

**The Legacy of *Kokutai* (国体) as Political Theology:
Examining Schmittian Realism in the Age of 'Closure'.
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Abstract

The idea of “Political Theology”, as espoused in the work of Carl Schmitt, is one which, owing to both general taboos surrounding the study of Schmitt’s thought and to the complex historical-contextual nature of the concept in-particular, is ripe to receive increased attention within mainstream circles of International Relations (IR) scholarship. Likewise, contemporary IR discourses concerning Schmittian thought vis-à-vis the claimed “Realist Tradition” of International Political Thought often fail to discuss the possibility of his thought being a distinct and particular “Realist” framework in this aforementioned tradition, and also thereafter the resultant theoretical delineation of this framework’s essential elements. This Thesis, over the course of seven chapters, sets out to attempt this investigation into Schmittian International Political Thought as a distinct “Realist” theory of IR, highlighting the central and foundational importance of, among other elements, Political Theology to the particularity of what is here-termed “Schmittian Realism”. Moreover, in recognizing the methodological importance of a proper understanding of Political Theology within Schmittian Realism, the Thesis considers the notion of the supposed “Closure” of Political Theology within scholarly and political spheres with reference to the external case study of *Kokutai*, a concept central to the wider application of political-theological thought in Imperial Japanese history. Through comparative analysis of *Kokutai* Thought alongside the aforementioned elements of Schmittian Realism (Concrete Order, the Schmittian *Nomos*, and Political Theology), the meaning of “Closure” is revealed as a sort of intellectual-political myth; one which sets out a conceptual basis pre-empting specific historical actions against the political and theological ideas entailed within both frameworks studied, but does not and cannot ultimately account for their continued relevance and *legacy* in the contemporary era. With the legacy of *Kokutai* considered and examined against the supposed “Closure” of Political Theology, the Thesis finally proposes that Schmittian Realism, via its identified unifying conceptual element of *organicity*, be termed “Organic Realism” for further inclusion and discussion within the “Realist Tradition” of mainstream International Relations.

Keywords: Carl Schmitt, *Kokutai*, Political Theology, Closure, Realism, Imperial Japan.

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Chapter 1: Introductory Matters – Towards an investigation of “Closure”.

“For atheists, anarchists and positivist scientists, any political theology – like any political metaphysics – was scientifically brought to an end because, for them, any theology and metaphysics were brought to an end as sciences long ago. They use the phrase only polemically and derogatively... to express a total and categorical negation. But the joy of negating is a creative joy; it has the ability to produce from nothingness that which was negated, and therefore to create it dialectically.” (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 34).

The accepted status of academic International Relations (IR) as a so-called social science, contingent on the formation and assessment of testable hypotheses and of theories thereafter such hypotheses, somewhat belies the fact that “International Relations Theory” might be accurately described as a particular branch of political philosophy, substituting normative and historical analysis for the formal empirical methods that one might expect from a “scientific” discipline. Of course, whether or not IR theory actually is closer to philosophy than science is largely a matter of personal opinion, depending on the both the theories a particular student or scholar of IR may focus their research towards, and on which genealogies said students and scholars might subscribe to regarding the intellectual history of their aforementioned theoretical foci. All of this is to say, then, that the descriptive status and location of any particular IR theory might be similarly deemed as following from a twofold recognition of its constituent elements and meta-theoretical history as inherently *methodological* elements.

In the passage above, the German jurist and political thinker Carl Schmitt, writing the opening phrases of 1970’s *Political Theology II*, his final major work, seems to echo a similar sentiment with regard to his intellectual pet-project, that of so-called “Political Theology.” In fact, Schmitt’s caustic remarks towards those “atheists, anarchists, and positivist scientists” who he holds as having “negated” political theology are themselves emblematic of a traceable trend through his own scholarly history, for in one of his earliest works, 1922’s *Political Theology*, he similarly notes the polemical invocation of political theology within the argumentation of his positivist interlocutors (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 34; *Theology*, 38-39). However, while these two works bookending Schmitt’s academic career do certainly contain similar elements and phraseology (as one may expect from a text’s direct numbered sequel), their place *within* the Schmittian canon could not be more different when examined in historical context. While the 1922 text concerns the fundamental precepts of political theology within a rebuttal of Hans

Kelsen's legal positivism, with Schmitt famously stating that "All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts", its 1970 sequel directly responds to earlier claims of the negation or "Closure" of political theology within mainstream intellectual currents by the theologian Erik Peterson, critically and sarcastically deeming them "a beautiful myth" (Schmitt, *Theology*, 18, 36; *Theology II*, 31). That Schmitt dedicated his final major work to defending what is one of his most seminal contributions to modern political thought, through assessing the validity of Peterson's suggested terminal "closure of any political theology", therefore might be said to reinforce in-example the claims made here above that theory and meta-theory are ultimately crucial for the enactment of any genealogical method.

Of course, the discussion or pursuit of any genealogical method with regard to the study or analysis of Schmitt's writings is itself a complicated matter, especially in the realm of International Relations. This complexity results not merely from the inherent controversies and taboos surrounding Schmitt's role in the Third Reich and the Nazi Party, but also from the still-unsettled question as to his place within the history of International Relations thought, both generally and with reference to some of his specific ideas such as the aforementioned Political Theology. When we consider again that Schmitt's final work was dedicated to addressing the supposed final "Closure" of what is perhaps his ideational and theoretical hallmark, any resulting discussions of his legacy within academic IR might then thereby take on an additional challenge. Scholars of Schmittian thought must not merely assess the "Closure of Political Theology" as debated by Schmitt himself, but also further consider the idea's place and presence within the bounds of contemporary International Relations theory.

This thesis concerns the above challenges as its primary aims, a twofold task of firstly analyzing Schmitt's view of "Closure" in the context of his own work, and secondly thereafter considering its place within the broader debates of contemporary International Relations. Towards the pursuit of these tasks' attempted fulfillment, the thesis here launches an investigation which must necessarily consider Schmitt by his own words, alongside the considerations of secondary scholars and commentators. This ideational analysis is crucial for any proper and robust location of both Schmittian Political Theology, and for any discussions of its supposed "Closure" within the wider claimed-genealogies and traditions of IR's many theoretical approaches. That said, such purely ideational analysis, of theory *qua* theory, is also

insufficient for a truly thorough investigation of the sort proposed and enacted hereinabove. As Schmitt grounds his international political thought in the progression of historical trends, intellectual histories, and concrete political developments, any attempt at discussing the “Closure” of Political Theology would be remiss to not consider an independent, real-world case study in which such a “Closure” might be located.

Therefore, this thesis, upon the aforementioned foundation of a theoretical and ideational analysis of Schmittian thought vis-à-vis its particular topics of Political Theology and its debated Closure, further includes within its investigatory bounds a discussion of the history and legacy of Japanese *Kokutai* (国体) thought; a legal-political philosophy whose own forceful “Closure” in the late 1940s presents a striking case study by which Schmitt’s theory might be comparatively assessed. Through analyzing the legacy of *Kokutai* as an external instantiation of Political Theology and its respective claimed “Closure”, the thesis then can consider the resultant place of Schmittian international political thought, particularly termed here as “Schmittian Realism”, within a contemporary IR which might be said to itself reside within an “Age of Closure”.

1.1 – Structure and Methodology.

In introducing the investigatory project whose foundational questions are laid out above, this thesis will now further outline the details of its structure, methodological precepts, and specific restrictions of scope and style. Following this sub-chapter on the aforementioned three organizational matters, the remainder of chapter one presents a short literature review of existing scholarship regarding both Schmittian Realism and *Kokutai* thought, providing a useful academic background upon which further ideational, historical, and concrete political analysis can then occur. Following the conclusion of introductory matters, chapter two will extensively set out what this thesis considers to be an essential ideational outline of Schmittian Realism, through its foundational elements of the *Nomos*, Concrete Order Politics, and Political Theology, before briefly concluding remarks which began in the prior literature review on the place of Schmittian Realism within the broader “Realist tradition” of academic IR. Chapter three will then delve into a thorough examination of *Political Theology II*, and the relationship of its centrally-discussed concept, that of political-theological “Closure”, to the ideational assumptions of Schmittian Realism, as well as the real-world historical and academic-ideational developments which the theory’s texts discuss.

Chapter four, following on from the largely ideational analysis of the prior two chapters, will then move to examine the history, philosophical groundwork, and ultimate “Closure” of Japanese *Kokutai* (国体) thought, the political-theological theory of “National Body/National Structure” which served a predominant role in the organization of Imperial Japan from the Meiji-era to the enactment of the postwar Japanese constitution. Moreover, this chapter will also build upon scholarly remarks first considered in the introduction’s literature review, in the hope that additional context from secondary discussions might provide opportunities for discursive connections between the otherwise disparate topics of the ideational Schmittian Realism and the historical *Kokutai* tradition. With this case study isolation completed, chapter five will then move to consider the legacy of *Kokutai* alongside Schmittian Realism’s cornerstone concept of the *Nomos*, examining the former as an (external) concrete instantiation of the latter, and furthermore then as evidence for an enduring relevance of Schmittian thought within the wider Realist tradition, even in an “Age of Closure”. Moving on to meta-theoretical analysis, chapter six will argue for a particular rehabilitation of the political-theological ideas contained in both of the priorly-discussed topics, positioning them as useful insights for the introduction of a new descriptor, that of the *organic*, into contemporary discussions of IR Realism and claimed genealogies of Realism therewithin.

Finally, chapter seven will conclude by proposing a method for the inclusion of the legacy of *Kokutai* thought, as well as the Schmittian Realist principles it embodies, within mainstream Realist genealogies, ultimately representing a broader sort of “Organic Realism”, whose specificities and additional possible instantiations then remain open for further study and elucidation. Even in what is academically regarded as an “Age of Closure”, this thesis holds, in agreement with Schmitt himself, that any final negation of Political Theology is indeed a myth, whether in the historical case of Japan, or contemporary discourses of International Relations.

With this summary out of the way, several strictly formal methodological disclaimers must be made, for the sake of easier argumentation and analytical investigation thereafter. Firstly, this thesis will *not* take part in any debates surrounding the status of Carl Schmitt as a “Realist” thinker within the bounds of International Relations thought or theory. It will instead take it as a foundational heuristic (as this chapter’s literature review will soon establish) that Schmittian international political thought *is essentially Realist* in its fundamental ideational precepts.

Furthermore, and on a similar note, while the thesis heavily utilizes secondary sources in informing its analysis and resulting suppositions on the primary sources it examines, the thesis will first and foremost consider Schmitt's ideas, again, *qua* Schmitt himself; both *a priori* as ideas, and within their specific historical-ideational contexts. Such a methodological choice purposefully moves to distance the thesis from the litany of existing literature which regards Schmitt and his thought as warranting inherent and reflexive condemnation on the part of concerned students and scholars. While the history of an author and his ideas cannot be ignored or disregarded in-full, nor should they, it nonetheless remains the case that for a truly proper and philosophical investigation to take place, ideas must be treated as ideas, and Carl Schmitt must therefore be treated on his own grounding.

Thirdly, and on a more-functional level, this thesis, dealing overwhelmingly with primary sources originally written in German and Japanese, will be considering such sources through their English translations, and by-extension through secondary commentary and analysis of said translations and their original-tongued texts. This decision, owing to a lack of sufficient linguistic comprehension ability in both German and Japanese on the part of myself as the thesis author, is one which is ultimately regrettable, but nonetheless necessarily for the purposes of this thesis, written at this particular point in time. It is my sincerest hope that I will be able to later revisit these texts and their contained ideas once my skills with the two concerned languages have considerably improved, so that more well-rounded analysis might then occur, and therefore that the insights and arguments reached in this thesis might then be expanded upon.

Finally, a fourth methodological disclaimer must be made in limiting the essential scope of this thesis' investigation strictly to the primary texts of the two topics concerned, those being the Schmittian corpus, and the *Kokutai* texts of the Imperial Japanese era from the late-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. While I hope to one day expand the findings of this thesis to include other potential concrete instantiations of Schmittian Realism or Political Theology in particular, and likewise to consider additional elements of the Japanese case study besides that of merely *Kokutai* thought, for the sake of investigatory clarity and coherence within the bounds of the present thesis project, the aforementioned limitation of scope is resultantly necessary. As with the linguistic disclaimer before it, this final methodological restriction will

hopefully again be remedied at a future date, and the two together serve as motivation and incentive for the continuation of this thesis' aims even beyond the end of these pages.

1.2 – Literature Review.

Before this thesis begins its analysis proper of Schmittian Realism and the *Kokutai* case study, a brief literature review discussing trends and methodological turns across secondary literature concerning both topics must first be completed. Such a review, as previously noted in the sub-section prior, will not only help to further ground and justify the thesis' stated methodological foundations, but will further aid in locating any existing research and scholarship gaps which this project might hope to address in the course of investigation.

Firstly, concerning Carl Schmitt, even a cursory examination of existing literature reveals a common trend among scholars to identify the German thinker as *broadly realist* in his international political thought. However, this identification takes several forms, ranging from direct labeling, to more flexible approaches which tend to place Schmitt within broader boundaries of a realist historical tradition, or adjacent to specific realist thinkers within academic IR. With reference to this first form of identification, scholars including Bendersky, Colombo, Gyulai, and Hooker directly attach the label of “realist” to Schmitt as an international political thinker (Bendersky, 127, 140; Colombo, 22; Gyulai, 28; Hooker, 204-207). Concerning the second form, Brown, Paipais, Scheuerman, and Williams all note or discuss Schmitt's influence and academic relationship with Hans Morgenthau, a key figure in the history of IR as a scholarly discipline in-general, and realism as a formal theory of IR in-particular; this shared discussion thereby allowing this thesis to label their approach to Schmitt as placing him in a “Proto-Realist” analytical grouping (Brown, “Twilight”, 44-48; Paipais, 364-367; Scheuerman, 68-75; Williams, 637-648, 656-657).

Finally, a third locatable form of scholarly identification of Schmitt vis-à-vis IR realism is that of what this thesis will term “Realist-Adjacent Analyses”, those which, while again not explicitly utilizing the word “realist” in their *specific description* of Schmitt's international political thought, nonetheless clearly note the aforementioned adjacency of the German thinker's ideas alongside those normally found within mainstream conceptions of the so-called “realist tradition”. This category includes scholars such as Slomp, who notably states that Schmitt's particular concept of *Nomos* is an example of a concept which is both uniquely important and

uniquely *original* within Schmittian international political thought, and therefore “distances him from most realists” with consideration to the boundaries of the theory within academic IR (Slomp, “Hostility”, 125, 137). Likewise, the “Adjacent” category also includes scholars who do not utilize the word “realist” *whatsoever* with reference to Schmittian political ideas. Kervégan, one such of these scholars, acknowledges a focus on state centrism and an opposition to liberal internationalism and universalism (themselves both cornerstone concepts within realist orthodoxy) as extant within Schmitt’s international political writings on the concept of *Grossraum* in-particular, an acknowledgement which upon external consideration might then be said to locate him alongside mainstream realists by-proxy (Kervégan, 56-64).

Overall, then, with these three forms of identification considered, it is again clear on a macro-level of analysis that scholars of Carl Schmitt largely consider the thinker to be at-least *adjacent to*, or at-most *directly locatable within*, the so-called “realist tradition” within academic IR. While there are those who place Schmitt outside of the realist sphere entirely such as Cristi, who rather identifies him as an “authoritarian liberal” in a domestic (and by-extension furthermore international) sense, this domestic focus leads the thesis to methodologically consider such positions as fundamentally separate to the internationally concerned typology of realist identification outlined above (Cristi, 134, 170-172). This now-clarified broadly realist location of Schmittian international political thought will again, as outlined in the methodology sub-chapter prior to this literature review, be taken as a heuristic for further analysis and meta-theoretical discussion now and hereafter within the bounds of this thesis’ investigation.

Moving beyond the mere location of Schmittian international political thought, then, this review must now additionally note the particular *applications* of Schmitt’s ideas throughout the last century of their study and discussion within academic circles. While Schmittian thought initially influenced (as previously noted) thinkers such as Morgenthau, it also garnered substantial consideration and criticism from seminal right-wing or “conservative” thinkers such as Leo Strauss, whose notes on Schmitt’s *Concept of the Political* are among the most biting commentaries on the text during the contemporary lifetimes of the two respective authors (Meier, 24, 36). That being said, despite this early presence of Schmitt-concerned scholarship among historically seminal rightist thinkers such as Strauss, there is surprisingly, then, a shocking dearth of further *explicitly* “conservative” analysis and critique of Schmitt within mainstream

contemporary scholarship, especially in contrast to the emergence of a distinctly and explicitly locatable school of so-called “Left-Schmittians” within academic discourses. These Left-Schmittians, including most famously among them Mouffe and Agamben, have dominated the “Schmittian Revival” following the end of the Cold War and the advent of the twenty-first century, utilizing Schmittian ideas towards *critical analysis* of events such as the war on terror, and broader neoconservative interventionism (Hooker, 209-214; Chandler, 28, 32-26; Mouffe, 23, 33, 96; Agamben, 37-38, 186-187).

However, these left-applications of Schmittian thought should not immediately be connected to any prior discussion of the three-part realist identification typology discussed above, for as scholars such as Chandler note, these leftist/critical approaches are themselves perhaps *idealistic* readings of a thinker who can be said to be explicitly *concrete* (and thereby at least realist-adjacent) in applying his ideas (Chandler, 38-43). This thesis, while again not considering these discursive debates at the core of its investigatory methodology, does ultimately find such critiques of the Left-Schmittians appropriate and convincing, and will therefore attempt to analyze any case-study applications of Schmitt’s ideas via a framing accurate to that taken within the original texts, concrete and realistic, rather than idealistic and abstract.

Regarding Schmittian scholarship, then, this review’s short overview has served to reinforce and provide additional context to the methodological choices of the thesis it preempts. Moreover, with the purely theoretical side of this investigation’s subject matter considered, the sub-chapter’s focus must now turn to consider the case study side of the project’s scope, and therefore the various English-language texts on the topic of *Kokutai* thought.

Of course, this thesis’ aforementioned restraining of scope to only include English-language pieces and translations of *Kokutai*-related publications does substantially limit both the analytical and contextual outcomes possible in consideration of the topic. That being said, this limitation therefore informs the meaningful methodological choice on the part of the thesis to consider *Kokutai* as a specific historical case study, through which the prior theoretical discussions of Schmittian Realism might be given real-world consideration outside of their original European context. In this way, such restrictions of scope are not inherently regrettable, and while they and their effects on the broader project must be noted as above, they do not preclude similar discursive analyses surrounding academic discussions of *Kokutai* within

English-language academic circles, which this review will now conclude by (briefly) considering.

It is firstly worth mentioning that English-language publications which either directly or indirectly concern *Kokutai* seem to take a notably *historical* approach to their respective examinations of the subject. A wide list of academics including Oda, Takayanagi, Wakabayashi, Ikegami, Kitagawa, Keene, and Fridell all clearly locate their discussions and examinations of *Kokutai* within specific historical developments in and around the Japanese Empire and its political predecessors, rather than on a purely ideational level as *a priori* philosophy (Fridell; Ikegami; Keene and Seishisai; Kitagawa; Oda; Takayanagi; Wakabayashi). However, despite this clear trend towards historical analyses, there is an additional locatable grouping of *Kokutai*-concerned texts within the history of ideas, or even perhaps within a strictly philosophical/theoretical frame of study. Scholars including Ward, Shimizu, Kawamura, Wachutka, Anzai, and Kumada, while still discussing the topic within its relevant historical context, nonetheless produce analysis which itself seems more concerned with the consideration of ideas in and of themselves, as opposed to their roles within historical processes (Anzai; Kawamura; Kumada; Shimizu; Wachutka; Ward).

Now, it may seem arbitrary upon first glance for the present review to make this bifurcated distinction at all, to separate a long list of authors into two broad-but-overlapping categories along admittedly minor methodological lines. After all, when discussing a concept as historically constrained to a specific time period and regime as *Kokutai* is, there will inevitably be heavy overlap between political history and the history of political ideas, both in terms of the concept itself, and with reference to scholarly discussions thereof. However, this methodological distinction, as the thesis will go on to discuss in its fourth chapter, is in-fact *crucial* to its overall approach in linking the case study of *Kokutai* to theoretical discourses surrounding Schmitt's discussed "Closure" of Political Theology. When Wachutka discusses the fourteenth century origins of *Kokutai* in the writings of thinker and court official Chikafusa Kitabatake, he describes the Showa-era revival of the concept as a so-called "practically applied 'political theology'", drawing their ideational influence from Japan's distant past, towards practical instantiation in a decidedly modern nationalist project (Wachutka, 146). Here, we see in the second grouping a recognition of the essential differences between the concept of political theology in-general, and

any of its particular instantiations, *Kokutai* included. While still (necessarily) acknowledging the foundational historical contexts which the idea arose in, we might claim that for such “ideas-concerned” scholarship, the idea itself is separated from the history it informed on both terminological and definitional levels of analysis.

This approach, and more importantly the methodological value it lends to this thesis’ project, finds a (cooperative) counterpart in the aforementioned grouping here-termed as historically concerned *Kokutai* scholarship, which instead of separating an idea from the history it influenced, instead notes the role such an idea held *within* its historical context. For example, while Oda’s text on Japanese law never directly uses the term *Kokutai*, his discussion nonetheless describes the historical processes by which the Post-War Japanese Constitution legally enshrined the “Closure” of *Kokutai* as a particular instantiation of political theology, with the abolition of State Shinto serving as a historical endpoint of legal-religious interaction which had begun with the Meiji Constitution almost one century prior (Oda, 16-20). Likewise, Fridell describes the so-called “*Kokutai* Cult” as a political-theological structure explicitly confined to the State Shinto period, analyzing the concept as a particular ideational *regime* in its concrete historical instantiation, “reaching its culmination in the ultranationalistic period from the early 1930’s to 1945” (Fridell, 552-553). Such a methodological angle, which still clearly dealing with the overlap between idea and history, nonetheless might again be viewed separately from scholarship which primarily concerns the idea in itself, rather than the specific role it played on a concrete level of historically locatable political action. This latter approach reflects the idea primarily as something which has encountered ideational and historical “Closure” in the Schmittian-critical mould, whereas the former considers it, albeit only partially, as an idea which was itself instantiated. In one case study of the form necessarily precedes its impact on the matter, and in the other, matter informs analysis of the form.

