東京大学公共政策大学院 | GraSPP / Graduate School of Public Policy | The university of Tokyo

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2024年秋学期のソウル大学校への交換プログラム（半年間）を若干名、募集します。それに伴い、12月13日（水）のランチタイムに説明会を実施します。来年度以降の留学についての相談会も並行して実施するため、お気軽に参加してください。登録は不要です。みなさんの質問にお答えします。 日時：12月13日（水）12:20～12:55 場所：東京大学本郷キャンパス　国際学術総合研究棟12階演習室D　（地図） 問い合わせ先：東京大学公共政策大学院 CAMPUS Asiaプログラム担当 exchange.j””gs.mail.u-tokyo.ac.jp （””を@に置き換え）

Research background and purpose Who pays for investing in employee skills has been a debated question in labor economics for more than 50 years. It may seem that improving employees' skills can increase productivity and profits. Still, if employees improve their general-purpose skills, those skills can be used at other companies, encouraging them to change jobs, which reduces investment costs. Gary Becker, winner of the Nobel Prize in economics, pointed out that there is no payback. On the other hand, around 2000, Acemoglu and Pischke theoretically argued that changing jobs in the real labor market is not so easy, and there are frictions. Hence, companies have an opportunity to recover their investment costs. This argument has become widely accepted in academic circles as being consistent with the reality in countries around the world where companies invest in the skills of their employees at a cost. Still, no rigorous empirical analysis has been conducted. I couldn't come. In order to verify the theory, it is necessary to show that the productivity improvement realized by skill investment exceeds the wage increase. Still, it is necessary to quantitatively measure the improvement in employee productivity due to skill investment. Because it was difficult. Our research team solved this measurement problem using data from a company that dispatches IT engineers. This data records the fees this company receives from its clients and the wages it pays its employees. So, if you consider the fees it receives from clients as an indicator of employee productivity, the same data contains productivity and wage indicators. This is because it includes both. This research aims to use this unique data to estimate the impact of skill investment in employees on productivity and wages, and to calculate the rate of return on skill investment from a company's perspective. Summary of research results The companies that received the data are headquartered in the Kanto region, do business nationwide, and dispatch information and communications engineers to client companies. We employ employees from various backgrounds, including new graduates, those with no experience in the industry, and those with industry experience on open-ended contracts. We provide information and communication technology training for approximately two months to develop IT engineers. We are in the business of dispatching people to other countries and receiving a service fee. The content of the training is divided by course, such as a course to acquire the skills necessary to set up and maintain servers. A course to acquire the skills necessary to customize the resource management software used by companies is available. In the case of a server management course, we require employees to take an industry-standard skill certification before completing the training. The skills acquired through this training are general-purpose skills that can be used in various companies. Using panel data of approximately 2,000 employees from 2015 to 2020 provided by this company, we analyzed how skill investment affects productivity and wages. The results of the analysis are shown in Figure 1, and it is clear that as the training period increases, the fees received from clients increase, but wages do not necessarily increase. [caption id="attachment_44837" align="aligncenter" width="748"] Figure 1 Relationship between the number of months of training, initial assignment hourly rate (left panel), and hourly wage (right panel)[/caption] This suggests that while it is possible to increase employee productivity by investing in general-purpose skills, it is not necessary to increase wages. It is also possible that employees' skills will improve through practical experience when they are assigned to a client company. To clarify this aspect, we also analyzed how rates and wages change as employees gain work experience. [caption id="attachment_44837" align="aligncenter" width="384"] Figure 2 Relationship between the number of months since joining the company, the natural logarithmic value of fees, and the natural logarithmic value of wages[/caption] [caption id="attachment_44838" align="aligncenter" width="384"] The results of the analysis are shown in Figure 2, where the natural logarithm of the hourly rate increases from the fourth month after joining the company, while the natural logarithm of the hourly wage increases. It became clear that there was no increase for the first 15 months or so. Furthermore, after 15 months, it became clear that the growth rate of fees exceeded the growth rate of wages. This means that while improving skills through practical experience leads to higher hourly rates, it does not lead to an equivalent increase in wages. The analysis so far has shown that the cost of investing in employee skills is recovered from the difference between fees and wages. Still, it is important to note that employees' skills are general-purpose. It is also important to keep in mind that many people change jobs to other companies due to this. Analysis of the data shows that four years after joining the company, approximately 40% of the original number of employees remain. Some people quit, which means you may not recover the cost of your skills investment. Therefore, we calculated the expected profit value of an employee by multiplying the probability of the employee remaining with the company by the average price of fees and wages, depending on the number of months after joining the company. The company's profit is the sum of these expected profit values at each point in time, from the time the employee is hired to the future. However, future expected profits must be discounted using the interest rate to correct them to present values. From a company's perspective, let's calculate how profitable a project is to hire employees, train them, and recover the costs through the difference between fees and wages. In the field of finance, the internal rate of return is the rate of interest that makes the investment required for a project equal to the present value of the future profits that the project will generate. By making certain assumptions about costs other than wages and assuming a 5-year project period, the internal rate of return for this company's IT engineer dispatch business was calculated to be 18.9%. This internal rate of return changes as assumptions about cost structure and project duration change, but in any case, a relatively high internal rate of return was calculated. This finding supports the proposition proposed by Acemoglu and Pischke that in situations where there is friction in the labor market and the productivity improvement effect of general-purpose skill investment exceeds the wage increase effect; private companies will bear the cost of skill investment. This is the first study to be directly verified using actual data, and is valuable as an academic study of labor economics. Implications of the results for public policy and corporate management As of November 2023, there is growing interest in human capital management in Japan. The idea is to help companies develop the careers of their employees, increase company productivity, and appropriately distribute profits between companies and employees to achieve sustainable corporate growth. The concern at this time is that if a company makes such an investment in skills, employees will change jobs, and the company will not be able to obtain a return commensurate with the investment. This research shows explicitly that even when investing in information and communication technology skills, which are extremely versatile, it is possible to recover the cost through future profits, and there are cases where such concerns do not apply. It can be said that it shows that it exists. This company has a strong incentive to constantly update the training it provides its employees to meet the needs of its clients. This is because giving employees outdated training will not be appreciated by clients, and they will not be able to find a company to send their employees to. By combining the functions of vocational training and job introduction, it is a business model that solves the problem of mismatch between the content of training and the skills required in the labor market. This does not only apply to the temporary staffing companies studied. When private companies provide vocational training opportunities, there is always an incentive to determine whether the training content meets the needs of the times. Educational institutions, including school education, have an incentive to update their educational content because students will not attract students unless they find employment, but this creates a large time lag. Therefore, it may be necessary to consider dividing the teaching of content that does not require frequent updates at educational institutions, and private companies for content that requires frequent updates. Future research topics This research is limited to a case study of one company. Masayuki Morikawa has already researched how company-paid investment in employee skills affects company profits and employee wages, but further research is needed. Additionally, this data is unique in that it allows us to observe worker productivity indicators and wages at the same time. It is also necessary to use this data to advance research that elucidates the actual state of friction in the labor market. Research team Xinwei Dong (Assistant Professor, Huazhong University of Science and Technology) Dean R. Hyslop (Senior Fellow, Motu Economic and Public Policy Research) Daiji Kawaguchi (Professor, University of Tokyo) Paper information Xinwei Dong, Dean R. Hyslop, Daiji Kawaguchi (2023) Skill, Productivity and Wages: Direct Evidence from a Temporary Help Agency, forthcoming in Journal of Labor Economics.

