
The authors combine comprehensive data on the U.S. federal rulemaking process with individual level personnel and voter registration records to study the consequences of partisan misalignment between regulators and the president. We present three main results. First, even important pieces of new regulation are frequently delegated to bureaucrats who are politically misaligned. Second, rules that are overseen by misaligned regulators take systematically longer to complete, are more verbose, generate more negative feedback from the public, and are more likely to be challenged in court. Third, in assigning regulators to rules, agency leaders often face a sharp tradeoff between political alignment and expertise. Agency frictions notwithstanding, they tend to resolve this tradeoff in favor of expertise.
Date & Time:
9:30-11:15, Thursday, November 13, 2025
*The seminar will be held online*
Speaker:
Dr. Guo Xu (University of California, Berkeley)
Coordinator: Dr. Stacey H. Chen (GraSPP, UTokyo)
Registration:
Pre-registration is required: Registration Form