Overall, then, this second half of the literature review has set out to give preliminary arrangement to some existing literature surrounding the history and legacy of *Kokutai* thought; locating two distinct-but-overlapping approaches to the topic, whose delineation here will again later serve to help elucidate the place of the case study in relation to the theoretical analysis which both precedes and surrounds it. Moreover, the specifically historical focus (whether informal or formal) essential to *Kokutai*-concerned literature renders it as a potentially fruitful

thematic match for the thesis' particular methodological approach to Schmittian Realism as a theory of International Relations based in the discussion of political theology *contra* "Closure". However, before the *Kokutai* case study can itself be examined alongside its project-respective theoretical framework, the framework itself, that of Schmittian Realism, must first be thoroughly outlined, analyzed, and critically assessed. Towards those specific tasks this introductory chapter is therefore finally concluded, so that the investigation proper of this thesis may now begin.

Chapter 2: A Theoretical Outline of Schmittian Realism.

This thesis contends that the international political thought of Carl Schmitt, when analyzed in-sum through its central texts and ideas, can not only be located within the broader “Realist” tradition of IR in-general, but is further identifiable as a particular and unique framework of Realist thought. This specific framework will henceforth be termed as “Schmittian Realism”, and it is the project of this chapter to provide a conceptual outline by which its three foundational concepts, Concrete Order Politics, the *Nomos*, and Political Theology, might be examined both with reference to each other, and to the wider claimed thought-system which they are here-proposed to form. In the process of elucidating the role that each of these individual concepts play in forming the broader framework content-wise, the ideational *context* of both the elements and the theory at large with reference to the mainstream claimed (and so-called) “Realist Tradition” can then be further considered. Finally, by first firmly establishing the foundations of Schmittian Realism independently, and then further moving to locate it within a particular (Schmitt-inclusive) proposed genealogy of larger IR Realism, the work which was briefly initiated in the prior chapter’s literature review will here be continued, allowing for Schmittian Realism’s contextual and discursive consideration vis-à-vis the aforementioned “Schmittian Revival” in academia.

The notion that Schmitt’s international political thought is broadly locatable within a generalized and so-called “Realist Tradition” is not itself especially controversial or even uncommon within mainstream IR scholarship, as this thesis’ literature review established in the previous chapter. However, what *is* uncommon is not the mere identification of Schmitt within some generalized and vague notion of “Realism” at large, but the further *specific* inclusion of his ideas within genealogies tracing the history of formal, academic IR Realism. Commonly-utilized textbooks of IR Theory, such as Jack Donnelly’s *Realism and International Relations* are especially easy-to-locate sources of such (non) commonality, as in the named example, the author fails to mention Schmitt throughout the entire text even once, much less placing him among the so-called “paradigmatic” thinkers of IR Realism; a list including both Schmitt’s influences (namely Hobbes) and those he deeply influenced (namely Morgenthau) in his own time (Donnelly, iii, 2). Of course, while noting that a singular textbook doesn’t include Schmitt in its particular reading of the claimed “Realist Tradition” does not itself entirely prove the

broad non-existence of a scholarly trend there-concerned, it does demonstrate a point to which this chapter (and the thesis more-generally) will return to at a later point: the “Closure” of Schmittian Realism in the past serves to highlight its present neglect from inclusion in mainstream genealogies of IR Realism overall. However, as was previously mentioned in the prior chapter’s literature review, any discussion proper of Schmittian Realism’s place in relation to mainstream academic discourse must follow the framework’s thorough outlining in its own right, and with that necessity in mind, this chapter can begin its main exegesis.

2.1 – Concrete Order.

It would be an understatement to say that the notion of “Concrete Order” is fundamental to any understanding of Schmittian Realism in-general, or to any understanding of its other most-important constituent elements such as the *Nomos* or Political Theology. Even when establishing his (in)famous definition of the *concept* of the political as the essential distinction between friend and enemy, Schmitt notes that the both the distinction itself, and the notion of “the political” which it further reveals ought “to be understood in their concrete and existential sense, not as metaphors or symbols” (Schmitt, *Concept*, 26-30). Where the defining distinction of “the political” as an independent ideational sphere is necessarily understood in concrete terms, this understanding results from the *unique* position of the participants in a political conflict to “correctly recognize, understand, and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case” (Schmitt, *Concept*, 27). In determining whether something or someone is a friend or an enemy, what matters, in Schmitt’s view, is the particular and specific *concrete* threat that actor may or not present to any given political actor, whether the potential enemy “intends to negate his opponent’s way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one’s own form of existence” (Schmitt, *Concept*, 27). Given that the Schmittian concept of the political, with its fundamentally life or death stakes and grounding, is essentially concrete in its mode of analysis, we might therefore assume that Schmittian *politics* are similarly concrete in their instantiation and practice.

However, one does not need to merely rely on such conceptual assumptions, as merely three pages following his original definition of the concept of the political, Schmitt goes on to directly address and lay out the essential concrete nature of political action itself, that “all political concepts... are focused on a specific conflict and are bound to a concrete situation”

(Schmitt, *Concept*, 30). This binding is so specific, in fact, that Schmitt further remarks how political concepts “turn into empty and ghostlike abstractions when this [specific concrete] situation disappears” (Schmitt, *Concepts*, 30). Basic political notions and ideas including the state, its entailed sovereignty, or its various organizational forms are themselves described by Schmitt as “incomprehensible if one does not know exactly who is to be affected, combated, refuted, or negated” in the expression of such ideas (Schmitt, *Concept*, 30). This specific state of combat which grounds such ideas, what Schmitt refers to as “concrete antagonism”, further informs the concrete, targeted means of their usage, conveyed in the maxim “all political concepts, images, and terms have a polemical meaning” (Schmitt, *Concept*, 30).

Given that the concrete antagonism that underlies the application of political ideas within the Schmittian framework is inherently targeted and again *polemical*, what thereby becomes revealed as crucially important to said framework’s precise workings is the political *decision*, and the concrete *decision-maker* himself therewithin. For Schmitt, the most important (and therefore defining) decision a political actor must make is that of “the exception”, for, at its most basic level “The decision on the exception is a decision in the true sense of the word...Because a general norm... can never encompass a total exception, the decision that a real exception exists cannot therefore be entirely derived from this norm” (Schmitt, *Theology*, 6). In defining the limits of decision-making itself, what separates the ordinary from the extraordinary on both the conceptual and practical levels, the decision-maker gains the utmost primacy as a specifically *political actor*. As Schmitt himself puts it, “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception” (Schmitt, *Theology*, 5). Moreover, the actual method by which a decision-making actor applies his political power differs greatly from government to government, but this reflection on difference itself also reinforces the inherent concreteness of the political decision. With reference to the specific construction of a state’s political organization, Schmitt writes that the method and/or technique for the actual exercise of political power varies “Depending on... concrete circumstances...” and that likewise following from different methods “a different construction emerges” (Schmitt, *Dictatorship*, 6).

In any case, it is evident that at the most fundamental levels of political organization, Schmittian thought holds the *concrete* as an essential factor by which the form, context, and method of political decision exists at all. Such concreteness is, of course, a natural assumption

for any theory which places such emphasis on antagonism as perhaps its primary form of external political consciousness. Schmitt himself notes just after defining the concept of the political, holding that the distinctional concepts of friend and enemy upon which concrete political decisions are made are conferred “real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing” (Schmitt, *Concept*, 33). At the most fundamental level, concrete (political) antagonism necessarily implies the existence and prevalence of life-or-death conflict. This, as Schmitt quickly points out, does not further reveal a belief that the *only* means of political decision is violent conflict, but merely suggests “an ever present possibility... which determines in a characteristic way human action... and thereby creates a specifically political behavior” (Schmitt, *Concept*, 34). This note on the place of conflict as an essential concrete possibility is an essentially *Realist* conception of political reality, for Schmitt does not assign any particular condemnation or praise to antagonism (enmity) at this fundamental level, but instead acknowledges it as a simple fact of life, a foundational element of political reality, so basic as to rest at the very definition of “the political” itself (Schmitt, *Concept*, 35).

Beyond its foundations discussed hereabove, the notion of the political decision as the key element of concrete political action serves a larger purpose as the cornerstone of Schmittian Realism’s first major conceptual instantiated aspect, that of “Concrete Order”. It is not enough that a Realist framework merely recognize the concrete nature of politics as a specific distinctional characterization, for it must further describe the manner by which such distinctions instantiate themselves into recognizable political *organizations*. In the case of Schmittian thought, the sort of political organization of overwhelming concern is that of the state, the sovereign state in-particular, with the sovereign decision-maker (often discussed via the case of the historical and conceptual dictator) serving as its loci of political action-power. In a specifically IR-concerned context, this point of state-centrism again serves to help reader locate Schmittian Realism as specifically Realist in orientation, as scholars such as Kervégan note Schmitt’s focus on the state’s “monopoly on politics and the political” even in his early writings (Kervégan, 56).

It is worth mentioning here that Schmittian Realism does not *necessitate* the existence of a dictator, as it again assumes foundationally that the concrete constructions of any particular state system will differ in due to their likewise concrete circumstances, and this extends, of

course, to the specific form of the decisionistic political executive. That being said, however, Schmitt himself, at least in one of his earliest writings, 1921's *Dictatorship*, does still suggest the existence of an "orientation towards dictatorship... at the origins of the modern state" (Schmitt, *Dictatorship*, 9).

Schmitt holds that the state, specifically when governed by a dictator as its decisionistic actor, is uniquely able to achieve political *goals* in an executive manner, further labeling such execution as the driver of specifically *concrete* outcomes; "only the goal governs... determined by the need to create a concrete situation" (Schmitt, *Dictatorship*, 8). The decisionism of a political actor and the state he governs, both in terms of outcomes and methods, is necessarily and essentially concrete, and this overall decisionistic structure, therefore, is what this thesis deems "Concrete Order"; borrowed from Schmitt directly, the "concrete means of achieving a concrete goal" (Schmitt, *Dictatorship*, 8). The "Order" in Concrete Order is not merely the construction of a particular political organization, but is further the *action* of "ordering" itself. In a complimentary manner of definition, the foundational and continuative political ordering of a state is necessarily concrete, and the concrete construction of a state underlies its status as a sovereign, decisionistic order.

More insight into this aforementioned complementarity of Concrete Order comes from Schmitt's discussion of *Konkretes Ordnungsdenken* (Concrete Order *Thinking*) in his 1934 work "On The Three Types of Juristic Thought", where Schmitt expresses his belief in the superiority of "conceptually realistic" law and legal thought, holding such a realistic posture as representing "genuine juristic thought" (Schmitt, *Three*, 44). Schmitt's consideration of legal and juristic *thought* in this text follows smoothly into his consideration thereafter of legal and juristic actions by political actors and decision-makers, the results of which are his establishment of a typology of *Recht* (law) in then-contemporary Germany, consisting in *Recht* as either norm, decision, or (concrete) order (Schmitt, *Three*, 43). Much like Schmitt affirmed his preference for a realistic juristic thought, he similarly shows his praises for the third portion of the *Recht*-typology over its competitors, specifically connecting the Concrete Order *Recht* and therefore Concrete Order Thinking with his prior-praised thought processes via their grounding in suprapersonal political reality (Schmitt, *Three*, 48-49). Whereas normative thinking and legal normativism are impersonal and abstract, concrete order (and decisionistic) law/legal thought are instead

suprapersonal and personal (respectively), and likewise *realistic* in their foundation, a distinction which once made reveals Schmitt's particular disdain for abstract normativism in-general, which he views as a corrupting *foreign* force, ill-suited and disruptive for use with reference to "the concrete reality of intrinsic German problems" (Schmitt, *Three*, 43-46, 75-76, 89-95).

Following from the statement considered at the close of the previous paragraph, Schmitt's expressed disdain here for normative legal and juristic thought further reveals that, when readers examine his expressed threefold typology of *Recht*, the text (and moreover, its author) seem to imply an inherent separation in conceptual *essence* between normative thought on one hand, and decisionist and concrete-order thought on the other. This claim to an implied 2:1 separation lies mostly in an interpretation of Schmitt's assertion that "For concrete-order thinking, 'order' is also juristically not primarily 'rule' or a summation of rules, but conversely, rule is only a component and a medium of order" (Schmitt, *Three*, 48). This assertion serves to place the ideational notion of "order" itself as a particular conception of *Recht* under general concrete circumstances, that is to say, again at the suprapersonal level of analysis, as previously mentioned (Schmitt, *Three*, 48-49). It must be stressed here that this suprapersonality is essentially *organic* in its origination and execution, predicated upon "recognizable concrete figures growing out of the order of the concrete 'conditions'": it is inherently tied to the group-level (whether in the family, the community, the court, or the state) existence of specific peoples in specific places, rather than general norms of assumed interactions between any given people (Schmitt, *Three*, 51-54, 55). While Schmitt himself does not use the word "organic" in these concerned passages, his aforementioned contention regarding the "concrete reality" of German legal thought prior to the introduction of abstract normativism indicates that he views concrete-order thinking as the *essential* and perhaps original mode of legal thinking amongst the German peoples (Schmitt, *Three*, 45).

Where Schmitt holds that "Various peoples... are associated with various types of thought" he likewise follows that "There are peoples that, without territory, without a state, and without a church, exist only in 'law'", and then finally asserts that the Germans are not such a people, instead possessing a "through-and-through concrete-order thinking" which was only later "displaced" by the introduction of foreign *normative* legal ideas after the end of the Middle Ages (Schmitt, *Three*, 45). To locate in these words an implication of essentiality, or, to modify an

earlier-used term, *organicity*, is also possible beyond this specific German example, though. Schmitt contends as a maxim that “It is inherent of the nature of the thing, that... Every form of political life stands in direct, mutual relationship with the specific mode of thought and argumentation of legal life”, and in said maxim provides an *absolute* placement of the legal alongside the political (Schmitt, *Three*, 45). This placement is crucially important for any discussion of *organicity* within Schmittian legal-political thinking, as it helps to further clarify and add meaning to Schmitt’s own concept of the political, and his interpretations of the concept of law and order in *Recht* thereafter. Recalling *The Concept of the Political* itself, Schmitt famously begins that text by stating that “The concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political”, and moreover that “the state is a specific entity of a people”, and among such entities, “it is in the decisive case the ultimate authority” (Schmitt, *Concept*, 19-20). This conferral of authority to the state, as a specific and particular entity to a specific and particular people, not only allows us to again locate the Schmittian view of the state as essentially *concrete*, but further therefore ties such a view to the aforementioned discussion of the intrinsically-linked political and legal *thoughts* of said peoples and their states; concrete-order thinking is the natural and original outgrowth of the concrete political organization of a given state and people.

But it is the additional point on the state as the *decisive ultimate authority* which reveals, finally, the similarity in orientation (at least as opposed to normative legal thought) between the concrete-order and decisionist models of thinking, for as previously mentioned, Schmitt holds the political *decision* as the key element in the location of the friend-enemy distinction between states and peoples, and therefore in the location of the concept of the political itself (Schmitt, *Concept*, 19-20, 25-27). Schmitt defines a decision, on the ideational level, as an “act of will” which itself “creates *Recht* initially”, based further on “the authority or sovereignty of an ultimate decision with which the command is given”, with said authority historically exemplified here via the examples of the Christian God, the Pope, or the Hobbesian Sovereign as absolute decision makers (Schmitt, *Three*, 59-62). In any case, however, Schmittian thought holds the sovereign decision itself as essentially arising out of “concrete disorder”, from the very life-or-death conflicts and decisions which not only necessitate the sovereign to make political decisions in a state of war (recalling *Dictatorship*), but thereby instantiate the concept of the political via its entailed friend-enemy distinction in times of existential threat (Schmitt, *Three*, 62; *Concept*, 26-30, 33-35; *Dictatorship*, 6). While this is not to say that decisionistic and concrete-order

thinking are identical, readers can and perhaps should imply from Schmitt's statements here that any given concrete-order, in the process of its organic political formulation and legal organization, will have necessarily at some point of origination contained a moment of sovereign decisionism as exercised by an absolute, perhaps dictatorial figure. This analysis is supported by Schmitt's own remark that the sovereign decision springs not only from concrete disorder in the real (and existentially positive) sense, but also in a negatory sense from "the normative nothing" (Schmitt, *Three*, 62). The sovereign's *personal* decision allows for the organic outgrowth of the concrete, but also exists precisely relative to the *specific negation and therefore non-existence* of any specific normative thinking prior to a state, people, or legal institution's original political organization: "*Recht*, which is... above all, order", invokes "Concepts like king, master... or governor... concrete institutional orders that are no longer mere *rules*" (Schmitt, *Three*, 50). The *suprapersonal* concrete order presupposes the *personal* decision and its respective decision maker, for the political group must first exist and define itself opposite an enemy in order for political action to be taken in its existential defense (Schmitt, *Concept*, 27-28).

This distinction, regarding the relation between suprapersonal and personal forms of political ordering, rests at the heart of "Concrete Order" as a keystone for Schmittian Realism as a theoretical approach to international relations overall, but it is on this mention of the wider discipline of IR that the thesis must discuss one further element of "Concrete Order" in detail for the purposes of this chapter, that being the *international* ramifications of the concept itself. Of course, as a theoretical approach to international relations, Schmittian Realism (as particularly defined and located within the analysis of this thesis), necessarily concerns itself with the function of international politics. However, such a concern must therefore essentially establish the difference between the functioning of politics at the aforementioned international level of analysis with that at the domestic level. This chapter has thus-far considered "Concrete Order" specifically as Schmitt discusses it with reference to domestic political order, but it is in-fact in the recently mentioned distinction between the personal and the suprapersonal that readers might glean insight into Schmittian Realism's conception of the *concrete* in international relations. As previously noted, Schmitt ultimately locates the finality of any political decision (made within political reality, rather than in an abstracted sense, recalling the concept of the political) in the sovereign *decisionistic* actor, but this decision is that to do with existential violence, which on the scale of international politics for Schmitt takes the form of *war* (Schmitt, *Concept*, 19, 33-37,

45; *Three*, 48-62). Therefore, again recalling the personal-suprapersonal distinction of concrete order and decision, the final decision on matters of war is essentially an *international* decision, but one which relies, just as is the case vis-à-vis matters of domestic political violence, on a fundamental *concrete* disorder within the realm of international relations (Schmitt, *Three*, 62).

On this topic of concrete disorder, a clarification must now be briefly made regarding the interaction between decisionistic and concrete political orders, so as not to confuse earlier-made remarks with more-recent ones. When Schmitt discusses the political decision vis-à-vis the international threat of war upon a state, he does so via direct reference to Hobbesian thought; noting that, in his view, Hobbes held that “the deciding sovereign surely does not have jurisdiction for the decision on the basis of an already-established order... it is the decision that replaces the condition of disorder... with the order and security of the stately condition that makes him the sovereign and makes everything else possible, including law and order” (Schmitt, *Three*, 62). At first glance, one might take this Hobbesian analysis as evidence that Schmitt held to a method of “pure decisionism” with reference to international threats of war, that decisionistic order cannot arise from concrete order, a claim directly in conflict with those reached in previous paragraphs above. However, upon closer examination, readers will find that this is not what Schmitt says in-full, with the German rather stating that the sovereign decision in a Hobbesian sense refers to an *absolute beginning*, “the deepest desperate disorder” occurring before any proper organization of conflicting peoples into stately organization (Schmitt, *Three*, 62). To put it simply, while pure decision might, following Hobbes, be the origination point of any political order, it is not the origination point of *particular* political actors within the era of existing concrete orders which Schmitt concerns his ideas, again recalling his intentions to deal with political realities in a concrete and particular sense (Schmitt, *Three*, 62; *Concept*, 27).

Applied back again, then, to Concrete Order as a distinct element of Schmittian IR Realism, readers might note that the aforementioned particularity of concrete orders infers Schmitt’s arrangement of juristic-legal origins in the realm of international politics: the domestic political order is thoroughly concrete and *suprapersonal*, but on the international level, it is the final, absolute, and definitionally *personal* sovereign decision which necessary holds ideational primacy within the framework (Schmitt, *Three*, 48-50, 55-61; *Concept*, 19, 26-28, 35). With this inferred view of the specific arrangement of legal-political organization within Schmittian

Realism proposed, then, this subchapter can conclude by saying of “Concrete Order” that its fundamentality to the framework at-large again rests in the specifically concrete and thereafter *real* focus it places at the origin of political relations. While this order is subordinate to personal (rather than suprapersonal) politics at the international level (owing to the essential decisionistic and existential qualities of war between states), it is nonetheless concrete at its very basis.

2.2 – The Schmittian *Nomos*.

While Concrete Order may have been the conceptual bedrock of Schmittian Realism, it is undeniable that, as a theoretical approach to international relations, the ideational core of the framework is that of the *Nomos*, which Schmitt uses both in conceptual and concrete terms to outline the means by which states exist and interact as political agents. As this subchapter will now discuss, the Schmittian *Nomos* is simultaneously simple and complex as a political concept, and in examining its definition, instantiations, and moral-political implications, this duality in complexity will ultimately be revealed as highlighting the aforementioned core importance of the term to Schmittian Realism more-broadly.

Within the Schmittian canon, so to speak, the work which outlines and discusses the notion of *Nomos* more than any other is arguably also its author’s magnum opus, 1950’s *The Nomos of the Earth*. While Schmitt does discuss the *Nomos* with reference to wider conceptions of law and *Recht* in the essay examined in the prior subchapter, it is in *Nomos of the Earth*, as its title might suggest, that the term is fully elucidated and defined as a robust political and further *moral* concept, especially with reference to its role here considered as a vehicle for Schmittian Realism in IR (Schmitt, *Three*, 50-51). This definition begins with Schmitt ascribing his particular conception of the word an inherently *spatial* dimension, when he defines its meaning going back to ancient Greek times as the “first measure of all subsequent measures” (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 67). The definitional tie to Ancient Greece is not merely linguistic, however, as the term “*Nomos*” in-fact has a history in political writings likewise tracing back to the writings of both Plato and Aristotle, whose invocations of the word-concept Schmitt uses to negatively and positively (respectively) relate the evolution of *Nomos* with specific reference to its inherent and essential spatial character (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 67-69).

Beyond its origins, Schmitt defines *Nomos* as “the fundamental process involved in the relation between order and orientation”, that is, the arrangement of people into a specific place in

the creation of a spatial (political) entity (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 67). In the context of Schmittian Realism as a theoretical approach to international relations, the sort of entity in question here is principally that of the state as a concrete political unit. However, since *Nomos* again reflects an organizational *process* in-particular, it likewise definitionally includes modes of political organization larger than that of the sovereign state in the Westphalian mould, namely the *Großraum* (translated as “great space” or “great order” from German), or as Schmitt defines it, a “sphere of international law” larger in scale than that of a traditional state entity (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 231; *Grossraum*, 77-80). In some sense, this typology of different sorts of *Nomos* (plural “*Nomoi*”), represents the first link between the concept itself and that discussed in the subchapter prior, Concrete Order, for Schmitt notes that in the organization of any given *Nomos*, “measure, order and form constitute a spatially concrete unity” (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 70). This is not to say that the *Nomos* is a solely concrete mode of political organization, however, as near after the quote referenced in the previous sentence, Schmitt states that *Nomoi*, as boundaries akin to walls in the spatial-concrete sense (in their organization of specific appropriations of land and people) also contain a further theological dimension, for any given *Nomos* is “based on sacred orientations” (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 70).

