東京大学公共政策大学院 | GraSPP / Graduate School of Public Policy | The university of Tokyo

We welcome you to attend The 9th PKU-UTokyo Forum  Date:  January 5, 2024, 10:00-12:20 (JST)  via Zoom Language: English Program : Session 1   "Climate Change and Nature Conservation: Ways of Cooperation" Session 2   "Russia and Ukraine: China and Japan's Relations with Them - Lessons Learnt from the Past Two Years -" Faculty and students of UTokyo and Peking University are welcome.  Pre-registration required. Please register through the link below (First-come-first-served basis). The details and link for accessing this forum by Zoom will be provided by email near the date.  Registration: https://www.wjx.top/vm/hOHvbtr.aspx

Eligibility: International Students and Foreign Researchers at UTokyo Short-term Japanese Courses ・For beginners: “Survival Japanese in January”      (A) January 15 (Mon) –19 (Fri)   Total 5 sessions (B)January 29 (Mon) –February 2 (Fri)   Total 5 sessions　*(A) (B)are the same content

  Details: (A)https://globe.u-tokyo.ac.jp/nkc/en/calendar/23a_short_survival_dec_00001.html

(B) https://globe.u-tokyo.ac.jp/nkc/en/calendar/23a_short_survival_jan_00002.html

・For Upper Elementary level: “Let's Complete Elementary Level Japanese!”  January 22 (Mon) – February 2 (Fri)  Total 10 sessions Details： https://globe.u-tokyo.ac.jp/nkc/en/calendar/23a_short_complete_elemlv_00001.html Special Themed Seminar

・For beginners:

“Kanji First Step”                  January 22 (Mon), 24(Wed), 29(Mon), 31(Wed)

Details： https://globe.u-tokyo.ac.jp/nkc/en/calendar/23a_spot_kanji_firststep_00001.html

・Elementary level:

“Bridge to Level 2”              January 22 (Mon), 24(Wed), 26 (Fri)

“Bridge to Level pre3”         January 22 (Mon), 24(Wed), 26 (Fri)

Details：Level 2 https://globe.u-tokyo.ac.jp/nkc/en/calendar/23a_spot_bridgetolv2.html

Level pre3 https://globe.u-tokyo.ac.jp/nkc/en/calendar/23a_spot_bridgetolvpre3.html

 ・Intermediate level:

“Speak and Listen Well in Japanese*”      January 30 (Tue), 31(Wed), February 1 (Thu)

*(1) Lower Intermediate  (2)Upper Intermediate  

Details：(1)https://globe.u-tokyo.ac.jp/nkc/en/calendar/23a_spot_speakandlisten.html

(2)https://globe.u-tokyo.ac.jp/nkc/en/calendar/23a_spot_speakandlisten_00001.html

・Upper Intermediate to Advanced level:

“You Can Do It! Tips on Reading Japanese Kanji for Kanji background students”　 January 22 (Mon), 24(Wed), 29(Mon), 31(Wed)

Details: https://globe.u-tokyo.ac.jp/nkc/en/calendar/23a_spot_kanji_forchinese.html

“Explore interacting in Japanese with greeting expressions”   　January 22(Mon), 23(Tue), 25(Thu)

Details: https://globe.u-tokyo.ac.jp/nkc/en/calendar/23a_spot_greeting.html

・Advanced level:

“Japanese Culture and Society”  January 29(Mon), 31(Wed), February 2(Fri) 

Details: https://globe.u-tokyo.ac.jp/nkc/en/calendar/23a_spot_culture.html

  *Classes will be conducted online. *For details of the application procedure, please refer to the website of the Center for Japanese Language Education.    