The cardinal principle in international politics that “there are neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies, but only permanent interests” defines this type of diplomacy. The ongoing U.S.-China tensions entail a balancing act for the Philippines that needs to be pursued to maintain favorable relations with both powers while avoiding overdependence on either. Said act will be influenced by China’s territorial disputes and U.S. allies’ Free and Open Indo-Pacific in the wake of rising geopolitical tensions. The Philippines aims to enhance its strategic significance and maintain its rules-based system in the Indo-Pacific region despite challenges in maintaining an autonomous foreign policy. [caption id="attachment_44797" align="alignright" width="300"] Image by vector4stock on Freepik[/caption] Philippine President Ferdinand “Bongbong” R. Marcos Jr. emphasized the country’s pursuit of an “independent foreign policy” during his first State of the Nation address in July 2022. The Marcos Jr. administration seems more inclined to adopt a strategic hedge approach bolstered by “strong and multifaceted” partnerships while compartmentalizing its dealings with major powers. ASEAN’s intra-ASEAN trade has stagnated at 22-23% over the past two decades, mainly due to its shallow integration model, stricter rules of origin, and non-contained nature. ASEAN members must diversify external engagements to achieve economic cohesion, avoid relying solely on economic, security, or political incentives, reevaluate bilateral relations, and create a mechanism to disincentivize failure to reach a consensus. Given that U.S.-China strategic competition has shifted ASEAN’s approach, focusing on diversified unity, centrality, and inclusive development is necessary. The Philippines needs to strategize and maximize this approach while the competition shapes international affairs, leaving the future uncertain. In September 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden and President Marcos Jr. marked a significant step forward, affirming the U.S. “commitment to enhancing the Philippines” defense capability. In May 2023, they reiterated their commitment to remain “ironclad,” including in the disputed South China Sea. Prior, a U.S.-Philippines 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue was concluded with a joint statement committing to modernizing U.S.-Philippines cooperation and enhancing economic engagement and people-to-people ties focused on counterterrorism, humanitarian response, and interoperability with U.S. forces. This has crucial implications for the Philippines’ defense capabilities in response to natural disasters and maritime security threats. The statement also mentions how China is not complying with a legally binding international ruling from 2016, which determined China’s “nine-dash line” claims in the Spratly Islands were unlawful. These dialogues led to fast-track discussions on proposed U.S.-Philippines Bilateral Defense Guidelines. It is expected to cover policies on the recent expansion of the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), a bilateral agreement allowing extended deployments of U.S. troops and the construction of more facilities on existing military sites strategically located in the provinces of Cagayan, Zambales, Isabela, and Palawan. Economic cooperation was also discussed, including sending a trade and investment mission to Manila, specifically on the roll-out of 5G telecommunications technology, and launching public-private financing for critical minerals and “smart” power grid development. With the establishment of the updated EDCA sites, China’s foreign ministry stressed that this move was “uncalled for” and a need to rethink if there was an “increased U.S. military deployment in one country.” Therefore, Philippine-China relations are projected to worsen as the former aligns itself more closely with the U.S., jeopardizing China’s territorial sovereignty. However, President Marcos Jr. still wants to expand ties with China and acknowledges it as the country’s essential trade partner. Both countries signed 14 bilateral agreements covering sectors such as agriculture, infrastructure, development cooperation, maritime security, tourism, and information and communications technology. [caption id="attachment_44798" align="alignleft" width="300"] Image by vector4stock on Freepik[/caption] The Philippines, with its active involvement in regional economic agreements like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and International Production and Export Financing (IPEF), has expressed interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and manifests a recognition as a middle power supporting free trade principles. To fully benefit from these agreements, the Marcos Jr. administration needs to implement structural reforms, such as improving intellectual property rights enforcement, addressing anti-competitive practices, enhancing labor rights protection, promoting sustainable practices, strengthening transparency and anti-corruption measures, and increasing the utilization of the free trade agreements among local companies. Trade diversification opportunities can be capitalized on by exploring new markets and expanding trade relations with other Asian and Indo-Pacific neighbors. Japan, a key trading partner in the manufacturing and infrastructure development sectors, can help the Philippines address shared challenges and contribute to regional stability. To further aid the country in preparation for Chinese aggression against Taiwan and the South China Sea, discussions with Japan for an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement and a Visiting Forces Agreement to facilitate military interoperability, arms transfers, and the deployment of Japanese troops are moving ahead. Maintaining a flexible and independent foreign policy will be challenging in a zero-sum geostrategic situation, specifically when national interests are at risk. The current administration needs to effectively and efficiently allocate the country’s resources vis-à-vis the policy prioritization agenda and the long-term plan for an overall national development and security strategy. The question remains: Can the Marcos Jr. administration’s “independent foreign policy” be realized amidst the U.S.-China tension?   This student blogpost is originally written as an assignment for the course “Asia’s Geoeconomic Landscapes and Public Policy I” offered in the academic year 2023, representing the author’s personal views on the subject. The author was inspired and benefited from a discussion with her classmates, Prof. Shiro Armstrong from the Australian National University’s Crawford School of Public Policy, and Prof. Toshiro Nishizawa from GraSPP.