Of course, beyond this essential spatial and further theological dimension, the Schmittian conception of *Nomos* finally contains a practical and concrete-legal dimension, once more tied back to Ancient Greek (specifically again Platonistic and Aristotelian) views of the term delineating the notion of rulership, “the metamorphosis of *is* into *ought*, of actuality into law”, and therefore by-extension the exercise of concrete legal-political power through personal *decision* (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 72-73). Recalling again that the Schmittian *Nomos* is an organizational process, the aforementioned concrete-legal dimension detailed in the previous sentence further demonstrates how the concept more-broadly works as a *vehicle* for Schmittian Realism as a particular Realist framework within International Relations thought. If a Concrete Order (specifically that of the sovereign state) is the essential *unit* of Schmittian Realism, then the *Nomos* is the conceptual vehicle by which the organization and place of that unit is explained within the wider realm of international politics.

To give an example of this dynamic from Schmitt himself, the thinker names the so-called “*Jus Publicum Europaeum*” (JPE), specifically defined as “the traditional Eurocentric

order of international law” lasting from the European discovery and colonization of the Americas to the end of the First World War, and characterized primarily by the “limiting and bracketing of European wars” under what Schmitt deems “conventional enmity” between conflicting states (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 39, 83, 140-148, 239, 351-355; *Partisan*, 11). However, this limiting was not akin to “international law” in the contemporary normative sense, but was rather the exercise of a delineative principle (according to Schmitt) through the bounding of enmity within European civilization (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 141). More specifically, the competition between European powers within the shifting boundaries of their colonial holdings allowed for the *exportation* of existential or “real” enmity to instantiation within said colonies, while wars within Europe could then remain comparatively “controlled and bracketed” (Schmitt, *Partisan*, 11; *Nomos*, 141). Therefore, given the *JPE*’s inherent “bracketing” of Europe from the “terror and counter-terror” of existential enmity in war, it should come as no surprise that Schmitt holds that the downfall of this particular *Nomos* began with the inclusion of non-European states (namely the United States of America and Japan) into the category of “Great Powers” during the nineteenth century, before the structure completely collapsed with the claimed triumph of a universal and abstract liberal international law following World War One (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 152, 165-166, 217, 237-241, 299, 305-307; *Partisan*, 11; Slomp, “Partisan”, 507-510).

Moreover, where the *JPE* was an essentially and specifically European *Nomos* as an organization of individual Concrete Order units within a spatial bounding, Schmitt here again identifies its first challenge from a rival *Nomos* in the Monroe Doctrine of the United States, itself being a *Großraum* order (*Nomos*) of the Western Hemisphere, which directly stood against European spatial claims to an isolated bracket of peer conflict and competition on European terms (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 217, 237-241; *Grossraum*, 77-80, 101, Luoma-Aho, 37-40). When the open spaces of the Western Hemisphere were constrained by the United States’ new *Großraum Nomos*, the *JPE*’s challenged unrestricted European recognition and expansion, and the aforementioned exportation of enmity central to its function, were thereby fundamentally curtailed, forming the first cracks which would eventually lead to the shattering of the old European *Nomos* (the *JPE* itself) during the explosion of inter-European enmity during World War One (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 217, 237-240). Furthermore, Schmitt claims that it was at the conclusion of World War One where Woodrow Wilson’s American liberal-international (and more-importantly *universal*) conception of international politics and law was imposed onto the

ruins of the priorly-Concrete *JPE*, thereby eliminating the founding Eurocentric spatial ordering which underpinned the *JPE* as a particular *Nomos* of the (old) European world order (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 296-207).

What is especially important here to note is that where Schmittian Realism is again a fundamentally Realist framework, its focus on political *reality* in the concrete sense is crucial to any examination of its view of *Nomos* as a concept, for the Schmittian (Realist) *Nomos* is essentially *organic* in its concreteness of population and scale. Just as the Concrete Orders of Europe produced the *JPE*, the Concrete Order of the United States produced the differently ordered *Nomos* of the Monroe Doctrine *Großraum*, and likewise to them both (as this thesis will come to discuss in detail in its fourth chapter) so later did the Japanese in East Asia, something unthinkable to European Great Powers during the mid-nineteenth century (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 217). If the specificities of a particular *Nomos* originate from the concrete realities of its spatial and populational foundations, then the *Nomos* itself can be said to again serve as a conceptual vehicle for what are essentially concrete concepts of political reality: the Schmittian *Nomos* is a “Realist” conception of the ways by which Concrete Order states participate(d) in international relations. Of course, the inherent *realism* of the Schmittian *Nomos* is not wholly bound-up in this organic particularity of the origins of any of its given instantiations, for the concept contains (as previously mentioned) further *moral-theological* dimensions which imbue it with again *realist* characteristics as an element of a framework for analyzing international relations in theory and in practice. However, in order to properly analyze these dimensions, this subchapter will now give way to its successor, for the moral-theological aspects of the Schmittian *Nomos* (and Schmittian Realism as a whole thereafter) are only properly understood with reference to the broader notion of Political Theology within Schmitt’s political thought, the third and final essential element of this chapter’s concerned topic.

2.3 – Political Theology, and the Three Elements then in-tandem.

In one of his earliest and most-important works, 1922’s *Political Theology*, Carl Schmitt famous states that “All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts”, placing at the very foundations of his political thought the idea that any given political concept or order-*Recht* (and therefore *Nomos*) thereafter finds its origins in

theological and religious ideation; an organic extension of order from the abstract and eternal to the grounded and concrete law (Schmitt, *Theology*, 37). For Schmitt in-particular, concerning himself and his work with European legal and political thought, the specific theology which principally informed his views on so-called “Political Theology” (that being the aforementioned relationship between political and theological concepts within concrete political reality) was that of the Catholic Church, with the thinker even dedicating an entire book, entitled *Roman Catholicism and Political Form* to a political-theological analysis of his own faith tradition (Schmitt, *Catholicism*, 8-11, 14). In application alongside those other two essential elements of his Realist thought discussed thus far in this chapter, Concrete Order and the *Nomos*, Schmitt’s views on Catholic political theology underpin and complete his outline of the *JPE* as a distinctly European (and moreover distinctly *Christian/Catholic* international order).

Evidence of this underpinning comes to readers from Schmitt’s remarks that the Catholic Church during the medieval era and thereafter operated as a theological “constituted organism” wherein God’s moral authority acted through the specific human vicar-actor of the Pope; an organism that would in the post-medieval world of the *JPE* become secularized into the more-modern notions of state sovereignty and the decisionistic moral-political authority of the personal sovereign himself (Schmitt, *Dictatorship*, 112; Minca and Rowan, 274). Moreover, even more foundationally than international-level orders such as the *JPE* or other such *Nomoi*, Schmitt contends that prior to any notion of the concrete state (on an existential and conceptual level) there exists the so-called “ethic of state”, a meta-political reframing of the foundational and absolute role of the sovereign decision and decision-maker (recalling Concrete Order and its origins) wherein the state “determines the concrete situation in which moral norms can be... valid” (Schmitt, “Ethic”, 195-199; Pan, 66). This fundamentality in Schmitt’s delineation of the “ethic of state” here is parallel to his description of the political (and therefore-derived theological) power of Catholicism, which “rests neither on economic nor on military means but rather on the absolute realization of authority”, an authority which “the Person of Christ Himself: God become man in historical reality... Therein lies its superiority” (Schmitt, *Catholicism*, 19). On both the state and the international level of political order, Schmittian thought clearly locates the origination of political concepts of sovereignty, decisionistic, and further concrete ordering (paralleled via the aforementioned incarnation of Christ, in the Christian-Catholic case) in prior theological conceptions and authorities.

Of course, this is not to say that any broader identified framework of “Schmittian Realism” as is examined in this thesis is necessarily only applicable to Christian cases, or is solely adaptable to Christian thought and belief. While Schmitt and his work clearly held to these case-restrictions, readers in the contemporary period can operate off of the German thinker’s maxim again that *all* important political concepts in modernity are secularized from prior theological instance-parallels, thereafter applying the theory’s entailed view of the moral-political relationship to non-Christian (and likewise non-European and/or non-Catholic) case studies in either a comparative or an *a priori* ideational manner. That being said, readers and scholars looking to attempt such analysis must be careful in their course of their investigations not to apply Christian metaphysical precepts of authority and order to non-Christian theological-political systems, as to avoid the misattribution of concepts across religious and civilizational lines.

Overall, though, on this most basic level the notion of “Political Theology” found within the Schmittian canon serves as an explanatory lens by which the other two elements within what this thesis identifies as Schmittian Realism achieve moral-political alignment on both the conceptual and concrete levels. In *Concept of the Political*, Schmitt outlines a theory of independent distinction-spheres, wherein the “various relatively independent endeavors of human thought and action” including economics, morals and ethics, and aesthetics, can be separated from one another into independent conceptual spheres by their own respective distinctions, “between good and evil... beautiful and ugly” and so forth thereafter (Schmitt, *Concept*, 25-26). With this theory in mind, then, Concrete Order and the Schmittian *Nomos*, when viewed through and alongside the foundational lens of Political Theology, can again acquire positions with reference to both the moral and political conceptual spheres, as well as those spheres’ concrete instantiations in human action, whether that be the international management of enmity and territory in a given *Nomos*, or the specific ethical considerations of the sovereign political decision-maker during the foundation of a concrete order system (and its constituent “ethic of state”) on the domestic level.

With all three essential core elements of Schmittian Realism here outlined, this chapter can finally answer the question as to what exactly the identified approach actually is beyond its name. Schmittian Realism is a particular theoretical approach to International Relations wherein

the organization and subsequent conflicts of international political order are analyzed via a specific view of *political reality*, one based in the *organic* interplay of Concrete and Decisionistic political order, the particular arrangement of state orders into internationally-active *Nomoi*, and the contextual consideration of this concrete political reality via the essential and foundational lens of Political Theology. This definition again proposes Schmittian Realism as a distinct and *particular* form of IR Realism from those theories and theoretical approaches commonly discussed in mainstream scholarship, such as Classical Realism or NeoRealism, identifying Schmitt's specific contributions to the approach (those three elements outlined above) as distinct and unique enough to justify the location of a new and separate form of Realism outside of existing genealogies.

Moreover, Schmittian Realism, in terms of its historical context, is placed roughly adjacent to the Classical Realism of Hans Morgenthau as outlined in 1948's *Politics Among Nations*, a placement based on the fundamental location of Schmittian Realism's core concepts (as an approach again concerned with IR) within 1950's *The Nomos of the Earth*. Of course, Schmittian Realism shares more in-common with Morgenthauian Classical Realism than merely the publication dates of its here-identified seminal text. Notably among these is its view of human nature (and international political reality, resultantly) as essentially evil and wicked, a view which Schmitt describes as a necessary requirement for any "genuine" political theory to include, and one held in-common with Morgenthau's focus on the universality of human evil in the world (Schmitt, *Concept*, 58-65; Morgenthau, *Scientific*, 191-195; *Politics*, 31; Rengger, 124-125). Additionally, as attested to by scholars such as William Scheuerman, both Morgenthau and Schmitt greatly influenced one-another's political writings over the years, with Morgenthau influenced by Schmitt's critiques of international liberalism, and Schmitt influenced by Morgenthau's critique of Schmitt's own early editions of *Concept of the Political* to the extent of editing later versions with such critiques in-mind (Scheuerman, 63-64).

However, this thesis, as previously stated, does not simply label Schmitt's international political thought as an offshoot or adjacent form of Classical Realism in the Morgenthauian mould, for its explicit focus on Political Theology and moreover its extensive usage of specific Schmittian concepts such as *Nomos*, ultimately separates the framework from its contemporaries on the level of essential conceptual foundations. As previously noted in chapter one, the notion

that distinctive elements of Schmittian international political thought are unique from other IR “Realists” is itself not original, with scholars such as Gabriella Slomp in particular again noting the importance of *Nomos* as perhaps the distinctive concept separating Schmitt from other IR Realists (Slomp, “Hostility”, 125, 137). However, this thesis does not merely assert that there are certain elements of Schmitt’s international political thought which are distinctive (relative to the rest of IR’s claimed Realist tradition), but again seeks to locate and further *label* such thought in a combined and general manner as a particular and unique framework, that of “Schmittian Realism” which this chapter has just roughly outlined.

It must again here be restated that this labeling is again one made in-part to delineate and further justify a specific ideational framework for further analysis, It is included within the investigatory project of this thesis, but not serving as its main argumentative thrust. While much longer pieces of research and scholarship could and further *should* be written on the topic of Schmittian Realism as a distinctive sort of IR Realism (and I will perhaps undertake this lengthier task myself one day following the completion of the present project), such extended analysis is again not the purpose of this thesis or even this chapter within it. This chapter again serves merely to *outline* Schmittian Realism via the introduction and discussion of its three essential conceptual elements, so that the framework at-large can later be examined with reference to both its own “Closure” within IR and historical-political discourses (chapter three), and to the specific external case study of *Kokutai* thought in Japan (chapter four) thereafter. That being said, while the thesis from the end of this chapter onward will not dedicate further attention to an analysis of Schmittian Realism *qua* itself in a definitional sense, it will, however, extensively discuss implications and developments resulting from those essential elements that comprise the framework, with said discussion ultimately resulting in an overall-deeper analysis of both these elements themselves and the cases they find themselves placed alongside. Moreover, the broader topic of Schmittian Realism as a specific framework within the broader “Realist Tradition” of IR will come back into discussion during chapters five and six of this thesis, where the general theoretical outline produced here can be critically assessed alongside the particular case studies which are again the focus of the following two chapters.

Towards those the establishment of the aforementioned pending discussions, this (lengthy) chapter will now draw to a close again recalling that in its introduction and outlining of

Schmittian Realism as a distinctive ideational framework, its essential elements consisted in Concrete Order, the *Nomos*, and Political Theology. Of these three termed concepts, this chapter spent the majority of its exegesis exploring the foundations of Concrete Order, given that this first element definitionally gathers up notions of “Order”, the “Concrete”, and “the political” within its bounds, making its clear and extensive conceptual delineation essential for the thesis’ wider application of the framework to go ahead. With this foundational-definitional work, both in-general and with reference to Concrete Order now complete, the following two chapters will now further in-order examine the following two elements, respectively, vis-à-vis the “Closure” of Political Theology, and through the specific *Nomos* contained in the history and legacy of Imperial Japan’s *Kokutai* thought.

Chapter 3: The (Supposed) “Closure” of Political Theology.

Within a canon of written work ranging across six decades, it may seem bizarre at first glance that Carl Schmitt’s final major work published before his death was 1970’s *Political Theology II: The Myth of the Closure of any Political Theology*. This seeming bizarreness arises primarily from the fact that the work in question consists almost entirely of a response to a treatise by the German theologian and historian Erik Peterson, a response written both thirty-five years after the treatise in-question’s publication in 1935, and moreover ten years following Peterson’s own death in 1960. That Schmitt, a man in his eighties at the point of *Theology II*’s publication, would dedicate what was (knowingly or otherwise) his last significant work of scholarship to a decades-late academic response might again strike current-day readers as perplexing to say the least. However, as Schmitt himself writes during the text’s stated “Guideline for the Reader” at its introduction, he views the purpose of the work as “little more than a report on a cathartic operation”, an opportunity to “recall an old challenge” and discuss his views on the supposed “Closure” of political theology which Schmitt (as previously hinted at in this thesis’ introduction) regards perhaps sarcastically as “a beautiful myth... impossible to destroy” (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 31-32). With the combination in-mind of both a cited personal motivation (tracing the origins of *Theology II* to comments by the jurist Hans Barion inspiring Schmitt to respond to Peterson, even if decades later) and (again previously discussed in chapter one of this thesis) explicit thematic and titular symmetry between one of Schmitt’s first major works and his last, though, the seeming perplexity and/or bizarreness alluded to earlier fades away upon deeper inspection (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 31-32).

It is perhaps then not bizarre but quietly *poetic* that Schmitt’s final work returns to a topic so seminal to his overall thought in the form of a direct sequel, and given this aforementioned seminality, it is the principal undertaking of this chapter to conduct a thorough examination of *Political Theology II* and its entailed assertions, both independently and alongside analysis from secondary scholarship. In the process of this detailed study, the supposed “Closure” of political theology will be outlined and critically assessed, so that both (Schmittian) Political Theology (capitalized in reference to the specific located use of the term within Schmittian Realism) and the Myth surrounding its end might be better understood and applied towards external cases thereafter.

3.1 – Political Theology, Re-Examined.

When considering the specifics of Schmittian Political Theology, it must first be remarked that the term as utilized throughout the author's canon of written work contains both ideational and instantiated (practical, real-world) dimensions within its definitional bounds. On one hand, there is the conceptual side which the previous chapter's final subsection dedicated some time to laying out in a general sense, the maxim that "All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts", and its subsequent application to concepts such as the legal exception, which Schmitt ties to the theological miracle, or the aforementioned substitution in the sovereign state whereby "the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver" (Schmitt, *Theology*, 36). Of course, for Schmitt, this secularization reflected a further macro-level dimension of definitional and conceptual change within European civilization beyond merely the adaptations of individual concepts for political usage, a change which fundamentally reorientated the worldviews and actions taken thereafter for the modern European state: as he remarks in the original *Political Theology*, in modernity, especially after the French Revolution in 1789, "No medium exists... between catholicity and atheism... Everyone formulated a big either/or" (Schmitt, *Theology*, 53). In this way, the dynamic competition between worldviews (religious and secular) was itself imbued with an essential political character in the Schmittian mould, one of existential competition and enmity which reflected a mutually exclusive character to the political adaptation and usage of either frame.

That being said, Schmitt goes further than the Catholic Counter-Enlightenment figures he discusses this "either/or" view with reference to in his discussion of the secularization of politics, opting to consider the move away from the specifically Christian (read: Catholic, for Schmitt) orientation of pre-Modern European with specific attention to the rise of Liberal Positivism, which he decries as fundamentally *depoliticizing* in nature (Schmitt, *Theology*, 63-65). Recalling the essential *decisionistic* character to the Schmittian notion of Concrete Order (and Concrete Order Politics thereafter), it should come as no surprise then that Schmitt views Liberalism as an essentially atheistic and depoliticizing, a force which replaces decision with discussion, and in the process seeks to "dissolve metaphysical truth" in a realm where everything is up for debate on the normative level (Schmitt, *Theology*, 63). As Schmitt puts it bluntly, "Dictatorship is the opposite of discussion", and the secularization of the European worldview from the

Enlightenment onwards, then, reflected the separation in a political sense of God from His assumed omnipotent sovereignty on a cosmic level, where under Enlightenment Deism “The machine now runs by itself... The general will... became identical with the will of the sovereign; but simultaneously the concept of the general also contained a quantitative determination with regard to subject, which means that the people became the sovereign” (Schmitt, *Theology*, 63). Liberalism, as a positivistic force, conceptually ended the Medieval and earlier notion of God as *the* sovereign in a real, existential, and political sense in the real world, by relegating the essentially deific political decision, “an absolute decision created out of nothingness”, to replacement by discussion and reasoned debate (Schmitt, *Theology*, 66).

The importance of this distinction between the theological and the modern (atheistic, liberal, and positive) worldviews vis-à-vis the enactment of political action by the state, then, perhaps explains why Schmitt dedicates the first chapters of the text entitled “Political Theology” to legalistic discussions of the state of exception; stating at the text’s inception that “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception” is a *descriptive and definitional* statement given the modern framework the author finds himself situated within (Schmitt, *Theology*, 5). When Schmitt states that “The decisionistic and personalistic element in the concept of sovereignty was thus lost. The will of the people is always good... But the necessity by which the people always will what is right is not identical with the rightness that emanated from the commands of the personal sovereign”, the author’s focus on the *personal* and the *suprapersonal* attested to during the preceding chapter suddenly gains new context with reference to his disdain for the *impersonal* character of juristic normativism in *Three Types of Juristic Thought* (Schmitt, *Concept*, 48; *Three*).

Just after the publication of the original *Political Theology* in 1922, Schmitt, in the aforementioned *Roman Catholicism and Political Form* (1923), espouses ideas which help us as readers to bridge the gap between our locations of the first (conceptual) and second (instantiated) dimensional understandings of what exactly Schmittian Political Theology entails. Scholars such as Kathrin Braun turn to these two early texts to note that “for Schmitt modernity is constituted by the dissociation of political order from metaphysical substance”, a Weberian-inspired view of the modern situation which reduces the political from its original existential framing to “a mere apparatus for obtaining and preserving power, devoid of any substantial content” (Braun, 3-4).

Indeed, in *Political Theology*, Schmitt himself attests as much to the technical nature of political modernity, depoliticized by liberal positivism into reason-interested technical organization rather than his own preferred Concrete spatial-organization under theologically paralleled decision:

“There must no longer be political problems, only organizational-technical and economic-sociological tasks. The kind of economic-technical thinking that prevails today is no longer capable of perceiving a political idea. The modern state seems to have actually become what Max Weber envisioned: a huge industrial plant. Political ideas are generally recognized only when groups can be identified that have a plausible economic interest in turning them to their advantage. Whereas on one hand, the political vanishes into the economic or technical-organization, on the other hand the political dissolved into the everlasting discussion of cultural and philosophical-historical commonplaces...” (Schmitt, *Theology*, 65).

In this quotation, readers can locate immediately that for Schmitt, depoliticization is not merely constrained to the realm of political actions and organizations, but extends also and perhaps more-fundamentally to the realm of political *ideas*, to the very concept of the political itself even. Braun likewise notes on this topic, this time directly referencing *Roman Catholicism* (the Schmitt text, again) as evidence that Schmitt opposes “the idea and institutional form of the Church to what he calls economic-technical thought”; the primary mode of distinction for Schmittian views of modernity, prior to any instantiations in a particular state model, was *ideational* and *abstract* (Braun, 4-5). Turning to *Roman Catholicism*, Schmitt immediately makes clear his intent to denote the Catholic worldview and organizational spirit as inherently *concrete*, rather than abstract, in its default metaphysical orientation, noting that “Roman Catholic peoples appear to love the soil, mother earth, in a different way; they all have their own ‘*terrisme*’ [loyalty to the land]” (Schmitt, *Catholicism*, 10). This notion of *terrisme*, what Schmitt would much later in his career, within *Theory of the Partisan* to be specific, term the “telluric” character of a particular political fighting force, is again essentially *concrete*, and might potentially suggest further implications on the author’s part that such models of organization, running parallel to Catholic conceptions of Natural Law, are likewise *organic* rather than artificial in their origin (Schmitt, *Partisan*, 70-76; *Catholicism*, 11, 29). In fact, Schmitt even seems to state this directly later on in the text, noting that “Organic nature did not develop from the inorganic”, and likewise that “The devil is the wretched result of the absence of God, as is all evil an absence of good”

(Schmitt, *Catholicism*, 56). These assertions in-particular might then allow our present investigation to confidently claim that Schmittian Realism's Political Theology is the grounding principle behind the *organic* quality of its view of Concrete Order, and thereafter in the sorts of *Nomoi* which reflect such orders.

