下記ページで2025年度授業に関する科目表、時間割表等の情報を公開しました。
授業科目2025年度版
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〇2025年3月24日（月）の12：00～15：00 〇2025年3月31日（月）の11：00～13：00 ※自動証明書発行機は稼働します。
申し訳ありません、このコンテンツはただ今 英語 のみです。 For the sake of viewer convenience, the content is shown below in the alternative language. You may click the link to switch the active language.
What is sovereign debt?Sovereign debt is a financial liability a sovereign state owes to various creditors. A sovereign state is a political entity represented by a centralized government with supreme and legitimate authority over the territory. In a broader sense, government, public, and national debt are often used interchangeably with the term sovereign debt.
Sovereign debt matters because it gives a government policy options to improve people’s welfare by enabling it to provide public services when revenues fall short of expenditure needs. However, mismanaged sovereign debt can cause problems that affect people’s lives over generations. Public policy professionals must know that sovereign debt has significant economic, political, and social ramifications, which require public policy and legitimacy considerations.
Sovereigns’ debt restructuring challenges [caption id="attachment_51067" align="alignright" width="300"] Designed by studiogstock / Freepik[/caption]Globally, sovereign debt has been at an all-time high since 2020. At the end of 2023, the debt level reached US$98 trillion, or 94% of global GDP. On average, in 2023, the public debt-to-GDP ratio rose in emerging markets and developing economies, while it slightly declined in advanced economies except for the United States.
Some developing nations are grappling with debt restructuring challenges, which are complicated by the increasing presence of non-traditional bilateral creditors, such as China, and international bondholders. According to the World Bank, China owned US$181 billion of the US$6.2 trillion of the total external debt owed by low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) at the end of 2022.
Among low-income countries (LICs), eleven countries are assessed as being in debt distress, meaning that the debtor cannot meet its financial obligations and must resort to debt restructuring, and 24 countries with a high risk of debt distress as of October 2024 as categorized by the IMF. Of the eleven debt-distressed countries, Lao P.D.R., Djibouti, and Zimbabwe owe a disproportionately large share of their public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) debt to China of 55%, 51%, and 38%, respectively.
China and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)China has become the world’s largest bilateral lender to LMICs, and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provoked criticism from parts of the Western world with an unfounded “debt-trap diplomacy” narrative. The BRI is a global infrastructure development strategy China launched in 2013. However, increasing research has evidenced such a narrative as a myth. Brautigam characterizes the Chinese debt-trap diplomacy narrative as a meme spreading out of a “negativity bias” based on fear, especially in the United States, about China’s possible global dominance.
Despite the BRI’s strategic rhetoric, China’s lending spree was driven by economic motivation rather than geopolitical goals. Jones and Hameiri interpret the BRI’s true intention as an approach to stimulating “external demand for Chinese goods, services, and capital” and characterize it as “externalizing domestic problems” of overcapacities, diminishing returns, and excessive indebtedness.
Furthermore, at a micro level, the BRI’s early stage was driven by the commercial motives of actors in China facing unfavorable domestic business prospects. Problems for both recipient countries and China emerged as lending grew rapidly. China’s fragmented governance regime vis-à-vis the BRI may have resulted in a lack of coordination and caused project failure in some cases. It can be characterized as a double-edged debt trap for lenders and borrowers.
Euphoria, a bubble, and a bustBorrowing enables a state or commercial actor to increase its possession of various resources beyond its current holdings to help generate future value, income, and wealth. However, overborrowing and excessive indebtedness tend to occur in a state of euphoria for future wealth, creating a bubble that ends with a bust. Reinhart and Rogoff warn that human nature does not change and repeat the same mistake by believing “financial crises are things that happen to other people in other countries at other times; crises do not happen to us, here and now.” Such human nature leads to what they call the this-time-is-different syndrome.
[caption id="attachment_51070" align="alignright" width="300"] Designed by rawpixel.com / Freepik[/caption]China’s lending spree at the early stages of the BRI may indicate euphoria on the lender and borrower fronts. One question is why the BRI's intention to externalize domestic problems ended up with the same overlending and excessive indebtedness outside China. It could be another case of this time-is-different syndrome.
History tells us that economic logic eventually overrides geopolitical and commercial motives. Here, “economic logic” refers to the market forces of supply and demand that either drive or collapse individual actors’ economic activities, while “commercial motives” are the driving factors that push commercial actors to maximize their profits. The cost of failed geopolitical and commercial attempts ultimately falls on someone’s shoulders. Therefore, ensuring debt sustainability and adhering to economic logic is crucial.
History of debt restructuringDebtor countries’ payment difficulties have been addressed by an informal yet established forum called the Paris Club of 22 permanent members of mostly advanced Western nations since 1956. Debtor countries needing debt relief can request Paris Club members to discuss a debt restructuring, with the condition that debtor countries have an International Monetary Fund (IMF)-supported program committed to restoring their economic and financial soundness.
Paris Club debt restructuring for LICs evolves progressively under the treatment categories with increased concessionality, typically repayment period extension and reduced interest payments, in favor of debtor countries. Despite creditors’ efforts to address LICs’ debt problems by offering increasingly favorable terms, many debtor countries suffered heavy debt burdens. Paris Club creditors eventually realized that protracted rescheduling was due to the problem with the ability to pay debt or “solvency,” not liquidity.
Against this backdrop, the IMF and World Bank launched the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative in 1996. The Initiative aims to assist eligible countries in reducing their heavy debt burden to sustainable levels in stages as a coordinated action by official bilateral and multilateral creditors.