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2023年10月31日、東京大学公共政策大学院は、文部科学省と共に「キャンパス・アジアと国際教育政策」をテーマにセミナーを実施しました。本セミナーは鈴木寛教授の「事例研究（中央省庁における政策立案Ⅱ）」の講義と並行して行われ、多数の東大生に参加いただきました。また、本セミナーはオンライン併用のハイブリッド形式で開催され、オンラインからは40名を超える方々にご参加いただきました。 冒頭で鈴木寛教授により、文部科学副大臣時代にキャンパス・アジア（パイロットプログラム）におけるご経験などについてお話いただきました。その後、文部科学省の小林洋介参事官からは「高等教育の国際的な施策に関する最新動向及びこれまでのキャンパス・アジア」というタイトルで、これまでの文部科学省の取り組みに加え、キャンパス・アジアを含めた大学の国際展開力強化事業プログラムの概要についてご講演いただきました。高原明生教授からは現在の中国との緊張が高まる中で、実渡航を伴った学生間の交流が重要であることが指摘されました。 東大による試みについては、服部孝洋特任講師より、東京大学におけるキャンパス・アジアにおける取組や、中央省庁への訪問や政策担当者との交流など公共政策大学院の特徴を生かした教育事例について説明がありました。キャンパス・アジアプログラムに所属する原理央氏からは、文部科学省に所属しながら東大に進学した経緯に加え、ソウル大学校における留学の経験や意義などについて講演いただきました。