In elucidating this claim from the textual evidence provided above, this subchapter can now finally move firmly to the second dimension of Schmittian Political Theology identified, that of instantiated, rather than ideational, politics. Definitionally speaking, these instantiated forms as discussed within the Schmittian Canon (and especially further within seminal IR-related texts such as *Nomos of the Earth*) are different instantiations of the *Nomos*, either historical or contemporary to Schmitt himself. While the most discussed of these is the aforementioned *JPE*, Schmitt also devotes considerable attention to *Nomoi* in existence before and after it. The former of these types is best embodied in the overtly religious and Catholic Medieval *Nomos* which directly preceded the *JPE*, whereas the latter corresponds in Schmitt's analysis to the abstract, idealist, and universalist international paradigm represented by the morally normative (rather than concrete) orders of the United States and the Soviet Union following World War One (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 227-231, 287-295, 299).

Schmitt directly associates these two otherwise distant international powers throughout *Nomos of the Earth* on the grounds of their abstract and ideological, rather than concrete, political-organizational foundations. He specifically ties the opposition of both powers (following World War One) to colonialism to their anti-concreteness in this regard, noting that the very foundation of the *JPE* was the *appropriation* of the New World and beyond by European powers, defining colonialism "*In concreto*" as this appropriative act which itself therefore mirrors the organic and concrete foundation of the state in the ideational framework of the Schmittian *Nomos*, wherein Concrete Order arises from the appropriated organization of people into space (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 67-71, 346). In denying the fundamental appropriative act which defines the organic (Catholic) conception of the *JPE*'s European Concrete Order, these normative powers revolted against the Schmittian *Nomos* itself.

"Despite...ideological antitheses, the leading world powers of the West and the East are united in their rejection of colonialism...it is nothing other than the odium of appropriation. In this repudiation, progressive liberalism and Marxist communism agree completely...no longer is anything taken, but only divided and developed" (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 346).

In their denial of the Schmittian *Nomos* in the fundamental concrete sense in which it was defined and conceived, Schmitt also by-extension *condemns* the United States and the Soviet Union for the role in replacing the older conventional enmity and real enmity which defined the Catholic/Christian *JPE* (within Europe and outside of it, respectively) with a totalizing and morally normative *absolute enmity*, one wherein the enemy is viewed as a *moral evil* to be destroyed, rather than a threat to be faced, or an opponent to be competed with (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 147-154, 165-166, 171, 320-322; *Partisan*, 48-54). The enemy in this view is essentially *criminal*, and therefore is dealt with via *discriminatory* warfare, unrestricted and totalizing in its enactment, and characteristic both of the two World Wars and of irregular warfare within the histories of the two concerned states; the “Indian Wars” during the closing of the American frontier, and the Russian Civil War under Lenin’s Bolsheviks (Schmitt, *Partisan*, 3-4, 48-50, 90-91; *Nomos*, 121-122; Slomp, “Partisan”, 508-512; “Discriminating”, 62-64). Where the theological context of this turn factors back in, then, is in the *moral* angle taken with reference to the normative-secular states’ denial of the *Nomos*’ essential concrete character: a state’s “ethic of state” becomes in Schmitt’s own words “wretched” rather than majestic, when it abandons the concreteness necessary for true political unity, rather than the mere positivistic “economic ‘association’” associated with modernistic abstraction (Schmitt, “Ethic”, 204-206).

To further detail here the specifics of the (claimed) wretched character of these states and their respective normative, universalist, and/or liberal *Nomoi*, this subchapter must now briefly turn to the particular case of warfare again as an expression of a state’s *Nomos*. It is important to recall on this point that the purported purpose of the *JPE*, in Schmitt’s view, was simultaneously the internal limiting of warfare within European borders to that of “conventional” enmity under a sort of international law, and the external exportation of priorly-existing “real” or existential, threat-based enmity to the contested locations of Europe’s then-colonies (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 140-141). The purpose of these new universalizing *Nomoi* originating *outside* of Europe, then, can be likewise asserted within the Schmittian Realist framework to entail the purposeful enactment of absolute enmity between states and nations, with the discriminatory total warfare characteristic of this sort of enmity acting as the catalyst-action for the purported *moral imperialism* of secular and universalist ideology unto otherwise-Concrete Order states and *Nomoi* (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 296-307; “Neutrality”, 41-45; “Discriminating”, 62-64). Where the secular *Nomos* destroys its theological opponent and precedent, it not only challenges the order on a spatial level, but on a

theological level, finally here revealing the fundamental nature of the relationship between Political Theology in the Schmittian ideational sense and the notion of *Nomos* which it intertwines with in instantiation. As political concepts are secularized theological concepts, conflict which might be at-first seen as between secular states might be further considered with a theological lens in mind.

In re-examining Schmittian Realism's particular view of Political Theology in-depth, this subchapter has detailed particularities of the theoretical element in two dimensions, conceptual and instantiated, both in-context to their application within the framework of IR thought here examined. However, before discussing the supposed "Closure" of Schmittian Political Theology, some brief exegesis is further required regarding an additional key concept to any understanding of the element itself, one which sheds light onto the aforementioned "theological lens" for viewing interstate conflict hinted at in the previous paragraph. This concept is the notion of the *Katechon*, and is the subject of the subchapter which can now begin.

3.2 – The *Katechon*, and Conflict through a Theological Lens.

As defined in *Nomos of the Earth*, the Schmittian conception of *Katechon* (translated from Greek as "Restrainer" in English), is the "power to *restrain* the appearance of the Antichrist and the end of the present eon" traced back to Paul the Apostle's letters of the New Testament (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 59-60). This concept, despite not being mentioned in either the preceding chapter or this one until the present subsection, is crucial to any proper understanding of both Schmittian Realism in-general and Schmittian Political Theology within its theoretical-ideational bounds. For Schmitt, the notion of *Katechon*, the theological restrainer of evil and apocalypse (insofar as apocalypse signifies the end of an era), is evidently mirrored in *history* as it exists in scripture, given his statement the implied power embodied within the *Katechon* was the specific "historical power" of a "Christian Empire", a traceable lineage from the very origins of the Christian religion (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 59-60). Moreover, this notion of a Christian Empire itself constituted the wider European *Nomos* during the Medieval era; "The continuity that bound medieval international law to the Roman Empire was found not in norms and general ideas, but in the concrete orientation to Rome" (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 59). The *Jus Publicum Europaeum* was preceded by the *respublica Christiana* on concrete terms, and essentially supported by a theological lineage; here concreteness helps to explain the historically bound nature of the

Nomos as located by Schmitt, for he claims that “This Christian empire was not eternal. It always had its own end and that of the present eon in view. Nevertheless, it was capable of being a historical power” (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 59). Much like any other *Nomos*, the earthly nature of the *respublica Cristiana* entailed its historical restraining to a particular period of time, thereby fighting a theological and earthly war simultaneously in the exercise of real enmity against existential foes. In this case, then, of the Christian Empire (of the Medieval era) as a *Nomos* and *Katechon*, the previous subchapter’s lens has found its key example for study: international conflict can be viewed through a dually concrete and theological lens.

When Schmitt states that the *Katechon* was historically bound, he locates it specifically in the Germanic Kingdoms of Western and Central Europe, embodying a specific (Roman) Catholic unity within Christendom which thereafter enabled the *restraining* power of Christian Europe as a *Nomos-realm*, a “unity of *imperium* and *sacerdotium*” which Schmitt held as an *inevitable* political-theological outgrowth of any Christian realm (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 59-61). This inevitability also implies for Schmitt an *exclusive* existence of the notion of *Katechon* as a political-theological conception behind the specific Medieval *Nomos* of the Christian Empire, given his statement that “I do not believe...any historical concept other than *Katechon* would have been possible for the original Christian faith. The belief that a restrainer holds back the end of the world provides the only bridge between... eschatological paralysis of all human events and a tremendous historical monolith like that of the Christian empire” (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 60). In both the delineation of the boundaries of (Catholic) Europe prior to the Protestant Reformation and the chaos and warfare which followed it, the theological notion of *Katechon* gave religious grounding to the protection and defense of a realm from outside threat on the concrete level, and resultant apocalypse on the level of faith. In the emblematic case of the Spanish Reconquista, for example, Schmitt notes that the Christian Kings of Spain adopted the title of *imperator*, despite not falling under the rule of the German Holy Roman Emperor, a signifier that the Christian Empire as the *Katechon* during “holy war against Islam, the foe of Christianity” (as the author himself puts it) was again a wider *realm* unified on both political and theological grounds within a particular concrete historical moment, albeit one with monumentous religious significance as a holy war (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 65).

Of course, this historical moment had to end, and Schmitt notes how this switch from the Medieval *Nomos-Katechon* of the Christian Empire (in whichever form it may have taken) occurred on *spatial* and *concrete* grounds, when the discovery of the Americas led to the opening of appropriation opportunities to any European state capable, leading to “the centralized, spatially self-contained, continental European state that faced emperor and pope, as well as other, similarly organized neighboring states” and the international law of the *JPE* along with it (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 66). The *JPE*, then, largely replaced the *Katechon* role of a protective and restraining enmity upon the *Nomos* with a new orientation, that of “equilibrium” within the sovereign states of Europe, where warfare was bracketed inside the realm, and real enmity again exported outwards (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 66). However, it is incorrect to say that Schmitt is implying here that the religious-theological dimension of the “Christian Empire”, and that of the *Katechon* role in its entirety along with it, were *entirely* removed from the European realm when the *JPE* arose. When Schmitt states that what kept the Medieval *Nomos* alive, even as spatial authority amongst Catholic emperors declined, was “the distinction between the soil of Christian princes and peoples vis-à-vis that of non-Christian countries”, readers might claim that this notion of a religiously informed realm defense, of *Katechon* behavior, perhaps remained, in some form, long past the *JPE*’s inception (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 66). Such a claim rests on Schmitt’s distinction here between *peoples* on their religion, but moreover on how this distinction manifested into *concrete political reality*, where under the *JPE* he notes that there emerged “distinctions between various types of was, and thereby, in the concrete orders of peoples” (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 66). So long as different concrete orders existed, smaller-scale *Nomoi* (not to be confused with the IR-concerned and internationally enacted *Nomos* of Schmittian Realism) perhaps reflected the essential national and religious characters of the wars which would occur between these various orders.

When Schmitt refers at the end of his section within *Nomos of the Earth* on *Katechon* to “the nihilism of the 19th and 20th centuries”, he notes that this nihilism is essentially connected to notions of *utopia*, to an (implied to be atheistic) idealism which must entail “fundamental separation of order and orientation” (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 66). With this remark in mind, the text’s later remarks on the (de)volution of conflict into total war and absolute enmity during this time period of “nihilism” perhaps then takes on an additional theological layer than that discussed before. Where the *Katechon* of a unified Christendom would defend the realm from the Antichrist forces of Islam, the atheistic and utopian (liberal, universalist) *Nomoi* as international

law enforced upon Europe by the United States and later the Soviet Union themselves reflect the apocalyptic (and again, morally “wretched”, given Schmitt’s conflation of moral majesty with a political unity of the sort he imparts upon Catholic Medieval Europe) eschatological change which the earlier *Nomos* served to restrain (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 58, 65, 87, 258, 276, 280; “Ethic”, 205-207).

Moreover, as chapter four of this thesis will eventually discuss, perhaps some final vestigial remnant of the *Katechon* remained in the *JPE*’s contrast and opposition to those external concrete orders which were both spiritually and nationally foreign to European international law, two-fold criteria which apply in this case only to one of the major intruders upon the European *Nomos* in the nineteenth century, that being Imperial Japan. Whereas the United States held at-least the spirit of Christianity (Protestantism, as Schmitt himself attests that a secularized “Calvinist-Puritan outlook” underlies American territorial *Großraum* ideology) at its political-theological core when it upstaged the bounded realm of European colonial politics in the 1800s, the Japanese Empire was both *concretely and spiritually foreign*; but this discussion beyond the present foreshadowing must again wait until the succeeding chapter for proper discussion (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 191, 217, 288, 290).

Beyond Schmitt’s usage of *Katechon* in *Nomos of the Earth*, secondary scholars have engaged in considerable efforts to highlight the place and dynamics of the concept within Schmitt’s political-theological thought. The remainder of this subchapter will now henceforth concern itself with discussing what these sources individual discursive considerations of *Katechon* resultantly might reveal about the concept itself in-particular, and its broader general implications for the aforementioned “theological lens” with which the subchapter aims to view international conflict. Julia Hell undertakes a specific genealogical approach towards analyzing the Schmittian view of *Katechon* (specifically again that outside of *Nomos of the Earth*), describing it as reflective of what she deems Schmitt’s “imperial theology”, a “politics of empire that feeds on the remnants of eschatological history” (Hell, 311). Through the usage of theological and apocalyptic conceptual language, Schmitt “theorized empire as the inextricable articulation of beginning and end” in a process that comes close to reification (in my personal view), but which Hell describes instead as “reconceptualization”, placing earlier historical (imperial) decline within a later-located theological context (Hell, 284, 311). With reference to

war as a particular period-action relating to this historical-theological relationship, Luke Collison provides specific evidence from Schmitt as to how this process of reifying the abstract and theological into the concrete actually functioned in the located Christian Empire(s), citing Schmitt's claim in *Nomos of the Earth* that "Peace" as a political-theological concept "was not a free-floating, normative, general concept, but rather, one oriented *concretely* to the peace of the empire, the territorial ruler, of the church, of the city, of the castle, of the marketplace, of the local judicial assembly" (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 59; Collison, 175-176). Collison further notes this reification from theology to spatial politics on the part of *Katechon* in overt terms, claiming that for Schmitt's conception of the term, "Abstract demands are recoded as 'spatial concepts' in order to give the task of the *Katechon* a connection with objective reality", and that resultantly from this process, "The *katechon* is anti-utopian" (Collison, 175).

Of course, this final remark mentioned regarding anti-utopianism is especially relevant and useful for the purposes of this chapter and wider thesis, for it provides evidence of Schmitt's Political Theology expressing additional claims and theoretical sentiments which are fundamentally *realist* in their orientation, both ideationally and in-practice vis-à-vis concrete politics. This fundamental realism is a cornerstone, again, of Schmittian political thought in isolation of its theological elements, for in the definitionally-concerned *Concept of the Political*, Schmitt famously states that "In the concrete reality of the political, no abstract orders or norms but always real human groupings and associations rule over the other human groupings and associations. Politically, the rule of morality, law, and economics always assumes a concrete political meaning" (Schmitt, *Concept*, 73). Likewise, Hell again connects Schmitt's political-theological views of *Katechon* and (Christian) Empire with this fundamental concreteness in orientation, noting that for Schmitt, every warring state needed a fundamental people (*volk*) at its core, and that the organization of these *volk* and the states and empires which they were ordered within was akin to a "constellation" of conflict wherein empires and so-called "counter-empires" were poised constantly at the threat of war (Hell, 296). This view of people (*volk*), empire, and conflict is again not only incredibly similar to that of the *international anarchy* assumed in any textbook view of IR Realism in-general, but is more-specifically reflective of the *real enmity* which Schmitt locates at the essential instantiation of the concept of the political itself (Schmitt, *Concept*, 37, 53-54, 64; Donnelly, 2-3, 10).

What might be said overall, then, regarding Schmitt's usage of *Katechon* within his international relations-concerned works such as *Nomos of the Earth* (and with specific reference therein to what this usage reveals about his Political Theology as an element of Schmittian Realist thought) is that the concept again serves a reifying role in navigating the concrete-abstract divide inherent to any instantiation of political theology as a general philosophical concept. Speaking on Schmitt's (in)famous political-theology maxim regarding secularization, Alison McQueen notes how while Schmittian Political Theology held that "with secularization, the ways in which divine authority was understood and negotiated were transferred to the confrontation with political sovereignty", it was also the case that "the structure of the concept remains the same", that "What remains constant...is the systemic structure of the theological concept...the way in which it orders and narrates relations of authority" (McQueen, 19). With this framework-rule constant in mind, then, this subchapter can state that where this principle of constancy in theological structure applies in general for Schmittian Political Theology, it also applies in-specific to the particular concept of *Katechon*. Serving as a historical-theological marker for the *role* of a Christian Empire as a particular *Nomos* encountering particular sorts of enmity (in both a theological-religious and a political-concrete sense), the Schmittian *Katechon* ultimately operates as a vehicle for Political Theology within Schmittian Realism's view of Christian Europe's history, in a similar to which *Nomos* acts as a vehicle for the thinker's view of Concrete Order within an IR framework.

3.3 – *Political Theology II*, and the meaning of "Closure".

With Schmitt's Political Theology and perhaps its most important conceptual vehicle for Schmittian Realism more-broadly now discussed, this chapter can finally move to its final topic of consideration, that of the notion of "Closure" as analyzed and debated within *Political Theology II*. This subchapter, through careful consideration of the aforementioned text, as well as additional sources from both Schmitt himself and secondary authors, aims to firstly locate and define what exactly "Closure" means with reference to (Schmittian) Political Theology in-particular, before further assessing what effects and implications the concept itself (as well as Schmitt's reference to its assertion as a "Myth") might have for Schmittian Realism at-large.

As previously mentioned, *Political Theology II* concerns Schmitt's rebuttal-response to Erik Peterson on the topic of the (supposed) "closure of any political theology", which Schmitt

notes in the book's introduction is "declared decisively" alongside the related claim that with such "Closure" declared, "political theology" (in quotes of skepticism, colloquially "scare quotes") is a "theological impossibility" in Peterson's view (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 35-36). It is immediately clear even in this introductory section of the text that Schmitt intends his final major work to be a rebuttal, an argument in disagreement with Peterson, as his referral to the "Closure" as a "beautiful myth" that "No one should want to disturb" and which is "impossible to destroy" strikes a tone of both thinly-veiled sarcasm and hints at the claim itself being *mythic* or *legendary* in a way which simple dismissal cannot hope to confront (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 31). In this way, the usage of the word "myth" may then take on another meaning, for where an *argument* can be rationally debated and potentially debunked (and Schmitt himself immediately makes his intent following this to "concentrate on the internal relation between the argument and the conclusion of this [Peterson's] Treatise"), a *myth* exists outside the bounds of logic, and therefore cannot hope to be destroyed with fact (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 31). Evidence for this interpretation can be found in the editor's introduction to Polity Press' 2008 English translation by Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward, who note that sometimes a myth "could only be countered and challenged by belief in another myth" (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 25). Where Schmitt challenges the myth of Political Theology's "Closure", it is perhaps then his own theological views, including vehicles such as *Katechon* as discussed earlier, which then serve as myths in their own right within this discursive and further perhaps *mythological* conflict themselves. Likewise, this framing may be applied backwards onto the *Nomos*-related developments decried by Schmitt throughout *Nomos of the Earth*; the end of the *JPE* challenged the "myth" (perhaps) of a bounded and bracketed European world, with the countering "myth" being that of universal idealist ideologies, be they American liberalism, or Soviet Communism. In any case, Schmitt's intent for the work is evident, to discern on rational grounds of argumentation the potential (in)validity of the conclusions behind a larger myth, the (supposed) "great theological closure", or for our purposes, "Closure" as an (anti)political-theological concept (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 36).

Recalling the opening phrases of *Political Theology II* which were quoted at the beginning of this thesis' first chapter, it is again immediately clear from the onset of the text which actors Schmitt locates responsibility in for the myth of "Closure", those being "atheists, anarchists, and positive scientists", who he states have not only a derogative prejudice against theology but also any metaphysics alongside insofar as those subjects might be approached in a

scientific manner of study (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 34). This identification of actors oppositional to Political Theology is then followed by Schmitt with an identification of what they have sought to replace the concept with, that being a variety of so-called *auto-compositional* ideas, such as “Self-expression, self-affirmation, and self-empowerment”, ideas which “produce themselves, and... produce the conditions for their own possibility”; a positive-scientific copy of the creation *ex-nihilo* which had previously been reserved to the power of God the Creator (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 34). That Schmitt views these auto-compositional ideas as *copies* is clear, given that he adds to the previous statement about producing possibility conditions that these are perhaps only “artificial laboratory conditions”; whereas God “transforms nothingness into something utterly astonishing, namely something out of which a world can be created”, the “worlds” and ideas allegedly produced by these positive, laboratory forces are not described by Schmitt as similarly astonishing (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 34).

However, it is important to note here that Schmitt explicitly goes out of his way to note that Peterson and his particular theological “Closure” “does not want to be associated with... atheistic, anarchistic or positivistic closures”, and that what he is responding to, ultimately is a Christian and *theological* closure of political theology, rather than an atheistic one (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 35). This note is crucially important to make early on in any discussion on the topic, as it would be simply dishonest to claim that Schmitt ties Peterson, either explicitly or otherwise, to these atheistic-positivistic forces which he clearly holds in great contempt. Schmitt does not do this within *Political Theology II*, and pointing out this fact allows the present investigation to establish firstly of the notion of “Closure” (as it is discussed by Schmitt) as having at-least two forms, one which is theological in mode, and one which is atheistic. The latter has already been detailed to some degree with reference to the triumph of liberal positivist ideas in international politics during the twentieth century discussed in previous chapters, and so therefore it is the nature of the former which is primarily up for investigation here.

