difficulty in harmonizing two cooperation approaches (implementation by public servants in the case of Brazil vs. hiring of consulting services for Japan), the lack of similarity between Brazil and Mozambique’s institutional and socioeconomic conditions, and, most importantly, the feasibility of the division of labor. In the Brazilian case, the complexity and long term horizon of ProSAVANA did not fit ABC’s relative lack of experience in long term projects and its domestic environment of institutional frailty. For Mozambique, the lack of human resources for promotion of the program can be said to have contributed to the lack of information identified by Mozambican CSOs as one of the triggers for contestation.

This paper contributes to the study of Triangular Cooperation in two main ways. First, it attempts to integrate policy- and politics-oriented analysis. Second, it addresses the dearth of analytical case studies (as opposed to descriptive accounts) on the topic by conducting an in-depth research on a program conducted by two leading TC providers, namely Brazil and Japan. From the policy transfer perspective, this study demonstrates sign of feasibility of the policy transfer framework in a trilateral setting. Additionally, it joins the growing body of studies of transfers from and between developing countries while also contributing to the still incipient field of research on ongoing policy transfers.

One of the limitations of this study is related to the lack of access to key informants in the Mozambican government, which made inviable the assessment of (un)informed transfers as well as the full use of the standardization framework in conjunction to the chains of knowledge creation model. As such, this study can perhaps be described as involuntarily biased towards Brazilian and Japanese perspectives while also subscribing to one of the perceived weaknesses of the Triangular Cooperation literature, namely the absence of recipient-oriented studies.

Finally, two tentative findings from this study suggest possible pathways for
future research. First, it was demonstrated that the imagery of the Cerrado played a key role in early ProSAVANA project identification. Simultaneously though, the reference of the Cerrado also seem to have enabled increased contact and mutual support between Mozambican, Brazilian and Japanese CSOs. An analysis of the characteristics of knowledge transfer in this process holds a potential not only contribute to social movement studies, but also to a better understanding of soft policy transfers between non-state actors. Another possible direction for future research would be building upon the differing degrees of mobilization and contestation entailed by Mozambican civil society in relation to ProSAVANA and to similar initiatives either in terms of promotion of contract farming (e.g. Gurué district) or of foreign agribusiness investment promotion under the imagery of a parallel with the Cerrado experience (BAGC). Such undertaking could further our understanding of the impact of different public relations approaches by different donors and maybe even identify enabling factors for civil society mobilization in Mozambique.
References


Cabral, Lidia & Weinstock, Julia (2010), “Brazilian technical cooperation for


Government of Brazil (2010) Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento
Internacional: 2005–2009, Brasília, Brazil: IPEA/ABC.

Government of Brazil (2013), Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional: 2010, Brasília, Brazil: IPEA/ABC.


JICA (2009), 「日本とブラジルがモザンビークで農業開発協力—ブラジル・セラード農業開発の知見を生かして—」、2009年09月28日

JICA (2012), An Overview of South-South and Triangular Cooperation, Tokyo: JICA.


Cooperation.pdf> (accessed on November 11, 2015).


Lana, Xenia & Evans, Mark (2004) “Policy Transfer between Developing Countries. The Transfer of the Bolsa-Escola Programme to Ecuador”, in: Evans, M. (ed.) Policy


Memorandum de Entendimento (2009), Memorandum de Entendimento sobre a Cooperacao Triangular para o Desenvolvimento da Agricultura das Savanas Tropicais em Moçambique. Maputo, Moçambique, 17 de Setembro de 2009.


OECD (2013), Triangular Cooperation: What’s the literature telling us? Literature review prepared by the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate.


Oshima, Kenzo (大嶋健介) (2012年)，「日本・ブラジル・モザンビーク三角協力による農業開発プログラムー ProSavana の三つの視点ー」、ARDEC 47号 Special Issue 海外農業投資と食料安全保障、2012年12月、Key Note 4。


ProSAVANA-PD (2012), ProSAVANA-PD Report on Data Collection and Analysis of Agriculture in the Nacala Corridor and Drawing of Overral Picture of the Development


Rowlands, Dane (2008). “Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance:


UNAC et al. (2013), Open letter from Mozambican civil society organisations and movements to the presidents of Mozambique and Brazil and the Prime Minister of Japan.

UNAC & ORAM (2013) “ProSAVANA e FACE OCULTA Do Prodecer” (video), available online at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jUKmyKf5E0k> (accessed on December 22, 2015).


Yoshida, Ken (吉田 憲) (2012年)、「ブラジル農業の三角協力でアフリカに参入」、JETRO：ジェトロセンサー 2012年9月号、56・57.
Annex I

Interview outline

General questions:
1) In the perspective of Japan/Brazil as a donor, what are challenges and opportunities of trilateral cooperation?

2) What are the most important elements for the selection of Triangular Cooperation partners in Japan's/Brazil's/Mozambique's point of view?

3) How would you compare the approaches of bilateral projects (Japan-Mozambique / Brazil-Mozambique) with that of Triangular Cooperation programs (such as ProSavana)?

Questions about ProSavana:
4) What were the origins of ProSavana?

5) In your view, what would be the main Brazilian contribution to ProSavana? And what would be the main contribution by Japan?

6) What is the division of labor between the three parties? How was it established?

7) Originally ProSavana was meant to cover 12 districts in the Nacala Corridor. Later though 7 new districts were added to the area to be covered by ProSavana-PD. Could you explain the context behind the target area expansion?

8) Many of the official ProSavana documents mention that the agricultural development in the Brazilian Cerrado is a relevant experience for the project. In your opinion, what are the main lessons to be learned from the Brazilian Cerrado experience?

9) How do you evaluate ProSavana's relationship with Mozambican civil society?