For an emerging country long aspiring to signify its socio-economic transformation through the high-speed rail system, Thailand’s decision to select China as a partner is no coincidence. China’s more than 42,000 kilometers of rail lines built only in recent decades are undeniably remarkable and have become the world's longest and most extensively used. Moreover, the construction cost is relatively cheap compared to its Japanese or European counterparts. This can be attributed to several factors: cheap labor, the government's absolute power in dealing with land acquisition, and economies of scale, to name a few. Most importantly, safety has not been compromised despite much lower construction costs. Unsurprisingly, the governments of emerging ASEAN nations like Laos and Indonesia picked the Chinese model for their high-speed rail projects. Thailand followed suit under Prayut Chan-o-cha’s administration in 2014 by signing an MOU with China. Tens of meetings then took place between officials from the two governments to discuss the details and negotiate financing terms for the investment. Unfortunately, it eventually turned out that finding common ground on funding was rather difficult. Taking loans from the Export-Import Bank of China with a 3% interest rate was not profitable, while borrowing from domestic sources offered a lower rate of 2%. The necessity for Chinese loans is, thus, minimal because Thailand’s relatively strong financial sector gives access to domestic funding. Two other important reasons exist behind the decision to avoid Chinese loans and fund the investment domestically. The first is the deliberate attempt to prevent what many may call "debt-trap diplomacy." While this debt-trap concept is unlikely to be accurate, the anti-Chinese sentiment apparently does exist. Borrowing from China, even for a tiny amount, could be frowned upon by the general public and media in Thailand, undermining the political support. This also explains why the Thai government has yet to borrow from China under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The second concerns the legacy of the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis. The remnants and recollections of the crisis make those in the government and financial market afraid of external borrowing with possible negative impacts of currency mismatches, as observed with Thailand’s foreign-currency public debt accounting for only 1.6% of the total. The next question is what else but “connectivity” Beijing stands to gain when its loans play no role and whether its partnership with the Thais can justify a critical technology transfer. One can easily observe a power play between Bangkok and Beijing. As much as Thai people long for their first high-speed rail line, the Chinese government wants Thailand to choose its high-speed rail model over other countries. With its strategic location at the heart of mainland Southeast Asia, Thailand is critical for China to see its high-speed rail system expand from Yunnan province to Indochina and eventually reach the Malay Peninsula via a revived Kuala Lumpur-Singapore project. There are two key benefits for Beijing. First, Thailand adopting Chinese technology for its first high-speed rail line will likely continue using China’s trains and construction techniques for its subsequent high-speed rail investments because of economies of scale and the familiarity for those who will work on constructing and operating the lines. Second, Thailand's precedent will impact its neighbors in today's highly interconnected world with freer flows of goods and services. The nations around Thailand may also choose Chinese trains to make every transportation step to or through Thailand as smooth as possible. Aware of the benefits for China, the Thai government used its “strategic location” trump card and leveraged this during negotiations to win an agreement for Beijing to transfer its critically important technology without taking China’s loans, unlike Laos and Indonesia. Putting smaller countries on an equal footing with major powers is not easy. This Thai high-speed rail case has involved the side effects of significant project delays. Nonetheless, it helps ensure relatively smaller and more capable countries stand to gain more. One may simply call this a “slow but steady” approach. After all, Bangkok needs Beijing to build high-speed trains that are safe, efficient, and, most importantly, affordable, just as much as Beijing needs Bangkok to promote economic growth and gain political influence through the critical technology in Thailand at the heart of Southeast Asia. The final question is whether other smaller countries can replicate this approach when negotiating with major powers. The answer is yes, but they must understand that this high-speed rail project is yet to be completed and cannot be guaranteed success. In fact, without financially and legally binding agreements, the Thai-Chinese partnership can be considered as fragile. Technology transfers have been agreed only in principle and still heavily depend on various conditions, such as reviewing China's high-speed rail standards and the qualifications of Chinese engineers and architects. Even though construction of the line’s first phase between Bangkok and Nakhon Ratchasima has already begun, its 15% completion as of late 2022 is only a fragment of the entire project. In addition, while China has enjoyed a much lower construction cost with few land acquisition problems and economies of scale, other countries, including Thailand, may not, even with the Chinese model. China, a uniquely huge country with ample financial resources, was able to reap the benefits of economies of scale by building several high-speed rail lines simultaneously. This contrasts with countries like Thailand and Indonesia, where only one high-speed rail line is currently being built. Likewise, unlike a single-party state with the government’s absolute power, land acquisition is more challenging, and political changes mean any earlier administration’s commitments could fade away. Most importantly, other countries will need to consider their contexts, which may differ from Thailand’s, such as their location and domestic financial sector. Nevertheless, regardless of the Thai mega project’s success or failure, the investment, coupled with a series of battling negotiations with major powers like China, will become a successful use of game-changing cards to set an example for those countries to put themselves on a more equal footing with major powers.   (Image by storyset on Freepik) This student blogpost is originally written as an assignment for the course “Asia’s Geoeconomic Landscapes and Public Policy I” offered in the academic year 2023, representing the author’s personal views on the subject. The author was inspired and benefited from a discussion with his classmates, Prof. Shiro Armstrong from the Australian National University’s Crawford School of Public Policy, and Prof. Toshiro Nishizawa from GraSPP.