With regard to this *theological* “Closure” of any political theology, Schmitt describes the phenomenon, of “Closure”, as entailing (from the aforementioned atheistic point-of-view) “a case of intra-theological self-critique and self-destruction, an unintended annulment of any belief in God being politically relevant, or of any socially relevant theology at all” (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 35). This subchapter (and thesis more broadly) will from here-on adapt this description as a

loose definition of what exactly Schmitt means when he refers to this theological “Closure”, the removal of the *relevancy* of God and theology from political importance and-or relevance in considered cases. Furthermore, Schmitt places his discussion (and Peterson’s before and contemporary to the first *Political Theology* text by Schmitt himself) on the topic of Political Theology in a specific historical context, noting how perhaps the publication of the original 1935 Treatise on “Closure” came as a sort of protest against the German government’s then conflation of worldly political power with divine religious authority, the so-called “cult of the Führer” during the Third Reich (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 38). Moreover, Schmitt describes how in-context, the rise of Hitler’s National Socialist regime itself presented a “new crisis” for theology in Germany (of all Christian denominations), one which Peterson considered vis-à-vis tensions between the classical Augustinian view of the City of God and the City of Man (the “two kingdoms” teaching), and the then-reigning Nazi regime’s signing of the *Reichskonkordat* with the Catholic Church in 1933 (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 43). With this historical context in mind, Schmitt additionally moves to provide a steelman view of-sorts for Peterson’s position on *why* Political Theology may have seemed an impossibility on a theological level even beyond the historical case; where “theology is the continuation of the revealed *logos* in the form of concrete discussion”, the very notion of “Political Theology” itself is “meaningless, if not blasphemous” (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 42). Even while keeping this wider theological and historical context in-mind, however, Schmitt still ultimately notes that he views Peterson’s 1935 treatise, and its final claim on the “Closure” and further *impossibility* of political theology as written with direct reference to (and thereby in-response to, by implication) Schmitt’s original *Political Theology* text (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 50).

Having by this point established both the context and direction (in his view) of Peterson’s “Closure” remarks, Schmitt turns to examining, as he previously had declared his intent to, analyze the *argument* towards the conclusions of “Closure” and impossibility on a logical, validity-testing level. He immediately notes that Peterson’s 1935 work, which primarily concerned implications and discussion of *monotheism*, was seminal and attained status as a “legendary document” due to its building on Peterson’s prior scholarly assertions that “the formula of *one God* as a public acclamation can be affirmation or demonstration both for a particular god or for a particular emperor or king. It does not contain a confession of monotheism” (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 60-61). With reference again to the political-historical

circumstances under which the treatise was published during the Third Reich, this political ramifications of these ideas become especially relevant and obvious to contextually-concerned readers, but Schmitt points out the importance of this idea within then-contemporary academia not matter-of-factly, but as a sort of *curiosity* when noting that these prior works and arguments (before 1931) of Peterson's never mentioned "Political Theology" in-specific or at all (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 61). Schmitt notes that Peterson's first mention of "Political Theology" properly in phrase or in meaning came with reference to the claimed *political problem of monotheism*, whereby "Monotheism as a political problem is, for him, nothing but the problem of the Hellenistic transformation of the Jewish belief in God", which Peterson tied to later late-Roman attempts to "*politicise* the idea of God's monarchy" under Eusebius and Constantine the Great (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 62). Through analyzing these earlier works and views of Peterson's, Schmitt locates his ultimate problem with so-called political monotheism (and by extension later, political theology, from a *theological* Christian perspective), that such politicization contradicts the fundamental Christian dogma of the Trinitarian God, and that a "divine monarchy" of any sort in an imperial manner is blasphemous, something which "imitates the antichrist", and renders any attempt to imitate divine monarchy (in heaven) through earthly political leadership *impossible* (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 62).

Where Peterson then, in Schmitt's analysis, forms his final argument in the 1935 treatise is in the change in *scale* of his initial claims from the Rome-specific case to a generalized maxim on the rejection of any political theology: "The rationale for the argument is simply that the epoch of the Roman Empire... should be *exemplary* for the whole problem of political theology" (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 63). It is with this argumentative thrust that Schmitt takes issue with Peterson's claims, for he, simply put, does not view the "concrete analogy" used by Peterson as convincingly made between a particular problem with Roman-era imperial political monotheism and a *general impossibility of any political theology* (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 63). This lack of convincingness, for Schmitt, is laid out primarily again on rational, logical grounds of argumentation, for he points out that "the exemplary nature of the analogy is neither explained nor established"; Schmitt does not see how the conclusion follows from the earlier points made in an analogical form (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 63). Context anticipating this development is provided for the reader earlier in the text, where Schmitt notes the historical processes which pre-empted his writing of *Dictatorship* and *The Concept of the Political* in the 1920s, those entailing

the decoupling of “politics” from the state’s prior monopoly over it, brought about by the end of World War One and the various revolutions that accompanied the peace (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 44). In particular, Schmitt highlights among those forces which broke the state monopoly on politics the “industrial proletariat” whose communist and socialist revolutions (in Europe and Russia) “imploded” traditional conceptions of who in a country might be “the new effective subject of the political” (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 44). Via this development, among others, the modern situation in Europe meant that the aforementioned “two kingdoms” of Augustinian theology ceased to be “distinguishable, either in matter or content” in Schmitt’s view, with the “spiritual-temporal” in any instance of that dichotomy left to “only be determined according to the struggle between the subjects” (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 43-44).

These observations by Schmitt, most-directly stated with his critique that “Peterson ignores the crisis of the modern problematic of church/state/society”, not only again offer a sort of pre-empting context to his later criticism of Peterson’s historical analogy, but also offer continuity for readers in the contemporary who are looking to analyze *Political Theology II* vis-à-vis developments in the Schmittian canon going back to the two previously-mentioned 1920s texts, as well as the original *Political Theology* (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 44). Put simply, the root of Schmitt’s disagreement with Peterson, even before the logical-validity concerns, seems to be that he misunderstands the broader situation which preceded Peterson’s own claimed location of “Closure”; Schmitt holds to a view wherein modernity entailed “the transition from church and state to the political”, and (at least seemingly) deems Peterson as not properly reckoning with the modernity within which Schmitt’s *Political Theology* was originally drafted (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 45). However, this is again only a possible contextual explanation, and with it considered as supporting evidence, our focus must now return to Schmitt’s explicitly-stated concerns with Peterson’s argument-conclusion validity as discussed previously.

Schmitt notes that even during the Ancient Roman period which Peterson is concerned with, “Political theology is part of the *nomos* and constitutes the public sphere...It belongs to the political identity and continuity of a people...essential in order to identify one’s heritage, one’s legitimate succession, and oneself” (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 65). With this position in mind then, a proper definition of Schmittian “Political Theology” given with explicit reference to one of his other seminal concepts (the *Nomos*), Schmitt further details his opposition to Peterson’s analogy

to a *general* critique of political theology's *theological* validity. He not only holds that Peterson fails to consider the crisis of modernity which pre-empted Schmitt's particular view of Political Theology, but further that he failed to consider the *spatial* dimension of the *Nomos* which accompanies said view of Political Theology at its most fundamental level vis-à-vis the political:

“The church of Christ is not *of* this world and its history, but it is *in* this world. That means: it is localized and opens up a space; and space here means impermeability, visibility and the public sphere. Peterson does not take any of this into account in his examination, and therefore he does not consider it in his conclusion” (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 65).

When Schmitt claims that “Political theology is a polymorphous phenomenon”, he maintains that this conceptual morphology contains “two different sides...a theological and a political one...Each...directed to its specific concepts” (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 66). From this statement, Schmitt continues that this specificity is in-built to Political Theology as a general concept, that “There are many political theologies because there are, on the one hand, many different religions, and, on the other, many different kinds and methods of doing politics” (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 66). Here we can locate Schmitt's clearest-defined opposition to the *conclusion* of Peterson's analogy; Peterson's statement of the impossibility of *any* political philosophy is, in Schmitt's view, an academically *unserious* position, a judgment especially evident given his statement that “in such a twofold and bipolar field, a serious discussion is only possible when the arguments, questions and answers are precisely defined” (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 66). Schmitt disagrees with Peterson's argument both in the historical and the modern case of its analogical core, but his disagreement in both cases does not end at these specific quotes.

Schmitt further attaches his reconstruction of Peterson's view, that “political theology is over” to the latter's usage of a specific application of a French phrase from the post-revolutionary, *liberal* era of French nineteenth century history, that “the king reigns but does not govern” (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 66-67). In this attachment, he attacks Peterson's usage of such a term from an again comparably *liberal* era of relations between church and state to attack Schmitt's 1922 definition of Political Theology, which itself critiques the very results of such a liberal relationship between the political and the theological expressed in the quote Peterson employs (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 66-67). It is clear that with this and the other examples of

purported misunderstandings detailed above considered, Schmitt does not believe that Peterson properly understood the original Schmittian view which he critiqued in 1935, going so far in the case of the liberal-era quotation briefly mentioned above to state that Peterson’s “retrospective use of such a formula, from a post-Christian, liberal epoch back to the antiquity of the first century, is astonishing” (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 68). To put it bluntly, Schmitt seems to hold Peterson’s approach to the analogy central to his conclusion as sloppy, for lack of a better term, attaching examples improperly understood to one another to form a specifically polemical point against Schmitt in the historical context of 1930s Germany (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 96, 106-107).

But for Schmitt, this sloppiness is seemingly further analyzed as *dangerous*. While he previously and explicitly notes that Peterson was *not* in-alignment with the atheists and positivists (which by historical inference Schmitt is clearly tying to the revolutionary, Communist forces of then-contemporary Europe) who sought a general “Closure” or *end* to theology itself, Schmitt does note that Peterson’s “structural mistake” in declaring his final “Closure” of any political theology “makes it easy for the positivist to turn a purely theological closure of political theology into a scientific closure of theology itself” (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 58). In the weakness of his central analogy, Peterson has potentially aided the enemies (in Schmitt’s view) of theology itself in his disordered and again *political-polemical* attack on “any” political theology.

In any case, with all of the above analysis and exegesis of *Political Theology II* considered, this lengthy chapter can now conclude with some brief remarks on what exactly the (supposed) “Closure” of Political Theology is. Recalling Schmitt’s prior assertion that political theology is part of the Schmittian *Nomos*, and that (per chapter two of this thesis) the Schmittian *Nomos* is a vehicle for the foundational notion of Concrete Order’s extension into the realm of international politics (via the exemplified instantiations of specific historical *Nomoi* themselves), we might state then, that the claimed “Closure” of Political Theology entails the nullification and end of the parallelism between the concrete and the theological which underpins *all* of Schmittian Realism. When the crisis of modernity shattered the *JPE*’s concrete and further vestigial religious identity as the realm of European Christendom, the positivist, secular, and liberal forces *external* to the European *Nomos* (within the historical-theoretical framing of Schmittian Realism’s political approach) further constructed a *myth*, a *legendary* account of this

process whereby not only spatial organization was upset in revolution, but theological ordering was as well. The “Closure” of Political Theology is itself a polemical and polemical *story*, again a myth/legend aimed at recalling and reframing a political struggle for the identity of a particular *Nomos* along the theological grounds (from the Schmittian Realist point of view) which ideationally pre-date any such political organization at their most essential level. Where Schmittian Realism holds the dually Concrete-Theological *Nomos* at its core, its opposition, Liberal Idealism, Positivism, and Universalism, rest upon the myth that the Political Theology which helps to form that *Nomos* has been “Closed”, consigned to history, and removed from relevance in modernity.

This chapter, then, has now finally defined and assessed the meanings of both Schmittian Realism’s view of Political Theology itself, and of the debate and mythology surrounding its historical “Closure” in the conflicts of twentieth century modernity. However, in order to assess the further *general* and discipline-wide relevance and convincingness of these concepts (as well as their wider resident framework) to academic IR and the claimed Realist tradition therewithin, the present investigation must move outside of the strictly-European bounds with which Schmittian Realism concerns itself it, in search of an *external case study* that might allow for a final comparative analysis and critical assessment of those ideas discussed in the thesis thus far. Towards the fulfillment of this search, the following chapter will now turn its focus away from Europe; to the case of Imperial Japan, and the specific *Nomos* which underpinned both its political organization and international relations.

Chapter 4: The Form, “Closure”, and Legacy of *Kokutai* (国体) Thought.

As the *JPE* reached its apex in the nineteenth century, with European colonial empires extending from one end of the Earth to the other on six of seven continents, two challengers to this (again) distinctly *European Nomos* arose from opposite sides of the European continent. As Carl Schmitt noted (and as this thesis has previously discussed with reference to those notes), the first of these challenges came from the United States, from its claim to a new *Großraum* order in the Western Hemisphere via the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 191). The second challenge, however, came not from Europe’s West, but to its Far-East, with the rise of Imperial Japan to Great Power status following the Meiji Restoration, a rise formally “recognized” after Japanese victories in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars in 1894 and 1905, respectively (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 191). For Schmitt, it was this second challenge, the rise of Japan as a peer Great Power to the European imperial states, which truly began the “transition to a new, no longer Eurocentric world order”, explicitly via the “inclusion of an East Asian Great Power” (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 191).

With this note in-mind, and considering the prior two chapters’ extensive study and analysis of Schmitt’s International Political Thought both in concrete and theological terms, the question then arises as to how this thought might be considered from *outside* of its own case-specific bounds. After all, the *JPE* was a distinctly *European Nomos*, and with Schmittian Realism having now been considered and examined from within its own historical-theological foundations, further consideration of the theory via an *external* case study is necessary for a properly robust and multifaceted investigation of its theoretical value and relevance. Therefore, this chapter will consider Imperial Japan as such an external case study by which to analyse and assess Schmittian Realism and its three essential elements, looking into the Japanese example for comparative instantiations of Concrete Order, a Schmittian *Nomos*, and Political Theology, as well as the development of these elements over time during the extent of the historical case. In the course of its analysis, this chapter, having first identified and outlined the bounds and origins of *Kokutai* Thought as the distinctive *Nomos* of Imperial Japan both domestically and internationally, will then discuss the eventual “Closure” of this particular *Nomos* and the Concrete Order and Political Philosophy which it foundationally entailed, before finally considering its legacy in contemporary Japanese political reality.

4.1 – *Kokutai* Thought as a Distinctly Japanese *Nomos*.

When the Meiji Restoration of the mid-nineteenth century saw the older Shogunate legal system of Edo-era Japan replaced with centralized and direct rule by the Emperor, the new Imperial Regime sought as one of its goals the achievement of parity with the Western powers which had formally “opened” Japan beginning in the 1850s, and one of the chief legal reforms towards this goal was the drafting and subsequent adoption of the so-called Meiji Constitution. Influenced by the constitutions of the Western (European) powers, this constitution yet retained a *distinctly* Japanese character, evident from its opening lines.

“The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal” (Meiji Draft Committee, *Constitution*, Article 1).

“The Emperor is sacred and inviolable” (Meiji Draft Committee, *Constitution*, Article 3).

From the very beginning of the Meiji Constitution, what is established is that the Empire of Japan is governed by an Imperial house which is declared to be “eternal”, “sacred”, and “inviolable” (Meiji Draft Committee, *Constitution*, Articles 1-3). This language, of temporal eternity and further *divine* protection and mandate, is immediately recognizable as *theological* in nature, tying the Emperor of Japan (and his Empire, by extension) to a specific conception (although here unnamed) of divine-religious power. Adding context to these opening constitutional articles, an oath given upon the enactment of the Meiji Constitution further mentions that the new Constitution and Empire are “in pursuance of a great policy co-extensive with the Heavens and with the Earth”, upholding an “ancient form of Government” owed to “the glorious Spirits of the Imperial Founder of Our House and of Our other Imperial Ancestors” (Meiji Draft Committee, *Oath*). These ancestral spirits, beyond serving as the apparent “ancient” originators of the Japanese Imperial House and form of government, are moreover deemed an essential part of the Empire on a *divine, theological* level, for the aforementioned oath notes the swearing of Imperial officials to “reverently make Our prayer to Them and to Our Illustrious Father”, prayers which “implore the help of... Sacred Spirits” whom themselves are then described as “Heavenly” in nature (Meiji Draft Committee, *Oath*).

Where this aforementioned theological-bent to the new Imperial Regime is again immediately evident based on the sources quotes above, it is simultaneously conflated and essentially associated with the *concrete* power of the Emperor, who is described in Article Four of the Meiji Constitution as “head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty” (Meiji Draft Committee, *Constitution*, Article 4). Therefore, in this fusion of *divine* and *concrete* power and sovereignty, the Japanese Emperor (and his regime, stemming from its very founding constitution) are inherently founded in political theology. However, it is not simply enough to state that these political-theological elements of the Imperial Japanese regime and constitution are reminiscent of any general political theology, for the system set up and legally enshrined in the Meiji Constitution was moreover *particularly* Japanese in its political-theological organization, and to explain this particularity, our focus must turn to the system of thought integral to the character of the new Japanese Empire, that of *Kokutai* Thought.

Kokutai, translated literally into English as either “national essence” or “national spirit” (as previously mentioned in the literature review within chapter one of this thesis), is frequently referred to by scholarly experts on Imperial Japan as a fundamental concept and further-developed thought system behind the legal and political changes between the new Meiji government and the Shogunate regime which preceded it (Ikegami, 214-216; Epp, 45-47; Keene and Seishisai, 79-80; Kitagawa, 209, 225). The purpose of this system of thought, as a political-theological (and thereby also legal in-practice) ordering structure for the new Empire, is attested to as being based in desires by the elite of Meiji-era Japan to retain a particularly Japanese *national character* amidst the ongoing Westernization and Western-emulation of the legal institutions within the country (Epp, 45-47; Takayanagi, 10-12; Ikegami, 213-216; Wakabayashi, 54-55; Keene and Seishisai, 78-80). Of course, this mentioning of “national character” serves (much as the identification of political-theological elements in the Meiji Constitution did) as a key and evident tie between the presently-considered Japanese case study and the priorly-analyzed European (Schmittian) theories and ideas, for national character as a concept within academic IR is present in the very foundations of modern IR Realism as outlined by Hans J. Morgenthau in his landmark *Politics Among Nations*.

Describing national character as a factor of national power which is qualitative in nature, Morgenthau notes that the term possesses both “elusiveness from the point of view of rational

prognosis” and “permanent and often decisive influence upon the weight a nation is able to put into the scales of national politics” (Morgenthau, *Politics*, 146-147). Of course, for a concept to be both elusive and *decisively* important to international relations makes giving a proper discussion of its definition and essential qualities difficult to say the least, but thankfully, Morgenthau goes further to note that national character is foundationally *anthropological* in its focus on “culture pattern”, the recognition and proposal that “certain qualities of intellect and character occur more frequently and are more highly valued in one nation than in another” (Morgenthau, *Politics*, 147). It is unfortunate that Morgenthau speaks little to the nature of national character beyond this on a definitional level, but where he does so, he refers to it as “intangible”, and further located in the *people* of a nation, rather than its government in-particular (Morgenthau, *Politics*, 152). Based on what little information we as readers have on Morgenthau’s view of the concept based on his writings in *Politics Among Nations*, it suffices to say that for the purposes of this thesis, national character in a Realist sense (borrowing from Morgenthau) will be based in the cultural patterns and resultant character of the people of any particular nation.

It is important here to note that while “national character” as a broad concept is essentially located in a given nation and people’s culture, it cannot be identical with the notion of “culture” itself, for the latter allows for whatever identification of the former is possible, and where culture is again traceable (according to Morgenthau) in cultural *patterns*, national character is ultimately “intangible” (Morgenthau, *Politics*, 152). This labeling, however, is what allows us to comparatively tie *Kokutai* to the concept of national character in Morgenthau’s (and perhaps Schmitt’s, in relation) Realist framework. Where culture is identifiable in a qualitative sense of pattern, national character’s intangibility draws definitional similarities to the translation of *Kokutai* as a national *essence* or *spirit*, those words and entailed term-concepts themselves intangible on a level of qualitative study. Moreover, *Kokutai* signifies a national essence/spirit which is *distinct* and *particular* to both the concrete political order of the Japanese Empire and the divine-spiritual which said Empire parallels (Kitagawa, 209; Fridell, 548-552). Scholars including Wilbur Fridell state as much explicitly, that the concrete and the divine-spiritual (theological) are unified in the concept of *Kokutai* in conveying the notion of a distinctly Japanese “nation-body”, itself defined by a two-fold structure of the concrete imperial state and

the theological metaphysics of the State Shinto religion which combine into a “sacred center...complex of state-nation-emperor” (Fridell, 548-553).

The specificity of State Shinto, the national religion adopted as the political-theological belief structure behind the Imperial Japanese regime, to *Kokutai* cannot be overstated, as the ideology’s foundation lies fundamentally in the (implied) divinity and spiritual status of the Japanese Emperor himself; the Emperor being (again, as noted in the Meiji Constitution and beyond) the latest sovereign in an *eternal* and *sacred* line tracing back to both the legendary Emperor Jimmu and before him the solar goddess Amaterasu (Wachutka, 134-125; Anzai, 16; Ikegami, 216; Kitagawa, 224-226; Kumada, 8; Meiji Draft Committee, *Constitution*, Articles 1-4; *Oath*). This essential typing of *Kokutai* to State Shinto extends to the entire Japanese state as a political-theological entity, for even prior to the Meiji Restoration, *Kokutai* thinkers including Aizawa Seishisai argued for the unity of religion and politics in the person of the Emperor so that the divine blessings of Amaterasu might ensure harmony within the political apparatus of the *state* through reverence of the Emperor’s place and sovereignty (Calichman et. al., 1020-1022; Keene and Seishisai, 75-76). In this way, *Kokutai* thought implied a distinctly divine Japanese Emperor, and then by-extension a divinely-blessed Japanese *state* and *national people* thereafter; *Kokutai* thought was not merely distinctively Japanese in its focus on the person of the Emperor, but was proposed furthermore as an *organic* outgrowth of “the Japanese experience” of unified political and spiritual nationhood (Calichman, et. al, 1023-1025). *Kokutai* was *organically Japanese*, and therefore by inference we might claim that it viewed the Japanese Empire, the political entity which embodies such a national essence, as the located and supposed *organic* political model of the Japanese nation.

Any reader of this thesis thus far will immediately notice the similarities between *Kokutai* as it is discussed above and the priorly-mentioned Western notions of Schmittian Political Theology and *Nomos*, with this “organic” view of *Kokutai* seemingly an external parallel of the sort of Concrete Order *Nomoi* Schmitt identifies both in Medieval Germany in-particular, and in the wider European *Nomoi* of the *respublica Cristiana* and the *JPE*, respectively (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 217; *Three*, 45-62; *Concept*, 19-21). Where this chapter previously noted similarities between Japanese *Kokutai* and Morgenthau’s Realist “national character”, it now notes even-greater parallels between *Kokutai* and the Schmittian *Nomos*. Returning to Schmitt’s original definition of

Nomos as “the first measure of all subsequent measures”, and moreover later as the particular and organic organization of peoples into political units (which follow thereafter along political-theological lines), *Kokutai*’s essential claimed *eternal* and *organic* character would seem to mark the concept as a civilizational-mirror to Schmitt’s otherwise Western-specific political terminology (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 67-70). In asserting the organic political-theological outgrowth of the Japanese nation and resultant nation-state polity, *Kokutai* seems to imply a distinct state organization which in its eternality might then be identified as the *first* of such organizational measures that the Schmittian *Nomos* definitionally describes. It describes and asserts an ordering myth whereby the national character of the Japanese nation is spatially ordered into the Concrete Order of Imperial Japan under divine ordination; the Eastern *Kokutai* here conceptually mirrors the Western *Nomos*, albeit on a *nation-specific* level, rather than that of the internationally-concerned *Nomoi* which Schmitt eventually considers. That being said, where Schmitt also attributed a *Nomos* to individual nations’ political orderings (domestically and internationally), such as in the case of the United States and its Monroe Doctrine, there is no reason to assume that the concept might lack the ideational flexibility to extend to both realms of political organization simultaneously in a general sense, especially when being applied outside of its original Western framing, to the external Eastern case of *Kokutai*.