In the context of the HIPC Initiative, Paris Club creditors agreed in 1996 to raise the level of debt cancellation to 80% and in 1999 up to 90% or more. In 2005, G8 Heads of States proposed and put into action the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) as a debt relief initiative calling for the 100% cancellation of the claims of the IMF, the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank Group, and the African Development Fund (AfDF). The MDRI enabled a complete cancelation of multilateral debt with the cost borne by the shareholders, even though multilateral creditors are conventionally granted the de facto preferred creditor status, which allows them to get paid before other creditors. Western creditors eventually lost their financial claims on many debt-distressed HIPCs by the mid-2000s.
LMICs’ PPG long-term debt owed to private creditors has more than tripled since the early 2010s, reaching US$2.0 trillion at the end of 2023. The growing presence of private creditors has resulted from abundant liquidity in the global financial markets since the aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. This liquidity has allowed LMICs to expand their market-based financing by issuing bonds or borrowing from commercial banks.
The fundamental challenge of sovereign debt restructuring in the developing world is not China but how to equitably address unsustainable debt owed to multiple categories of creditors. Nevertheless, as the world's largest bilateral lender to LMICs, China faces challenges in dealing with some sovereign borrowers in debt distress under the BRI.
China’s role in the global sovereign debt landscapeChina can alleviate the burden on borrowers who disproportionately owe significant debt to China and prevent trapping itself in unpaid debts. China’s policy decision will determine whether it can avoid the same mistake that Western creditors made of eventually losing all financial claims.
The current debt distress was triggered by a series of challenges due to the pandemic and regional conflicts, which hampered the effective utilization of fiscal resources to address such adversities. One long-term concern is the vicious cycle in which vulnerabilities to climate change prolong and exacerbate the existing debt distress.
[caption id="attachment_51068" align="alignright" width="300"] Designed by Zirconicusso / Freepik[/caption]Amid an increasingly popular discourse on climate action and growing concerns over the BRI’s negative environmental impacts, China began to promote “eco-sustainability” as early as 2015. Recently, President Xi Jinping announced “promoting green development” as one of the eight major steps China will take to support the joint pursuit of high-quality BRI cooperation at the third Belt and Road Forum in October 2023.
China’s considerate approach is key to achieving the dual goals of mitigating LMICs’ debt distress and vulnerabilities to climate change by applying a climate-centered approach toward sustainable socio-economic development. China can contribute to creating better global debt governance, which should go hand in hand with global environmental governance.
This blog post is a shortened, updated, and supplemented version of the article “China’s role in sovereign debt restructuring” published in the peer-reviewed academic journal China International Strategy Review (Springer) on June 19, 2024. It discusses the nature of debt distress facing low- and middle-income countries and suggests the role China could play in mitigating such countries’ difficulties in paying their debts.
1. 預金口座への入金
2025年度前期授業料の預金口座からの引き落し日は、５月２7日（火）です。 ５月２6日（月）までに、預金口座へ授業料相当額の入金を忘れないように注意してください。
なお、大学院生の2025年度前期分授業料は以下のとおりです。
専門職学位課程学生：２６７，９００円 博士課程学生：２６０，４００円 *2018年度以前の9月入学者で修了年度にあたる学生の授業料（年額の12分の5）は、２２３，２５０円（専門職）・２１７，０００円（博士）となります。
2. 授業料免除等申請者
半額免除及び不許可が決定した場合、引き落とし日については2025年７月下旬（予定）にUTASと東京大学ウェブサイトでお知らせします。掲示により指定される入金期限までに預金口座への入金をお願いします。
3. 領収証書の交付
授業料領収書の発行が必要な場合は、UTASにて電子申請を行ってください。詳しい申請方法については、UTASログイン後のトップページに掲載されているUTASマニュアル（学生版）（後期課程・大学院用）をご覧ください。なお、領収証書の交付は６月4日（水）以降になります。
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希望者は下記ページを参照のうえ、本部奨学厚生課奨学チームにお申し込みください。
【募集する奨学金】
・公益財団法人 佐藤奨学会 ※3月31日〆切
・公益財団法人 尚志社 ※3月31日〆切
・公益財団法人 旭硝子財団 （博士課程）※3月31日〆切
【対象】 ＴＡとして教育補助業務を行う予定の学生 ＴＡ募集への応募を検討している学生
ＴＡに関する基本的な情報をお知らせします。
１．勤務時間の上限について（１）TAの総勤務時間数の上限は科目の単位数により決まっています。
◆1単位科目：21時間 ◆2単位科目：42時間 ◆4単位科目：70時間
（２）別表１または別表２に記載された科目の上限は次のとおりです。
◆別表１：112時間 ◆別表２：70時間
別表1・2はこちら
（３）科目により上記ルールと異なる上限時間の場合もありますので、授業担当教員に確認してください。
２．一時間当たりの手当額について（１）以下のとおり所属する課程により決まります。
◆博士課程：1,590円 ◆専門職・修士：1,380円
（２）別表１に記載された科目のTAは高度な教育補助業務を行うティーチング・フェローと称して次のとおり手当額が設定されています。
◆博士：1,800円 ◆専門職・修士：1,590円
３．ＴＡ募集への応募教員がＴＡを募集する場合には在校生掲示板に募集掲示が投稿されます。
４．ＴＡ申請手続き手続はまず教員が行い、その後、学生が手続きを行います。教員側の手続きが完了すると、公共政策学務チームからメールが届きますので、書かれた指示に従って速やかに手続きを行ってください。
5．ＴＡの全学研修 ※2025/3/18追記 令和7年度より、大学院学生がTAを行う場合は全学研修の受講が必須となりました。詳細は添付のPDFと大学ホームページをご参照ください。 https://www.u-tokyo.ac.jp/ja/students/classes/ta.html