On November 4, 2023, Professor Toshiro Nishizawa presented his thoughts on “Institutions and Governance for Financing National Development: Japan’s Story” at the parallel session “Institutions and Governance from the Perspective of Modernization” during the Beijing Forum 2023 in Beijing.

Professor Nishizawa’s discussion on institutions and governance for financing national development focused on Japan’s two government-sponsored agencies, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), followed by a comparison with China’s two policy banks, China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (Chexim).

Professor Nishizawa drew implications for economic statecraft in his concluding remarks.

“A tradeoff exists between economic and geopolitical goals because the pursuit of geopolitical goals often involves economic costs typically paid by people. Such an outcome may contradict the government’s national development efforts to enhance people’s well-being. “Institutions and governance for financing national development should serve to find a balance between economic and geopolitical goals to minimize the risk of undermining national development efforts.

“Successful economic achievements change the role of economic statecraft and require updating of the prevailing institutions and governance frameworks.”

***

Beijing Forum is an international forum co-sponsored by Peking University, Beijing Municipal Commission of Education, and Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies, with annual events since 2004. The general theme of the Beijing Forum 2023 is “The Harmony of Civilizations and Prosperity for All—Inheritance and Mutual Learning.” Beijing Forum aims to promote the study of humanities and social sciences worldwide.

Please see here for the summary report in Chinese of the parallel session “Institutions and Governance from the Perspective of Modernization.” A translated excerpt from the summary report follows.

The political science parallel session “Institutions and Governance from the Perspective of Modernization” invited eight scholars from the University of Cambridge, the University of Michigan, the University of Queensland, the National University of Singapore, the University of Tokyo, as well as Fudan University, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and Peking University for their research presentations. The session was divided into morning and afternoon parts, hosted by Professor Zhang Changdong and Assistant Professor Ma Xiao from the Department of Political Science, School of Government of Peking University.

Professor Toshiro Nishizawa of the University of Tokyo’s Graduate School of Public Policy (GraSPP) presented his thoughts on “Institutions and Governance for Financing National Development: Japan’s Story.” The presentation focused on the two major government institutions in Japan, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), as examples to discuss the “Japanese model” of development and financing under changes in institutions and governance. The uniqueness of this model is that while having independence from the government, the two major institutions actively participate in financing initiatives advocated by the government and achieve a clear division of labor between economic and geopolitical goals. JBIC is dedicated to financing Japanese companies’ overseas businesses, and JICA promotes international cooperation in developing countries. This model has a particular reference significant for China’s financial system construction, that is, how to better balance economic and geopolitical goals.

Class on December 25 will be cancelled. Make-up class will be conducted on Tuesday, December 26, 6th period at the same classroom as usual.

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2023年10月18日、今学期開講中の実践科目「CAMPUS Asia Joint Course: Public Policy in Japan」（担当：服部孝洋特任講師）の一環で、経済産業省を訪問しました。本講義は、東京大学・北京大学・ソウル大学校・シンガポール国立大学の交流プログラム（キャンパスアジア・プラスプログラム）に所属する学生に向けた授業です。本講義は通常の東大生も履修可能であり、今期は多くの留学生や日本人の学生が履修し、多様なバックグラウンドを有する学生が交流する授業となりました。 経済産業省では、福島復興推進グループの宮崎高行室長補佐に、我が国における福島の復興政策や近年実施している政策について説明を伺いました。また、ショクバイ株式会社林志洋代表取締役による同時通訳や補足のサポートもありました。学生からは多数の質問があり、大変有意義であったというフィードバックを貰いました。