With the origins of *Kokutai* as a concept now roughly outlined and paralleled to the thesis’ (Western) theoretical bounds of study, this subchapter can finally move to consider the development and specifics of *Kokutai Thought*, the formulation of the concept which was directly applied in the realm of international relations during the militaristic turn of the Japanese Empire during the early Showa era in the 1930s and wartime 1940s. Towards this consideration of the aforementioned specific period of *Kokutai*’s relevance within Japanese political history, our attention turns to the document known as the *Kokutai no Hongi* (translated as “Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of Japan”). The *Kokutai No Hongi* was a propaganda text published and drafted around 1937, and distributed throughout the Japanese Empire in order to (in its own words) “clarify our national entity and...cultivate and awaken national sentiment and consciousness” owing to “the pressing need of the hour” for a Japan then at war in China (Ito, et. al., 50, 190). Of course, it is worth noting here that this chapter’s analysis is here dampened in terms of full contextual understanding by its need to utilize only English translations of Japanese works rather than their original versions, for its entirely possible that the translation here of *Kokutai* as “National

Entity” rather than “Essence” or “Spirit” holds within it a profound difference in meaning compared to those discussed previously. However, as this is again an issue formed by fundamental methodological constraints of the present project, the issue of the exact translation of the word will not be discussed further beyond this brief disclaimer.

The *Kokutai no Hongi* begins, much like the Meiji Constitution did, with an assertion of the Emperor as the central element of the Japanese state and nation, describing the “unbroken line of Emperors, receiving the Oracle of the Founder of the Nation” (identified later as Amaterasu herself) as *the Kokutai* itself, the Imperial House *is* “our eternal and immutable national entity” (Ito, et. al., 59). Much like the preceding few paragraphs’ analysis implied, however, the *Kokutai no Hongi* also extends the divine significance of this entity to the entire Japanese nation, noting that “all the people, united as one great family nation in heart and obeying the Imperial Will, enhance indeed the beautiful virtues of loyalty and filial piety...together with heaven and earth, without end” (Ito, et. al., 59). Through this filial piety, the text connects Amaterasu’s blessing to her Imperial posterity, the Emperors who “have had for their mind of the great deity and have been one in ‘essence’ with the great deity”, and thereafter from them by-extension to “our nation’s piety and ancestor worship” more-broadly (Ito, et. al, 64). The Emperor is defined as not merely divinely-descended, then, but a deity *himself*, and therefore a subject of filial piety for the whole nation: “The subjects, in looking up to the Emperor, who is deity incarnate, reverence at the same time the Imperial Ancestors, and under his bounty become the subjects of our country” (Ito, et. al, 66). Service to the emperor is portrayed here not as mere submission to a political sovereign but the “spontaneous obedience of deep faith”, a faith in the Emperor as well as in “the cause behind...the Imperial Line and its dignity, of which there is no parallel in foreign countries” (Ito, et. al., 67). This last note about the unique specificity of the *Kokutai* entity/essence to Japan on a political-theological level being moreover *superior* in its uniqueness is important to note, for it is the first time in this wartime text that the authors relate the Japanese national spirit to the realm of international political relations.

These comparisons and assertions of superiority as opposed to foreign nations are continued as the text goes on, with the Meiji Constitution noted as merely codifying in a modern notion of law the place of the Emperor that was already eternally established in Heaven, and this

establishment therefore marking the Emperor as politically and theologically distinct from *any* other sovereign on Earth:

“Wherefore, the Emperor differs from the sovereigns of foreign countries, is not a ruler set up by reason of necessity for the administration of a country, nor is he a sovereign chosen and settled upon by subjects on grounds of intelligence or virtues” (Ito, et. al., 71).

This quotation in particular sets apart the Japanese Empire as both divinely and *politically* superior to its foreign opponents, for the role of the Emperor is not only divinely ordained, but the Japanese people’s obedience to him is a matter of filial faith and piety rather than merely legally-necessitated (at least, according to the religious rationale of the text’s State Shinto ideology). In fact, the text further states that the relationship between sovereign and people in Japan is divinely protected from the sort of revolutionary pressures against governments that arise in foreign nations whose political decision-making is “purely the result of men’s doing and men’s influences” (Ito, et. al., 66-67). In this way, a further parallel can be drawn between the Political Theology of *Kokutai* and that of Schmitt’s *respublica Cristiana* as discussed in chapter three of this thesis, for the *Kokutai no Hongi*’s description of the (divine) Imperial system as a stabilizing, *restraining* force against the forces of chaos and revolution endemic to foreign countries is strikingly similar to that of Schmitt’s *Katechon*, a divine force against *restraining* the end of a political order on divine command.

Moreover, though, the text goes out of its way to make an essential distinction even further between the Japanese subjects of the Emperor and what it called the “so-called citizens” of the Western nations (Ito, et. al., 79). The former are portrayed as “united in mind by the very spirit in which many deities served...when...the Imperial Grandchild...descended to earth”, again sharing in the divine foundations of the national essence on an organic level, whereas the latter are described as “conglomerations of separate individuals independent of each other”, who support a ruler while there is “no deep foundation between ruler and citizen to unite them” (Ito, et. al., 79). The *organicity* of the *Kokutai*-bound relationship between the Japanese nation and their Emperor is especially stressed here (even if the word *organic* is not specifically used), for the text notes that the Japanese relationship is “a Way ‘naturally’ one in essence with nature and man united as one”, again a similarity with the noted *terrisme* (telluricity) ascribed by Schmitt to Catholic Political Theology and its instantiations across Medieval Europe (Ito, et. al., 80; Schmitt, *Partisan*, 70-76;

Catholicism, 10-12, 28-29). This organicity is contrasted to that of the West's citizen-ruler relationship, which the text claims is instead *artificial*, the mere bowing down to any authority for its own sake as a state authority (Ito, et. al., 80-81). *Kokutai Thought* explicitly and fundamentally rejects the claimed Western precepts of "treating the individual as supreme...from personal abstract consciousness", in favor of an *organic* political-theological organization resting at the very heart of the national people of Japan (Ito, et. al., 81-82).

However, *Kokutai Thought* was not merely concerned with discussing the superiority of the Japanese national essence and political-theological structure to those of other countries, but additionally, in the case of the ideas expressed in the *Kokutai no Hongi*, also concerned itself with the international expansion and international relations of the Japanese Empire with those of its surrounding East Asian neighbor states. It is first and foremost apparent that the *Kokutai no Hongi* seeks to provide a political-theological justification for the establishment via military force of a Greater East Asia *realm* governed under the Japanese Empire. In describing the history of the state of Japan, the text relays that according to State Shinto tradition, Amaterasu granted to her posterity the land of Yamato province/prefecture, from which divine rights to the surrounding lands of Japan were successively granted to the Imperial House towards their role of "keeping the Land at peace...everywhere" (Ito, et. al., 74). This historical religious case is presented, within the broader political and propagandistic goals of the text, in order to justify the following claims that then-contemporary expansions by the Japanese Empire into East Asia during the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars were merely the continuation of this divinely-ordained territorial conquest and realm-wide peacekeeping (Ito, et. al., 74-75). Moreover, when the text specifically states that "in recent times... the annexation of Korea, and the efforts exerted in the founding of Manchoukuo, are one and all but expressions of the great august Will replying to... the granting of the Land by the Imperial Ancestor", it moreover notes that these expansions (as with their historical antecedents) were granted towards "promoting the peace of the country...thus radiating the grace of the Imperial Throne" (Ito, et. al., 75).

Even beyond these explicitly mytho-historical precedent cases, the *Kokutai no Hongi* also moves to justify this territorial expansion on then-contemporary political terms, noting that it is the role of the Japanese military to fulfill the "Imperial Mandate" to "make our national prestige greatly felt within and without our country, to preserve the peace of the Orient in the face of the

world powers, and to preserve and enhance the happiness of mankind” (Ito, et. al., 171). This language holds a double meaning, with the two-fold aims of the Mandate mirroring those divine ordinances mentioned previously at Japan’s founding; to both keep the peace in the realm, and to spread Japanese national spirit (and therefore, prestige) through the sort of *radiance* attributed to the Emperor’s rule (Ito, et. al., 75, 171-172). The addition of the phrase “in the face of the world powers” additionally adds to the idea that the *Kokutai no Hongi* is here concerned with establishing a case for a Greater East Asian *realm* of Japanese imperial rule, for Japan is presented here as a peacekeeper over a wider sphere of influence or space, a core protecting East Asia from the (Western) Great Powers (Ito, et. al., 171). This assertion of a dually spiritual and concrete-spatial realm at-once perhaps draws an invitation to an additional similarity with Schmittian *Realism* in particular, for in portraying itself as a protector of the bounded East Asian *realm* from outside forces on partially-theological lines, *Kokutai* Thought again positions itself as an Eastern parallel to the Schmittian-European *Katechon* of Christendom, defending the bounded realm of Europe from Islamic foreign powers. On this point, scholars such as Max Ward have noted the presence within documents of *Kokutai* Thought of specific references to *seisen* (translated as “Holy War”), which for the purposes of this subchapter only further serve to illustrate the proposed mirroring here of Schmitt’s Western Political Theology in the external Japanese case (Ward, 479). Furthermore, the text asserts the specifically *concrete* nature of Japanese state power’s existence in comparison to that of the West, but specifically does so on what are recognizably “Realist” terms from a Western perspective. It describes the Meiji Constitution as “not a thing that has been turned into a norm”, and further decrying Western political order as one that “loses sight of the totality and concreteness of human being and deviates from the reality of human existence”, in contrast to the organic outgrowth claimed by the Japanese (Ito et. al., 161-162, 176). In admonishing “Occidental institutions” as embodying “abstractions that have lost sight of realities”, a (mirrored) sort of Realism emerges here from a certain point of view, one which in a focus on “reality” is certainly recognizable to students of IR Theory (Ito, et. al., 178).

Therefore, in the *Kokutai no Hongi*, what is being proposed is again a *realm* of Japanese Imperial expansion and control, but one directly positioned in opposition to Western abstract individualism and liberalism, and which claims to defend East Asia as a whole (regardless of its actual intents) from “universal theories” embraced by the West “rather than concrete nations and their characteristic qualities” (Ito, et. al., 180-181). This language is not merely similar to

Schmittian Realism in its political-theological foundations, but further in its claimed opposition to universal abstract ideologies and the states which employ them in international relations. The “national entity” of *Kokutai* is proposed to pursue the task of “maintain the prosperity of the Imperial Throne which is coeval with heaven and earth” both “at Home and abroad”, goals presented as “Our contributions to the world” by the Japanese Empire in the *Kokutai no Hongi* (Ito et. al., 183). Moreover, this mission is further explicitly applied to a now directly-named *realm* of “Greater East Asia” in other Imperial texts such as the “Imperial Rescript on Education”, which is stated to hold Japan as its “nucleus”, and East Asia as a “related whole” whose specifically *geographical* significance must be taught in context of any “European and American invasion of East Asia” (Ito, et. al., 195). In this case, the parallel of *Katechon* in *Kokutai* is nothing but obvious.

This specific reference to Japan as a *nucleus* state within a wider international imperial *realm* will be of greater significance during chapter five of this thesis, where a proper comparison of Schmittian Realism with *Kokutai* Thought will be conducted with specific reference to a critical view of Schmitt’s concept of *Großraum* Order. With that foreshadowing set out, it must be mentioned again that its inclusion in this chapter serves above all to firmly establish the position of this thesis’ analysis that *Kokutai* as a particularly Japanese political-theological framework provides a *strikingly mirrored* Eastern parallel to consider as an external case study to the Concrete Order thinking, *Nomos* instantiations, and civilizationally-bounded Political Theology of Schmittian Realism. However, much like with Schmittian Realism and its Political Theology in-particular, *Kokutai* Thought encountered a “Closure” of its own, and while the exact “Closure” of Schmittian *political* thought has yet to be discussed (receiving its attention again in the following chapter of this thesis), the remainder of this chapter will now discuss the (again supposed) “Closure” of *Kokutai* following the Second World War, and thereafter the legacy of the concept-framework since.

4.2 – The “Closure” and Legacy of *Kokutai* Thought, Post-War.

With the end of the Second World War, Imperial Japan ceased to exist, and with it, the Meiji Constitution was amended and replaced in 1947 with a new liberal-democratic constitution imposed by the American occupation forces, a constitution which remains in force in Japan until the present (Oda, 21). Considering that this wholesale replacement occurred both in Japan’s system of government (moving from direct Imperial Rule to a liberal-democratic constitutional monarchy)

and in its constitution therewithin as a codifying legal document, it is first worth mentioning that the Post-War Constitution began with a wholesale revision of the most fundamental aspects grounding the prior Imperial Order, that being the political-theological notions of the Imperial *Kokutai*.

The preamble to the Post-War Constitution begins in a manner similar to that of the American Constitution, stating fundamentally and undeniably that in a fundamental reversal in orientation to the Imperial Regime, Japan now operated on a principle of *popular sovereignty*:

“We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout the land...do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and...firmly establish this constitution” (Japan, Preamble).

Following this “declaration” at the document’s opening, the Post-War Constitution then moves during the remainder of its preamble to reaffirm the fundamentally new and liberal-democratic orientation of the new Japanese political regime, describing the new constitution’s popular sovereignty as a “universal principle of mankind”, and further asserting that “the laws of political morality are universal” rather than being particular and unique to any specific nation or people (Japan, Preamble). These commitments to universal and liberal conceptions of sovereignty and political morality are immediately noticeable as being in direct contrast, again, with the prior Meiji Constitution, and this much is tacitly acknowledged by the new preamble as well, which explicitly states that the Japanese people “reject and revoke all constitutions, laws, ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith” (Japan, Preamble). This mention of *revocation* is crucially important, for it not only means to signal and further codify a legal and moreover *popular* rejection of the prior order at its most fundamental levels. Imperial ordinances, the Imperial Constitution, and even supplementary documents such as the aforementioned Imperial Rescript on Education (which again spoke of Greater East Asia and further applications of *Kokutai* Thought) were not merely being replaced by an occupying power but by the democratic will of the Japanese nation, in accordance with universal, rather than particularly Japanese, political-moral ideals.

Where the preamble of the Post-War Constitution sought to establish the foundations of the new order in the rejection of its predecessor, the first chapter which directly followed it likewise reshaped and affirmed the new place of the Emperor within Japanese political reality. Stating that the Emperor was the “symbol of the State and the unity of the people”, Article One of the Post-War Constitution further distinguished itself from its Meiji-era counterpart by noting that the Emperor’s new *symbolic* nature was based in (his) “deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power” (Japan, Article 1). Moreover, where Article One defined the Emperor as a symbolic and popularly-ordained figure, Articles Three and Four likewise restrict him from holding *any* governmental power, and additionally restrain his new formal state functions to those approved by the Cabinet; where the *status* of the Emperor was left in a heavily-constrained form via its linkage to popular sovereignty, his *political* power was removed altogether (Japan, Articles 1, 3-4).

It must be noted here that the nature of this change in Japan’s fundamental political structure and order was moreover a wholesale revolution, or rather, a “*Closure*”, of any theological order within the country. Under the American occupation forces, “Shintoism was... separated from the State”, and “Education on Shintoism and Confucian ethics” was removed across the country, a sign that liberal universalism took absolute primacy in the new Japan over the old system of *organic* and particular political-theological orientation (Oda, 20). This theological “Closure” was first accomplished, even before the enactment of the Post-War Constitution, through a rescript issued on New Year’s Day in 1946 at the onset of the occupation which stated a thorough denial by the new regime of “the false conception that the Emperor is divine and that the Japanese people are superior to other races” (Ito, et. al., 196-197). Given that the Meiji Constitution and the *Kokutai no Hongi* firmly established the divinity and absolute political sovereignty of the Emperor as *the* core of the Japanese national essence, the very notion of *Kokutai* as a distinctly Japanese political-theological concept therefore seems to have been thoroughly “Closed” (in a Schmittian sense) with the advent of the Post-War Constitution; *any* Japanese political theology was declared (legally) impossible.

Of course, with this declaration being made of a located “Closure” of *Kokutai* as a distinctly and organically Japanese political theology, it is worth making a very brief return to Schmitt’s *Political Theology II* to examine what exactly “Closure” means in the again external (non-Western

and non-Christian) context of the transition from Imperial to Post-War Japan. First, regarding “Closure”, Schmitt notes that the word, especially in its original German (*Erledigung*) “is not a theological term”, and that therefore, while it is simple to tie a notion of “Closure” to the *end* of any particular political theology within a country or on an academic level, upon more detailed consideration it becomes the task of academic examiners to determine how exactly the term is understood on a theological level (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 105). However, he then later states that in the case of the supposed “Closure” of *Christian* political theology which Schmitt writes on, this is/was “*theologically* brought to an end as a *political* problem”, meaning “either...that it is brought to an end *because* it is a political and not a theological problem...or it is brought to an end *despite* being a political problem...it can be brought to an end (also) as a political problem, from a theological perspective” (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 106). While this extracted quotation is quite complex in its entailed messaging, what is clear from its wording is that the interaction of the two fields considered (the political and the theological) does not matter as much as the fact that for an essentially two-fold concept such as Political Theology, the closure of the political dimension (by whichever motive, theological or otherwise) likewise entails the closure of its theological counterpart-companion. As Schmitt himself notes, theology and law (and perhaps then by extension, politics, recalling his connection between the legal and the political via the concept of *Recht* as discussed in chapter two of this thesis) are “two academic disciplines which work, to a large extent, with structurally compatible concepts” (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 107).

All of this is to say, then, that with reference to the case of *Kokutai*, the fact that it instantiated in the specific unitary figure of the Emperor as a political-theological actor (and according to State Shinto, a deity in himself) thereby renders this aforementioned *structural compatibility* between any examination of a dually political and theological “Closure”. Where the *Kokutai no Hongi* referred to the status of the Emperor and the Imperial Throne as “coeval with heaven and earth”, it asserted a unitary political authority in said Throne and its divine occupant which although ordained on theological grounds was executed politically both by the person of the Emperor and *through* the dutiful obligation of the Japanese people to his will (Ito, et. al., 65, 117, 172). By legally (in the Post-War Constitution) and moreover personally-communicatively (through Imperial rescript, as previously mentioned) denying the divinity of the Emperor on one hand and denying his political authority on the other, *Kokutai* as both a political and a theological

concept encountered what was again seemingly a thorough “Closure” adaptable to that definition used in the Schmittian mould.

Moreover, even beyond the core of *Kokutai* as a Political-Theological concept, other elements of the broader framework of *Kokutai* Thought were themselves “Closed” with the advent of the new Post-War Constitution, with the most easily locatable of these being that of the aforementioned “national character” so similar in name to the “national essence” at *Kokutai*’s definitional foundation. The “Closure” of this character-element is primarily locatable in Article Nine of the Post-War Constitution, which states that “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes...the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized” (Japan, Article 9). This remark, aside from its clear legal-political implications, directly imposes “Closure” on the element of *Kokutai* (per the *Kokutai no Hongi*) termed as Japan’s “sacred martial spirit”, which through war is “a thing for the bringing about of great harmony” (Ito, et. al., 94-95). While this is not to say that this aforementioned martial spirit was the *sole* defining element of Japanese national character (for such a statement would of course be foolish by any standard academic or otherwise), it nonetheless remains the case that in declaring a fundamental renunciation of war by the Japanese *sovereign people*, the essential “spirit” associated with that war and attributed to the again political-theological foundation of the nation is likewise subject to “Closure” in the Schmittian sense (Ito, et. al., 94-95).

Even beyond the case of martial spirit, the Japanese national character (at least that as defined again the *Kokutai no Hongi*) was moreover subject to “Closure” in the Post-War Constitutions aforementioned dedication of the sovereign nation/people to universal ideals and a universal political morality, insofar as *Kokutai* Thought again maintained a *particular* and *organic* outgrowth of a distinctive Japanese spirit, character, and culture as manifested in its particular *concrete* political organization and ordering. Where the *Kokutai no Hongi* in-fact decried “universal theories common to the entire world” as the antithesis of “concrete nations and their characteristic qualities”, and moreover claimed that Western liberal democracy yielded a state where “concrete and historical national life became lost in the shadow of abstract theories”, the universal political morality and “universal principles of mankind...incumbent upon all nations”

codified at the start of the Post-War Constitution substitutes this earlier notion of a particular national character's instantiation with those universalities that said character had itself rejected (Ito, et. al., 180-181; Japan, Preamble). In both its fundamental political theology and in its further constituent elements thereafter as a national essence, the advent of the Post-War order in Japan brought with it the "Closure" of the essential aspects of *Kokutai* as articulated in seminal documents of the Imperial era.

However, while these specific political-theological and even broader character-concerned elements of *Kokutai* were themselves certainly subject to "Closure" in the Schmittian sense after the end of the Second World War, there still remains a degree of both historical and scholarly discussion as to whether or not *Kokutai* was subject to (to borrow the term used by Schmitt in *Political Theology II*) a specifically *final* and thereby complete "Closure" within the Japanese political order as a whole. In an appendix to the *Kokutai no Hongi*, an expository document by the Imperial Cabinet in 1946 (as the Post-War Constitution had nearly come into effect) is detailed which claims that despite the clear changes to the core of the Japanese political system, "the *Kokutai* has not changed" (Ito, et. al., 198). Now, of course, this claim is clearly made with acknowledgement of the obvious and fundamental "change that has taken place in the Emperor's position", but even with this disclaimer noted, the document still holds to the belief that insofar as *Kokutai* (again as "national entity" in this translation) can be interpreted as "basic characteristics of the nation", it is up for debate whether or not the Post-War reforms constitute a change in these basic characteristics of the *entity*, rather than merely the form of government (Ito, et. al., 198-200). Of course, the document notes the difficulty in distinguishing, especially given the Meiji-era view that the "link...deep down in their hearts" between the people and the Emperor as eternal sovereign are the "basis of Japan's existence", whether or not "national entity" refers merely to a certain form of government or to a wider concept beyond specific "institutional characteristics" (Ito, et. al., 198-200). Where the government and the entity-type/*essence* of the nation are so closely linked in one form as they were under the Meiji Constitution and its resultant *Kokutai* framework, it might then seem bizarre for this document to assert that *Kokutai* has not fundamentally changed.