Sorry, this entry is only available in Japanese. For the sake of viewer convenience, the content is shown below in the alternative language. You may click the link to switch the active language.

本部厚生奨学課より「2024年度(第16期)官民協働海外留学支援制度～トビタテ！留学JAPAN新・日本代表プログラム～の募集について」通知がありました。 希望者は以下の東京大学海外留学・国際交流情報内の「学内募集要項」等をよく読み、以下の期限までに必要書類を揃えて、公共政策大学院留学奨学金担当へ提出してください。 申請期限： 学内エントリー締切日　2024年1月22日（月）正午 学内本申請締切日　　　2024年2月5日 提出先： 公共政策大学院留学奨学金担当 E-mail: exchange.j[at]gs.mail.u-tokyo.ac.jp ※学内エントリーを行った者のみ、学内本申請が認められるので、留意すること。 ※学内エントリー締切日および学内本申請締切日までに必要書類を提出した者の申請のみが受け付けられるので、十分留意すること。  

For those who wish to use UTokyo Day Nursery (Hongo Keyaki Day Nursery, Komaba Mukunoki Day Nursery, Shirokane Himawari Day Nursery, and Kashiwa Donguri Day Nursery) in April 2024, please check the details on Office for the Gender Equality website and apply. ■Period of Application: December 4, 2023 (Monday) - January 4, 2024 (Thursday)   ■Eligiblity: Children from six weeks to six years old (Hongo Keyaki Day Nursery: under three years old) as of April 1, 2024, being brought up by UTokyo employees and students  (undergraduates, graduate students, international students, research students, etc.)  ■ Contact: Day Nursery Section, Diversity Promotion Group, Personnel Department Email: hoikuen.adm@gs.mail.u-tokyo.ac.jp

FUTI (Friends of UTokyo, Inc.) is a not-for-profit charitable organization registered in the State of New York. They are now accepting applications for scholarships for studying in the USA. Those who wish to apply for this scholarship should read the FUTI website and submit the necessary documents directly to FUTI. The application deadline is the end of February, 2024.    

We are pleased to announce that the IMF Fund Internship Program (FIP) for 2024 is now open (application deadline: January 7, 2024). The Fund Internship Program has a significant impact on recruitment, and many IMF interns are strong applicants for the Economist Program (EP). Please see the file and the link below for more information. https://www.pp.u-tokyo.ac.jp/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/2023_IMF-Fund-Internship-Program-Flyer.pdf https://www.imf.org/en/About/Recruitment/working-at-the-imf/fund-internship-program

The University of Tokyo will hold the AY 2023 Diploma Presentation Ceremony as follows. Date&Time： Thursday, 21 March 2024 [Session 1] 9:00 a.m. - 9:45 a.m.  (Entrance time: 8:30 a.m. - 8:50 a.m.) Venue： Yasuda Auditorium (Address: 7-3-1, Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo) (Campus Map) Eligibility： Those who graduated (will graduate) between October2023 and March 2024 A live stream of the ceremony will be provided via the Internet.   In the afternoon of the same day, the GraSPP Diploma Presentation Ceremony will take place. The GraSPP Graduate School Office will notify graduating students of the schedule directly.

Sorry, this entry is only available in Japanese. For the sake of viewer convenience, the content is shown below in the alternative language. You may click the link to switch the active language.

本日12月7日（木）の授業は休講となります。