From the perspective of the Imperial Cabinet in this case, though, there was a solution, that perhaps the passage of the Post-War Constitution via those *amendment* principles espoused in Article Seventy-Three of the Meiji Constitution implied a certain "immutability of the national

entity...consequent oneness of the State, and further...continuity of the Constitution” which then allowed for the transition in order to occur “without any feelings of inconsistency” (Ito, et. al, 199; Meiji Draft Committee, *Constitution*, Article 73). Cabinet members also considered the additional possibility that perhaps the retaining of the Emperor as a symbolic figure alongside the declaration of popular sovereignty presented a sort of “awakening” (to borrow the terminology used by the Cabinet themselves) regarding the meaning of *Kokutai* as a concept, whereby “the intrinsic qualities of the sovereignty resting with the people have existed in the past” and therefore “sovereignty has always rested with the entire nation, the Emperor having been the controlling organ of national rights” (Ito, et. al., 199). Now, whether or not this discussion and debate regarding a potential (non)change in *Kokutai* are to be taken as-stated or with a degree of skepticism on the part of the Imperial Cabinet is a matter for the discernment of any individual student of this case, but as far as this thesis is concerned, it is difficult to accept, at least based on the sources considered hereabove, that this aforementioned conceptual “awakening” was not in-part motivated by the ongoing occupation of Japan by a foreign government which was imposing upon it a new conception of political order. The fact that the Imperial Cabinet in this document states that the above solution/discussion entails “the Government’s view concerning our national entity and sovereignty” but moreover how even despite this being the government position that “differences of views will probably remain in the future as a scholastic problem regarding the interpretation of the New Constitution”, makes it more-likely, it seems, that perhaps these declarations are being made from a *political*, rather than a genuinely ideational, point of analysis (Ito, et. al., 199-200).

With all of this being said, then, it is ultimately impossible (owing to methodological constraints and a further lack of historical context in terms of discerning the motives of statements made by individual authors and groups of authors within these concerned sources) for this thesis to make a clear statement one way or the another as to whether or not a *final* “Closure” of *Kokutai* occurred, given the aforementioned possibility and further assertion of a change in the meaning of the term-concept over time. However, what the thesis very much *is* capable of doing is stating again that with reference to *Kokutai* as it is specifically outlined and instantiated through sources such as the Meiji Constitution, Imperial Rescript on Education, and the *Kokutai no Hongi*, the *particularly Japanese organic Political Theology* which the term entails was *most certainly* met with “Closure” with the historical imposition of the Post-War order unto Japan in 1947. Concrete instances of Political Theology were replaced with universal and abstract notions of liberal

democracy, and the concrete powers of the Emperor as a decisionistic actor were rejected and replaced with a symbolic role removed of both its concrete and further theological significance. The “Closure” of *Kokutai* insofar as it presents a Japanese parallel to the Western *Nomos* of Schmittian Realism, can be confidently located and declared.

Finally, however, while *Kokutai* was therefore “Closed”, this does not mean that it was left without a *legacy* in the Japanese political order and broader national character. While not invoked directly by-name, the notion that Japan has a specific national character which is embodied in-part in its political order and organization still finds relevance in contemporary debates surrounding a potential revision to the Japanese Post-War Constitution. In the proposed amended Constitution by drafted by Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 2012, various aspects of the Post-War Constitution have seen their overt liberal democratic and universal moral-political elements lessened in declarative extremity, whereas other previously changed elements, such as the role of the Emperor, are elaborated upon with decidedly *national character*-concerned language. When the draft, for example, proposes a rewritten preamble, rather than referring to the “universal principle of mankind” or that the “laws of political morality are universal” it instead talks of how Japan has a “long history and unique culture, having the Emperor as the symbol of the unity of the people”, and of how Japan establishes the constitution “in order to pass on our good traditions and our nation to posterity” (Liberal Democratic Party, preamble). This language is a clear move away from the universal and again towards the *concrete* and the *particular*, mentioning Japan-specific national facets in the proposed draft which were previously *universal* in the 1947 original. Beyond the proposed amended preamble, Article One of the draft adds the role of “head of the State” to the description of the Emperor *before* his description as “symbol of the State”, a move which does not confer any political power upon the Imperial Throne, but which again nonetheless affirms a specific *State*-level importance of the Emperor in a concrete manner prior to the previously-codified symbolic one; a concrete *presence* is given to a concrete member of the state apparatus (Liberal Democratic Party, Article 1).

Article Nine, meanwhile, while not anywhere-near mentioning the “martial spirit” of the Imperial *Kokutai*, is yet proposed to remove the revocation of state belligerency and the “forever” timing of its renunciation of war, and moreover explicitly gives the “National Defense Military” powers of self-defense “In order to secure peace and independence for our nation as well as the

safety of the State and the people” (Liberal Democratic Party, Article 9). This language is again markedly more *specific and particular* to Japan as a sovereign and independent nation, proposing a view of national sovereignty which is predicated on self-defense, a significant departure from the preamble of the 1947 Constitution, which describes Japan as merely seeking “an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace” (on this international level), and moreover attributes the duty to the Japanese nation to “justify their sovereign relationship with other nations” (Japan, preamble).

Finally, and perhaps the most relevant to this subchapter regarding the legacy of *Kokutai* as a specific and particular *Political Theology*, the proposed draft constituted amends Article Twenty (on religious freedom) to remove the line that “No religious organization shall exercise any political authority”, while also adding that while the state must “refrain from particular religious education and other religious activities...this provision shall not apply to activities that do not exceed the scope of social rituals or customary practices” (Liberal Democratic Party, Article 20). Taken together with the earlier-mentioned preamble proposals regarding the passing on of good traditions and unique culture, this language in particular, perhaps more than any other in the draft proposal, evokes the *legacy* of some political-theology understanding of a particular Japanese *Kokutai*. Where particular social rituals or practices innate to Japan’s (Shinto, Buddhist, or some combination thereof, by the implication of tradition) claimed *unique culture* are tentatively not punished when committed by state actors, some degree of alignment between the political and the theological is certainly evident in this proposed Article-amendment, especially when considered as an outgrowth of a reaffirmed *national character* in Japan’s constitutional foundations. Again, while the changes here are by no means even remotely similar to those ideas expressed in explicit terms in older Imperial *Kokutai*-minded texts, the broader themes within Article Twenty and the proposed draft Constitution more-broadly do seem to ultimately demonstrate the *legacy* of at-least some elements of earlier *Kokutai* thought within ongoing debates on the nature of Japan’s political organization.

In an article discussing the development of *Kokutai* during Japan’s revived Imperial Period, scholar Satofumi Kawamura notes the concept is “one of the most problematic...in Japanese modern politics”, and that its revival “continued to be a controversial issue raised by conservative intellectuals and politicians” during the Post-War era (Kawamura, 25-26). In the process of this

discussion, Kawamura claims that discourses surrounding the meaning and application of *Kokutai* were themselves “complex, ambiguous, and paradoxical”, and that debates on the topic, both during the Imperial Era and afterwards, often entailed interlocutors accepting multiple usages for the term as a political principle on rational grounds, even when they may have seemed contradictory to one another in-practice (Kawamura, 26, 37-38). In this way, perhaps the above-identified *legacy* of *Kokutai* is more complex than evidence of its hard “Closure” might have originally suggested. While the specific and explicit political-theological tenets of the framework were most-certainly subject to definitive “Closure” with the end of the Imperial Order, it is the position again of this thesis that, especially as it relates to the broader notion of national character (in a Morgenthau-esque Realist framing), *Kokutai* was not subject to any *final* “Closure”. The particular version of the concept which strikingly paralleled the *Nomos* orders of Schmittian Realism was put to a political and theological end, yes, but debates and discussions surrounding its legacy in contemporary Japan ultimately paint an again more-complex picture.

As of the writing of this thesis, the proposed draft Constitution by the LDP has not been approved by the Japanese National Diet, and therefore the status of the Post-War Constitution vis-à-vis any potential amendments remains to be concluded in the future. Nonetheless, the example of the proposed revisions demonstrates that the legacy of *Kokutai*, post-“Closure”, is one which while difficult to properly define is likewise easy to locate in-context. In the external case of Japan, *Kokutai* might yet remain (even if in a vestigial form) during what is otherwise an “Age of Closure”.

However, with this external case study now extensively discussed and analyzed, the project remains for this thesis to consider the *Kokutai* example (both in its historical form and in any legacy-remnants) alongside Schmittian Realism and the case of that framework’s again supposed “Closure” within international relations practice and theory. Towards that end, the following chapter will now discuss both the Western and Eastern frameworks (and therefore also the Western and Eastern *Nomoi* considered within them) beside one-another in a comparative fashion, so that the legacy and place of Schmittian Realism might be similarly identified and perhaps then extracted with reference to the claimed Realist Tradition of Mainstream IR scholarship.

Chapter 5: Schmittian Realism and *Kokutai* Thought under Comparative Analysis.

When looking to draw comparisons between Schmittian Realism on one hand and the various instantiations and interpretations of *Kokutai* and *Kokutai* Thought on the other, it is important at the outset of any such analysis of the two ideational frameworks considered to note that they are again both grounded in *Concrete* political reality. Even when taking into account their inherent and *crucially* important political-theological elements and foundations, it is evident that both Schmittian Realism and *Kokutai* Thought are inherently *Concrete* views of political order, tied to a *particular, organic*, and thereafter perhaps *telluric* account of the origin and organization of European and Japanese *Nomoi*, respectively. With this inherent *concreteness* restated, then, in beginning its comparative analysis between both the Schmittian Realist “theory” and the external Japanese case study of *Kokutai* this chapter must therefore begin by examining the aforementioned concrete-*spatial* organization of these two respective frameworks.

Recalling the findings of the previous chapter, there is an immediate and clear set of parallels that can be drawn between Schmittian Realism’s key spatial notion of *Nomos* and the specific Imperial Japanese notion of *Kokutai*, with the former again referring to the organization of people(s) into territories on either a national or international level; an international relations and state organization-concerned reframing of as “the first measure of all subsequent measures” (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 67-70). Moreover, this particular and implied *organic* arrangement of peoples into these political units again took place along political-theological lines within the Schmittian framework, forming (in the historical cases mentioned by Schmitt) bounded realms whereby spatial and religious civilizational lines served as spiritual and territorial borders simultaneously (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 62, 67-70, 91, 100). With this expanded definition of *Nomos* in mind then, *Kokutai*, being the *national essence* of Imperial Japan, personified in the divinely ordained arrangement of the Japanese nation into the Imperial State under the Imperial Throne, certainly fits the conceptual bounds of a Schmittian *Nomos*. However, beyond these immediate comparisons, *Kokutai* Thought contains one specific element which this thesis has not yet touched on in-depth regarding Schmittian Realism’s discussed *Nomos* instantiations, the notion of a *realm* on the international *spatial* level.

5.1 – *Kokutai* and *Großraum* in Historical Context.

In the Imperial Rescript on Education mentioned again in the *Kokutai no Hongi*, readers can recall that Japan is proposed under *Kokutai* Thought to serve as the “nucleus” of “Greater East Asia”, an Imperial realm which is still included in the wider political-theological plan for the Japanese national project, but which is ultimately defined on *spatial* and *geographic* terms (Ito, et. al., 195). In particular, this realm is framed in terms of specific geopolitical-civilizational threat, whereby not the Japanese mainland but its “related whole” in Korea and Manchuria (“Manchukuo”) are in danger from “European and American invasion”, and therefore require protection by the Japanese Imperial Government, making it clear to students of the topic that according to this particular form of *Kokutai* Thought, the Japanese *realm* was first *spatially-organized* on the international level, rather than theologically; Concrete Order again grounds the wider theory of *Nomos* above it (Ito, et. al., 195).

In comparison to Schmittian Realism, though, this model of nucleus and what this thesis will now deem the periphery or frontier territories (the “related whole” of *Kokutai* Thought) shares less of a parallel with the *JPE*, Schmittian Realism’s primarily-exemplified *Nomos*, and in-fact has more fundamentally in-common with the American government’s declared “Monroe Doctrine, what Schmitt again deemed an example of *Großraum* Order (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 237, 238-240, 253; *Grossraum*, 80-84). *Großraum*, translated from German as *great space* or *great order*, is defined by Schmitt in *Nomos of the Earth* as a spatially defined “sphere of international law”, and refers dually to a “territorial concrete spatial order” consisting of multiple bounded nations (beyond normative conceptions of the sovereign state), and to the further aforementioned *international law* whereby a central nucleus-state (identified by Schmitt as a *Reich*) exercises a regional legal-political sphere of influences over the so-called *great space* (Schmitt, *Grossraum*, 77-84; Luoma-Aho, 37-41). The former of these two entailed elements of *Großraum* is referred to as the *concrete Großraum*, and the latter the wider *Großraum order* (Schmitt, *Grossraum*, 77). Both are located on explicitly spatial terms, and rely upon the central *Reich*’s claim again to a “natural” sphere of interest and further sphere of international jurisprudence beyond the core state; the *suprapersonal* Concrete Order is again the foundation of any notion of “international” law organized thereafter (Schmitt, *Grossraum*, 79-84; Luoma-Aho, 37-40). However, the latter can exist separate from the former in specific cases, as in the example of the Monroe Doctrine,

the United States laid claim to a bounded sphere of regional influence without exercising direct political and spatial control over the entire Western Hemisphere (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 281-283).

Detailing his thoughts on the concept of *Großraum* in an essay published in 1941, Schmitt notes that “International law is...as a law of nations, first and foremost a *personal* concrete order – an order, in other words, determined on the basis of belonging to a nation or state”, again recalling the *suprapersonal* nature of Concrete Order as mentioned in the previous paragraph, but moreover also implying a role for *appropriation* within national-political ordering (Schmitt, *Grossraum*, 77). Where Schmitt stated in the aforementioned *Großraum* essay of 1941 that “The principle of order assigned to the concept of nation in international law is the right of national self-determination”, he later wrote in 1953 that his notion of *Nomos* contained the notion of *appropriation* as its first of three *applied* meanings entailed within the term (alongside *distribution* and *production*); these later remarks firmly establishing that within Schmittian international thought the domestic assertion of any State-*Nomos* is in-fact appropriative self-determination from an international point of analysis (Schmitt, *Grossraum*, 77; “Appropriation”, 52-55). Moreover, though, within the sphere of international relations *between* states the *Großraum* represents the international appropriation of land into a *realm* whose conceptual and definitional boundaries rest beyond traditional notions of the state within European jurisprudence (according to Schmitt), and therefore, *Großraum* innately reflects a *spatial order* which in a Schmittian view is principally assigned after or alongside that aforementioned *national* angle of determination (Schmitt, *Grossraum*, 77).

Through this sort of international appropriation, the *Großraum order* then can be located as an additional *sort* of instantiation of the Schmittian *Nomos*, and, alongside the Monroe Doctrine, it is the perspective of this thesis that *Kokutai* Thought’s conception and assertion of a Japanese concrete spatial order in “Greater East Asia” (realized through Japanese external holdings in Korea and Manchuria) represents this sort of *Großraum* and wider *Großraum order*. While it is important to note that Schmitt himself does not make such an explicit connection (the word explicit being important, as we shall soon see) between his notions of *Großraum* and *Großraum order* and the Japanese case, this thesis nonetheless contends that those territorial claims and organizational realities expressed within *Kokutai* Thought’s essential documents present such striking parallels to the just-discussed concepts that the application of Schmittian labels to them is appropriate on a comparative level. Additionally, Schmitt states that “Many conceptions of... *Großraum* have been

effective at all times in both state law and international law”, opening the conceptual-definitional door, so to speak, that an external example of *Großraum* might be found in East Asia even if not mentioned directly by Schmitt himself (Schmitt, *Grossraum*, 79). Where *Nomos* has many instantiations (including the *Großraum*), the *Großraum* itself can perhaps likewise instantiate in several forms in a recursive manner. However, while Schmitt again does not directly mention a Japanese *Großraum* via the explicit usage of that phrase, he nonetheless does mention that historical discussions occurred at the turn of the twentieth century in the United States regarding the potential of an “Asian Monroe theory” or even a “Japanese Monroe theory” more specifically (Schmitt, *Grossraum*, 89-90). He then further states that the Japanese conquest of Manchuria “was unpleasant” in its reflection of a “Japanese Monroe Doctrine”, with *doctrine* here being the operative word differing from *theory* in the applicative sense of military power rather than the mere assertion of a sphere of influence (Schmitt, *Grossraum*, 90). With this information in-mind, it becomes much more comfortable for an analysis such as this one to suggest that, in a specifically Schmittian frame of reference, the labeling of *Kokutai* Thought’s instantiated Greater East Asia *realm* might itself constitute a *Großraum/Großraum order* as the Monroe Doctrine did.

In the case of *Kokutai* specifically, where Japan is presented as the nucleus of Greater East Asia within the Japanese Empire, it serves the role of the *Großraum*’s *Reich* in the Schmittian framework, the core state outward from which what Schmitt calls “connected achievement” throughout the wider realm flows (Schmitt, *Grossraum*, 79). This notion of connected achievement, which in Schmitt’s view lies at the core of *Großraum* as “a comprehensive modern tendency of development of arising areas of human planning, organization, and activity”, likewise seems to find proper and appropriate comparison in *Kokutai* Thought’s language of territorial expansion “radiating the grace of the Imperial Throne” and the national-material prosperity implied by such radiant grace (Schmitt, *Grossraum*, 79; Ito, et. al., 74-75). Moreover, the aforementioned framing of a Japanese presence in East Asia around the protection from potential European or American invasions, on a geopolitical level, helps to place this *Kokutai*-specific iteration of *Großraum order* within the conceptual boundaries of Schmittian *Realism* in-particular. It perhaps suggests (albeit with a degree of irony accounted for, owing to the essentially expansionist and invasive nature of the Japanese presence outside of the nucleus-*Reich* of Japan itself in the Greater East Asian region) a posture against extra-regional conflict reflective of the Monroe Doctrine which Schmitt admires as prudent regionalization (Schmitt, *Grossraum*, 85-88, Ito, et. al., 194-195). This claim to a

specifically *Realist* bend to the *Kokutai Großraum*, as it will henceforth be called, rests both in the aforementioned (perhaps) *defensive posture* reflected in its framing within *Kokutai* literature, and in Schmitt's own descriptions on the *limits* of *Großraum* as a geopolitical spatial concept.

Schmitt, in the same essay where he defines the concept of *Großraum* within the sphere of international politics and international relations, notes that the concreteness at the term's definitional center is essential to its proper application, with specific reference to the case, yet again, of Wilsonian Liberal Internationalism which Schmitt decries (Schmitt, *Grossraum*, 90). Where Schmitt references Wilson's extension of the previously concrete and region-specific posture and scope of the Monroe Doctrine to a so-called "World Doctrine" (then adaptively codified into international law by the Geneva League of Nations), he notes in unambiguously critical terms the ill-impact of this development for the notion of *Großraum* which he originally applied to the Monroe Doctrine case:

"These are typical and telling changes in the meaning of the doctrine. Their methods consist in dissolving a concrete, spatially determined concept of order into universalistic "world" ideas and, in doing so, transforming the healthy core of a *Großraum* principle of international law of non-intervention into a global ideology that interferes in everything, a pan-interventionist ideology as it were, all under the cover of humanitarianism" (Schmitt, *Grossraum*, 90).

Where Schmittian Realism in-general rests its conceptual foundations again in the assertion of the general-realist opposition to universal idealistic principles of liberal international politics and international relations, here it in-particular extends this opposition with reference to the case of *Großraum* as a concept within scholarly, perhaps "theoretical" (owing to the many possible instantiations of the term, as mentioned previously) IR. Where Schmitt both here-quoted above and then after notes that "Universalistic general concepts that encompass the world are the typical weapons of interventionism in international law", the repetition of *typical* and *universalistic* give away the Realist ought-implications of the cases they are here being attached to: *Großraum* is a Realist concept when healthily applied precisely because such a healthy application necessarily entails the purely *concrete*, *regional*, and (external) *non-interventionist* bent Schmitt intended to convey in his original exploration of the term (Schmitt, *Grossraum*, 90).

Applied back to the case of the *Kokutai Großraum*, then, this location of a foundationally Realist element to Schmitt's understanding and proposal of *Großraum* and *Großraum order* as concepts of international politics helps to again tie the otherwise-external Japanese example to the broader conceptual framework of Schmittian Realism at-large. This one case of identified parallelism, the Japanese claim to a defensive posture in its sphere of influence realized in the conquered *Kokutai Großraum*, is not the only one of its kind to be located, however. If we recall that the *Kokutai no Hongi* spoke of Western countries' embrace of "universal theories" in derisive terms, contrasting them with the Japanese Empire's (claimed, again with a grain of salt given its expansionist ambitions) praise of "concrete nations and their characteristic qualities", the *Kokutai Großraum* then might perhaps be interpreted as further asserting the Japanese desire for non-intervention by external powers into the East Asian region, in a manner mirroring that of the American Monroe Doctrine (Ito, et. al., 161-162, 176, 180-181). The *Kokutai Großraum*, from a Schmittian Realist perspective, then *is* the "Japanese Monroe Doctrine" so "unpleasantly" viewed by American government officials during the rise of the East Asian nation to Great Power status (Schmitt, *Grossraum*, 89-90). At least through a *Großraum*-oriented analysis, the Japanese case of *Kokutai* seems to suggest that at least two principles of Schmittian Realism, those of the *Nomos* in-general, and the particular opposition to liberal universalism within any given concrete *Nomos*.

The externality of the Japanese example here moreover *aids* the present investigation in its goal of elucidating and thereafter extracting Schmittian Realism's applied (theoretical) principles within real-world issues of international relations. Where Schmitt's writings concerned the construction and subsequent collapse of various European *Nomoi* such as the *JPE*, the degree of parallelism found in a wholly external case such as that of Japanese *Kokutai* Thought in-practice again helps to present the case that Schmitt's ideas hold wider potential relevancy for globally-interested International Relations thought outside of the European regional sphere. Ironically, perhaps, the wellness of fit located here in an external case study lends credence to the idea that a framework situated around *concrete* and *particular* spatial orders contains a further, generalizable applicability.

This extension of more generally-applicable concepts such as *Großraum* (outside of a solely-European context, as has been seen with both the case of the United States and Japan in this chapter) ultimately perhaps presents the best case that Schmittian Realism as a broader

framework of Realist IR thought presents a dynamic and *contemporarily relevant*, rather than purely historically-concerned, view of international political *reality*. This view of political reality is one which, in tracing the development of the *Nomos* from its particular concrete instantiations within a given state (Germany, for example) to a regional structure (the *JPE*), before this regional structure is finally challenged by external actors both *concrete* (Japan) and *universalist* (the United States) and their *Großraum* conceptions (even if eventually corrupted by liberal ideology) of spatial politics. In this way, the *nostalgia* which Schmitt holds and expresses for the “golden age in European international relations” embodied by the *JPE* in its particularity helps to situate his thought as an again especially *dynamic* form of Realism from a historical-contextual perspective; the decial of discriminatory warfare in the twentieth century under liberal-universalism holds continuity with Schmitt’s similar criticisms levied against Just War Theory, which in his view characterized the inter-European Religious Wars prior to the *JPE*’s instantiation (Brown, “Humanized”, 59-60; Schmitt, *Nomos*, 56. 114, 120-121). Likewise on this point of historical context, comparison of the Japanese *Kokutai Großraum* to that of the *JPE* further emphasizes Schmittian Realism’s thematic focus on *organicity* and *concreteness* within its spatial politics, insofar as any given *Nomos* will express its spatial and concrete orientation on similarly *organic* and *concrete* lines unique to its particular geographic and political-historical circumstances. That the general model of Schmittian Realism’s *Nomos* functions both within and outside of its mainly-concerned European framing renders what is otherwise merely a Realist approach a potential further Realist *theory*, testable and replicable within otherwise unrelated cases.

5.2 – Comparative Analysis vs. the Myth of “Closure”.

Finally, comparison of the role played by Schmittian Political Theology within both the European and Japanese cases reveals again that the Western *theory* finds parallel expression in the Eastern *case study*. Schmitt’s discussion of “Closure” as *myth* contains the temporal marker that such a myth must continue to “live” through its re-expression and authoritative translation into the real use of power to keep it “uncontested” (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 49, 96). With reference to Peterson’s specific *myth* of the “Closure” of (any) European Political Theology, while Schmitt again denies the logical conclusion of the argument put forth on its general level of application, he nonetheless admits that “The real effect of Peterson’s treatise, its wit, one might say, was not

the closure of that big problem [political theology] but the effective use of a political myth” (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 96). Whether or not European (Christian) Political Theology *itself* was finally closed with the triumph of universalist positivism following World War One is not so much Schmitt’s, not this thesis’, concern, rather that the *myth* of such “Closure” endures on a political and theological level within the minds of concerned actors and scholars. Similarly, in the case of *Kokutai* and *Kokutai* Thought, while it is undeniable that the *core* of the *particular* Political Theology inherent to the (Imperial) *Kokutai* framework was legally shuttered in 1947, contemporary political developments such as the proposed LDP Constitutional amendments reflect that the wider *myth* of *Kokutai*’s “Closure” in a particular historical instance might belie vestigial *concrete* remnants of the political-theological phenomenon in-question. Reflecting on the dynamic by which this thematic element of the political-theological relationship within *concrete* politics functions through European history, Schmitt, writing under arrest from 1945-1947 following World War Two in *Ex Captivitate Salus*, notes that:

“There are two remarkable calls for silence at the beginning and at the end of epoch. At the beginning lies a call for silence that emanates from jurists and is directed at the theologians of just war. At the end lies a demand, directed at jurists, for pure – in other words completely profane – technicity. I do not wish to discuss here the connection between the two orders of silence. It is merely good and salutary to recall that the situation was no less brutal at the beginning of the epoch than it is at its end. Every situation has its secret, and every scholarly discipline bears its secret [*arcanum*] within itself.” (Schmitt, *Captivitate*, 60).

In this passage, it is clear that Schmitt’s expression of the historical development of attitudes surrounding the relationship between political technique and theological jurisprudence is not his concern so much as the *concrete* contexts and forces that interacted with such a relationship; the particular and *concrete* are paramount over the abstract, a thoroughly *Realist* expression of political-theological reality. This sentiment is made even clearer when Schmitt states later that “theologians tend to define the enemy as something that must be destroyed. But I a jurist, not a theologian”, an assertion that it is political (and thereafter *political-theological*) *reality* by which his thought discerns and renders judgment upon concepts and events: “Whom in the world can I acknowledge as my Enemy? Clearly only him who can call me into question. By

recognizing him as enemy I acknowledge that he can call me into question...One categorizes oneself through one's enemy" (Schmitt, *Captivitate*, 71). Only by identifying the external and oppositional can the original frame of reference, then, be properly identified and understood *qua* itself. Likewise, *Kokutai* thought ultimately reflects Schmittian Realism's enduring relevance and particularist analytical lens back onto the European framework again as IR *Theory*.

This chapter overall has demonstrated that through comparative analysis of the key themes found within Schmittian Realism (Concrete Order, *Nomos*, and Political Theology) and the particular case study of Japanese *Kokutai* and *Kokutai* Thought, the former framework can in-fact be evaluated and understood as a particular and enduringly relevant form of Realist Thought and perhaps further *Theory* within the field of International Relations. Especially in what might be deemed an "Age of Closure", whether these "Closures" are merely *supposed*, confined to the realm of myth, or if those *myths* are in-fact reflected in concrete political developments, Schmittian Realism, through an elucidative comparison with the history and *legacy* of *Kokutai* in Japanese political reality, provides compelling insights worthy of application and study within contemporary and historical topics of IR scholarship. However, this thesis still has one final task yet to complete, that being to argue for the particular place and distinguishing factor of Schmittian Realism within the Mainstream *Realist* Tradition as aided by the aforementioned case study analysis. Towards this task, the following chapter will now briefly explain, in meta-theoretical terms, how Schmittian Realism can serve as a vehicle for the rehabilitation for the *organic* within Realist theories of IR.

Chapter 6: Schmittian Realism – A Case for the *Organic* in International Relations Theory.

The issue of what exactly distinguishes any particular theory or theoretical approach within the broader “school”, “field”, or “tradition” of Realist International Relations thought is one which is necessarily difficult to properly “solve” in the sense of providing a *final* answer for the purposes of categorization and the formation of academic history. Part of the reason why defining the distinguishing factors of any “Realist Tradition” in-particular proves difficult within the boundaries of mainstream scholarship is that the foundation of any “Realism”, that being so-called *political reality*, is an essentially-contested concept. The very existence of so many different approaches to discussing what entails “political reality” is a testament enough to this essentially-contested labeling being applied to the “tradition” writ large.

For Carl Schmitt, this focus on *political reality* is so essential to his thought both generally and with reference to specific concepts that in one of his earliest works, 1919’s *Political Romanticism*, one of the then-young thinker’s primary critiques of the titular Romantic philosophy is its fundamental opposition to *concrete* reality: the romantics “preferred the state of eternal becoming and possibilities that are never consummated to the confined of concrete reality...A world is destroyed for a narrow-minded reality...Every foundation is false; for with the foundation, a limit is always given as well” (Schmitt, *Romanticism*, 66). Where Schmitt here speaks of (political and general) romanticism’s destruction of the foundations of any given concrete world, the core of his critique is immediately recognizable as mirroring his later remarks on any number of liberal, universalist, positivist, or *idealist* conceptions of the political in thought and in application. In *Concept of the Political*, most famously, his assertion that “The concern here is neither with abstractions nor with normative ideas, but with inherent reality”, makes it clear to any reader that Schmitt values the most fundamental sort of political reality, the *concrete* (as the opposite of the abstract), and the *inherent* (as the opposite of the potential, ideal, or possible): this sort of essential *realism* is crucial to even the most basic elements of Schmittian political thought in-general (Schmitt, *Concept*, 28).

Perhaps ironically, then, it is also within this earliest of Schmitt’s major works that the most useful insights for the purposes of this thesis can be found with reference to the issue discussed in his final key writing, that being the *myth* of “Closure”. Where Schmitt discusses the nature of myth vis-à-vis political reality and history, he notes that for political romantics, “An

impression suggested by historical and political reality is supposed to become the occasion for subjective creativity”, but that this (irrational) subjectivity is “not the irrationality of myth”, for “the creation of a political or a historical myth arises from political activity...arises only in the real war” (Schmitt, *Romanticism*, 160). Much as Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction at the core of his very concept of the political is predicated only on the *real enmity* between existentially threatened actors, a true myth necessitates real political activity for its formation. In this way, then, the (supposed) “Closure” of any political theology which Schmitt deems a myth both meets and fails the criteria set here for a *properly created* myth, depending on the *instance* of “Closure” in-question. In the case of *Kokutai*, for example, the myth surrounding its “Closure” on a political-theological level is in-fact licit, given that it was the hardest of political power which put down the Imperial Japanese regime and its entailed *Kokutai Nomos*. On the other hand, the *generally* discussed “Closure” which Schmitt contends with in *Political Theology II* appears then to be a myth which in its abstracted generalist attitudes lacks the “fabric of reasons, which myth cannot forgo...the emanation of a political energy”: it falls apart upon rational consideration, but remains only on the level of aforementioned “subjective creativity” as a romantically-constructed political *legend* (Schmitt, *Romanticism*, 160). The Schmittian *Nomos* is not a romantic concept, but one historically and spatially-concretely located in a *particular* place and time, and for that reason, perhaps represents a view of political reality which cannot ultimately be “Closed”. As any other universal ideology falls away, the *concrete political* remains and endures, and this is the heart of any convincing Realism.

All of this is to say, then, that it is in-fact the fundamental *realism* of Schmittian Realism which again renders it an approach with such enduring potential relevance and theoretical value within a wider “Realist Tradition” of International Relations. But this thesis, of course, holds as its final task here in its sixth chapter the location of what specific element “earns” Schmittian Realism its place within the *mainstream* canon of IR Realism, what unique facet at its core makes Schmittian Realism not merely enduring and relevant, but *particularly* possessing of such attributes when viewed on a level of meta-theoretical comparison. While this thesis has already elaborated in great detail the conceptual intricacies of the three core conceptual pillars of Schmittian Realism, those being Concrete Order, the *Nomos*, and Political Theology, these are merely again pillars, but not the overall *thematic* foundation that describes Schmittian Realism in comparison to its genealogical brethren. Where “Classical”, “Structural”, or even “Offensive”

Realism all have some fundamental descriptor prefixed to their name and place, it does not suffice to merely name Schmittian Realism by the identification of its author from this thematic perspective. Therefore, when examining not only all three requisite pillars of Schmittian Realism but additionally those elements adjacent or external to the framework: from *Großraum* and *Großraum order*, to the historical instance of *Kokutai*, to the typology of enmity, and even to the myth of “Closure”, what unifies all of these otherwise disparate concepts and elements is the source of their *concrete particularity*, which thereby explains their fundamental *realism* in application to Schmitt’s overall international political thought. This source is their *organicity*, and therefore, more essentially, the notion of the *organic* itself.

In contrast to that which is artificial, universalized, positivistic, and depoliticized, every aspect of Schmittian Realism’s core foundations and further instantiations in some way relates back to the distinction of being *organic* in its essential character. At the beginning of political organization, when humans in the Hobbesian mould form groups out of existential need and thereby realize the fundamental concept of the political through their distinction, Schmitt notes that the fundamental political unity which results from this move from the personal to the suprapersonal is “organic unity”(Schmitt, *Leviathan*, 37; *Concept*, 60-68; *Dictatorship*, 122-123; *Three*, 51-55). Likewise, where Schmitt speaks on the formation of constitutions after this original political organization, he not only speaks to these constitutions as conceptually holding that “the state order is the organic execution of the [state] will so formed”, but moreover notes that failed constitutions such as that of Weimar Germany failed to achieve an “organic connection” between their notion of rights and the state of exception which clarifies sovereign power (Schmitt, *Constitutional*, 62; *Legality*, 78). Finally, in the move from the domestic organization of the state *Nomos* to the establishment of any given international *Nomos*, it has been noted in great detail throughout this thesis that the notion of the Schmittian *Nomos* itself, whether instantiated in the *JPE*, the *respublica Cristiana*, or even the external case of *Kokutai* vis-à-vis Imperial Japan, necessitates the *organic* arrangement of the *Nomos* in-question (Schmitt, *Nomos*, 62, 67-70, 91, 100, 217, 346; *Theology*, 37-38; *Catholicism*, 8-14, 29, 56; *Partisan*, 70-76). On every level of arrangement, (personal-individual, suprapersonal-state, and interpersonal-international, identified through a spatialized reading of Schmitt’s typology established in *Three Types of Juristic Thought*), the *proper* political arrangement of these respective sorts of *Nomoi* are *organically* organized upon concrete reality, lest they become the

corrupted impersonal *Nomoi* of absolute enmity and universalized ideology which Schmitt so often critiques over his long career (Schmitt, *Three*, 48-49). From the lowest level of organization to the highest, Schmittian Realism holds that *organic* arrangement is key to the avoidance of ruinous international political outcomes.

This mentioning of the typology of the personal, with reference to iterations of law and thereby *Nomos* again via analogical extension, moreover raises one final topic of *organicity* within Schmittian Realism, that people the nation, the “people”, themselves within a given *Nomos*-Order. Even as early as in *Political Romanticism*, Schmitt notes the notion of the suprapersonal concrete grouping (which would in his later works be recognizable as the foundation of any given *Nomos*) as “the folk”, and names this folk (*volk*, in German) as “an organic, superindividual unity”; language recalling the just-mentioned organic unity necessary at the very conception of the political distinction (Schmitt, *Romanticism*, 27). The *volk*, the very foundation of the nation and the people of any *Nomos*, is *inherently organic* in the Schmittian view, and therefore this *volk* is describable as *animate*, *genuine*, and *vitally energetic*, the life force of the state as *Nomos*, and the antithesis of the artificial, impersonal, and universal (Schmitt, *Romanticism*, 90, 101-102, 114). Furthermore, Schmitt states that the understanding of what makes a given *volk* organic and what its “spirit” (*Volksgeist*, a term deeply invoking later notions of national character and then concrete particularity of any given Schmittian *Nomos* is “can be ascertained only historically”, a statement which fundamentally preempts his later work’s focus on the historical-contextual angle of the concrete, rather than abstract, organization of a moral, rather than wretched, political unity and *Nomos* thereafter (Schmitt, *Romanticism*, 62; “Ethic”, 206).

For Schmitt, this notion of a concrete *volk* additionally served organizational purposes in his further denouncement of normative political and legal thinking, for as he states in *State, Movement, People*, “a simple ‘concretization of abstract norms’ could... ignore the truth that all human thinking is bound to existence as every... interpretation of facts are bound to the situation...this sentence already points to the sphere of the living human being, filled with organic, biological, and ethnic differences” (Schmitt, *Movement*, 51). Of course, such a statement, as well as the wider text which it originates in, act explicitly as apologia for National Socialist models of ethnic organization, so it is necessary to note the *mode of application* for

which the organic quality of the notion of *volk* is invoked in this case, so as not to confuse its propagandistic employment with that in what are academically-minded textual sources. That being said, even in-context it is undeniable that Schmitt's international political thought, including Schmittian Realism as-identified within this thesis, fundamentally positions the *organic* as the antithesis of the normative and the artificial in matters of national political organization. Even when applied to the case of the Schmittian *Großraum*, scholars such as Roberto Orsi contend that for Schmitt, *Großraum* is applied as a polemical spatial concept in opposition to "an abstract conception which ignores the peculiarities of the relation between the soil and nation which inhabits it", a concept whereby an individual *volk* or multiple *völker*, themselves "concrete political communities", constitute the core populations organized into the central *Reich* of any given *Großraum* (Orsi, "*Großraum*", 306-308). Orsi further notes that the political unity of the *volk*, for Schmitt, "does not descend from the decisionism of the sovereign, but it has organic characteristics", a statement which ascribes a further *organic character* to Schmittian notions of both the state and the *volk*, therewithin described as "organic entities" (Orsi, "*Volk*", 698). Again, in the case of *Großraum* as with those examined just before it, it is apparent that within any given model of national-political organization within the Schmittian Realist view of international political order, Schmitt himself gives conceptual primacy in his description of political reality to those actors, states, and *Nomoi* which are essentially *organic*.

Overall, then, in ascribing all of these individual constituent elements of Schmittian Realism with a fundamentally *organic* character, it follows that this thesis concludes its investigation by suggesting that Schmittian Realism's place within the Mainstream Realist Tradition of academic International Relations is as what is here being termed "Organic Realism". While these ideas are all Schmittian in their conceptual origin and instantiated application to the field of International Relations, the prefixed descriptor of "Organic" not only relays the fundamental element (*Organicity*) contributed by its resident framework to wider Realist discourses of IR on a meta-theoretical level, but further allows for their easier analysis *a priori*.

Schmittian Realism, on every level of its articulation, is an *Organic* Realism.

Chapter 7: Conclusions – The Realist *Nomos* in an “Age of Closure”.

Any consideration of the supposed “Closure of Political Theology”, owing to the nature of contemporary political reality particularly in the field of International Relations, must necessarily reckon with the wider-scale “Closure” of several such ideas, paradigms, and frameworks which by various historical and discursive processes have been relegated from the dominant and mainstream channels of academic discussion. One hand it is certainly true that in the world of English-language scholarship, topics like the work of Carl Schmitt are not nearly as taboo as they once were. Scholars as Jef Huysmans once claimed any Realism-concerned study of Schmitt’s ideas *qua* themselves “would incite a permanent question about the ethico-political project of realist political theory any time Schmitt is invoked” towards a “more responsible” study of the thinker and his ideas; a claim made in 1999 whose centrally-mentioned “spectre of Nazism” surrounding Schmitt is nowadays not nearly as ubiquitously-discussed as critical scholars such as Huysmans would have preferred (Huysmans, 323, 328).

As mentioned in this thesis’ introduction, a new wave of Schmitt-concerned scholarship has, largely as a result of the so-called “Left-Schmittians”, re-entered the English-language scholarly vogue within the fields of Political Theory and International Relations since the end of the twentieth century. The study of Carl Schmitt is by no means forbidden or discouraged *in totality*, but that being said, it would be incorrect to state that *any* and *all* controversy or discursive criticism surrounding Schmitt has dissipated within IR discourses, Realist or otherwise. Roberto Orsi, for example, in tracing the recent history of Schmitt’s “encounter” with mainstream scholars of International Political Theory, notes that “The case for a re-appraisal of Schmitt...seems to be closely dependent on the ways in which this authors work is understood and, crucially, *contextualized*” (Orsi, “Encounter”, 2-9). It is on this note of contextualization that this thesis began its analysis, discussing the difference in historical and academic circumstances under which Schmitt’s two texts on Political Theology were published nearly 50 years apart, and in particular the “Closure” that was alleged to have occurred during that decades-long period. Much like that particular introductory contextualization made the conscious methodological decision to analyze Schmitt’s view of “Closure” within the context of his own, this thesis now at its conclusion has additionally considered this view from an external historical context, that of the origins, “Closure”, and legacy thereafter of Imperial Japanese *Kokutai* Thought.

Through this specific consideration of an external case study alongside the otherwise self-contained study of Schmittian Political Theology, and its place within the then-identified framework of “Schmittian Realism”, the thesis eventually elucidated from the Japanese example a new context by which to not only view Schmittian conceptions of “Closure” in a political-theological sense, but also to reconsider the place of the aforementioned particular Realist approach via its revealed essence in *organic* conceptions of *concrete political reality*. The project of this thesis, then, has yielded a result which has proposed a thorough definitional recontextualization of Schmitt’s International Relations-concerned thought within the meta-theoretical context of the claimed “Realist Tradition” within mainstream IR scholarship.

With the following six chapters’ final attempted achievement of recontextualization in-mind, then, this thesis, in conclusion, has sought to answer the necessary criteria for an expanded reappropriation of Schmittian thought laid out above. In the process of this lengthy endeavor, the thesis has moreover specifically addressed the German thinker’s work at the intersection of subject areas deemed “promising” by scholars including Orsi himself, including Political Theology with reference to IR Theory in-general, and the specific problem of secularization and modernity vis-à-vis theological understanding in Schmitt’s consideration of the “Closure” of *any* political theology (Orsi, “Encounter”, 16-18). While it would be presumptuous for this brief set of final remarks to state that the outcome of its investigation will prove successful in its attempts at a wholesale recontextualization of Schmittian thought as “Organic Realism”, the thesis as a whole presents an original and alternative contextual perspective by which the opportunities for Schmitt’s scholarly reappraisal noted by Orsi might be achieved.

Aside from its contributions to the contextual analysis and genealogical location of Schmitt’s international political thought within their historical and ideational context, this thesis has, through its consideration of the again wholly-external case study of Japanese *Kokutai* Thought alongside the aforementioned Schmittian Realist texts, proposed a new and multifaceted assessment of a topic which is respectively under-studied in English-language scholarship. Moreover, this external case-assessment included a robust comparative analysis that serves to accomplish additional recontextualization of *Kokutai* itself as a concept, and of the Schmittian Theory it has been here-considered alongside. Conceptual bridges, or at-least the foundation of such bridges, were constructed between two spheres of the history of international political ideas

that would otherwise remain relatively disparate from one another in the field of academic IR. Much like with its primary theoretical-ideational focus, the crucial addition of the *Kokutai* case study, aside from its efforts to help fill the aforementioned research and scholarship gap surrounding English-language understandings of *Kokutai* Thought within an International Relations framing, also presents fruitful opportunities for what could perhaps be the future reappraisal or reappropriation of *Kokutai* as a concept within identified genealogies of Japanese political thought and its legacy, both historical and in the contemporary.

Finally, then, this mention of the contemporary returns our focus to the title of this thesis, to that thread which unifies both discussions of *Kokutai* and its legacy and the framework of Schmittian (Organic) Realism, the notion of “Closure” in an ideational-political sense. Where both Schmittian/Organic Realism (especially with regard to its Schmittian origins) and *Kokutai* Thought are fundamentally unified from a contemporary academic perspective, disregarding for only a moment their *internal* contextual parallels as extensively discussed in the chapters preceding this one, is in their historical “Closure”. Regardless of the extent to which the “Closure” of each of these topics individually was a myth successfully built into a lasting legend, it remains the case that both Schmitt’s Realist Thought and the concept of *Kokutai* were subject to political and theological “Closure” in the historical sense; relegated to historical *instances*, rather than topics widely studied for their likewise historical legacy, enduring relevance, and inherent intellectual value. For the two topics considered in the thesis produced above, their academic timeline is currently marked by what is assuredly an “Age of Closure”.

Whereas this thesis began with Schmitt’s statement that a polemical negation, no matter how total, nonetheless produces a “creative joy”, it now concludes again with by recalling his subsequent remark: this seeming oxymoron, of *creative negation*, can dialectically produce and invoke those topics formerly negated, or, to use a more familiar term, subject to “Closure” (Schmitt, *Theology II*, 34). It is again uncertain question as to whether or not the findings of this thesis, from the proposal of Schmittian-Organic Realism to the reappraisal of *Kokutai* Thought, will bear further discursive fruit, so to speak, but so long as this perhaps mythical dialectic of creation and negation continues, the present “Age of Closure” might yet become such a myth itself.

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